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Aim: To gather, analyse and present the views of personnel currently working within 
pharmaceutical companies relating to factors influencing drug diffusion (market 
penetration), using case studies to determine how their perspective relates to diffusion 
curves and literature-based timelines describing the same phenomenon. 
Methods: Qualitative study based on semi-structured interviews with marketing, 
market access or senior management personnel from eight major UK R&D 
pharmaceutical companies. Case studies were selected through expert consultation. 
Diffusion curves were produced for all potential case study drugs (n=21) and timelines 
constructed from the literature and augmented with clinical expert input.  
Results: Thematic analysis of 15 interviews conducted across four case studies: 
bisphosphonates; atypical antipsychotics; phosphodiesterase type 5 inhibitors and 
statins revealed 10 diffusion themes: clinical need; clinician/patient experience; clinical 
evidence; health service/policy environments; adopter attitude; communicating relative 
advantage; market development; opinion leaders; company cultural heritage/perception 
and pricing. Triangulation with diffusion curves and literature-based timelines 
demonstrated a high level of convergence between accounts. Points of divergence 
revealed unique pharmaceutical industry insights. 
Conclusion: Eliciting diffusion knowledge from this under-researched stakeholder 
group largely confirmed issues previously outlined in the literature, but importantly has 
revealed the significance of less tangible social interactions that inform perceptions of 
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INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND  
AND THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
1.1. Introduction 
1.1.1. Nature of the Problem 
Around 25 new pharmaceuticals are launched onto the market each year in the UK 
(Light and Lexchin, 2012; Naci et al., 2012). Some will be adopted rapidly into use, 
while others may take significantly longer. But what are the factors that determine 
whether pharmaceuticals will diffuse successfully or not? There are several bodies of 
literature including the biomedical, marketing, economics  and sociology paradigms that 
have examined this question specifically for pharmaceuticals (for key reviews and 
articles see Mason, 2008; Chauhan and Mason, 2008; Atun et al., 2007; Prosser et al., 
2003; Prosser and Walley, 2003a, 2003b and 2005; Jones et al., 2001; Hemminki, 
1975), and for other innovations within the health care context (Robert et al., 2008; 
Greenhalgh et al., 2005; Berwick, 2003; Fitzgerald et al., 2002; Bonair and Persson, 
1996). However, the emphasis has been on addressing this issue mainly from the 
perspective of adopter stakeholders i.e. prescribers, payers and policy makers.  
While findings for one drug may not be generalisable to others, the one factor that is 
consistently identified as being influential on pharmaceutical diffusion (both through 
health professionals’ self-report and through correlation with independent prescribing 
data) is the driving impact of the activities of the pharmaceutical industry (Spurling et 
al., 2010; Prosser et al., 2003; Prosser and Walley, 2003a and 2003b; Jones et al., 2001; 
Wazana, 2000; Booth-Clibborn et al., 2000; Peay and Peay, 1994; Avorn et al., 1982). 
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Collier and Iheanacho (2002) stated that “via their promotional and educational activity, 
the pharmaceutical industry is probably the biggest individual influence on prescribing 
practice”. This view was echoed by Dr Richard Horton, editor of The Lancet, describing 
that “at almost every level of NHS care provision, the pharmaceutical industry shapes 
the agenda and the practice of medicine” (House of Commons Health Committee, 
2005). 
The question of what factors determine the successful uptake of a drug is perhaps of 
greatest significance to the pharmaceutical industry themselves (to be referred to from 
here on in as ‘the Industry’), as an understanding and awareness of these factors will 
inevitably enhance the market potential of their drugs. The competitive edge afforded 
by such an insight has resulted in little of this knowledge being explicit for fear of 
revealing marketing strategies. In the absence of that ‘voice’, the Industry’s own 
activities can provide some insight by being considered a response to the factors they 
have identified as being important in diffusion, and as such can act as a proxy for 
reflecting their perspective.  
Industry activities have been given significant attention in the biomedical literature over 
the last decade. The British Medical Journal (BMJ) dedicated an entire issue in 2003 to 
the Industry’s influence on prescribing behavior. This was followed by a House of 
Commons Health Committee (HCHC) Inquiry into the Influence of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry in 2005. There are varying views amongst health professionals as to the impact 
Industry activities have on the diffusion of drugs. Equally, assessing what the Industry 
does (or does not do) is merely a reflection of the aspects of diffusion they have 
influence over. It is therefore worthwhile to seek empirically the views of the Industry 
directly, not only to validate these findings, but also to explore their implicit views on 
  
3 
other factors they perceive to be important that are outside of their control and 
subsequently have not been elucidated through their actions.  
 
1.1.2. Purpose of the Ph.D. 
This Ph.D. is an exploration of pharmaceutical industry perspectives on factors they 
think are influential in affecting the diffusion of drugs in the UK through a case study 
approach. The participating companies are predominantly from the group colloquially 
known as ‘Big Pharma’ and therefore the views represent only a subsector of the 
pharmaceutical industry (limitations are discussed in section 3.8.3). As the ‘change 
agents’ responsible for driving the adoption and diffusion of pharmaceutical 
innovations, the Industry are critical players holding a unique position in gaining a 
greater understanding of this process. While diffusion curves representing drug usage 
can show how drugs diffuse, the opportunity to speak directly with personnel currently 
working within the pharmaceutical industry about specific cases aims to provide an 
insight into the reasons why the curves are the shape they are from their perspective. 
The ‘why’ questions that increase understanding of the motivations for adopting an 
innovation have, according to Rogers (1995), only seldom been probed by diffusion 
researchers. 
Through elicitation of common themes across case studies, the intention is to generate a 
framework of diffusion influences representing an alternative stakeholder’s contribution 
that has been largely absent from the diffusion of innovations theoretical framework. In 
a comprehensive systematic review of the diffusion of innovations literature in health 
service organisations by Greenhalgh et al. (2005), the authors recommended the need 
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for further qualitative research on the roles of change agents (individuals who influence 
client’s innovation decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a change agency) in 
different organisational contexts and settings. The barrier to this type of research 
however, is often due to difficulties in gaining access to this group of participants.  
With the growing focus in the NHS to recognise the benefits of strengthening 
partnerships with health technology industries with regard to innovation, an 
appreciation of the issues faced by those driving the diffusion of new technologies, to 
complement the widely documented views of adopters, will not only enrich the 
theoretical understanding of this process, but may also provide a platform from which 
all stakeholders can feel engaged.  
 
1.2. Background  
 
The following section outlines the salient characteristics of one of the most established 
theories on Diffusion of Innovations and is intended as background information to place 
the research subject in context. 
1.2.1. Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations Theory 
 
 
“Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain 
channels over time among the members of a social system.” 
 
Everett Rogers, 1962 
 
 
Diffusion of Innovations Theory is a mid-range theory that explains how new 
technologies or ideas are adopted by a population in a predictable pattern. Everett 
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Rogers’ classic text, The Diffusion of Innovations, has over several editions summarised 
and interpreted decades of diffusion research spanning multiple research disciplines to 
identify basic patterns, categories of adopters, and factors that influence the decision to 
adopt (Rogers, 1995).  
Diffusion is a process of social change that starts with a slow initial (lag) phase, 
followed by acceleration (take-off) in the number of people adopting an innovation in 
each time period, then a corresponding deceleration and finally a tail off phase as the 
last few individuals who are going to adopt finally do so. The bell-shaped diffusion 
curve becomes an S-curve when cumulative adoption is used (Figure 1.1) (Greenhalgh 
et al., 2005). ‘Adoption’ describes the “decision to make full use of an innovation as the 
best course of action available” at an individual level, rather than an aggregate market 
process (Rogers, 1995).  
Some researchers in this field make a distinction between the processes of diffusion and 
dissemination, claiming that diffusion is “a passive phenomenon of social influence” 
compared with dissemination which is an “active and planned effort to persuade a target 
group to adopt an innovation” (Greenhalgh et al., 2005; Mowatt et al. 1998). Rogers’ 
definition of diffusion includes both the planned and the spontaneous spread of new 
ideas, which I perceive to be a more realistic definition of the process, certainly within 
the context of pharmaceutical diffusion. Seldom, if indeed at all in our current society, 
can an innovation diffuse in isolation of some ‘pushing’ influence advocating its use. 
The awareness of commercially produced innovations is driven by manufactures 
through promotional efforts during the initial stages, even if at later stages of the 
process the message takes on a more socially influenced spread amongst individuals. In 





dissemination is highly implausible, as there will be a manufacturer promoting the use 
of the drug, certainly throughout its patented lifecycle. Sometimes dissemination efforts 
may be more subtle when operationalised through influence on guidelines or policy. 
One could argue that the penetration of pharmaceuticals in the marketplace is purely a 
process of dissemination, but Rogers’ definition does incorporate the more socially 
driven transfer of information, capturing the exchange that occurs between clinicians 
and patients once an innovation has been introduced. Even in those circumstances 
where a pharmaceutical has lost its patent protection many decades ago but for which 
new indications have been identified, such as with aspirin, there will be a driving 
influence not necessarily from manufacturers, but from interested parties such as 






Figure 1.1: The classic S-shaped diffusion curve of Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations model  
 
While there is variation in the slope of the curve from innovation to innovation, the 
‘take off’ phase usually occurs at around 10-25% adoption, when interpersonal 
networks become activated so that a critical mass of adopters begins to use an 
























remain who have not yet adopted the innovation. Rogers’ definition includes four key 
components: the innovation; the actors who adopt the innovation; the environment into 
which the new product diffuses; and the means by which the messages are 
communicated. These four components are briefly outlined in Figure 1.2. 
 
1.2.2. Pharmaceutical Diffusion 
Pharmaceutical marketers have traditionally relied on Rogers’ model to understand and 
manage market penetration of a new drug (Kroes et al., 2011) and yet the concepts and 
theoretical explanations of this model are strongly rooted in consumer markets across 
several research traditions from rural sociology to marketing and economics (for a 
comprehensive review see Greenhalgh et al., 2005). However, while the innovation may 
differ across these disciplines, the common denominator is the consistent manner in 
which members of a social system behave (key components of Rogers’ diffusion of 
innovations theory are outlined in Figure 1.2). Early research in pharmaceutical 
diffusion found Rogers’ model to be consistent for drugs, with doctors displaying the 
same characteristic patterns of uptake as Rogers’ adopter categories (Coleman et al., 
1966; Greer, 1988), however more recent studies have found discrepancies with the 
model in drug innovation (Kozyrskyj et al., 2007; Greenhalgh et al., 2005; Dybdahl et 
al. 2004; Peay and Peay, 1994). Wolfe (1994) argued that highly generic and linear 
models of diffusion utilising the five-stage model of the innovation decision process of 
knowledge; persuasion; decision; implementation and confirmation (Rogers, 1995) lack 
empirical validity in pharmaceuticals. This position was supported by Kroes et al. 
(2011) who also argued the Rogers’ model has little empirical support in the complex, 




Figure 1.2: Key Components of Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations Theory  
 
 INNOVATION ATTRIBUTES 
 
1.  RELATIVE ADVANTAGE 
The degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
better than the idea it supersedes (measured in 
economic terms, social prestige, convenience or 
satisfaction). Objective advantage is not 
necessarily of great importance. The greater the 




The degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
being consistent with the existing values, past 
experiences and needs of potential adopters. 
 
3. COMPLEXITY  
The degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
difficult to understand and use. New ideas that are 
simple to understand are adopted more rapidly 
than innovations that require the adopter to 
develop new skills and understanding. 
 
4. TRIALABILITY  
The degree to which an innovation may be 
experimented with on a limited basis. An idea that 
is trialable represents less uncertainty to the 
individual who is considering it for adoption.  
 
5. OBSERVABILITY  
The degree to which results of an innovation are 
visible to others. Such visibility stimulates peer 




1. INNOVATORS (2.5% of adopters) 
Interact with other innovators, educated, 
venturesome, cosmopolite, risk-taking, 
information seeking, with a higher financial status.  
 
2. EARLY ADOPTERS (13.5%) 
Social, greatest degree of opinion leadership, 
respected by other members of the social group, 
adopt new ideas early but carefully. Strategies 
with a motivational emphasis may be most 
effective at getting them involved in the diffusion 
process. 
 
3. EARLY MAJORITY (34%) 
Deliberate, adopt new ideas just before the 
average member of a system, rarely leaders but 
have many informal social contacts. 
 
4. LATE MAJORITY (34%) 
Sceptical, traditional, adopt new ideas just after 
the average member of a system. The pressure of 
peers is necessary to motivate adoption. 
Intervention strategies that help them to overcome 
barriers are needed to get them to take up the 
innovation.  
 
5. LAGGARDS (16%) 
Traditional, last in a social system to adopt an 
innovation, pays little attention to the opinions of 
others. Suspicious of change. Adopts an 






COMMUNICATION CHANNELS: CHANGE AGENTS 
  
1. DEVELOP A NEED FOR CHANGE   
Help clients to become aware of the need to alter their behaviour. 
They assess a client’s need and may help create need. 
 
2. ESTABLISH AN INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
RELATIONSHIP  
Develop client rapport. Enhance relationships by being perceived 
as credible, competent and trustworthy and by empathising with 
the client’s needs and problems. Innovations are judged on the 
basis of how the change agent is perceived (accepting the change 
agent before they will accept the innovation they are promoting). 
 
3. DIAGNOSE PROBLEMS  
Analyse client problems to determine why existing alternatives 
do not meet their needs. 
 
4. CREATE AN INTENT IN THE CLIENT TO CHANGE   
After exploring various avenues of action to achieve the client’s 
goal, seek to motivate the client’s interest in the innovation.  
 
5. TRANSLATE THE INTENT TO ACTION   
The change agent can operate only indirectly, by working with 
opinion leaders to activate near-peer networks.  
 
6. STABILISE ADOPTION AND PREVENT  
DISCONTINUANCE  
Reinforce messages to clients who have already adopted, thus 
‘freezing’ the new behaviour.  
 
7. ACHIEVE A TERMINAL RELATIONSHIP  
A change agent’s end goal is to develop self-renewing behaviour 
on the part of the client (seek to put themselves out of business 






CENTRALISED: Top down diffusion from R&D through change agents via opinion leaders to adopters. 
 






1.2.2.1. Pharmaceutical diffusion: key points of divergence from Rogers’ model  
The pharmaceutical market has distinct differences from a traditional consumer goods 
market in several of these key components: 
a) Innovation  
- Even in the era of evidence-based medicine, when clinicians prescribe drugs, the 
decision may be affected by factors unrelated to the pharmaceutical properties of 
the drug. 
- Unlike many consumer goods, pharmaceutical product characteristics mean very 
little without information on what the product does. 
- Pharmaceuticals carry a greater element of risk (or perceived risk) than 
consumer products and therefore ethical, regulatory and liability considerations 
are often much higher. 




- A key difference in medicine is that the consumer (patient) is neither the 
decision maker, nor the buyer. The new product must be adopted first by the 
clinician before it can be adopted by the patient. Aggarwal and Cha (1997) 
suggest the term ‘surrogate adopters’ to describe the role of clinicians as they 
occupy a unique position. They act both as gatekeepers by selectively choosing 
which innovation to adopt based on their own values, and as facilitators in 
diffusing the new product among patients.  
  
10 
- Clinicians use more nebulous criteria for judging the efficacy of an innovation 
compared with commercially driven criteria (Fitzgerald et al., 2002). 
- Clinicians do not always follow the Rogers’ model of ‘adopter categories’ i.e. 
innovator behaviour is not consistent with all new technologies (Jones et al., 
2001; Greenhalgh et al., 2005). 
 
c) Environment 
- The market for innovative drugs is the NHS, which is a very different 
environment in which to operate compared with consumer markets. In terms of 
drug innovations, the NHS represents a centralised system involving multiple 
stakeholders, which places a far greater importance on the interactions between 
groups. Since its inception in 1948, the NHS has taken on many structural 
forms, each iteration bringing with it a change in the degree of influence of 
different stakeholder groups in the process.  
- The Industry operates within a highly regulated environment in the way it 
undertakes research, produces and licenses its products, creating more hurdles 
than in consumer markets. This has prevented predictive models of diffusion 
such as the Bass model1 (a mathematical presentation of the Rogers’ model), 
which in consumer markets has provided a means for marketers to predict 
whether, and to what extent, a particular innovation would ‘catch on’, from 
being widely used in health care diffusion research (Sillup, 1992).  
                                                 
1 The Bass model assumes that new product adopters are influenced by two types of communication: 
mass media and interpersonal communication, and that the mass media effects, which have a greater 
impact on innovative customers, will be greater at the outset of the product launch. The interpersonal 
communication effects, which have a greater impact on the much larger number of imitative customers, 
will be greater during the later periods of the diffusion process (Rogers, 1995). 
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- Whilst individual doctors retain clinical freedom to treat patients as they deem 
appropriate, there is increasing pressure from managers, prescribing advisors 
and payers that has created a ‘comply or explain’ philosophy in an attempt to 
control the medicines bill. Limited formularies, incentives to encourage generic 
prescribing and formal assessments of the clinical and cost effectiveness of new 
medicines have been the environment in which prescribing decisions have been 
made. 
- There is an implicit social incompatibility between profit and health, giving rise 
to negative connotations with regard to marketing and promotional activities in 
medicine, which does not affect most consumer goods markets. 
 
d) Communication channels 
The role of the Industry as the ‘change agency’ is not only to produce innovations, 
but also to communicate information about them. Marketing, which is the process 
responsible for anticipating and satisfying customer requirements profitably (UK 
Chartered Institute of Marketing), and opinion leadership, which utilises the 
influence of revered experts are based on central communication aspects of Rogers’ 
model. However:   
- pharmaceutical change agents are more likely to be homophilous with clinicians 
in social characteristics, thereby avoiding the social marginality Rogers refers to 
that can otherwise present a communication barrier for change agents in 
commercial markets. They are however, heterophilous with regard to technical 
competence about the innovation being diffused, affording them an educational 
role. Greenhalgh et al., (2005) highlighted that within the medical profession 
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change agents naturally focus their efforts on innovators and early adopters 
because they tend to share more characteristics with them, however they argue 
their input is most needed for late adopters. 
- pharmaceutical change agents do not withdraw from the market as suggested by 
Rogers when a critical mass is reached at around 30% adoption. They continue 
to influence behaviour throughout the patented lifecycle of a drug.  
 
1.2.3. The Pharmaceutical Industry 
The pharmaceutical industry represents the UK’s third most profitable economic sector 
and employs around 80,000 people directly and around 250,000 as a result of the 
Industry’s presence in the UK. It is therefore of significant importance to the UK 
economy. The purchase of medicines accounts for around 12% of the entire NHS 
budget, with total drug sales to the NHS in 2011 of £13.7 billion (Association of the 
British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), 2012a). The UK represents around 7% of 
world sales after the United States of America, Japan, Germany and France, and has 
traditionally been an important site for drug-related research and development. With 
such an economic presence, the Government has to balance the need to promote the 
competitiveness of the Industry, with the need to address health concerns and promote 
the effectiveness of the NHS (HCHC, 2005).  
It is important to recognise that the pharmaceutical industry is not just one organisation. 
It includes companies that focus on research and development of new pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology companies, generics companies, and companies that combine new drug 
development and generics. While they all share a common purpose to manufacture, 
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supply and market medicines, each of these different business models will hold different 
beliefs around what affects the diffusion of pharmaceuticals based on their own 
individual challenges. The dominance of a small number of large multinational 
companies (colloquially known as ‘Big Pharma’) indicates the high level of inherent 
risk that accompanies research and development of new pharmaceuticals. The reported 
costs of drug development are now in excess of £1.2 billion due to the high attrition 
rates that result in only one drug launched for every five to ten thousand compounds 
evaluated. Patent life is typically around 20 years, of which around 12 years is taken up 
by the drug development process (outlined in Figure 1.3). 
During the course of the drug lifecycle, the Industry interacts with the health system in 
two ways; i) through research and development and ii) drug promotion and advertising, 
the first being more comfortably acknowledged by health professionals according to 
Breen (2004). Once launched, a drug is subjected to further evaluation through post-
licensing surveillance by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA) and the Yellow Card Scheme for adverse reactions, and through bodies such 
as the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) that assess clinical 
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RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL MARKET  
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A key concern of the Industry is the rate at which new technologies are adopted in the 
UK, which is amongst the slowest in Europe (Wanless, 2002; Danzon and Kim, 2002) 
and has been attributed to the conservatism of prescribers (Griffin, 1995) and regulatory 
hurdles such as NICE. The UK adoption rate measured as mean per capita use, is 54% 
of average international levels 5 years after product launch (Pharmaceutical Industry 
Competitiveness Task Force (PICTF), 2005). The Industry’s aim through its activities is 
to accelerate the uptake rate of their products in the initial phase, and ensure that the 
product is adopted by the maximum number of prescribers during its remaining patent 
life. 
The pharmaceutical industry is now considered to be a matured market, demonstrated 
by traits such as decreasing product differentiation, industry consolidation, slower rate 
of growth and intensifying competition. Mature markets favour expertise in market 
strategy development (marketing), compared with growing markets that favour product 
development skills (innovation) (Smith, 2003a), which is in accordance with the 
perception held by critics of the Industry in relation to where their priorities are 
focussed. 
 
1.2.4. Industry Activities 
There is little doubt that Industry activities have the ability to influence prescribing 
decisions, with a substantial number of articles published in the biomedical literature 
assessing the impact of such influence (Spurling et al., 2010; Watkins et al., 2003; 
Prosser et al., 2003; Prosser and Walley, 2003a and 2003b; Wazana, 2000; Chren and 




326) focussed on disentanglement of doctors from drug companies, while the 
parliamentary inquiry found some questionable Industry practices, with assertions of 
buying influence over doctors, researchers, patient groups, charities, journalists and 
politicians. Regulation provided by the MHRA was regarded as being weak or 
ambiguous stemming from a culture of common policy objectives, consultation and 
interchange of staff with the Industry, which was exacerbated by the need for 
competition with other regulators in Europe (HCHC, 2005). These issues are not new, 
but their significance has increased in parallel with the Industry’s increasing size, 
influence and power. 
The strategies used by companies to increase awareness of new drugs amongst 
stakeholders (most notably prescribers) are diverse and wide reaching. Overt practices 
include visits by drug company representatives (Naik et al., 2010; Manchanda and 
Chintagunta, 2004; Prosser and Walley, 2003a; Jones et al., 2001; Buban et al., 2001; 
Pugh et al., 2003), advertisements and advertorials (Smith, 2003b; Jones et al. 1999; 
Walton, 1980), direct mailing (Collier and Iheanacho, 2002), free samples and gifts 
(Wazana, 2000; Katz et al., 2003; Brett et al., 2003), and sponsorship of meetings and 
conferences (Heath, 2011). These activities are regulated under the ABPI Industry Code 
of Practice, which is policed by the Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority, 
although implementation of the Code is sometimes perceived as unsatisfactory (Dowsett 
et al., 2010).   
More covert influences reported in the literature include Industry links with regulatory 
authorities (Abraham, 2002; Hemminki, 1980), scientific investigators and academic 
institutions (Psaty and Rennie, 2006; Bekelman et al., 2003; Boyd and Bero, 2000), 




Herxheimer, 2003), use of opinion leaders to convey Industry views (Liberati and 
Magrini, 2003; Jackson, 2001; Minhas, 2007), provision of continuing medical 
education to prescribers and medical students (Zipkin and Steinman, 2005; Sandbery et 
al., 1997; Relman, 2001), the invention of new diseases to match their pipelines (disease 
mongering)’ (Moynihan et al., 2002), and while ‘direct to consumer’ advertising is not 
permitted in Europe, disease awareness programmes and use of the mass media provide 
a conduit through which to influence patient perceptions (Burton and Rowell, 2003; 
Collier and Iheanacho, 2002).  
Furthermore, scrutiny of Industry funded trial publications has also led to allegations of 
the Industry withholding negative findings from publication (McCarthy, 2000; Nathan 
and Weatherall, 1999), selectively reporting favourable outcomes (Spurling et al., 2010; 
Lexchin et al., 2003; Bhandari et al., 2004; Bero and Rennie, 1996), bias in trial design 
(Rochon et al., 1994; Montaner et al., 2001) and paying non-Industry experts for 
engaging in ghostwriting and guest authorship (Dowsett et al., 2010; Moynihan, 2003). 
While many of these sources are from the USA, pharmaceutical companies operate at a 
global level, therefore with the exception of direct to consumer advertising, many of the 
issues raised in articles by international authors are also relevant to the UK. 
There are divergent views amongst clinicians about the value of the information 
provided by pharmaceutical companies, with arguments on both sides increasingly 
appearing in the literature. Studies have shown that some see the information provided 
by companies as useful, especially in the immediate post-launch phase (Fischer et al., 
2009; Chimonas et al., 2007; Prosser et al., 2003; Prosser and Walley, 2003a; Azoulay, 
2002; Jones et al., 2001; McGettigan et al., 2001; Wieringa et al., 2001; Gönül et al., 




colleagues but not themselves (Morgan et al., 2006; Rutledge et al., 2003; Watkins et 
al., 2003; Steinman et al., 2001; Carthy et al., 2000; Chren, 1999; Peay and Peay, 1988; 
Avorn et al., 1982). What is clear, however, is that many doctors are willing to give 
time to Industry representatives (Blumanthal, 2004). There is also some evidence that 
because of misleading promotion leading to poor clinical practice (Othman et al., 2009; 
Montgomery et al., 2008; Lexchin, 1997; Ziegler et al., 1995; Hemminki, 1977; 
Spurling et al., 2010; Wazana, 2000), a number of organisations have called for the 
stricter control of Industry activities (Rothman et al., 2009; Mansfield et al., 2006). 
 
1.3. Chapter comment  
The Industry, with regard to how it operates, is not well understood by those outside of 
it. The knowledge they possess on the diffusion of pharmaceuticals is of considerable 
value to complement various other stakeholder perspectives in the pursuit of a balanced 
view of this sociological process. Greenhalgh et al. (2005) identified that “whilst there 
is a wealth of empirical research into the role of change agents in general, the literature 
into the role of change agents in disseminating innovations in health service delivery 
and organisation was sparse”. The following research project has sought to elucidate 
and present Industry views on what factors from the perspective of the change agent 
affect drug adoption and diffusion rather than relying on proxy measures of their 







1.4. Thesis structure  
 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the current literature addressing Industry views on 
diffusion influences, directly or through empirical research. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview and rationale of the methods of research and analysis 
selected and considers some of the practical considerations for undertaking data 
collection in this context. This section concludes with a discussion of the strengths and 
limitations of the research, taking into consideration quality assessment measures 
commensurate with qualitative research i.e. credibility, dependability and transferability 
of the findings. 
Chapter 4 presents the data portfolios for each of the four case studies including the 
diffusion curves and the case specific literature and clinical expert augmented timelines 
with accompanying commentaries.  
Chapter 5 presents an across case study thematic analysis of the Industry interviews, 
identifying a framework of Industry perceived factors that influence the diffusion of 
pharmaceuticals. 
Chapter 6 explores through triangulation the degree of convergence and divergence 
between the diffusion curves, Industry respondents and literature-based accounts for 
each case study, which served to test the validity of the data and elucidate unique 
Industry insights. 
Chapter 7 outlines a discussion of the main findings and implications of the research. 
This is accompanied with a reflection on what further research may be supported in 









The aim of the literature review was to determine the extent to which the views of the 
Industry on diffusion influences have been previously elucidated in the literature, either 
directly through Industry authored pieces, or indirectly through empirical studies with 
Industry personnel as the subject of the research. While it is acknowledged that there is 
a wealth of literature from many other perspectives that may oppose these views, it was 
not within the scope of the literature review to address these as the intention was to find 
out the ideas and opinions of Industry respondents. 
 
2.2. Search methods 
The topic spanned multiple research disciplines and required extensive searching of 
both the peer-reviewed and grey literature across seven databases applicable to the 
biomedical, social sciences, business, law and economics fields, dating from their 
inception through to September 2012 (see Appendix 1 for details of databases searched 
and search strategy employed). As this qualitative inquiry was concerned with 
uncovering the Industry’s own voice, normative literature was not included, as its 
authorship was dominated by consultancies or marketing academics rather than Industry 




that was intended to explore the importance of multiple rather than single diffusion 
factors, or to such a comprehensive extent as afforded by the case study approach. 
 
2.3. Diffusion themes from Industry authored commentaries 
The literature surrounding the topic of the pharmaceutical industry is plagued with 
seemingly biased contributions from both critics of the Industry and the Industry 
themselves. Indeed the stimulus for many of the Industry authored articles has been 
their need to counter accusations about their practices and influence, some based on 
robust studies, but often characterised by polemic. There is little doubt that the Industry 
can influence prescribing decisions. They present themselves, and wish to be considered 
very much as partners in the healthcare system (Barr, 1994), which rightly or wrongly is 
reliant on their resources for research, education and delivering patient benefit through 
pharmaceutical innovation. Through general discussions of specific aspects in the 
literature, several factors were revealed by Industry contributors as potential influences 
on diffusion, which are outlined below.  
 
2.3.1. Diagnosis  
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Roche in 2004 described how diffusion of new 
drugs is dependent on patients coming into the system to be treated through accurate 
diagnosis. Conditions for commercial success include symptoms that are readily 
identifiable and measurable so that clinical response can be monitored (Humer, 2004; 




difficult to define as a result of their complex aetiologies, such as Alzheimer’s disease 
and severe asthma, present delays to completion of clinical trials e.g. in terms of patient 
recruitment; determining appropriate outcomes measures; lack of surrogate measures 
and the impact that has on extending trials. Additionally primary care physicians are not 
necessarily equipped to make such highly accurate diagnoses, particularly as simple 
tests are unlikely to be available. Without a diagnosis, or the availability of the 
necessary provisions to make a diagnosis, the Industry has highlighted how this is a 
barrier to the dissemination of any new treatment.  
The Industry has faced criticisms in relation to disease redefinition, which involves 
widening diagnostic boundaries of conditions to increase the eligible patient population 
(Moynihan et al., 2012). The Industry argues that the criteria by which patients gain 
inclusion for treatment in the UK are set through government and professional 
guidelines, such as the National Service Frameworks (NSFs) and the General Practice 
Quality Outcome Frameworks (QOF). A former medical director of the ABPI 
acknowledged however, that the Industry is involved in “sponsoring the definition of 
diseases in conjunction with regulatory authorities to develop closely defined 
definitions such that safety and efficacy of new medicines can be properly measured” 
(Tiner, 2002). 
An example of disease classification that was surrounded with controversy was the 
WHO definition of osteoporosis. The primary concern from critics related to the 
emphasis on the importance of bone mineral density (BMD), a surrogate marker. By 
raising BMD to the status of a diagnostic criterion, it conceptualised a risk factor as a 
disease (Eastell, 1998). This is a concern with surrogate markers in general and 




WHO definition set the bone density of young white women as normal, and to judge the 
bones of older women against this standard was also viewed contentiously by some in 
the medical profession, who have indicated a Z-score measure (BMD is compared with 
the mean value in normal subjects of the same age and sex) may have been more 
appropriate (Eastell, 1998; Moynihan et al., 2002). Some have implied that interested 
companies were heavily involved in influencing the WHO definition, through 
sponsorship of key meetings of the WHO study group, and developing extensive 
financial ties with leading researchers and patient groups (Moynihan, 2002).  
 
2.3.2. Research and Development (R&D) 
Genuine innovations  
Even in small patient populations, some Industry authors believe there can still be 
significant commercial opportunity if an innovation is addressing an unmet need 
(Knowles, 2011; Antonaccio, 1994). The Industry have not disputed that they are 
financially obligated to their shareholders, but as that profit can only come to fruition by 
satisfying clinical need with innovative drugs that improve the quality of healthcare, this 
does not automatically put them at odds with the priorities of Government and health 
professionals (Leather and Davis, 2005; HCHC, 2005; Blackledge, 1999).  
To identify areas of unmet clinical need, Robinson (2000) discussed how the Industry 
uses epidemiology to guide their research agendas, by providing information on the 
extent and severity of disease in different populations and the burden on resource use. 
The traditional model of pharmaceutical R&D has been to discover new drug candidates 
in-house, but in the wake of stagnating pipelines, companies have used various 




achieved through mergers and acquisitions (Gopal, 1998; Mittra, 2007), strategic 
alliances and collaborative research efforts (Spiegel, 1991; Cagle, 2005) or new R&D 
models such as GSK’s Centres of Excellence for Drug Discovery (CEDDs). CEDDs are 
based on a configuration of seven units designed to encourage competition between the 
company’s researchers according to therapeutic area to stimulate development of 
innovative products (Iglehart, 2003). 
Meeting an unmet need may not require radical innovations. Incremental developments 
are usually regarded by critics as strategies to extend patent protection but, as Tom 
McKillop (CEO of AstraZeneca in 1998) highlighted, companies get the product to 
market “as quickly as possible for a defined indication and then look for ways to add 
value to that product”. That value may not be identifiable until the drug has been in use 
for some time and may involve developing a new formulation for example, but if this 
modification addresses a problem that has been preventing patients from using a 
medication then its impact on diffusion can be significant (Gopal, 1998).  
Critics of the Industry however, have concerns that needs are being invented in 
accordance with a company’s existing portfolio of drugs. This practice, which is 
referred to pejoratively as ‘disease mongering’, involves the medicalisation of ordinary 
life, such that the “social construction of illness is being replaced by the corporate 
construction of disease” (Moynihan et al., 2002; Moynihan et al., 2012; Goldacre, 
2012). Examples often cited include female sexual dysfunction, menopause presented as 
hormone deficiency and shyness as social anxiety disorder. In response to this issue, the 
Industry indicated in their evidence to the HCHC Inquiry that a drug can only be 
licensed for a valid condition that is internationally recognised through the WHO 




2.3.1., the Industry has made acknowledgements in the literature of their involvement in 
the definition of diseases.  
UK research presence 
Around one fifth of the most commonly prescribed drugs used worldwide were 
developed in the UK (ABPI, 2012b). The Industry claim it has become increasingly 
expensive to conduct clinical trials in the UK and that an uncompetitive environment, 
with the loss of UK research presence, could detrimentally impact on drug diffusion. By 
retaining research in the UK, clinicians and patients can input into research priorities, 
keeping UK physicians at the forefront of clinical research and enables patients to 
access new medicines through clinical trials (HCHC, 2005). PICTF was a joint initiative 
between the UK Government and the Industry with the aim to ensure the UK remained 
a desirable location to conduct research, and the NHS as a setting to run clinical trials 
(PICTF, 2001). While it is claimed that the UK’s reputation for scientific and clinical 
innovation is threatened by expertise of the emerging world, the high quality standards 
of UK research, the unique patient and staff resource provided by the NHS and recent 
initiatives such as the UK Clinical Research Collaboration (UKCRC) and the NIHR 
Clinical Research Network (NIHR CRN) is likely to mean that the UK will remain an 
attractive proposition for the Industry.  
Forecasting R&D priorities 
Increased regulatory requirements have had a significant influence on the financial risk 
to companies by increasing the cost of drug development and reduction in patent life. It 
is estimated that fewer than one in five new drugs recover the cost of their development 
(Macdonald, 1990). A challenge for companies is that they have to make key 




launch with regard to clinical priorities and competitors. Misjudgement of these 
predictions can have major consequences on the diffusion of a drug. Determining the 
needs and priorities of stakeholders, both clinical and financial through market research 
activities, can help mitigate the risks involved in these forecasting decisions, leading to 
the development of a drug that can be differentiated both on its clinical and commercial 
attributes when it eventually reaches the market (Alphs, 2006). As mentioned in 
previous sections, this view is in contrast to that held by Industry critics who believe 
that needs are not necessarily congruent with those of stakeholders. 
 
2.3.3. Medical research/Clinical trials 
Clinical trials serve an important function in diffusion; they provide the evidence to 
allow a drug to enter the market, but are also used to communicate information about 
the risks and benefits of new therapies to decision makers and prescribers to change 
clinical practice. They also substantiate the Industry’s education activities by providing 
legitimacy to their claims (Cappelleri and Stecher, 2008; Marlow, 1994).  
 
2.3.3.1. Trial design barriers  
Regulatory constraints 
The appropriateness of clinical trial design is a common criticism of Industry funded 
trials, the suggestion being that the design intentionally shows the drugs in the most 
favourable light. The Industry response is that medicines are produced as part of a 
global strategy, and so comparators may not always be applicable to every country. The 




inconclusive. Companies therefore have to ensure that trial design will accommodate 
the needs of regulatory agencies and clinicians in various countries as much as possible, 
but the constraints of regulation can often frustrate clinical investigators and assessors 
(Blackledge, 1999; Carmine, 1996).  
 
Restricted trial population 
Clinical trials are usually conducted in the secondary care setting under the control of 
specialists. The patient populations enrolled are governed by strict inclusion and 
exclusion criteria, which can only therefore provide a limited insight into how the drug 
will perform in a real world context. There have been some suggestions from Industry 
that conducting pre-marketing trials in general practice may provide a sample more 
representative of the vast majority of patients who will use the drug, while also allowing 
general practitioners (GPs) to be involved in clinical evaluation (Marsh, 1981). Post-
marketing studies currently provide this context but they are sometimes viewed as an 




The double-blind trial design has been highlighted by Industry authors as being 
detrimental to the uptake of some new drugs. Its purpose is to reduce differences 
between treatment or analysis that may confound the interpretation of the results, but in 
some cases it may lead to the obscuring of possible benefits of new treatments. An 
example cited by Industry authors Anderson and colleagues (1999) involved the 
antiplatelet drug abciximab. The drug’s relative advantage was its enhanced cost 




months after hospitalisation in patients undergoing percutaneous transluminal coronary 
angioplasty (PTCA) or arthrectomy. In using a double-blind trial design however, the 
benefit of abciximab was compromised by the need to administer standard dose heparin 
in all treatment arms to avoid making the treatment arms identifiable, which produced a 
higher rate of bleeding complications with abciximab. Any early cost benefit that was 
expected from a reduced need for repeat interventions necessary to offset the upfront 
costs of the drug was apparently eliminated due to administration of heparin. Despite 
these possible tensions, the evidence supporting the use of such study designs is 
overwhelming. While the problems identified in this particular example are not 
commonly encountered, they should be recognised.  
 
Multiregional trials 
The intention of multiregional trials is to accelerate the approval process. A region takes 
into consideration factors such as race, ethnicity, disease epidemiology, medical 
practice and geographical proximity. Geography is the most common way of defining a 
region, but it is not necessarily the most appropriate. For example, the regions defined 
in the PLATO study, comparing ticagrelor with clopidogrel which included North 
America; Asia/Australia; Central/South America; Europe/Middle and East/Africa; have 
been criticised for having little relationship with either practice patterns and/or 
population genetics. An increasing number of companies have started to conduct late 
phase trials in emerging clinical trial locations in developing countries, such as Latin 
America, India, the Middle East, and Africa. Despite the view that Industry are 
exploiting trial subjects in these regions, the assertion by Industry is that regional 




significant debate during the regulatory process, potentially slowing access and 
reducing confidence in outcomes (Binkowitz and Ibia, 2011).  
 
Comparative effectiveness 
Regulatory approval is usually based on randomised, placebo-controlled trials, but more 
robust comparative trials are becoming necessary for a drug to get through market 
access hurdles. According to the Industry authored literature this is presenting a 
significant barrier to adoption. Large scale trials are necessary to attain sufficient 
statistical power to demonstrate superiority, but they inevitably increase the cost of drug 
development. This has been raised as an issue of concern as it may discourage future 
innovation within a class, as benefit is not always a feature of efficacy, but may relate to 
improvements in tolerability or safety (Yager and Starrett, 2006). Enrichment of trial 
populations to select those patients most likely to display the outcome of interest may 
however, mitigate the need for vast trials (Knowles, 2011), but it also increases the 
chances of obtaining a positive trial outcome. As indicated in the commentary by 
Berger and Grainger (2010), early engagement with assessment agencies enables 
companies to discuss design issues to achieve credible outcomes that satisfy the 
requirements of the assessors and thus minimise potential access barriers. 
 
2.3.3.2. Credibility of Industry funded studies 
Publication of trials and economic models in peer-reviewed journals has been 
highlighted in Industry authored commentaries as being the most credible means of 
conveying research findings to medical communities (Miranda and Ginestet, 2002; 
Olson et al., 2003). The vast majority of studies for new drugs are funded by the 




generate clinical trial data to support their market approvals. In evidence submitted to 
the HCHC Inquiry, the Industry outlined how they invest £3.3 billion per year (£10 
million per day) into R&D in the UK, which exceeds every other public source 
combined (HCHC, 2005). In the absence of publicly funded studies, Industry funded 
trials, which account for over three quarters of randomised controlled trials (RCTs) 
reported in major journals, provide a basis for decision making and are therefore a key 
factor in diffusion.  
However, the premise that Industry funded studies are less credible, which is a view 
widely presented in the academic literature, has according to Tohen (2007), undermined 
the impact of genuine scientifically valid contributions. The perception that they cannot 
be trusted in the same way as the outcomes of non-Industry funded trials, has 
implications in slowing the rate of adoption. Studies have been conducted showing that 
trials sponsored by pharmaceutical companies are more likely to have outcomes 
favouring the sponsor (Lexchin et al., 2003; Bhandari et al., 2004; Lexchin et al., 2010), 
resulting from selective funding of trials on drugs that the company considers superior 
to the competition or through design aspects such as inappropriate comparators. Rochon 
and colleagues (1994) demonstrated that in most cases in which the doses of the study 
and comparator drugs were not equivalent, the drug given at the higher dose was that of 
the supporting manufacturer. Additionally, publication bias has been implicated in the 
disproportionate representation of positive Industry trials, with the suggestion that 
manufacturers have attempted to prevent studies which are unfavourable to their 
products from being published (McCarthy, 2000). A counteraction from the Industry 





Tohen (2007) argues that the quality of the findings from Industry supported studies 
should be judged on the rigour of the scientific methodology rather than the credentials 
or affiliations of the investigators or the source of funding. In the systematic review by 
Lexchin et al. (2003) highlighting Industry sponsorship and research outcome, none of 
the 13 studies that analysed methods reported that studies funded by the Industry were 
of poorer quality. They even went as far as stating that research methods were “at least 
as good as non-industry funded research and in many cases better”.  
Dowsett et al. (2010) defended the premise that “a conflict of interest does not 
necessarily equate to a biased representation of research findings” and that “operating a 
successful, for-profit business and maintaining a focus on improving health are not 
mutually exclusive goals”. In an attempt to redress the balance, several authors 
(Chavers et al., 2011; Tohen, 2007; Blum et al., 1986; Stucki, 1985) have argued that 
financial conflicts of interest are not the sole source of conflict that investigators may 
have, with others potentially arising when research outcomes dispute hypotheses, 
mainstream medical views or a researcher’s prior publication record.  
Such is the importance of clinical evidence, the Industry are responding to the criticisms 
that have been levelled at them with regard to overly positive results and poor quality 
design, through initiatives such as clinical trial registers (Dowsett et al., 2010; Norris, 
2010; Mansi et al., 2012; Leather and Davis, 2005; Chavers et al., 2011) and publishing 
their own publication policies (Dowsett et al., 2010), and recommendations for closing 
the credibility gap in reporting Industry sponsored clinical research (Mansi et al., 2012). 
Some would argue however, that this has taken a concerted effort on behalf of campaign 




and their results reported in the public domain, to bring about this change in perspective 
(Coombes, 2013).  
2.3.4. Cost impact 
The cost of pharmaceuticals is a contentious issue. Coombe (2000) suggested that some 
doctors do not prescribe certain drugs even though they know they work simply due to 
cost pressures. Industry authors argue that while pharmaceuticals are considered by 
Government as the cause of increasing NHS expenditure, they have consistently 
accounted for between 10-15% over several decades (Wells, 1992), with hospital 
expenditure accounting for more than 50%. With the removal of waste and unnecessary 
expenditure in other sectors, the suggestion is that this could produce savings in excess 
of the total pharmaceutical spend (Griffin and Teeling Smith; 1992). The high cost of 
drug development is attributed to the inherent risks involved in the R&D process, but 
the Industry has been keen to highlight that around 17%-25% of sales revenue is 
reinvested in further R&D efforts, which is more than many other comparable industries 
(Rajfer, 1993; Iglehart, 2003; Azoulay, 2002). Complex manufacturing methods can 
further inflate costs as demonstrated in the case of biologics (Kramer, 2011), which can 
present an adoption barrier for these drugs resulting from the price differential 
compared with the existing market. Griffin and Teeling Smith (1992) also argue that 
without premium prices made possible by patents and brand names, there would be no 
economic motivation for innovation.  
The cost stated to bring a new medicine to the market is now in excess of £1.2 billion. 
While it is acknowledged that the rigorous assessment of medicines is an expensive 




services have to be confident that the extra benefit to patients justifies the price. Some 
have started to question this figure, including the chief executive of NICE who in an 
open letter to The Times newspaper stated “If it really does cost £1.2bn to develop a 
new drug, the question the pharmaceutical industry must be able to answer is this: are 
you absolutely confident that it needs to?” (Dillon, 2013). Suggestions have been made 
that all aspects of the drug discovery and development process including the 
requirements of the regulatory authorities should be examined for potential cost savings 
to prevent this estimate from continually increasing (Rawlins, 2004).  
The relative advantage offered by many drugs is related to the long-term savings they 
can provide through prevention (i.e. medications reducing the need for expensive 
interventional procedures), or impacting on health resources by reducing length of stay. 
But the perceived high initial costs may present a barrier to diffusion of innovative 
medicines (Iglehart, 2003). An alternative cost perspective presented by Industry 
authors Griffin and Teeling Smith (1992) in response to the usual criticism that an over-
spending doctor should be discouraged, is that an under-spending doctor is just as much 
of a problem as they are potentially failing to diagnose and treat conditions in their 
patients. The premise for this position is that such doctors are often failing to realise the 
cost savings for the NHS that can come from preventative medicine being correctly 
implemented. The cost-benefit of preventative medicines is however, difficult to 
demonstrate, particularly in a medical culture that remains heavily focused on treating 






2.3.5. Health Technology Assessment (HTA) 
HTA was the focus of many Industry articles (Keech, 2001; Thwaites and Townsend, 
1998; Lothgren and Ratcliffe, 2004; Earnshaw and Lewis, 2008). Recent studies 
acknowledge it has a major role in drug adoption as pharmacoeconomic research assists 
in decision making, but the earlier empirical studies questioned its value (see section 
2.5). The commercial benefit of HTA has been recognised by the Industry in that it can 
lead to more profitable commercialisation of new drugs through earlier and increased 
access to customers and markets, with evidence-based justifications and acceptance of 
possibly premium priced products. Additionally collaboration with HTA submissions 
can improve a company’s reputation and improve relationships with customers through 
enhanced credibility for their commitment to high quality research and the provision of 
cost effective healthcare (Thwaites and Townsend, 1998; Berger and Grainger, 2010).  
Equally, companies have to balance the ambition to provide more comprehensive 
information, with the risk that it extends an already lengthy process to market access. 
Earnshaw and Lewis (2008) commented that while they recognised the need for 
robustness and quality in NICE guidance, there are equivalent needs of the NHS for 
timely information and the need of patients for access to new drugs. With a shortened 
period to recoup investment costs from the pressure of generics, the ‘fourth hurdle’ as it 
is often referred to, which requires a new drug to demonstrate economic benefits at 
national and regional levels in addition to the licensing requirements of safety and 
efficacy, could reduce this time even further (Lothgren and Ratcliffe, 2004).  
Many companies have integrated cost effectiveness measures into the development 




assessment process can cause significant delays to adoption (Keech, 2001; Thwaites and 
Townsend, 1998). However, there are usually discrepancies between the economic 
models submitted by the sponsoring companies and the independent analyses conducted 
on behalf of NICE, which can lead to delays in the process. The robustness of NICE’s 
procedures and the confidence this creates in their outcomes has ultimately increased 
the promotional impact of a positive NICE recommendation through its ability to 
accelerate the adoption and diffusion of that drug or its class. It could be inferred 
therefore to have contributed in part to the Industry’s acceptance of the role of HTA in 
pharmaceutical assessment.  
Complexity (Knowledge barriers) 
Formal HTA processes have been part of decision making in the NHS for over 10 years. 
Yet several Industry articles alluded to how some prescribers, formulary managers and 
policy makers are not comfortable with the principles and methods of economic 
analysis and may not feel confident to interpret the data contained in these studies 
(Olson et al., 2003; Thwaites and Townsend, 1998; Assiff et al., 1999). The fear is that 
decision makers may become disenfranchised by the highly technical focus of what is 
otherwise a very useful tool in decision making (Earnshaw and Lewis, 2008). The 
challenge faced by Industry is to communicate the wider implications of treatment 
choices to ease the burden of decision making, but some companies felt they were not 
always meeting the needs of their customers in this respect and that sales forces now 
need to be competent in this aspect (Armstrong et al., 2001; Thwaites and Townsend, 
1998). Since some of the earlier articles were published, the growing importance of 
HTA in decision making in the NHS has meant that this potential barrier, while it may 




appraisals are intended to condense the complexities of HTA, such that the findings are 
transferable to a broad audience of decision makers.  
Relevance 
NICE has a key role in evaluating the findings of clinical and cost effectiveness 
analyses and then translating their assessments to key users of that information. Wells 
(1992) noted however, that economic analyses that take into account impact on all 
sectors of the health service can be seen by some groups to have only limited relevance 
to their own activities, which inevitably limits its impact. The view expressed by some 
Industry authors is that practitioners constrained by budget silos are principally 
concerned with their drug costs and not explicitly with the resource implications on 
other parts of the health service. Presenting cost effectiveness data in such a way that 
has relevance to all concerned parties is difficult as there are differences in the 
perceptions of costs and benefits depending on who the decision maker is, but 
customisation inevitably increases the value of this information (Anderson et al., 1999; 
Olson et al., 2003). Responding to customer-specific, country-specific, national, and 
multiregional HTA requirements, while vital in developing effective guidance, 
contributes to the increasing costs of medicines and can cause delays to access if the 
prioritisation process and methods of assessment used by HTA agencies are not clearly 
defined (Lothgren and Ratcliffe, 2004; Schubert, 2002).   
 
2.3.6. Patient influence 
Patients and patient groups have been exercising increasing levels of influence in their 
demands for access, quality and priorities in healthcare. The Industry authored literature 




awareness of diseases, particularly in circumstances, as in the UK, where advertising to 
patients is not permitted (Thwaites and Townsend, 1998; Buttle and Boldrini, 2001; 
O’Quinn, 2001). Some patient groups receive funding from pharmaceutical companies 
as there is a vested interest for both parties from such an interaction. There are 
criticisms however, that pharmaceutical companies and patient organisations are 
unequal partners in these collaborations, which raises serious questions about the 
influence afforded to patient groups in decision making if their relationship with 
Industry is not at arm’s length and transparent (Herxheimer, 2003).  
Patient reported outcomes data, such as symptoms, satisfaction with care and treatment 
adherence is also gaining in importance in clinical trial design. Industry articles cite 
how there is an increasing focus on the patient perspective in decision making, 
particularly in conditions such as sexual dysfunction (Cappelleri and Stecher, 2008). In 
these circumstances prescribers and payers may benefit from subjective information to 
better define the value of drugs. Arpinelli and Bamfi (2006) acknowledged that if a 
positive impact on a patient’s health status and daily life can be demonstrated, this 
additional data can differentiate a drug from its competitors aiding its diffudion and may 
enable a higher price to be achieved.  
 
2.3.7. Marketing and promotion activities 
Marketing and other forms of promotion exist to increase sales of products beyond the 
level that would occur if such activities did not take place. It is therefore a major driver 
of pharmaceutical diffusion. In their evidence to the HCHC Inquiry, GlaxoSmithKline 




nor the Medicines Act, nor the EU Directive on the Advertising and Promotion of 
Medicines prohibits this activity” (HCHC, 2005). 
Permissible marketing activities are set out in the ABPI Code of Practice and regulated 
by the Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority, which was established by the 
ABPI to operate independently of the Association. The MHRA also has a responsibility 
to rigorously monitor promotional activities examining practices and responding to 
complaints (MHRA, 2012). 
The publicly available Code (ABPI, 2012b) is explicit about the term ‘promotion’ 
which includes: 
• the provision of inducements to prescribe, supply, administer, buy or sell 
medicines, by the gift, offer or promise of any benefit or bonus whether in 
money or in kind; 
• the provision of hospitality; 
• the sponsorship of scientific and other meetings including payment of travel 
and accommodation expenses.  
The concept of self-regulation however is a contentious one. Numerous incidents over 
the past few decades have brought pharmaceutical marketing practices under scrutiny 
and criticism, drawing into question the capacity of the Industry in the UK to undertake 
self-regulation. A study of marketing practices by Devlin et al. (2007) obtained through 
the HCHC Inquiry identified serious breaches of the Industry’s own ABPI Code of 
Practice, concluding that “the regulatory framework in the UK appears insufficient to 
prevent systemic violations of prescription only medicine advertising”. The Industry 




competition with each other are likely to be the most expert and sensitive critics of their 
competitors’ behaviour and that penalties for transgression are substantial. They are also 
acutely aware that direct government control is less preferable.  
Clinicians are also given clear guidance through the General Medical Council (GMC) 
guidelines of appropriate conduct when dealing with Industry, including the statement 
“You must not ask or accept any inducement, gift or hospitality which may be seen to 
affect your judgement” (GMC, 2008). This begs the counter-argument that clinicians 
have an equal responsibility to be accountable for their behaviour and practices as those 
being levelled at the Industry. There are numerous publications cataloguing the various 
ways in which pharmaceutical companies are claimed to influence clinicians. These 
range from the seemingly trivial (the subliminal messages conveyed through branded 
pens and note pads) to the support of lavish trips and entertainment (Moynihan, 2003). 
While not confined to the past, the era of generous inducements offered to clinicians as 
a means of altering their behaviour has become somewhat curtailed. This is likely to be 
a result of increasing scrutiny, but also by what appears to be a societal shift in the 
perception of the motivations of those people in positions of power who respond to 
these inducements. Registers, such as the Sunshine Act in the USA that came into force 
in April 2012 and which compulsorily requires companies to list payments to individual 
doctors, are likely to be inevitable in the UK (Cohen, 2011). 
 One purpose of marketing is to disseminate knowledge. The availability of a drug is of 
limited value unless prescribers are aware that it exists and has access to scientific and 
medical information to know how to use it effectively. The view presented by 
pharmaceutical companies is that they consider themselves to be the most 




providing information to many stakeholder groups to ensure the appropriate use of 
medicines (Yager and Starrett, 2006; Niblack, 1997; Spiegel, 1991; Peretz, 1978). 
Views of prescribers are mixed in relation to this point. Studies with GPs have shown 
they are “largely reactive recipients rather than active searchers of new drug 
information” and therefore rely on the Industry as a convenient and accessible source of 
information (Prosser et al., 2003; Prosser and Walley, 2003a). Clinicians qualify this by 
indicating they usually need to seek further information or a colleague’s opinion before 
prescribing. Others take the view that this information provision role should not be left 
to the sponsors of the drug who will inevitably present the findings within the context of 
a particular agenda, but this underplays a clinician’s ability to recognise company 
sponsored information for what it is. 
 
2.3.7.1. Promotion 
Promotion is just one component of the ‘marketing mix’; the other components being 
price, product and place. Marketing can therefore exist without promotion, but 
promotion does not exist independently of marketing. Within promotion, there are a 
further four elements that comprise the ‘promotional mix’ (advertising, personal selling, 
sales promotion and public relations). Industry authors have stated that information 
provision on their products is just as much a part of their role as research and 
development (Medd, 1983). Snell (1986) argued that any criticism of promotion 
therefore, should be confined to its quality and quantity, but not to its need. Promotion 
serves multiple functions; it provides prescribing information for clinicians and a means 
by which clinicians can feedback information about new products to the companies via 




sales revenue (Azoulay, 2002). Increased awareness of a drug can also stimulate 
product improvements by competitors.  
Advertisements  
In Europe, advertising is restricted to prescribers. The placement of adverts in medical 
journals, either for broad dissemination within high impact journals, or to select 
audiences in disease- or sector-specific publications provides a channel of 
communication to create awareness. However, in evidence to the HCHC (2005), the 
Industry implied that its impact is questionable. Despite promotion being regarded as 
intense, the reality is that the speed of uptake of new drugs in the UK is comparatively 
slow. Even when drugs receive positive NICE recommendations, some drugs are still 
not adopted, which members of the Industry believe counteracts the suggestion that the 
level of promotion is influencing things in any one direction. However, a question that 
could be asked is why would a company spend the vast sums of money on advertising if 
it was not impactful? It is difficult to measure the return on investment from advertising, 
as unlike the situation with medical representatives, it is not possible to determine the 
correlation between who is being exposed to the message and those prescribing the 
drug. Independent studies such as that by Jones et al., (1999) have not been able to 
demonstrate a clear relationship between the extent of advertising and the amount of 
prescribing, concluding that advertising is just one of many other influential factors.  
 
Medical representatives  
Medical representatives (also referred to as reps, detailers or field force) are considered 
by the Industry to be key in communicating information about drugs to health 




There are approximately 8,000 medical reps in the UK, with the ABPI Code of Practice 
stating that “the number of calls made on a doctor or other prescriber by a representative 
each year should not normally exceed three on average” (HCHC, 2005). Traditionally 
general practitioners have been the prime focus of detailing efforts, however as Gaedeke 
et al. (1999) noted, the number of individual prescribers accessible to representatives 
has been reducing through formation of clinician groups and restricted formularies 
which limit an individual physician’s discretion in drug decisions. The Industry 
literature highlighted how over the last ten years, while specialist influence has 
remained constant, there has been a clear shift in influence from GPs to payers in the 
NHS and an increasing importance of key opinion leaders in decision making 
(McClearn and Croisier, 2011). The ability to adapt marketing strategies to reflect these 
changes can enhance the diffusion of a company’s product, but as Ruzicic and Danner 
(2007) acknowledged, many companies have a cautious approach to dealing with 
changing healthcare environments, with some struggling to develop new business 
models to interact with their most influential customers. Occasionally co-promotion 
using the expertise of other companies is used to complement a company’s own 
resources if they are marketing a new drug in an unfamiliar disease area.  
As one of the most expensive aspects of marketing, it is clear that the Industry value the 
‘rep model’. While the Industry literature is reluctant to document the dynamics of the 
interpersonal relationships they forge with clinicians, there are many commentaries that 
have outlined the tactics companies are claimed to use to manipulate clinicians. They 
describe it as not simply an information exchange, but an attempt to influence through 
false friendships that are often not recognised as such (Fugh-Berman and Ahari, 2007). 




unbiased sources of information in preference. With the increasing importance of 
prescribing formularies and monitoring of their implementation, the individual clinician 
model is likely to be limited in its influence. 
Product samples 
The provision of prescription medicine sample packs (starter packs) aims to attract new 
customers by allowing clinicians to develop first-hand experience with a drug through 
observing the effects in their own patient population. The Industry literature accepts that 
samples aid a drug’s diffusion as once patients have started therapy with a particular 
drug and no significant side effects are apparent, they are unlikely to switch to 
alternative drugs (Kyle et al., 2008). While being candid with regard to this benefit, it 
could also be argued that supplying drug samples is an opportunity to gain face to face 
access to clinicians and habituate them to prescribing particular drugs (Fugh-Berman 
and Ahari, 2007). 
Branding  
The importance of brand names was identified in the Industry authored literature as a 
means of communicating differences between drugs in a class. They also serve as an 
identifier of quality and consistency in relation to a company’s reputation, which they 
believe may play a role in prescribing decisions, and therefore has a bearing on 
diffusion (Hoare, 1974).  
 
2.3.7.2. Continuing Medical Education (CME) 
Over half of all clinician postgraduate education and training is funded by the Industry 




professional bodies and government (Leather and Davis, 2005). Medical education is 
considered separately from promotional activities on the basis that CME events are led 
by senior healthcare professionals to deal with issues related to clinical practice and are 
not forums to promote individually branded products (unless as the first of a new class) 
(Davis, 2004). Leather and Davis (2005) indicated that much of the finance for these 
events is provided unconditionally, with no control by Industry over the content or style 
of delivery. These events however, can enhance diffusion if prescribers need to be made 
aware of changes to clinical practice that may ultimately favour the use of a drug, or its 
class (Blake, 2001).  
Boccuzzi (1999) used the example of angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors 
to highlight that despite the existence of clinical guidelines and a large body of 
evidence, these agents were underutilised and inappropriately dosed. The Industry 
played an important role to increase adoption of this class through support for 
professional education and evidence-based practices. Rajfer (1993) similarly described 
how publication in high impact journals does not guarantee awareness amongst 
prescribers. Among physicians familiar with a heart failure trial published in the New 
England Journal of Medicine, less than half were able to identify the ACE inhibitor used 
in the study, which supports the Industry view that there is a need for targeted 
dissemination of information related to therapeutic advances.  
Education not only extends to physicians. Companies produce medical education 
materials that are used as aids to discuss the risks and benefits of new drugs with 
patients. When risks are perceived by patients and clinicians to be significantly greater 




uptake and diffusion (as exemplified by cases such as the MMR vaccine (Leather and 
Davis, 2005)). 
Views from those outside the Industry on their involvement with CME take a more 
critical stance, perceiving it as an extension of their marketing campaigns (Moynihan, 
2008). Relman (2001), described how pharmaceutical companies have assumed a role in 
CME that is inappropriate for an industry with a vested interest in selling prescription 
drugs. He also criticises how medical institutions solicit Industry participation in 
activities that should be the sole responsibility of the medical profession. In a report for 
the Josiah Macy Foundation, Professor Suzanne Fletcher also declared how “no amount 
of strengthening of the firewall between commercial entities and the content and 
processes of continuing medical education can eliminate the potential for bias.” 
(Fletcher, 2008). The question about the funding gap that would be created if the 
Industry were excluded from CME activities, emphasises the need for a cultural change 
in the way CME is delivered. There have been recommendations that the current model 
with its emphasis on lectures (learning what to do) moves towards focusing on a more 
practical approach of helping clinicians measure and improve what they do in their 
practices (Fletcher, 2008). 
 
2.3.8 Safety/ Regulation 
Safety concerns 
Industry authors have been keen to highlight the limitations of the current system of 
regulatory approval, which requires testing in around 3,000 patients, with specific high 
risk or complicated populations invariably excluded. For a drug to receive marketing 




provided to regulators, but it is only once a drug has been in use in the general 
population that many adverse events that were not detected during the manufacturer’s 
pre-marketing clinical investigations start to emerge (Sullivan, 1990; Tilson, 1988). 
Safety concerns are detrimental to diffusion, but to varying degrees, ranging from a 
minor decline in usage to complete market withdrawal.   
Sir Richard Sykes, the former chairman of GSK in 2006 stated that the best way to 
minimise risk is to “introduce novel drugs slowly and then watch for potential adverse 
events. If they occur you have the opportunity to understand them” (Sykes, 2006). This 
is somewhat counterintuitive to the Industry’s role in accelerating adoption, but if an ‘at 
risk’ group can be identified and monitored or excluded, the Industry’s view is that a 
drug has the potential to be considered safe in the majority and should not be 
withdrawn. When drugs are adopted too rapidly, often as a result of media coverage, 
this can jeopardise any chance of continued controlled diffusion. This sudden exposure 
of a large population can reveal high rates of adverse events, permanently tainting a 
drug and requiring its withdrawal. Personalised medicine is anticipated to reduce safety 
issues as it becomes easier to predetermine at risk individuals before a drug enters the 
market. Despite this, all drugs do carry risks and as Hartford (2006) outlined, it is 
important for safety decisions to be evidence-based rather than reactive.  
Labelling 
Yager and Starrett (2006) indicated in their commentary that “unfortunately there have 
been instances where physicians prescribed products incorrectly despite warnings and 
guidance from regulatory agencies”. This can have a significant impact on the way the 
medicine is then subsequently perceived by patients and the public and detrimentally 




concerted effort to address inappropriate use, but until a safety issue is raised this is 
seldom a key marketing message as there is the potential it may expand drug use.  
 
According to Bush et al. (2005) “safe medicines refer to those drugs whose benefits 
have been found to outweigh their risks when they are used according to the approved 
labelling”. These authors and others have highlighted the importance of labelling as an 
education tool in ensuring that clinicians and patients are informed of the risks and 
benefits of a new drug and that any marketing claims have to be consistent with explicit 
statements in the labelling. The risks have to be clearly communicated as concerns 
about adverse reactions listed in the labelling may deter apprehensive patients from 
initiating drug therapy (Robinson, 1994). 
Benefits and risks in the post-approval phase are evaluated through a reactive system of 
spontaneous reports and post-marketing surveillance studies (Bush et al., 2005; Blake, 
2001; Sullivan, 1990), but a more proactive stance is being required by regulators. The 
FDA for example, now requires companies to produce risk mitigation strategies, which 
has elevated the rigour with which manufacturers must fulfil post-marketing safety 
commitments (Nicholson et al., 2012). These strategies may incorporate medication 
guides if regulators determine information related to possible side effects could 
influence a patient’s decision to initiate, or continue to use a drug, and communication 
plans for clinicians to assure the safe use and implementation of new drugs. Appropriate 
communication of not only the benefits, but also the risks is, according to Industry, an 






Several authors have responded to criticisms levelled at the Industry’s close relationship 
with regulators, commenting that communication is an essential process throughout the 
entire lifecycle of a drug, not only in accelerating market access, but also managing 
safety issues efficiently to reduce the potential impact on diffusion (Heidenreich, 2006; 
Bush et al., 2005; Amery, 1994; Hartford, 2006). Industry authors described how the 
UK has a prominent voice in international regulatory matters through the reputation of 
the MHRA and the UK-based European Medicines Agency (EMA), which can 
ultimately influence the environment into which a drug diffuses (HCHC, 2005).  
 
While it is accepted that the Industry has to operate effective working relationships with 
the regulators, there are concerns about the more covert influences, such as what has 
been referred to as the ‘revolving door policy’. It is claimed that in the UK a large 
proportion of scientists working within the regulatory sector originally worked for 
Industry and many move back there. The concern is that this conflict could introduce 
values sympathetic to the pharmaceutical companies resulting in awarding them the 
benefit of scientific doubt when reviewing products (Abraham, 2002). There has also 
been an insidious culture around reducing times to approval, instilling competition 
between regulatory agencies. Abraham (2002) highlighted how the UK reports some of 
the fastest approval rates, which ultimately aligns with the interests of the Industry.  
Regulators are often accused of using experts to review safety and efficacy data during 
the regulatory process that are not entirely independent of the Industry. This is not just a 
problem for regulators, but for all organisations that depend on expert input. The very 




this ultimately leads to potential conflicts. Adoption of a pragmatic stance of 
transparency, whereby conflicts of interests are declared and managed appropriately, is 
necessary in these circumstances. In addition, there is criticism of the confidentiality 
agreements that exist between the regulators and the Industry, which restricts any other 
interested parties including medical and scientific communities having access to the 
data they hold. While there appears to be a changing attitude from the Industry due to 
pressure from the AllTrials campaign, they are reluctant to sign up to full public 




While recognising the potential detriment of competitor entry, an Industry view 
provided by Yager and Starrett (2006) concluded that there is a place for fast-follower 
or ‘me-too’ products in that molecular refinements lead to improvements in the clinical 
utility of therapeutic classes. Spiegel (1991) also argued that the perception that a drug 
entering second or third in its class is “simply a copy quickly brought to market by a 
competitor as they observe the success of the first product approved is not supported by 
the realities of the 10-12 year process required for drug development”. Decisions 
regarding R&D investment are made by companies when the arrival of future 
competitive agents is unknown. Simultaneous, often closely similar research efforts by 
several companies usually result from the rapid, global dissemination of scientific 
advances (Spiegel, 1991; Yager and Starrett, 2006). It is often a race to be first on the 
market and until the trials are done, and the drugs are approved, it is unclear which is 




A criticism of the Industry is that they consistently fail to conduct head to head trials 
that are necessary to demonstrate the superiority of one drug above another in a class 
(Estellat and Ravaud, 2012). For drugs in simultaneous development, it is accepted that 
comparative trials cannot be conducted before the drugs are licensed, however late 
entrants to a class are often introduced with placebo rather than comparative study data. 
Comparison with placebo is all that is required for approval by the regulators, but this 
falls short of what is required by clinicians to aid decision making.  
 
Generics 
While a generic drug generally curtails the diffusion of its branded counterpart, it can 
also detrimentally impact on drugs within the same class still on patent. Iglehart (2003) 
and several other Industry authors have highlighted a scenario that while R&D time and 
expense has been increasing, the time to recoup R&D costs has been gradually reducing 
(Kramer, 2011; Berger and Grainger, 2010). Some generic companies no longer wait 
until patent expiry to enter the market, either through earlier patent challenge, or claims 
of non-infringement despite the presence of valid patents. The incentive to be the first 
generic is substantial as there is a period of several months of exclusive sales at 80-90% 
of the brand-name cost. Devoid of the need to invest in R&D, generic companies can 
afford to engage in litigation so as to not have to wait for patent expiry. Garnier, the 
CEO of GSK in 2003, presented the case of Paxil, which experienced generic challenge 
five years after market entry in what should have been a 14 year effective patent life 
(Iglehart, 2003). In the following three years, a further seven companies applied to 





Patent extensions through reformulations or combination products are often viewed as 
strategies to stave off the generic impact on diffusion; a term referred to as 
‘evergreening’. They are often released just before patent expiry to encourage 
prescribers to switch ahead of generic introduction, on the basis that patients are 
unlikely to be switched back. In addition to extended release and combination products, 
an increasing number of patent extensions are focusing on use in children. The EU 
permits an additional six months of patent protection if efficacy can be demonstrated in 
this group as they are generally excluded from the initial regulatory trials. An Industry 
perspective provided by Marlow (1994) however, argued that these developments are 
genuine responses to clinical need. 
 
Hoare (1974) presented a different Industry perspective on generics, commenting that 
the cost savings from generics are somewhat marginal, the impact only really being 
apparent on diffusion if, at patent expiry, the product is still widely prescribed (not 
having already been superseded by a branded competitor), and its market price has 
remained high throughout its lifecycle. The greater impact from a diffusion perspective 
is therefore posed by other branded competitor products. This view is however, unlikely 
to reflect the current situation where the price of some blockbuster drugs remains 
consistently high throughout their lifecycle. 
 
 
2.3.10. Mass media 
 
It could be perceived that the print media sometimes take a polarised stance on 




cures’. This may distort the public perception of the benefit/risk debate. When safety 
issues arise on commercialisation of a new drug, premature release of information ahead 
of completion of assessment by regulatory agencies or the company can, according to 
Industry commentators, have permanent consequences on diffusion. Yager and Starrett 
(2006) noted that complex scientific messages are often needed to counteract the 
negative ‘sound bites’ in the media, but this can create a communication barrier with the 
public, adversely influencing diffusion through a loss of confidence. While the media 
can be considered as an unsophisticated tool for conveyance of certain types of 
messages, the Industry do exploit this medium to bypass the direct to consumer 
advertising restrictions imposed in the UK by way of enabling them to bring disease 
awareness to the attention of a wide audience. 
 
2.3.11. Government priorities 
 
In a publicly funded health system, government departments are involved in nearly all 
aspects of drug development and market access. In the UK, they subsequently have 
significant influence on diffusion through NIHR organisations involved in research, 
through the regulatory system via the MHRA, through assessment agencies including 
the NIHR HTA programme and NICE, through to policy initiatives that either support a 
particular drug class or that focus attention on a particular disease, or alternatively 
places restrictions on access. Pharmaceutical companies recognise the importance of 
coupling innovations to key government priorities in ensuring successful uptake of new 
drugs and through PICTF it was agreed that there should be close joint working 
between Industry and Government on the National Service Frameworks that set 




However, as with the involvement of the Industry in professional education, some 
regard their involvement with the political system equally unsettling (Heath, 2011). 
Industry authors regard public policy engagement as a way of conveying their 
perspective on issues such as barriers to access, counterfeit drugs, illegal importation 
and challenges to intellectual property protection. Several articles have made assertions 
about the close relationships that members of the Industry have with guideline 
developers and those in academic institutions (Norris et al., 2012; Choudhry et al., 
2002; Bekelman et al., 2003), but there is now a strong requirement to disclose financial 
conflicts of interest for authors and formal processes for discussing these conflicts prior 
to guidance development. Lobbying activities however, currently do not have to be 
registered, therefore there is no public record of the nature and extent of the Industry’s 
interactions with politicians.  
 
2.3.12. Supply 
Supply issues, while not featuring prominently as a common diffusion factor, can have 
an impact on a drug’s uptake. Drug manufacturers have a responsibility of aligning 
capacity with future anticipated demand to ensure the uninterrupted supply of safe 
pharmaceuticals (Van Arnum, 2011). However, additional supplies of drugs coming 
into the market, either through illegal counterfeit medicines or from the parallel import 
of branded drugs from countries outside the UK curtails the diffusion ceiling of a drug 






2.4. Case study specific diffusion factors 
In a rare insight, Kvesic (2009), a marketing director at Bayer Healthcare 
Pharmaceuticals (USA), published an article detailing the key factors that were 
instrumental to the success of nifedipine (Adalat) at particular stages of the drug’s 
lifecycle, and those that presented barriers.  
Many of the factors were consistent with those highlighted in the Industry authored 
commentary material. There was support for the importance of meeting clinical need 
through reformulations to improve patient compliance. Through that need, new 
indications were developed (angina through to hypertension). While reformulations are 
often dismissed as a lifecycle extension strategy, 15 years of modifications to the 
molecule were necessary before nifedipine reached its optimum form and was suitable 
for the hypertension market. Contrary to popular belief, lifecycle extension strategies in 
this case did not result in keeping the price of the drug high. The improvement from a 
three daily dose (which had become generic) to a twice daily dose (patented) meant that 
the cost of the new formulation of nifedipine could be provided at 25% less than the 
daily generic cost. The article confirmed the importance of the perceived role of 
evidence, clinician education and opinion leadership support, but it did provide 
additional insights as to the impact a company’s reputation based on its behaviour and 
approach to the market can have in terms of how it and its drug is received by the 




Table 2.1: Key factors outlined by Kvesic (2009) in the diffusion of nifedipine 
(Adalat)  
Factor Description 
1. Reformulation to 
improve dosing  
Angina indication  
• Novel mechanism provided first in class position, an advantage that enabled market leadership.  
• Adalat name chosen for international translation and enabled the drug to appear first in 
guidelines and formularies.  
• Initial R&D strategy focussed on a variety of formulations to improve patient compliance.  
• Intracoronary and intraventricular line extensions experienced limited success as they were 
complicated to use. 
• Clinical need existed for a once-daily formulation to improve patient compliance, but initial 
attempts proved difficult. Developed a twice-daily formulation within 5 years. Bayer introduced 
a lower 10mg dose of the twice-daily formulation in some markets which proved very 
successful in the UK where authorities were more reluctant to approve higher doses.  
2. Indication 




unmet need (shift 




• Guideline recommendations highlighted hypertension as a major risk factor for cardiovascular 
disease. Adalat was an effective agent for lowering blood pressure. 
• 10 years of modification to formulation required before molecule was suitable to expand into 
hypertension market. 
• Presence in the cardiovascular market with the angina indication helped sales force introduce the 
hypertension indication. Many patients have both conditions.  
• As hypertension is a chronic condition, it provided an opportunity for Adalat to build brand 
loyalty over time. 
• Product reached its optimum form 15 years after launch. The current environment requires a 
drug to be ‘near perfect’ before approval, allowing fewer opportunities for improvements and 
reformulations. 
3. Global uptake 
through staggered 
launch 
• Bayer launched the once and twice daily formulations within a 2 year period. The staggered 
launch strategy increased the probability of success as best practices and tactics were shared 
from country to country. In the current global regulatory environment, this strategy is no longer 
possible. 







• Pre-launch period spent promoting and positioning Bayer in CVD therapy area. Created 
awareness through international and national thought leader interactions, education and 
publications about the new class and molecule. 
• Success of creating drug class awareness hinged on support from American cardiologists who 
ran clinical trials and generated a publication in a high impact journal (NEJM). 
• Bayer supported the organisation of a key European Congress in cardiology which built 
scientific contacts and created brand awareness and credibility. 
• Thought leader network that supported Adalat throughout its lifecycle was key to presenting the 
safety data when under scrutiny. 




• Entered a licensing agreement with Pfizer to market in the USA - after 4 years licence would 
return to Bayer. When Pfizer developed a once daily formulation, Bayer was able to sub-licence 
the molecule outside of the USA.  





• Refocussed resources from the angina to the hypertension market. 
• Selected pricing models in countries where generics offered a 25% discount to the brand price, 
so that the twice daily branded molecule was priced at 75% of the generic three-times daily 
price.   
• In some markets the twice-daily formulation was removed to focus resource. 




• Limited success of FDC in the early part of the lifecycle due to lack of internal support. While 
current guidelines recommend the use of combination strategies to control hypertension, the 
initial reluctance of the company to revisit the strategy presented a competitive disadvantage and 
may have limited the potential of the brand.  
8. Clinical trials • Second growth phase supported by series of scientific and clinical trials to strengthen the 
marketing messages. 
• Long-term intervention studies provided academic credibility and strengthened reputation of 
company. Cost had previously prohibited these studies. 
• Some trials were planned in response to safety issues raised by a meta-analysis (attributed the 
effects to the 3 times daily formulation, but as the formulation had improved, many physicians 
dismissed the claims).  
• Trials confirmed what physicians knew and had experienced with the drug previously. 
9. Other factors • Withdrawal of Bayer’s cerevastatin increased priority of Adalat and provided newly available 
field force in some markets. 
• Complex structure of the molecule made it difficult to reproduce, extending its exclusivity. 
• Strong brand loyalty contributed to by the trusted, non-aggressive reputation of the company. 
Avoidance of aggressive competitor–targeted activities and promoting scientific activities was 





2.5. Empirical studies assessing Industry views 
In addition to the direct contributions to the literature from Industry personnel, there 
have been several studies conducted across different research paradigms that have 
sought Industry views on a range of topics. To aid comparison of these empirical 
studies, summaries of those that have touched on diffusion issues are presented in Table 
2.2.  
While questionnaire-based study designs have been able to access larger numbers of 
Industry participants, the qualitative studies utilising methods of face to face 
interviewing (consistent with the design adopted for this research) have been much 
smaller in scale, including between 1 to 17 companies and 5 to 49 interviewees. These 
studies have demonstrated that the Industry is not unwilling to speak in a research 
capacity, although several studies have indicated in their methodology that they had 
intended to include more subjects than they were able to achieve. Response rates 
however, were rarely reported and very few of the empirical studies included examples 
of raw material to assess the reliability of the data. 
Only three studies were conducted in the UK, with most being relevant to Australia and 
the USA health systems. Many studies did not name the companies who participated so 
it is difficult to determine parallels with companies operating in the UK. Most 
importantly, the nature of the research topics focussed on very specific issues, or topics 
that have concerned specific groups of Industry personnel, and none have used a case 
study approach to elicit the views of the Industry, which make it difficult to draw any 




Table 2.2: Empirical studies that have ascertained Industry views on potential diffusion factors (n=25) 
Study 
(Country) 












Exploration of medical 
representatives views on drug 
promotion techniques. 













Factors considered important in drug adoption included provision of free 
medical samples; use of educational materials; symposia and scientific 
meetings; gift and incentive provision and commercial offers. While 
respondents were altruistic towards patients they were conscious of 
unethical practices.  




Exploration of Industry 
opinions about the 












Not specified  Pharmaceutical Industry 
Associations. 
Prescription samples encourage early uptake of new medicines and 
provide leverage for companies to influence drug choice. Participants 
indicated that samples, which are generally for newer, more expensive 
products were expected and demanded by doctors; aided brand switching; 
provide early access to new medicines; facilitated prescriber familiarity, 
promoted brand awareness and was an attractive strategy in chronic 
disease markets. 










25 respondents.  
 
(25 accepted out 






Not stated. Representatives have a positive ethical view of their activities. The vast 
majority believed doctors were less knowledgeable than themselves 
regarding the marketed drug, indicating an educational role. Only 10% 
believed that meals and gifts were not acceptable practices, as they did 





















Large and mid-sized 
companies (anonymous -
18% were UK 
participants). 
Changes in stakeholder influence require adjustments to sales force size 
and structure. The growing importance of payers in decision making has 
resulted in fewer representatives being needed than when GPs held a 
more prominent role. Intensifying competition from generics, weak 
product pipelines and few product launches, regulatory constraints on 







Comparative analysis of 








90 respondents.  
 
(90 respondents 








Representatives believe that drugs they promote are more likely to be 
prescribed, yet they and physicians agree that representatives have 
minimal impact on determining the proper drugs to prescribe, with 
physicians requiring more information than what is provided by 
companies. There was agreement that while some promotional items are 
acceptable (samples however, were considered by both groups to have 
minimal impact), more extravagant gifts were to be discouraged for fear 





Self-perceived role of 
pharmaceutical 

















Representatives perceive their role as educational rather than marketing 
and that the information they provide is accurate. Two thirds indicated 
that while they felt doctors found the information useful, they believe 
doctors perceive their main goal is marketing. Most respondents felt a 
university-accredited educational programme would improve the quality 



















Exploration of marketing 
quality in medical markets 
(pharmaceutical, medical 










marketing and sales 
managers. 
UK companies 
(anonymous); 5 of the 8 
described as ‘first rank’. 
Marketing strategy of many medical companies is weak, particularly in 
respect of target market definition. Survival is dependent upon 
competitors having even weaker strategies. A subsequent follow-up paper 
sought to explain these findings concluding that generic approaches to 
marketing strategy fails most companies, and that a tailored process is 
required. 
Gaedeke et 
al.,  1999 
(USA) 
Exploration of whether 
pharmaceutical sales 
representatives’ perceptions 
regarding the value of 
services they provide are 











Anonymous. Both PSRs and physicians considered free product samples, detailing new 
products, promotional dinners and provision of research studies to be 
valuable services. PSRs were more neutral about the value of sponsored 
lunches and detailing old products. PSRs considered serving as expert 
consultants on new drugs and their role in recruiting physicians to post-











Exploration of Industry 
views on the business 



















5 biotechnology firms; 8 




9 biotechnology firms; 
12 large pharmaceutical 
Co. 
Knowledge barriers particularly with regard to radically new medical 
areas (e.g. genetics-based personalised medicine) can be a significant 
barrier to adoption for innovations utilising this knowledge as it impedes 
communications of technology benefits.   
 
Despite these knowledge barriers, targeted drugs are more likely to 
become adopted as they tip the benefit-risk decisions in favour of 
approval as well as influence payers’ product value assessment more 





Exploration of views on 
open-innovation from the 
Industry. 








managers and trade 
associations 
representatives. 
Amgen; GSK; Roche; 
Siena Biotech; MolMed; 




Companies acknowledged they should use external ideas that originate 
outside the company as well as those from within for successful 
innovation. Research indicated that firms have gradually modified their 















(Response rate  
not specified) 
Senior managers in 
product innovation. 
2 USA and 2 European 
global R&D-oriented 
companies; 2 local 
European companies. 
Respondents indicated earlier involvement of marketing and sales 
departments in the innovation process could enhance decisions relating to 
which technologies to pursue, and provide practical input into clinical 
trial design regarding future positioning of the drug and prescribing 





Exploration of Industry 
views of external knowledge 










executives within or 
close to R&D 
function. 
Amgen; Biogen; BMS; 
Genzyme; Johnson & 
Johnson; Lilly; Merck; 
Pfizer; Wyeth. 
Some companies in-license compounds regardless of whether there exists 
any in-house expertise or commercial presence in the company as long as 
they perceived the molecule has potential. Various strategies are used to 
identify and obtain externally developed compounds. Some companies 
use dedicated departments to systematically identify in-licensing 
candidates, while others take an opportunistic approach. 
Safety and Regulation 











Senior level R&D or 
regulatory 
personnel. 
7 biotech companies; 7 
pharmaceutical 
companies; 3 contract 
Industry seeks additional formal and informal interactions with 
regulators, particularly during phase II trials to assist in protocol reviews 

















suggest involving Industry in regulatory oversight boards and creating 
accessible regulatory knowledge databases containing safety information 
on previously developed/failed drugs to reduce unnecessary uncertainty 
and delays due to lack of communication and interaction.  
Medical research 




Exploration of differing 
attitudes of Industry and 
academia towards controlled 
clinical trials (CCTs). 
Consensus 
conference 






Not stated. Large sales volume 
pharmaceutical 
companies.  
Industry considered regulatory requirements were too complicated and 
that complex registration requirements and inadequate patent protection 
inhibited new drug development. Industry agreed with academics that a 
proliferation of ‘me-toos’ could inhibit CCTs where needed, and mostly 
accepted that CCTs are difficult to justify if they do not improve medical 
practice. 
HTA 




Assessing Industry views on 
effectiveness of 
pharmacoeconomics (PE) 
departments, how they have 
evolved and future 
implications for PE. 
Mixed: 




















Pharma; Janssen Ortho; 
Bristol-Myers Squibb; 
Pfizer; Abbott; Wyeth 
Ayers; Hoffmann-La 
Roche; Eli Lilly; Zeneca: 
Pharmacia & Upjohn; 
Searle 
Novartis; Hoechst 
Marion Roussel; Bayer; 
SmithKline Beecham. 
Respondents indicated they perceive that PE work is valuable to the 
company. CEOs felt the true value of PE data is not adequately 
understood by formulary reviewers and therefore may be an impediment 
to market access. 
Industry has difficulties justifying the importance of PE assessment 
because of inconsistencies in the interpretation of economic evaluations 
by healthcare assessors.  




Industry perceptions of 
presenting PE models to 

















PE models optimise formulary positioning of drugs. Simple spread sheet 
models and well-designed regression models were the most effective for 
communicating this form of data to decision makers. Producing 
scientifically robust models, involving non-biased contributors; 
customising, simplifying and increasing model transparency (assumptions 
and calculations) were all factors identified as improving the use of these 
models, enhanced by presenter credibility and training that are key to 
gaining the respect of decision makers.  
Armstrong  




beliefs on important factors 
in drug benefit decisions of 
MCOs, with specific 
reference to health outcome 










accepted out of 
47 invited) 
Individuals involved 
in direct marketing 
activities. 
Not stated. PE information was not considered to be the most important factor in 
drug coverage decisions, ranking second to efficacy and safety. Use of PE 
data was related to the sophistication of the MCO. Adopter barriers 
included lack of expertise, no long-term focus and drug silo budgeting. 
Some respondents acknowledged PE information did not always meet 
customer needs and that they could be easier to understand.  
Mass media 
Ulrich et al., 
2010  
(Switzerland) 
Exploration of the role of 
media in improving company 
public image. 
 













Pfizer. Public image of a company is important as it impacts on clinician 
perception, and can affect share price which ultimately impacts on R&D 
investment. Until recently the focus on physicians was too narrow, with 
the population and media not yet effectively treated as primary 













part of a larger study 
assessing population views). 
which indirect access is possible via the media. Pfizer needed to know 
which media were considered trustworthy by the population regarding 
health to improve its public image. 




Exploration of the role of the 
lay press as a communication 
channel for pharmaceutical 
companies.  






(7 Co. accepted 




Sample from the top 10 
companies in the 
Netherlands. 
Mass media plays an important role in information diffusion, particularly 
around launch, or earlier if a disease is under-diagnosed. Its content 
however, is under the control of journalists who decide what becomes 
news and the manner in which it is presented and interpreted. Industry 
does not communicate early ‘breakthroughs’ to avoid creating false 
hopes, but this information is independently sourced by journalists from 
the literature. Safety issues are only communicated through the press 
























Companies are experiencing increasing difficulty with KOL management 
as networks of influence become more complex and there is greater 
competition for KOL support.  Companies need to adapt their current 
approaches to integrate KOL management with other internal processes. 







Exploration of business 
issues facing the Industry and 
response strategies. 
In-depth face to 












Geigy; Eli Lilly; Glaxo-
Wellcome; Hoffman-
LaRoche; Pfizer; Sandoz 
and Zeneca. 
Industry reactively adapts the way it operates to accommodate regulatory 
controls. Priorities included i) reducing costs by optimal logistics, 
economies in scale of production and seeking R&D synergies with other 
firms; ii) distribution strategies; iii) forecasting negative impacts on 
demand (price-cutting trends, reduced clinician drug budgets, promoting 
health care economics); iv) developing new pricing strategies, v) reducing 
the impact of parallel trade.  
Industry indicated the need for effective lobbying of regulatory and 
government agencies to positively influence the business environment. 
Government 






















4 generic and 1 non-
prescription company. 
Respondents claim a commitment to collaboration with government 
initiatives. Acceptance is underpinned by corporate or personal 
identification with the aims of the strategy, altruism with regard to 
improving individual and public health and increased Industry credibility. 
Resistance comes from divisions within company departments, either 
through lack of understanding or conflicting commercial priorities, or 
ambivalence (some respondents may be motivated more by external 







Exploration of Industry 















(anonymous) and GSK. 
Exchange of information through this conduit provides the Industry with 
a means of communicating with patients and other stakeholders which 
also encourages patient compliance. Additionally these relationships 




2.6. Chapter comment 
The literature review has gathered together a discrete set of factors, but the Industry has 
not been asked in a comprehensive way what they think are the drivers and barriers of 
diffusion, how these factors interact, how they as manufacturers respond to them, and 
then compare the outcome against other sources of diffusion data representing the same 
phenomena. The presence of Industry authors in the literature, albeit not to the same 
extent as any other stakeholder, indicates their desire to present their perspective. Most 
Industry contributions to the academic literature so far have been from non-UK sources, 
and while pharmaceutical companies operate globally, this research aims to provide an 
insight into specific perspectives from personnel in relation to the UK environment. 
Together with other factors derived from the wider diffusion literature, these broad 
themes were used to inform both the case study selection exercise of the research 












This chapter outlines the multiple methods employed in this research to determine the 
views of the Industry on factors that influence the diffusion of pharmaceuticals. It 
begins with a justification for the use of case studies to explore the research question 
and the systematic approach with which the case studies were selected. In-depth, semi-
structured interviews were the main method of data collection. A comprehensive 
description of the qualitative methods used to access and interview Industry personnel is 
therefore provided. Methods to construct the literature-based timelines and the 
quantitative methods employed to generate the diffusion curves used in triangulation are 























Case Study (CS) Selection 
 
Industry Feasibility Study 
THEMATIC ANALYSIS *Unable to achieve an interview for a 3rd statin 
+ In addition to the case study drugs, 2 general 
interviews were conducted 
Pilot Interview 
Long List of Drugs  
Expert Consultation 




Short List of Drugs  




INDUSTRY INTERVIEWS (n=15) 
Seek Industry Agreement Case Study Literature Review 
Clinician Interviews 
 4 CASE STUDIES 
15 INTERVIEWS 
8 PHARMA Co. 
11 DRUGS 










• Alendronate - MSD 
• Etidronate - P&G 









• Olanzapine x 2 - Lilly 
• Quetiapine – AstraZeneca  




• Sildenafil - Pfizer 
• Tadalafil - Lilly 




• Atorvastatin – Pfizer  



















3.2. Case study selection 
 
3.2.1. Choice of case study methods 
Competing positions in case study research 
Case study research is particularly useful for examining phenomena in their natural 
context, recognising the complexities of the real-life setting and integrating multiple 
sources of evidence. There are two broadly competing positions in case study research, 
exemplified by Robert Yin (1994) and Robert Stake (1995), around which other 
commentators can be accommodated. Each position differs in its underlying 
philosophy. Yin is sympathetic to positivism and Stake to constructivism, and these 
sympathies infuse their methodological preferences. While each has a preference, they 
are also alive to claims of rival perspectives and therefore it is important not to 
overstate these preferences.  
In qualitative research the case study method should be commensurate with the 
philosophical underpinnings of the inquiry as this enables the reader to judge how 
findings have been interpreted. A positivist approach is consistent with a realist 
ontology, which regards reality as something that is out there waiting to be discovered 
and epistemologically, we are external to the knowledge we are uncovering. 
Conversely, a constructivist approach (sometimes referred to as interpretivism) is 
consistent with a relativist ontology in which reality is constructed subjectively by 
people and groups, creating a series of competing accounts. Taking a relativist 
perspective therefore, accepts that other perspectives are equally legitimate, even if you 
as the researcher do not agree with the views of those being researched. In this 
paradigm, knowledge is not discovered but is interactively constructed and only comes 
to light through individual interpretation, thereby making the researcher part of that 




The differences between the approaches of Yin and Stake to case study design have 
been well characterised in the critique by Appleton (2002) that outlined the following 
points of comparison:  
Definition of a case – Yin describes a case as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within is real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomena and context are not clearly evident”. Stake regards a case as an 
object and not a process, being “a specific, complex and functioning thing, with a 
boundary and functioning parts”. The boundaries are kept in focus. What is happening 
and deemed important within those boundaries (the emic perspective) is considered 
vital and usually determines what the study is about, as contrasted with other studies 
where hypotheses or issues previously targeted by the investigators (the etic 
perspective) usually determine the content of the study. The case study according to 
Stake uses idiosyncratic instances to create understanding of more general matters 
(using exceptions to prove the rule). 
Type of case study – Yin states that case study research can focus on either a single 
case or on multiple cases. These can be further defined as descriptive (documents a full 
description of the phenomenon within its context), exploratory (determines the 
feasibility of a study or defines questions and hypotheses of a subsequent study), or 
explanatory (demonstrates causal relationships). Stake suggests it may not always be 
possible to categorise case studies, but does describe three types: intrinsic (seeks clarity 
and understanding about a unique case); instrumental (a particular case is examined to 
provide insight into an issue or refinement of theory i.e. the case is not the primary 
focus); or collective (essentially an instrumental case expanded to incorporate a larger 




Paradigmatic orientation – The most obvious distinction between the two positions is 
that they have different paradigmatic starting points. Although Yin advocates 
qualitative and quantitative methods, his approach to case study research is considered 
by some to be essentially quantitative in nature (Stake, 1995). It follows a scientific 
framework to develop hypotheses, produce protocols to guide the investigation, collect 
empirical data and develop conclusions based on analysis of the data and therefore it 
could be argued that it is more consistent with a positivist viewpoint. Stake in contrast 
is influenced by a constructivist epistemology where knowledge is believed to be 
constructed and not discovered. It therefore requires purely qualitative approaches to 
uncover these multiple views about the case. Study designs emerge as the researcher 
interacts with study participants and begins to get a feel for important issues. While it is 
appropriate for a constructivist study to have clearly defined objectives and initial plans 
for preliminary data collection, Stake emphasises that these plans are often more 
tentative in nature. Commensurate with constructivism is the view that research cannot 
therefore be value free and is impacted upon by the researcher’s own philosophical 
viewpoints. The co-production of truth does imply that the researcher is an active 
participant and that their views will inform the exercise, either through the selection of 
the topic itself, the theoretical orientation of the specific research questions, or the 
micro-sociology of interactions with interviewees.  
Quality criteria – Consistent with Yin’s positivist perspective, he recommends using 
criteria more commonly associated with quantitative studies to assess the quality of a 
case study, such as internal and external validity and reliability. Clearly any definition 
of internal validity which includes measures of internal consistency of groups of 
variables in scales would be inappropriate in constructivist work, which seeks to 




does acknowledge that statistical generalisability is inappropriate, suggesting instead 
that the researcher seek analytical generalisation. This involves an attempt to 
“generalise a set of results to some broader theory” and then use this “as a template 
against which to compare empirical results” (Yin, 1994). In doing so, this approach 
focuses on the etic perspective (outsider or objective – description of a behaviour or a 
belief by an observer). Stake’s view of case studies is to deal with particularisation, 
focussing on the uniqueness of situations i.e. the emic perspective (insider or subjective 
– comes from a person within a culture) and not generalisation. Case reports can then 
help readers in their own construction of knowledge through vicarious experiences and 
not generalising findings to an existing theory. The responsibility lies with those who 
seek to apply or ‘transfer’ the study findings to other settings. These become naturalistic 
generalisations in which results become meaningful in terms of the reader’s own 
experiences, derived from the tacit knowledge of how things are, why they are, how 
people feel about them, and how these things relate to other circumstances with which 
that person is familiar (Stake, 1995). 
Sampling approach – Yin states cases should be selected at the beginning of a study to 
either “predict similar results (literal replication), or produce contrasting results but for 
predictable reasons (theoretical replication)”. Stake’s constructivist approach would not 
advocate explicit assumptions at the outset, but would be influenced by the realities 
encountered as the study developed. A case is initially selected due to its relevance to 
the phenomenon under investigation. The researcher then attempts to seek out the 
complexities of the case to provide greater insight into the issue of interest, often using 
purposive sampling to gather information rich cases.  
Use of theory - Yin states that theory is helpful in designing a case study, but also later 




prior commitment to theory, taking the view it is impossible to adopt a theoretical 
framework at the beginning of the study as not enough can be known about constructed 
realities which may exist in the context under investigation. This perspective takes the 
view that no a priori theory could possibly encompass the multiple realities that are 
likely to be encountered, believing that if this were the case there would be no need to 
do the research. Stake regards theory as emergent, but his approach to case study 
emphasises the uniqueness and particularisation of the case and does not insist on 
theory development.  
Despite oppositional framing of Yin and Stake by later commentators, it is important 
not to overstate the differences between them as there are inherent tensions associated 





Table 3.1: Associated tensions of oppositional framing of Yin and Stake in case study research 
Case study 
elements 
Yin (1994) Stake (1995) Tensions - commentary 
Ontology Realism.  Relativism. - 
Epistemology  Positivism (experimental) – there is an 
ultimate reality which the research is 
attempting to discover.  
 
Constructivism – each individual 
constructs his/her own reality resulting in 
multiple interpretations. Knowledge is 
constructed rather than discovered.  
- 
Perspective Objective  
An observer is providing a description of 
a participant’s beliefs.  
Subjective  
Participant and researcher are interacting 
to create knowledge together. 
Yin’s objectivist view is compromised by the fact the researcher does 
not simply reproduce participants’ meanings. It is inevitable that a 
process of selection and interpretation informed by the researcher’s 
theoretical framework intervenes between the researcher’s 
observation and the account which they give of that observation 
(Murphy et al., 1998).  
Researchers have to interpret others’ meanings and use strategies to 
avoid anecdotalism and the imposition of their prior assumptions 
upon the observations. 
Etic constructs are accounts, descriptions, 
and analyses that use as its starting point 
theories, hypothesis, perspectives, and 
concepts from outside of the setting being 
studied (imposition of prior theory). It 
allows for comparison across contexts 
and populations, and the development of 
more general cross-cultural concepts.  
Emic constructs are accounts, 
descriptions, and analyses expressed in 
terms of categories regarded as 
meaningful by members of the culture 
whose beliefs and behaviours are being 
studied. There is a focus on the 
particularity of the context, in its respect 
for local viewpoints, and its potential to 
uncover unexpected findings.  
In taking an emic approach, a researcher tries to put aside prior 
theories and assumptions in order to let the participants and data 
‘speak’ to them and to allow themes, patterns, and concepts to 
emerge. This approach is often used when researching topics that 
have not yet been heavily theorised. 
In taking an etic approach, a researcher takes an existing theory or 
conceptual framework and conducts research to see if it applies to a 
new setting or population. 
Researchers have to navigate the tensions between these two 
extremes. Stake’s approach advocates no prior assumptions impacting 
on interpretations, but since all researchers come with previous ideas, 
perspectives and commitments it may be impossible to be purely 
emic.  
Equally there is no recognition by Yin of the importance of tacit 
knowledge and intuitive processes in data collection. A completely 
etic approach risks blinding to potentially new and groundbreaking 
concepts.  
Questions are considered before 
embarking on the research and are of 
interest due to existing theory, previous 
research or own informed experience 
(hypothesis or issues previously targeted 
by the investigator determines the content 
of the study). 
Questions emerge from within the data 
during the research process (what is 
happening and deemed important within 
those boundaries is considered vital). 
 
Theory development takes place before 
data collection.  
 
Impossible to adopt a theoretical 
framework at the beginning of the study. 
Phenomenon of interest must be 






Yin (1994) Stake (1995) Tensions - commentary 
through progressive focussing. 
Explanatory (laws) – deductive 
Hypothesis-driven/ confirmatory. 
Exploratory – inductive. Neither approach can be totally devoid of overlap between inductive 
and deductive approaches. 
Case study attends more to the pervasive 
(i.e. proving the rule).  
Case study attends more to the 
idiosyncratic (exceptions) to create 
understanding of more general matters.  
Yin’s perspective is to use the case to test assumptions and so the 
emphasis on generalisation is stronger. Stake uses case studies to see 
where the general explanations fall down. Both however do this 
through an awareness of disconfirming evidence. 
Focus Not bounded – outside influences 
determine the content of the study. 
Series of case studies to test emerging 
theory.  
Bounded  – only concerned with the 
specific content of the case study.  
Focus in an intensive and in-depth 
fashion on one issue – on understanding 
the case itself.  
- 
Sampling Theoretical or literal replication. 
 
 - more emphasis placed on the method 
and the techniques. 
Purposive  - to give rise to interesting 
case studies.  
 - crucial to case study research is not the 
methods of investigation but that the 
object of study is a case. 
Probability sampling is not the intention of either approach.  
 
Generalisability Generalisable to theoretical propositions 
and not to populations or universes. 
 
Naturalistic generalisation. Responsibility 
lies with the reader to relate findings to 
their own experiences. 
 
 
While Yin’s method comes from an experimental tradition, there is an 
emphasis on the need to be cautious about generalising. Stake 
approaches it from the other direction in that while his approach in no 
way constitutes an experiment, it is possible to generalise beyond the 
case study margins. 
Methodology Advocates using both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. 
Qualitative only. - 
Triangulation Test of reliability – using multiple 
sources of data around the same 
phenomena to uncover an ultimate truth. 
Test of validity – using multiple sources 
of data around the same phenomena to 
construct a richer picture (each providing 
supplementary information).  
The tension arises here if one takes up a stable epistemological 
position on the nature of truth. Some researchers will make claims in 




Influences on my choice of case study method 
This research was an exploratory analysis of pharmaceutical industry views and was 
therefore suited to the methods of qualitative analysis. Neither Stake’s nor Yin’s 
approach to case study research however, was a perfect fit for this research. The 
approach taken was largely iterative and more constructivist in nature, but it is 
important to note that it did draw on pre-existing diffusion work as a starting point.  
Paradigmatic orientation – Case study was selected as the research intended to 
undertake a detailed examination of a contemporary issue (pharmaceutical industry 
personnel views on diffusion influences) within a real life setting (the context of the 
pharmaceutical industry) using multiple sources of data to elicit a greater understanding 
about the case. The aim of this research was not to set out to test hypotheses, but to 
uncover a set of constructed realities from members of the pharmaceutical industry 
about factors they believed influenced the diffusion of the case study drugs. I used the 
available understandings from Industry respondents to inform my analysis, and from 
these I developed my analysis to build a more nuanced and subtle understanding, while 
remaining close to the original data. This is consistent with Stake’s perspective, 
however, I did not start with a blank slate and these available understandings (from the 
literature and interviewees) have informed my analysis. For me this is more true to life 
that the position expounded by Stake, which implies that the analyst constructs 
understanding in a vacuum from first principles. The over-emphasis on construction, 
which ignores current understanding from which individuals build their understandings, 
is in my opinion a key weakness in Stake’s position. 
Definition of a case – While each individual case study in this research is concerned 




voice of the Industry respondents), the purpose of using multiple case studies was to use 
the information uncovered to provide a broader insight into diffusion issues, which is a 
heavily theorised topic (albeit from a particular perspective). While this is consistent 
with Stake’s definition of a ‘collective case study’ where case studies are used to 
explore a wider issue beyond the case itself, generalising beyond the boundaries of a 
particular case study aligns more with an etic perspective. 
Type of case – This study is examining Industry views across four different classes of 
drugs to increase the understanding about the phenomenon of interest i.e. 
pharmaceutical diffusion from a particular unique perspective. Therefore a collective 
case study exploratory in nature is being undertaken, as opposed to Yin’s explanatory 
approach to uncover an ultimate account as to how and why the drug classes diffused.  
Sampling – The approach taken to sampling was more consistent with Stake’s 
constructivist position. Information rich cases were sought as opposed to cases that 
would test a particular hypothesis through a set of theoretical contrasts.  
Rationale – Unlike Stakes’ approach, which focuses purely on qualitative methods, both 
quantitative and qualitative methods were used in the case study research, which is 
consistent with Yin’s perspective. The quantitative component was provided by the 
diffusion curves based on prescribing data of the case study pharmaceuticals. The 
qualitative component was represented by the interviews conducted with the 
pharmaceutical industry. The timeline information based on the literature and expert 





Use of theory – Pure constructivism holds the view that it is impossible to use any 
theoretical framework at the beginning of a study as not enough can be known about the 
constructed realities that may exist. This perspective does not then sit comfortably with 
the idea of using Framework analysis, which uses an inductive refinement of pre-
existing analytical categories. As mentioned previously, the concept of not having any a 
priori knowledge on a subject that you are researching, in practical terms is perhaps not 
a realistic perspective. Even when a largely inductive approach is taken, prior 
knowledge will have some influence in forming the analytical categories. I was 
therefore seeking to develop theoretical insights from new data, but being mindful of 
the existence of prior diffusion theory. 
It is clear that there are inherent tensions that exist by adhering purely to one or the 
other of these two positions. Instead a pragmatic approach was taken to the research that 
adopted a largely constructivist position, but used aspects of Yin’s perspective on case 
study methodology. 
 
3.2.2. Industry feasibility study  
Due to the sensitive nature of interaction with the pharmaceutical industry, a feasibility 
study was conducted at the outset (during April and May 2004) to determine whether 
the pharmaceutical industry would engage with the research. As the case study drugs 
were unknown at this stage, eight pharmaceutical companies selected from the ABPI’s 
list of the top 20 UK pharmaceutical corporations in 2002 (predominantly major 
companies, but also some smaller firms with whom the NIHR HSC had established 
relationships) were consulted to determine the propensity for Industry participation in 




also involved personnel from the companies’ marketing departments if referred by the 
contact. Companies were also asked whether they could provide quantitative data 
relating to marketing and whether they would discuss the specifics of marketing 
campaigns. 
Initial discussions revealed that while there was a generally positive response from 
Industry to the concept (from seven of the eight companies contacted), it was evident 
there would be caveats around access and confidentiality (see Appendix 2). This 
highlighted the need for a pool of case studies from which a final selection could be 
obtained to compensate for potential redundancy of responses. Discussion of specific 
drugs was acceptable providing they were reaching the end of their product lifecycles, 
but the provision of complementary quantitative data was regarded as problematic. 
Other researchers have experienced similar issues of access to quantitative Industry data 
or printed materials, resulting in them having to rely solely on interview data (Smith, 
2003a).  
 
3.2.3. Expert case study selection exercise  
A peer-review process with a selection of health care experts in medicines management 
was used to select cases based on interest (purposeful sampling frame), setting out the 
criteria for selection based on factors identified through the literature review and wider 
diffusion literature (see Appendix 3). Individuals were identified according to their 
experience within their respective fields, which included local and national prescribing 
committees (UK Medicines Information (UKMi) and the National Prescribing Centre), 
NICE, pharmaceutical advisors, representatives from the pharmaceutical industry, the 





Experts were contacted in December 2003 with the request to assist in the task of case 
study selection. A 10 year time frame (1990-2000) was applied during which the case 
study drug had to be launched based on the following general considerations: 
• Data sensitivity – launch sufficiently far back so as to remove issues of sensitivity 
regarding marketing practices; 
• Memory recall – launch not too far back as to compromise participant memory 
recall, particularly in an industry with high personnel turnover; 
• Sufficient data – The year 2000 was considered the latest feasible year of launch 
considering the drug would need to have been on the market long enough for 
sufficient data to be available on its uptake and diffusion. 
 
What were the experts asked? 
Members of the expert group were asked to provide suggestions for interesting case 
studies guided by a typology of criteria of diffusion factors identified from the literature 
review and the wider literature on pharmaceutical diffusion. These included such factors 
as cost, evidence base and side effect profile of the new drug, service reorganisation 
issues, marketing and journal, media or patient group interest (see Appendix 3). Experts 
were asked to suggest up to 10 drugs with a brief explanation as to the reason for their 
choices.  
 
The only other selection criterion applied was that the drugs were intended for use in 
primary or secondary care and not over the counter preparations. It was suggested that 
the selection did not only need to include ‘blockbuster’ drugs or those reviewed by 




that had already been the subject of diffusion research were highlighted to avoid 
duplicating these examples.  
 
Expert Response – Long list of case study drugs 
Of the 14 experts contacted, 11 provided responses, which were collated and analysed 
in February 2004. Many of the suggestions involved classes of drugs, which brought the 
total number of suggestions in excess of 60 drugs. There was considerable similarity in 
the selection of drugs between experts, and many (over half) of those selected were ones 
that had already received NICE guidance or guidance was pending.  
 
Short list of case study drugs 
Nine drug classes (incorporating 36 drugs), representing a potential pool of case studies, 
were selected from the expert sample based on frequency of suggestion (i.e. at least four 
suggestions of the same class were necessary to qualify, the cut-off of four providing a 
basis on which to obtain a reasonable size pool) (see Table 3.2). Selection based on 
suggestion frequency provided some variation as to the types of cases represented. This 
allowed for exploration of contrasts in the analysis, but this was not critical. Potential 
issues with access to interviewees (indicated through the feasibility study) meant that 
there was insufficient scope for a case-constrained selection (where cases are 
purposively selected to ensure certain dimensions at play can be explored i.e. primary 
versus secondary care etc.).  The intention was to complete, in no particular order, as 








Table 3.2: Short list of potential case studies (n=36) 
 
Class /Indication Propitary 
name  
Brand name  Company 





















Cozaar + diuretic (Cozaar-Comp) 
Diovan 
Teveten 




Micardis + diuretic (Micardis Plus) 


















Reminyl (mild to moderate) 
Excelon 







































Plavix Bristol-Myers Squibb/ 
Sanofi-synthelabo 





























Merck Sharp & Dohme 
Glitazones  
 















Fosamax + modified release (Fosamax 
Once Weekly) 
Actonel + modified release (Actonel 
Once a Week) 
Didronel + calcium carbonate (Didronel 
PMO) 
Merck Sharp & Dohme 
 
Procter & Gamble 
 
Procter & Gamble 
 
 
3.3. Gaining access to the Industry 
 
3.3.1. Interviewee identification 
For each case study, companies were approached in the order of market hierarchy 
position (market leader first). The diffusion curve data assisted in identifying the market 




provided clarification if not evident from the curves). For a case study to reach a 
conclusion, agreement to interview was sought from a minimum of three companies 
within the class.  
 
NIHR HSC contact  
The NIHR HSC has regular contact with the Industry as part of its day to day conduct in 
order to obtain intelligence about future products in development. This level of prior 
contact provided a personal means of credibility as a researcher and aided the process of 
initial access. Email requests were sent to the named point of contact for case study 
drug companies from the NIHR HSC database requesting contact details of potential 
interviewees. A brief outline of the research was provided, stating that a more detailed 
description would be forwarded once an appropriate person within marketing had been 
identified (language and content were validated with Industry contacts prior to sending - 
see Appendix 4). Although the NIHR HSC database of company contacts could not 
technically be regarded as a sampling frame, it provided the basis on which the sample 
population was sought.  
 
Industry contact 
On receiving information from the NIHR HSC contact, potential interviewees were 
approached directly with a request to participate in the research (see Appendix 5). 
Citing the NIHR HSC contact as the person who had suggested them as an interviewee, 
increased researcher credibility. The research was summarised in an attached 
information sheet that also addressed likely questions interviewees may have had 
regarding the use of the information (see Appendix 6). It was also indicated at this point 




particular individuals. The information sheet also served an additional function in that 
agreement to participate in receipt of this information was considered as consent on 
behalf of the respondent. 
 
Characteristics of the sample 
Interview participants required sufficient knowledge of the drug’s diffusion history and 
had to be of a level of seniority to have the authority to speak freely about the topic 
without reference to others. This ultimately defined the characteristics of the participant 
and restricted the number of participants who could be included in the study. It was 
feasible therefore to conduct in-depth interviews with a smaller number of participants, 
and in doing so trade depth in one dimension i.e. all stakeholders’ opinions about one 
drug, for breadth of knowledge in another i.e. using multiple case study drugs to explore 
one stakeholder’s perspective. 
The research request was addressed to the marketing directors of the companies 
involved. In addition to their position of authority, it was also accepted that the 
pharmaceutical industry is one in which there is a high turnover of staff and therefore it 
was unlikely that personnel could be identified who would have been present either 
within the same department, or even the same company, throughout the entire lifecycle 
of the case study drug. These were issues that had to be considered on an individual and 
pragmatic level, but personnel in directorate positions were considered more likely to 
have been in place for a sufficiently long enough period of time to recall the events 
under discussion. The interview population therefore comprised ‘elite’ professionals. 




accommodated during the access and interviewing stages (Duke, 2002; Ostrander, 
1995) (for further details see Appendix 7).  
 
3.3.2. Access process 
Figure 3.2 outlines the access process with the pharmaceutical companies involved (see 
section 3.6.3 for further details on the pilot interview). Different levels of contact were 
required to achieve a response. In general, anywhere between five and 25 emails were 
necessary to set up an interview date from the point of initial communication with the 
NIHR HSC contact, to arranging a date for the interview with the respondent, or 
alternatively effecting a decline. Once respondents agreed to participate, there was often 
a short turnaround time to prepare for the interview. 
On several occasions, the NIHR HSC contact (contact 1) unexpectedly acted as the 
‘gatekeeper’ to access, often delaying the process by several months. No response to the 
initial email was followed up with a phone call to explain the details of the project. This 
was usually sufficient to secure the name of an interviewee if the blockage had arisen at 
the first step. If the blockage arose at the second step i.e. with the potential interviewee 
(contact 2), phone contact to discuss the project directly often secured an interview. By 
addressing participant concerns, which included issues such as source of research 
funding; eventual use of the data and need for prior sight of the questions, it helped to 
establish the trust required to gain access to potential respondents.  
Refusal to participate occurred only on a few occasions. Reasons included:  
• No personnel left within the company with the organisational memory recall; 




• Potential interviewee too busy;  
• Case study drug still being marketed therefore information would be too 
sensitive; 
• Case study drug deemed not representative of case study (intended for specific 
subpopulations rather than for main class indication);  
• A second approach to a company for a different case study drug yielded the 
same nominated contact who had already declined to participate.  
  
In some cases it was not possible to obtain a direct refusal to participate, but equally it 
was not possible to obtain agreement either. Despite efforts to reassure, contact and 
arrange appointments, in these circumstances it was necessary to progress to the next 
company in the market leader hierarchy for that class. Towards the end of the project 
this became more difficult as fewer companies remained who had not been contacted 
previously through prior case studies. Where blockages occurred at the second point of 
contact in the process i.e. potential interviewees, it was possible to recontact the same 
company again regarding a different drug i.e. could reapproach contact 1. However, if 
the blockage occurred at the first point of contact, any drugs involving that company 
could not be pursued. Explanations for why certain drugs in the case study pool were 





























Key:        
C1  = Contact 1 (NIHR HSC Industry contact)   MSD = Merck Sharp & Dohme  
C2  = Contact 2 (potential interviewee)    GSK =  GlaxoSmithKline 
C3  = Contact 3 (potential interviewee)    P&G =  Procter & Gamble 
IV# = Completed interviews     BMS =  Bristol-Myers Squibb  
      =  Blockage to access ( Co. unwilling/unable to participate) AZ    =  AstraZeneca 
---  =  2nd  interview resulting from 1st interview   NR   =   No response 
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Table 3.3: Case specific issues: Drugs not pursued  
Case Drug Issues Case decision 
Statins Pravastatin Unable to pursue as received earlier 
refusal to participate in the research 
from Bristol-Myers Squibb regarding 
clopidogrel at the first contact point. 
Statins included as a case on 
the basis of having completed 
3 interviews (albeit on only 2 
statins). Was not possible to 
obtain any further interviews 
for this class. 
Cerevastatin Due to the withdrawal of cerevastatin 
after only four years, Bayer was not 
contacted regarding this drug. 
Glitazones Troglitazone Unable to pursue as GSK unable to 
discuss specific cases.  
Despite completing the 
timeline and expert 
consultation, this case study 




Rivastigmine  Approach made to NIHR HSC contact, 
but no interviewee provided by 
Novartis. 
Could not pursue case study as 
unable to secure interviews for 
3 drugs from this class. 
Galantamine No response from Shire. 
Donepezil Pfizer redirected to Eisai, but they were 
unable to provide a contact. 
Sartans Losartan 
 
No response from Merck Sharp & 
Dohme regarding losartan. 
Earlier contacts/outcomes 
from other case studies 
compromised the availability 
of options in the hierarchy for 
this class (left 3 possible 
drugs). Having already 
reached data saturation with 
previous cases, coupled with 
time constraints and the 
unlikelihood of gaining 
agreement from all 3 
companies, this case was not 
pursued further. 
Valsartan Approach made to NIHR HSC contact, 
but no interviewee provided by 
Novartis. 
Candesartan Initial approach made to AstraZeneca, 
but redirected to Takeda. Could not 
pursue further as had been unable to 
involve Takeda at first contact point in 
relation to earlier case study 
(pioglitazone). 
Irbesartan Unable to pursue due to Bristol-Myers 




Offered new companies, but case was not pursued due to time constraints and reaching 
data saturation with prior case studies. 
 
The final list of case studies is outlined in Table 3.4 together with summaries of the 






Table 3.4: Final Case Study Selection with Expert Justifications 
Case Study Drugs Included Company No. 
interviews 
Summaries of Experts’ justification for case study selection 
1 Bisphosphonates Etidronate 
 
P&G 1 BPs brought about a change in the definition of osteoporosis from a disease to a risk 
factor. Heavily promoted, directly to NHS staff and through provision of DEXA 
scanners in hospitals, and indirectly to the public about fear of hip fracture. Controversy 
surrounding the impact and benefit of BPs and where osteoporosis fitted as a risk 
alongside other factors in fracture prevention persisted due to delays in production of 
NICE guidance. Area of rapid increase in spend, especially since the demise of hormone 












Creation of a new class (AAs) marketed on the basis of fewer side effects was 
controversial as both the typicals and atypicals are an assorted group of drugs. Lively 
debate existed regarding their role in schizophrenia, their increased cost, unequal 
availability and emerging side effect profile compared to older drugs. High levels of 
patient engagement, formation of a patient group/professional and industry partnership 
promoted the needs of people suffering with schizophrenia, particularly with regard to 
quality of life issues. 
Olanzapine Lilly 2 
 
Quetiapine AstraZeneca 1 
3 PDE5 inhibitors Sildenafil Pfizer 
 
1 A very high profile class surrounded by immense publicity as the first oral treatments for 
erectile dysfunction. Raised numerous issues about cost, access, perception of erectile 
dysfunction as a lifestyle condition rather than a serious disease and became one of the 
few agents to be successful despite a lack of NICE guidance. Very heavily marketed 
both directly and indirectly to potential patients, but limited NHS availability restricted 




Vardenafil Bayer 1 
4 Statins Atorvastatin Pfizer 
 
 
1 Statins had a profound effect on approach to prevention of cardiovascular disease and 
prescribing budgets. Surrounded by substantial promotion and now one of the largest 
prescribing areas with a huge cost to the NHS. Strong evidence for the class and specific 
drugs, but later entrants diffused without evidence of improved clinical outcome. Any 
resistance changed with the National Service Framework for Coronary Heart Disease. 
Side effect issues affected the class, resulting in the withdrawal of one molecule. 












3.4. Diffusion curve construction  
Data was obtained for all 36 potential case study drugs as diffusion curves were 
produced in advance of final case study selection. The diffusion curves provided a data 
set amongst others to triangulate against interviewee responses. 
 
3.4.1. Data source: IMS Health 
IMS Health is a global profit-making organisation that collects and interprets 
anonymised health information from a number of sources and provides information and 
consulting services to the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries and research 
organisations. IMS Health was approached in preference to any other pharmaceutical 
data agency primarily because of previous diffusion research collaborations with the 
NIHR HSC.  
Data obtained 
Following requests to IMS Health in November 2004, UK data was supplied from their 
retail and hospital databases in the format of drug strength; number of tablets per pack; 
number of units (UN) sold (equivalent to packs sold); per quarter from Q12 (December) 
19922 to Q9 (September) 2004. The dataset was extracted from the IMS Health 
database by drug class, which enabled inclusion of all preparations, including those that 
had been previously withdrawn. Data updates were requested where necessary. 
 
3.4.2. Data analysis 
Data analysis took place between January and April 2005. In order to convert the data 
from a) number of packs sold3 to b) use in patients, the World Health Organization 
                                                 
2 The earliest date for which data was available. 
3 Retail and hospital units sold were combined to produce total usage of the drug in both primary and 




(WHO) classification system of Daily Defined Doses (DDDs) was used, as it is a 
recognised method of standardising patients from units sold.  
 
The definition of a DDD is the assumed average maintenance dose per day for a 
drug used for its main indication in adults. The DDD system is used for presenting 
drug utilisation data as it allows for standardisation of drug groupings, enables 
comparisons of drug use between countries, regions etc. and enables the 
examination of trends in medicine use. 
 
DDD measures for the case study drugs were obtained in December 2004 from the 
WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology website 
www.whocc.no/atcddd/ using the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC)/DDD 
Index 2005 and searching via the drug name. Drug usage in terms of number of 





Limitations of DDDs  
Diffusion curves based on DDD calculations are commonly used in diffusion studies, 
but they have to be considered within the context of their limitations. DDDs can be 
regarded as a crude method with obvious dangers of over-interpretation. They are based 
on the average daily therapeutic maintenance dose of a drug used for its main indication 
and therefore do not reflect the variations in dose if the drug is used for different 
indications. It can therefore only give a rough estimate of consumption (Clarke and 
Gray, 1995). An additional caveat to the DDD system is that in its attempt to determine 
Drug usage 
(No. of DDDs) 
[Concentration (mg/tab)] x [n tablets per pack] x [n units sold (UN)] 





an internationally universal value, the DDD could have potentially changed over time, 
although most modifications are recorded pre-2000. In this context however, DDDs 
were not being used to compare data on actual drug consumption, but as a relative 
measure to be able to achieve the shape of the curves. Alternative measures were 
considered, such as Prescribed Daily Dose (PDD), which is the average daily dose of 
the drug in the population with the disease of interest, but PDDs require that the 
treatment is specific to the disease and that the drugs are taken all year. As some of the 
drugs under consideration as case studies were not exclusively for chronic use, DDDs 
were chosen as the preferred unit. The use of direct sales data was also deemed 
unsuitable as firstly, it is subject to inflationary changes which would have to be 
accommodated for and secondly, it is not possible to identify when a product becomes 
generic, whereby usage could increase vastly, yet there would be little impact seen on 
the sales curve due to the significantly reduced price of the generic version. 
Due to the nature of the way the data was supplied, an additional limitation of the 
diffusion curves is that any impact from an event would not be evident until the next 
reported quarter. If several events occurred within the same quarter, it was not possible 
to distinguish their individual effects. Despite these inadequacies, the DDD approach 
achieved the desired aim, which was to demonstrate where the relative inflexion points 
occurred during the drug’s lifecycle to stimulate discussion with Industry respondents. 
It was not necessary to demonstrate exactly where the inflexion points occurred using 
time series analysis methods as the intention was for the respondents to identify where 







3.4.3. Diffusion curve construction 
Individual diffusion curves representing drug usage (in terms of number of DDDs) over 
time were plotted for each of the potential case study drugs. Area under the curve 
calculations indicated the market hierarchy position of each drug within its class. 
 
3.5. Timeline construction 
 
3.5.1. Literature-based timeline 
To augment the diffusion curves, a timeline of events potentially affecting the diffusion 
of the case study drugs was constructed from a review of the background literature. 
This was used as a triangulation source that could be compared with the diffusion curve 
and Industry-derived accounts of the same phenomenon. It was also an essential process 
of familiarisation of the topic material ahead of the interviews to enhance my credibility 
as a researcher amongst an elite participant sample. It was not an attempt to 
systematically document all activities that impacted upon the diffusion curve, but to 
reflect some of the main events prioritised with clinical expert input (see section 3.5.2).  
 
Information was sought mainly through internet search engines using key words or 
through MEDLINE/EmBASE and EconLit searches, drug pipeline development 
databases (PharmaProjects - Informa Healthcare [www.pharmaprojects.com]; Adis 
R&D Insight - Springer International Publishing AG [www.adisinsight.com]) and 
national and international clinical guideline finders, analyst reports and the Cochrane 
Library. Search terms included keyword searches of the drug’s generic and proprietary 
brand names, and specifically looked for any controversial events throughout the 
lifecycle; marketing campaigns; comparative reviews; pivotal trials; significant clinical 




reports; launches of new formulations, or additional licence indications (See Appendix 
8). 
3.5.2. Clinical expert augmentation  
 
The validity of the literature-based events were reviewed and augmented by case 
specific clinical experts in a one to two hour interview prior to conducting the Industry 
interviews. This was to 1) validate the findings of the case specific literature search and 
2) to provide any additional insights in preparation for the interviews with the Industry. 
As the intention of the research was to obtain Industry perspectives, the timelines were 
not shown to the interviewees at any stage so as to not influence their accounts by 
providing pre-identified events. They were however, later used as an additional data 
source for triangulation alongside the interviewee accounts and the diffusion curves.  
 
Experts were identified through snowball sampling, either through clinical contacts of 
one of my supervisors, or if they were unable to participate, they would suggest other 
colleagues. Experts were approached as soon as one company within the class had 
agreed to participate, which meant that the expert and background work had to be 
completed without the knowledge the case study would reach completion. This also 
resulted in a short turnaround time to complete expert interviews.  
 
Expert augmentation was considered a more preferable method of validating the 
literature-based explanations for the curve inflexions, compared to time and resource 
intensive techniques such as interrupted time series analysis where events either side of 
a data point are analysed to determine if an event was responsible for causing that 
inflexion. It was considered inappropriate to force such quantitative rigour onto a 
project that was concerned with perceptions and beliefs. The research aimed to capture 




were proven to be, and what they thought were the most likely explanations for the 
perceived inflexions. Case studies that lacked or had limited expert input relied more on 
the literature to justify inclusion of events in the timeline. 
 
3.6. Industry interviews 
 
Interviews were conducted with 15 participants from eight pharmaceutical companies. 
 
3.6.1. Semi-structured interviews 
To study perceptions that are representative of an organisation or individual requires 
methods that can reveal the depth of insight into what is said by respondents. Perception 
is by definition, the process by which someone interprets the actions of the external 
world. Questionnaires are too rudimentary to offer this level of depth, particularly when 
dealing with such a sensitive research subject often protected by ‘commercial in 
confidence’ caveats. This project required more subtle methods that enabled the 
building of trust between researcher and respondent.  
 
Interviews are one of the most important sources of case study information, as they are 
particularly appropriate for exploratory research to study the range and complexity of 
ideas and definitions used by respondents. They often enable access to private accounts, 
particularly when addressing sensitive subjects. They also allow participants more 
opportunity and time to express their views and opinions compared with other methods 
of qualitative data collection. In fact, such an in-depth understanding of the participant’s 
point of view cannot be achieved using any other data collection method (Hansen, 
2006). While it is appreciated that interviews do have inherent problems in that they 




they are collected, these limitations are considered acceptable if the aim is to understand 
individuals’ perceptions. When interviewing people in positions of power, a semi-
structured question format is considered to be far more effective than unstructured or 
highly structured interviews, as they tend to tip the balance of power in favour of the 
researcher (Walford, 1994; Ostrander, 1995; Hirsch, 1995). 
 
3.6.2. Interview schedule  
An interview schedule is a list of broad key areas to be covered during the interview 
along with a selection of open-ended questions relevant to each topic area designed to 
encourage a thorough response. It provides a visual reminder of the key subject areas to 
cover if the interviewee deviates away from the intended sequence of topics (a feature 
of the unstructured nature of a semi-structured interviews), and ensures the same topics 
are covered during each interview. 
Interview schedule structure 
The interview schedule (provided in Appendix 9) was developed in conjunction with 
the access materials. The questions were grouped into sections according to a priori 
knowledge of diffusion influences with introductory statements that explained the 
function of that particular set of questions. The schedule started with a statement of 
purpose and a series of general questions to settle the respondent into the interview, 
before progressing to specific case study questions about their understanding of, and 
attitudes towards critical factors they felt explained the inflexions in the diffusion 
curves of their company’s drug. Signposting statements were used throughout to 







The number of questions was determined as a function of the proposed interview 
length. The literature indicated that a semi-structured interview of 45-60 minutes would 
support around 10-12 interview questions (Hansen, 2006). Questions were constructed 
mindful of the fact respondents were participating through goodwill. It was essential to 
maintain that basis in broaching difficult subject areas or in reaction to ‘official line’ 
responses, by using a recognised interview technique that asks respondents about the 
opinions or behaviour of other people, such as “some people believe that ...What’s your 
view?” which enables disassociation of a potentially provocative view from that held by 
the researcher (Ostrander, 1995; Duke, 2002).  
Questions were:  
• open-ended to encourage a detailed response from respondents and reveal 
possibly unanticipated viewpoints (avoidance of closed/leading questions); 
• kept to individual concepts/unambiguous in their wording (emphasis on the use 
of spoken English as opposed to written English);  
• non-threatening/non-controversial at the outset; 
• designed to incorporate appropriate vocabulary (validated by Industry contacts 
prior to use as considered important when dealing with elite respondents); 
• asked in such as way as to achieve equivalence of meaning with individual 
respondents rather than imposing standardised questions throughout. 
 
It was necessary to establish credibility with participants by asking relevant questions 
that were perceived as meaningful by the interviewee and that were based on an 






3.6.3. Pilot interview 
 
The pilot interview gave the opportunity to trial and refine the interview schedule, 
whilst providing a forum for qualitative interviewing practice. The pilot was conducted 
with a former marketing director of a medical device company using implantable 
cardioverter defibrillators as the case study subject. The pilot interview took place 
before it was known which pharmaceutical companies were going to be involved in the 
research and therefore a non-pharmaceutical company was chosen so as to not 
jeopardise any of the potential case study drugs. The questions could be easily adapted 
to suit a medical technology, whilst still being able to identify any potential issues with 
the nature of the questions.   
 
The pilot interview was conducted in May 2006. As with the case studies, a diffusion 
curve and timeline of events was generated, but the respondent only had access to the 
unannotated diffusion curve during the interview. Suggestions for improvement 
included a need for clearer signposting during the interview, provision of a pre-
interview agenda to allow participants sufficient time to consider the questions properly 
and emphasising the fact that it was an academic and not a journalistic exercise to make 
respondents aware that breaking away from the ‘official line’ would not be detrimental. 
It was also highlighted that it would not be considered offensive to use direct or 
controversial prompts as this interview population would be experienced in dealing 








3.6.4. Interview Participants 
Despite a consistent approach in the way requests were made to companies with regard 
to interviewee profiles, participants had an extensive range of job titles. They were 
predominantly from within the marketing departments for the specific brands of drug, 
or disease area business units, but also included participants from more general areas of 
the companies including market access, government affairs or managing director level. 
While this variation ultimately impacted on the content of the interviews (consistent 
with the literature (Duke, 2002), those respondents of higher seniority were less 
guarded in their responses), the companies had selected the person they deemed the 
most suitable to participate in the research. Also consistent with Duke’s observations 
was that some respondents were either conducting research projects themselves, or had 
done so in the past as part of their professional training, which may have been a factor 
in their willingness to participate. 
 
On two occasions snowball ‘convenience’ sampling (where the interview participant 
suggested another person who would be useful to contribute to the case study 
discussion) led to subsequent interviews. While acknowledged as a sub-optimal 
sampling method, it was a pragmatic response to access difficulties and is not an 
uncommon practice in studies involving Industry participants.  
 
3.6.5. Pre-interview materials  
Respondents received an unannotated diffusion curve for their product under discussion 
in advance of the interview, but did not have access to the literature/clinical expert 




provided with a signposting agenda on the basis this would reassure them as to the 
direction and scope of the interview. However, after the second interview it became 
apparent that agendas changed the balance of power in favour of the respondent by 
enabling prepared responses and personal agendas that were difficult to steer away 
from. They were discontinued in subsequent interviews in favour of verbal signposting. 
 
3.6.6. Interview conditions  
Interviews took place between July 2006 and May 2008. Interviews were conducted 
solely by the researcher on a one to one basis at the interviewee’s place of work. 
Interviews lasted on average around one hour (range 45 minutes to 1 hour 50 minutes) 
and were digitally recorded to allow for accurate capture of the data following 
interviewee consent. Whilst introducing the project it was often necessary to explain the 
term ‘diffusion’ which seemed to be a term more closely associated with academic 
research rather than that routinely used in pharmaceutical marketing.  
The interviews covered general and case study specific themes, with the emphasis on 
enabling respondents to give spontaneous accounts of their perspectives on events they 
felt were most significant in affecting the diffusion curve for their product over its 
lifecycle and its competitors. The semi-structured format provided enough scope for 
respondents to talk freely around certain key themes and identify issues they felt were 
important that could then be pursued through new lines of questioning.  
It is accepted in the literature that interview schedules are dynamic as they reflect 
ongoing data collection and analysis (Hansen, 2006). Although the main topic areas 
remained constant, slight modifications were made during the course of the study 
period based on experiences of previous interviews. The most significant change was 




for greater exploration of the specific case study issues, as interviewees tended to draw 
on specific examples to respond to the general questions. 
 
3.7. Thematic analysis of the interview data  
Invariably, interview data in its text form is unwieldy and unstructured, with highly 
detailed content. A coherent structure has to be applied to the data for it to become 
meaningful without losing the original accounts and observations from which the 
structure is derived (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). Thematic analysis i.e. analysing the 
data across case studies by theme enabled a generic set of Industry views on diffusion 
factors to be elucidated. A thematic approach also removed some of the sensitivity 
issues surrounding individual drug narratives.   
 
3.7.1. Thematic frameworks 
Thematic frameworks provide the analytical tools to classify and organise data 
according to key themes, concepts and emergent categories. According to Ritchie and 
Spencer (1994), this process relies on the “conceptual ability of the analyst to determine 
meaning, salience and connections”. Framework is a particular thematic framework 
developed by Ritchie and Spencer (1994) and is a well-recognised method of qualitative 
analysis used in health services research. Framework starts deductively from pre-set 
aims and becomes more inductive as respondents’ themes emerge i.e. inductive 
refinement of existing analytical categories (Pope et al., 2000). A conceptual model 
relevant to the question is chosen and used as the basis of the initial coding framework 
(themes or concepts identified a priori can be specified as coding categories from the 




of Innovations theory meant that Framework was an appropriate method to use in this 
analysis. 
 
3.7.2. Stages involved in Framework analysis 
Framework analysis uses the standard qualitative approach of reading and re-reading 
the transcripts and selecting and reorganising responses according to themes, but data 
collection is more structured than would be the norm for other qualitative research. It 
uses a matrix-based method involving the construction of thematic categories into 
which data can be coded, enabling the analytical process to be more explicit (Dixon-
Woods, 2011). As more transcripts are included, the list of themes subsequently reduce 
by merging the subgroups into more useful groupings. The final product is a revised 
framework containing both modified factors and new factors that were not anticipated 
in the original model. This process is described according to five distinct, yet highly 
interconnected stages of familiarisation, identifying a thematic framework, indexing, 

















Table 3.5: The analytical process according to ‘Framework’ stages 
Framework Stages Theoretical description 
Familiarisation A priori issues are founded.  
Immersion in a selection of the data through:  
• listening to recordings 
• reading and re-reading transcripts 
• noting key ideas and recurrent themes 





First version is heavily rooted in a priori issues and largely descriptive.  
Apply framework to a few transcripts. 
Refine categories - look for conceptualisations that encapsulate experience; 
attitude; circumstance. 
Framework becomes more responsive to emergent themes. 
Indexing (coding) 
 
Systematically apply the thematic framework to individual transcripts.  
All data read, and annotated by numerical system corresponding to framework 
categories (margins). A paragraph may contain several themes (multiple 
indexing). Highlights patterns of association. Indexing is a subjective process 
and open to differing interpretations. 
Charting  
 
Build up a picture of the data as a whole. 
Data is ‘lifted’ from original context and rearranged according to the 
appropriate thematic reference (text grouped together with the same thematic 
code). 
The chart headings can be laid out according to whether analysis is to be:  
• thematic (for each theme across all respondents) 





Pull together core themes:  
charting – looking for themes. 
mapping – how themes relate to one another (conceptualisation).  
• Define concepts  
• Range and nature of phenomena 
• Creating typologies 
• Finding associations 
• Providing explanations 
• Developing strategies 
 
3.7.3. How I carried out the Framework analysis  
 The bisphosphonate case study interviews were completed first. Initial thoughts on key 
themes raised by respondents were noted immediately post-interview. Interviews were 
professionally transcribed verbatim, but due to time constraints and resolving access 
issues for subsequent cases, the coding process did not take place until after completion 
of the second case study (the atypical antipsychotics). Insights from notes and listening 
to the interviews from the first case study however, were used to iteratively develop the 






Atypical antipsychotics (AAs) 
On completion of the second case study, the coding process began. A manual version of 
thematic analysis was used in favour of software packages, such as NUDIST or NVIVO 
on the basis that as a novice qualitative researcher on a project of this scale, it would 
enable a comprehensive understanding of the distinct processes involved and explicit 
representation of how conclusions were reached. 
- Familiarisation (data immersion) 
Coding of the AA interviews took place first, but before sifting and sorting the data, it 
was necessary to get what is often described as a ‘feel’ for the data. The recordings 
from the AA interviews were listened to repeatedly and the transcripts verified for 
accuracy against the original recordings. Key ideas and recurrent themes which 
emerged as important to the respondents themselves were annotated on each drug’s 
diffusion curve. These narratives (referred to as drug-specific accounts) provided the 
third data source used to triangulate against the diffusion curve and the literature and 
expert augmented timelines (described in Chapter 6). These exercises provided a 
starting point for identifying the major anticipated (theoretically-informed) and 
emergent themes rather than using the transcript as a first strategy to coding and began 
the process of abstraction and conceptualisation. 
 
– Identifying a thematic framework (developing a coding frame) 
Notes were made in the margins of the transcripts, assigning quotes in the first instance 
to the broad a priori categories informed by the literature review and the substantial 
existing body of work on diffusion such as ‘Evidence’, ‘Communication channels’, 




subthemes and new categories that had started to emerge during the familiarisation 
stage were further developed to reflect any new insights offered (in vivo codes). Margin 
notes were collated, discussed with one of my supervisors and sorted into categories 
and subcategories. The resulting framework, referred to as the ‘post-coding’ framework 
consisted of a mixture of key themes reflecting the aims of the research and introduced 
into the interviews via the topic guide, as well as those emerging from the data, and 
analytical themes arising from the recurrence or patterning of particular views or 
experiences.  
– Indexing (Coding the data) 
The codes from the post-coding framework were applied to the four AA transcripts 
(two of the four interviews related to the same drug, but were from different personnel 
within the same company).  
– Charting (cut and paste)  
Coded extracts were electronically ‘cut and paste’ from the transcripts and collected 
under the corresponding coded headings in an excel spread sheet according to company 
to undergo data interpretation.  
– Initial mapping and data interpretation  
Once all of the data from the AA case study had been charted, the quotes were 
transferred into individual word documents according to theme. Descriptions were then 
written to define the theme and any emerging ideas about the data. As a result of doing 
this process, the framework could potentially adapt again as quotes were reorganised 
(‘post-analysis’ framework). This was the start of the mapping and interpretation 






At this stage it was not clear if separate frameworks would be appropriate for each case 
study and so the BP coding and charting processes were conducted independently of the 
AAs. While some of the key themes from the AA framework were used to inform the 
BP framework, it was mainly influenced by the BP data and the analysis was also 
considered separately from the AAs.   
 
PDE5 Inhibitors  
As a result of the similarity between the framework categories from the first two cases, 
the decision was made at this point to merge the AA and BP frameworks to develop a 
single ‘global framework’ that accommodated all the data so far. This provided a 
‘starter for ten’ for the next case. Any new insights to pursue were incorporated into the 
topic guide ahead of the interviews on the PDE5 inhibitors. The PDE5 inhibitor 
interview data was then coded against the merged AA and BP framework. New material 
further challenged the emerging coding framework, which was flexible enough to be 
adapted and refined as categories and subcategories were re-thought (the resulting 
framework incorporated themes from all three cases – referred to as the BP+AA+PDE5 
post-coding framework). Ritchie and Spencer (1994) described how, “devising and 
refining a thematic framework is not an automatic or mechanical process, but involves 
both logical and intuitive thinking. It involves making judgements about meaning about 
the relevance and importance of issues and about implicit connections between ideas”. 
The data from the previous two cases and the new case were charted according to the 
new framework structure on a single spreadsheet and analysed collectively, giving rise 
to further modifications to the framework (BP+AA+PDE5 post-analysis framework) as 





Statins case study and general interviews 
Once the final case study (statins) was completed, this data together with the general 
interviews conducted earlier in the process was coded against the BP+AA+PDE5 post-
analysis framework to generate the (BP+AA+PDE5)+statin+general post-coding 
version of the framework. The two interviews that covered general as opposed to case 
specific information were listened to and only material relevant to themes identified 
from the case study interviews was extracted i.e. supported existing themes, added new 
perspectives, or provided disconfirming evidence. The new data fitted into the previous 
version of the framework without significant alteration i.e. no new perspectives were 
uncovered, suggesting theoretical data saturation was being achieved.  
 
Disconfirming evidence – Throughout the process, negative cases (disconfirming 
evidence) were sought and incorporated into the analysis i.e. if part of transcript did not 
fit within one of the framework categories derived from the interviews so far, that 
category could be expanded using a different theme description to encompass the new 
piece of data. If this was not appropriate, then a new category would be formed, which 
could be absorbed into another theme at a later stage once more data fed into the 
framework (an example is provided later in section 3.8.1). 
 
A worked example showing how the coding framework developed throughout the 
analytical process for theme 3 ‘Clinical evidence (Efficacy)’ is presented in Figure 3.3. 
The assignment and re-assignment of direct quotes to the iteratively derived coding 





– Mapping and data interpretation  
Although the analysis was developed throughout the coding and charting stages, the 
final framework (BP+AA+PDE5+Statin+general post-analysis framework) was 
produced following analysis of the data as a whole. This stage addresses the key 
objectives of the qualitative analysis. This involved pulling together key characteristics 
of the data, mapping and interpreting the data by comparing and contrasting the 
perceptions and accounts, searching for patterns across the data and associations within 
it and seeking explanations for these internally within the data. As outlined by Ritchie 
and Spencer (1994), the type of analysis route is guided by the original research 
question and by the themes and associations which have emerged from the data. The 
analysis, which is presented in Chapter 5, is structured according to the ten major 
themes of the final framework to provide explanations as to the reasons why 
pharmaceuticals diffuse or not from the perspective of Industry respondents. In doing 





Figure 3.3: Iterative development of the coding framework for the ‘Clinical evidence (Efficacy)’ theme  















(BP+AA+PDE5) + Statins + General Post-
analysis   
3. Evidence 
3.1. Marketing evidence 
3.2. Impact of clinical evidence 
3.2.1. Trial design  
3.2.1.1. Functional versatility of evidence 
3.2.1.2. Novel trial perspective 
3.2.2. Evidence translation: 
Relevance/limitation of trial outcomes 
3.2.2.1. Head to head comparisons 
3.2.2.2. Surrogate markers versus clinically 
relevant outcomes 
3.2.3. Temporal impact of evidence 
3.2.4. Journal quality/Publication control 
 
BP+AA+PDE5 Post-coding 
3. Evidence  
3.1. Safety 
3.1.1. Unlicensed use  
3.1.2. Regulation 
3.1.2.1. Variation in regulatory standards 
3.1.2.2. Adverse effects (official  
warnings)/ contraindications 
3.2. Clinical effectiveness (primary data) 
3.2.1. Trial design  
3.2.3. Temporal impact of evidence 
3.2.3. Translation: Relevance/limitation of 
trial outcomes 
3.2.4. Journal quality/Publication control 
3.3. Marketing – market revival with new data 
 
BP: Post-analysis  
3. Evidence 
3.1. Safety 
3.1.1. Unlicensed use  
3.1.2. Regulatory issues 
3.1.2.1. Variation in regulatory 
standards 
3.1.2.2. Adverse effects (official 
warnings) 
3.2. Clinical effectiveness (primary data) 
3.2.1. Trial design  
3.2.2. Temporal impact of evidence 
3.2.3. Relevance/limitation of trial 
outcomes 
3.2.4. Journal quality/Publication 
control 
 
BP+AA+PDE5 Post-analysis  
3. Evidence  
3.1. Safety /Regulation 
3.1.1. Warnings 
3.1.1.1. Unlicensed use  
3.1.1.2. Adverse effects/contraindications 
3.1.2. Variation in regulatory standards 
3.2. Evidence as marketing 
3.2.1. Trial design  
3.2.2. Evidence translation: 
Relevance/limitation of trial 
outcomes 
3.2.2.1. Head to head comparisons 
3.2.2.2. Surrogate markers 
3.2.3. Temporal impact of evidence 
3.2.4. Journal quality/Publication control 
 
BP: Post-coding  
3. Evidence 
3.1. Safety 
3.1.1. Unlicensed use  
3.1.2. Regulatory Issues  
3.1.3. Adverse effects 
3.2. Clinical effectiveness (Primary level 
data) 
3.2.1. Trial design  
3.2.2. Journal quality/Publication control 
3.3. Evidence translation 
3.3.1. Trial outcomes: planned vs 
serendipitous 
3.3.2. Tailored to adopter category 




3.1. Legitimacy (authority) 
(Mandatory vs non-compulsory 
nature of evidence) 
3.2. Quality of the evidence 
Study design (RCT vs observation) 
and impact factor journal rating 
(BMJ/JAMA vs less prestigious 
journals) 
3.3. Primary studies 
3.3.1. Timing 
When in the lifecycle of the drug 
evidence findings are released 
3.3.2. Rejection/Acceptance 
Point at which crucial weight of 
evidence proves a particular 
finding 
3.3.3. Relevance clinical endpoint 
Whether they are meaningful to 
those interpreting them  
3.4. Warnings - safety concerns 
(mandatory (CSM) warnings vs 
suggestive links to adverse effects)  
 
Evidence - 
Results of clinical 
evaluations to 
prove/ disprove a 
technology’s 
effectiveness 
- Primary level 
- Secondary level 
 
AA:  Post-analysis 
3. Evidence 
3.1. Safety 
3.1.1. Unlicensed use 
3.1.2. Regulatory warning 
3.1.3. Adverse effects 
3.2. Clinical Data 
3.2.1. Primary 
3.2.2. Secondary 
3.3. Evidence Translation 
3.3.1. Relevance of outcomes 
3.4. Policy and guidelines 




Moved to its own category ‘Health 
service/policy environments’ as it became 
a more substantial issue. 
Became part of ‘Communicating relative 
advantage’ as this theme developed. 
(BP+AA+PDE5) + Statins + General Post-
coding   
3. Evidence  
3.1. Safety /Regulation 
3.1.1. Warnings 
3.1.1.1. Unlicensed use  
3.1.1.2. Adverse effects/contraindications 
3.1.2. Variation in regulatory standards 
3.2. Evidence as marketing 
3.2.1. Trial design  
3.2.2. Evidence translation: 
Relevance/limitation of trial outcomes 
3.2.2.1. Head to head comparisons 
3.2.2.2. Surrogate markers 
3.2.3. Temporal impact of evidence 
3.2.4. Journal quality/Publication control 
 
Became part of ‘Clinician/patient experience 
as most safety issues in these cases had arisen 




3.8. Quality assessment in qualitative research - strengths and limitations  
Qualitative research is often criticised for being an assembly of anecdote and personal 
impressions, strongly subject to researcher bias due to the degree of inference required 
to explain meaning, resultsing in research that lacks reproducibility (Mays and Pope, 
1995; Madill et al., 2000). Qualitative methods generate large amounts of detailed 
information about a small number of settings, and although statistical inference is not 
the objective of qualitative research it is often criticised for lacking generalisability. The 
results of this study must be interpreted in light of its limitations, but it is important to 
highlight that objectivity and reliability are understood differently in qualitative 
research (Houghton et al., 2013).  
 
Key questions in assessing the quality of qualitative analysis (Green and Browne, 2005) 
include: 
• How does the reader know these findings are not just the subjective 
interpretation of the researcher? 
• How does the reader know the researcher has not just picked out the examples 
that support their hypothesis? 
• The sample is very small – how does the reader know these participants are 
representative of a larger population?  
 
Kirk and Miller (1986) demonstrated how quality in qualitative research can be assessed 
in equivalent terms of reliability and validity as those employed in quantitative 




Table 3.6: Validity, reliability and generalisability in qualitative and quantitative 
studies 
Concern Quantitative approach Qualitative approach 
Does the study 
investigate what it 
aims to do? 
Internal validity: Good study design; the 
extent to which alternative explanations 
of causal relationships are explored and 
taken into account. 
Credibility: Triangulation of data to explore extent to 
which a full picture of complexity is achieved; 
examination of ‘negative’ or disconfirming cases (allow 
refining of categories); theoretical saturation (are 
concepts well rounded?). 
How broadly can the 
results be applied? 
External validity (generalisability): 
Large representative random samples, 
with statistical inference of results to 
defined populations. 
Transferability: purposive or theoretical sampling and 
discussion of choices made; results are descriptions 
applicable within a specified setting (is the setting 
representative of the population to which generalisation 
is sought); demographic material describing the context 
of the study is helpful. 
How is bias avoided? Objectivity: Attempt to control all 
sources of bias in order to arrive at an 
objective view. 
Reflexivity: Assessing the effect of the researcher at 
every step. Bias arises where the effect of the researcher 
is ignored. Preconceptions and prior theoretical 
perspectives declared and explored. 
What degree of 
certainty can we have 
of the results? 
Reliability: The extent to which a 
test/measure yields the same result in 
repeated applications i.e. replication. 
Reliability: Transparency and accuracy measures; 
respondent validation of results. 
 
 
Mays and Pope (1995) operationalised the set of concerns outlined in Table 3.6 in the 
form of a checklist against which the quality of qualitative studies can be assessed 
providing they adequately address the components described in the checklist (see 
Appendix 12).  
 
3.8.1. Credibility (internal validity)  
Comprehensiveness - Data from all of the case study interviews was coded and charted 
and interpretations accounted for all extracts under each thematic heading. The reader 
has access to the majority of quotes in Chapter 5, apart from circumstances where there 
were instances of repetition and the best exemplifying quote was presented.  
Thoroughness (disconfirming evidence) - Analysis was driven by comparisons between 
and within cases. Analysing why things were the same or different provided the basis on 
which to find out what respondents believed were influential drivers and barriers to 
diffusion. Disconfirming evidence to emerging theories was constantly sought 




incorporated into the analysis to aid understanding and refine theory development, or 
sometimes led to reconceptualisation of themes. An example included the impact of 
safety concerns. Most respondents considered safety issues regarding their drug as 
being detrimental to diffusion, but in the case of sildenafil, the fact that a 
contraindication had been identified was viewed by a respondent as having a positive 
impact.  It acted to reassure patients that the drug had been fully tested and they could 
be assured of its safety profile in amongst a backdrop of publicity suggesting potential 
safety issues. 
Study Design (Case study approach/semi-structured interviews) – While it placed 
constraints on the research, particularly since the results were then de-contextualised 
and presented thematically, the case study approach was instrumental in getting beyond 
‘official line’ responses. They provided real life contexts from which interviewees could 
draw upon examples. Compared with theoretical discussion of general factors, case 
studies enabled triangulation of accounts with other data sources of the same 
phenomenon to test validity and reliability of the empirical findings (in accordance with 
a constructivist approach however, it is inappropriate to consider that triangulation 
constructs an ultimate ‘truth’ of the case study story, but instead provides an enriched 
picture of events). 
Interviews elicited a depth of response through established rapport that would not have 
been achieved through written responses. The advantage of using a semi-structured 
approach was that similar data could be gathered from all respondents, which was 
useful when taking a thematic approach to the analysis. It is acknowledged however, 
that in talking a semi-structured approach, a priori knowledge influenced the analytical 




experienced qualitative researcher may have been able to have avoided this bias by 
being able to explore simply ‘what factors affect diffusion?’ which is likely to have 
elicited more fully the views and priorities of the respondents, but this would have been 
a high risk strategy with this group of respondents and the nature of the research topic.  
Social acceptability bias – When research of this nature has been conducted with 
adopter groups, social acceptability bias has been highlighted as a limiting factor. 
Clinicians may be reluctant to reveal some of the more irrational explanations behind 
their prescribing decisions that may not be in alignment with current practices or be 
judged as socially unacceptable by their peers. There is a certain freedom that comes 
with discussing another professional groups’ behaviour that would not be readily 
divulged by members within that group. As adopters are often keen to discuss Industry 
behaviour, respondents were equally prepared to discuss behaviours of clinicians and 
payers that were perceived by them as being influential in diffusion, which has offered a 
new insight into this area of research. 
Triangulation – Credibility can be enhanced with triangulation, which uses several 
methods to study one phenomenon. The three triangulated data sources in this research 
included the case specific i) diffusion curves, ii) literature and expert timelines and iii) 
individual drug-specific narratives developed through annotation of the diffusion curves 
from respondents accounts generated during the familiarisation stage of the analysis. 
The purpose of triangulation was to ensure the data was complete through gathering 
multiple perspectives from a variety of sources. Points of convergence are not claims of 
truth, but instead provide the context for discussion of differences, which enhances 
completeness. Exploration of the divergent understandings then generates an enriched 




cross contamination of the data during triangulation are addressed in the section on 
reflexivity in section 3.8.2.  
Single analyst/ Peer debriefing (multiple coding or inter-rater reliability) – As the 
subject of a Ph.D., multiple researcher coding was not possible. While consistency can 
be enhanced by a single analyst, it does increase the chance of missing important issues 
or being funnelled into narrow interpretations as no two researchers will interpret the 
data in the same way. Reflexivity was therefore particularly important to acknowledge 
how my pre-conceptions may have impacted on data interpretation. Ryan-Nicholls and 
Will (2009) recommend using peer debriefing, where the aim is not for another analyst 
to arrive at the exact same coding and thematic structure as the researcher. Rather the 
purpose is to see if they agree with the data coding and the logical paths taken to arrive 
at those codes (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). While no one else coded my raw data, 
discussions were conducted throughout with one of my supervisors regarding the coding 
frame I had developed to determine if it was a plausible interpretation. 
Member checking (respondent validation) – Credibility can be enhanced by giving 
respondents the opportunity to validate their input for accuracy and interpretation. There 
is debate however, at what point in the research process this should occur. If 
respondents are shown the verbatim transcripts, they will be able to acknowledge and 
respond to their own words, but they will have no contribution to how their opinion and 
assertions are interpreted and portrayed (Koch and Harrington, 1998). If respondents 
read the construction derived from the analysis, this brings different challenges (Koch, 
1994). Respondents will not be able to recognise themselves or their particular 
experiences if the study results have been synthesised, decontextualised and abstracted 




particular issue for this research project as the time taken to complete all case studies to 
achieve across case analysis meant that it was not possible to contact all those involved 
(feedback on individual transcripts or interim analyses would have been of limited value 
due to the evolving nature of the framework). Providing the individual transcripts could 
have also posed a risk of participant veto ahead of case study completion due to the 
sensitive nature of the content. The lack of member checking is recognised as a 
limitation in this research, but one that was particularly difficult to avoid. 
 
3.8.2. Dependability and confirmability (reliability/objectivity) 
Audit trail (transparency and accuracy) 
To assess the trustworthiness of a study it is necessary to examine the process by which 
the end-product has been achieved (Houghton et al., 2013; Bryar, 1999; Ryan-Nicholls 
and Will, 2009). Providing details of the steps between data collection and 
interpretation can improve the quality of qualitative research as it enables the reader to 
see how the analysis was carried out. Through the provision of raw data, even if a 
reader does not share a researcher’s interpretation, they are able to discern the means by 
which it has been achieved. 
In this study, interpretation bias was minimised with verbatim transcription of recorded 
interviews (i.e. data captured as described by respondents). The Framework method is 
also an explicit analytical process with thorough and systematic coding of the raw data 
which enables people other than the researcher to view and assess the analysis. 
Extensive amounts of raw data were included in Chapter 5 to justify analytical 




assigned and reassigned to new coding categories as they informed new concepts is 
available in Appendix 10. The interview schedule outlining the broad subject headings 
discussed is provided in Appendix 9. 
Reflexivity  
Reflexivity acknowledges the way in which a researcher and the research process have 
shaped the collected data, including the role of prior assumptions and experience, which 
can influence inductive inquiries. Mauthner and Doucet (2003) have criticised the fact 
that many qualitative studies simplify the complex processes of representing the 
‘voices’ of respondents “as though these voices speak on their own, rather than through 
the researcher who makes choices about how to interpret these voices and which 
transcript extracts to present as evidence”. A constructivist perspective acknowledges 
that the researcher is part of the research process. Credibility is therefore enhanced if the 
researcher is self-aware of the multiple influences they have on the research processes 
and can demonstrate how their theoretical perspective may have affected data collection 
and interpretation (Toffoli and Rudge, 2006).  
 
Researcher biography – As a female scientist working within a medical context, I 
shared similar educational and professional characteristics with those of the 
interviewees, several of whom were also holders of higher degrees. The privilege of 
being a Ph.D. student however, was that it afforded a non-threatening status. The 
interviewee population was of mixed gender, and were either of a similar age or older 
than myself. As an employee of the NIHR HSC, which is an organisation that interacts 
with the pharmaceutical industry and NICE, I had an appreciation of the culture in 




myself and interviewees shaped by their commercially-driven, as opposed to my 
academic influences.  
I came to my PhD with a positivistic background in toxicology. As such, I did feel a 
positivist pressure to render my voice and my influence invisible to the research, 
presenting a neutral, detached ‘objective’ view. My biography impacted upon the choice 
of methods that guided the research initially, preferring Yin’s positivistic approach to 
case study research that was more consistent with the paradigm with which I was 
familiar, rather than Stake’s more constructivist approach. Over the period of time 
during which I have conducted the research, I have felt caught between the two 
paradigms, identifying tensions and contradictions that exist in order to justify my 
fluctuation between the two positions. I have a shifting perspective, taking more of a 
positivist position on some questions (related to the material world) and a more 
relativist position on others (those that involve social phenomena).  
As the research and the analytical process have progressed, I have recognised how my 
involvement as a researcher has shaped the process, leading me more towards the 
constructivist position. Unlike empirical scientific studies the outcome of this research 
would probably have been different had it been conducted by someone else. Therefore, 
it feels inappropriate to attempt to present a detached view. The aim was not to uncover 
an ultimate truth, but to present one perspective amongst many others on this research 
subject, with the acceptance that reality is constructed differently depending on who is 
looking at it and from where. The presentation of my respondents’ reality was 
influenced by how my experiences have led to particular ways of ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ 




Reflections on the research process 
 
Access process 
There was an awareness of the potential difficulties of gaining access and appropriate 
measures were taken to increase chances of success. These are outlined in section 3.3 
(details provided on tailoring language, measures to alleviate respondents’ concerns 
etc.). From a personal perspective, while it was anticipated that gaining access would be 
challenging, it could be very frustrating at times and required persistence to gain 
agreement. This was particularly true when cases had to be pursued without the 
knowledge they would come to completion. Being conscious of respondents’ concerns, 
particularly with regard to the use of the data and identity issues, helped to secure their 
participation. In other cases where companies were showing signs of reluctance, it 
sometimes proved useful to highlight that they stood to be the only company within that 
class not to participate in the research. 
 
Interview process 
Use of agendas – The research process was responsive to problems as they arose. As 
discussed in section 3.6., the use of an agenda that was advocated during the pilot 
interview was substituted for verbal signposting as I felt respondents were driving 
through the agenda with what seemed like prepared responses rather than expanding on 
the issues to be covered. In the subsequent interviews, I decided to use verbal 
signposting, which helped to shift the balance of power in my favour. The responses of 
the interviewees appeared more considered as they often took longer to respond. At 




before responding. As much more insightful discussions took place, this format 
continued with all remaining interviews.  
 
Disclosure of a priori knowledge (prompting) – It was anticipated that the interviewees 
would expect that I had some knowledge of the drugs under discussion and this was 
indeed the case. The literature-derived timelines were not shown to respondents. 
Instead, they just had access to the unannotated diffusion curve and therefore I was 
conscious to keep prompts to an absolute minimum to avoid cross contamination of 
respondents’ accounts with the knowledge I had previously gained. While this would 
have inevitably been a limitation to be aware of in the minority of interviews where 
prompts were employed, the use of prompts where needed did stimulate further 
discussions and therefore were felt to be justified. 
 
Official line responses – There were fewer occasions than expected of ‘official line’ 
stances during the interviews, and the pre-emptive measures regarding question design 
and prompting techniques referred to in the methods section provided an effective 
means of exploring beyond them if they did occur. Where respondents had been 
guarded during the main body of the interview, on reaching its conclusion it was not 
unusual for them to continue for a further 20 to 30 minutes, returning and elaborating on 
limited responses provided to earlier questions. This often yielded very rich data, as it 
was provided in a more relaxed context, as respondents were aware of the boundaries of 
the research and safe in the knowledge that I was not going to ask them further 





Competitor discussions – Discussions surrounding competitor drugs were sometimes 
more revealing than anticipated as respondents were often more comfortable discussing 
other companies’ strategies than their own.  
 
Critical incidents (best/worst scenarios) – Explorations of situations that had not gone 
as well as expected were particularly useful for obtaining more detailed responses. By 
positioning this question towards the end of the interview, where an element of trust had 
been established, the interviewees tended to be more relaxed and open in their 
responses, often referring back to examples discussed during the main part of the 
interview, but in more depth. 
 
Probing – Pricing was initially a category for discussion on the interview schedule. 
However, following the first two interviews, it became apparent that addressing pricing 
issues directly was sensitive for commercial reasons, and a subject that participants 
were not prepared to elaborate on. In order to maintain rapport, the decision was made 
not to raise this topic specifically in subsequent interviews, but to pursue it if the subject 
was raised by participants themselves. Some researchers of elites have stated that they 
often felt they were deferential and over-gracious (Duke, 2002), and on reflection I 
could have been more confrontational and challenging in the interviews. This was 
tempered however, by the risk that probing too far could have jeopardised chances of 
any future interviews and gaining access not only to other people within the company, 







Sensitive nature of interview material – While respondents were advised that the 
interview material would be attributable to their company, I was conscious of the fact it 
should not be identifiable to individuals. Without respondent validation, I was perhaps 
more sensitive to the potential contentious nature with which this material could be 
viewed and therefore in situations where I had a selection of quotes to exemplify a 
theme I would preferentially use less contentious quotes or redact certain content, such 
as individual names within a quote.  
 
Thematic analysis – De-contextualisation of quotes from the individual drug stories, 
followed by re-contextualisation within generic themes inevitably resulted in data 
fragmentation. This induced a risk within the analysis that an interpretation may not 
necessarily be clear to a reader, as part of the story to explain that quote may be 
entwined in a quote elsewhere (I, however, had knowledge of the case study in its 
entirety). Themes were also at risk of amalgamation or repetition due to linkages that 
developed between themes. I likened the experience of thematic analysis to a shuffle 
puzzle analogy. Where in the case of the puzzle, a picture or number sequence is 
divided into a grid of squares (with one missing so they can be shuffled around), in 
thematic analysis the quotes represent the squares, charting to form parts of the picture, 
but then having to be reorganised repeatedly to eventually obtain the complete picture. 
The difficulty is that unlike the puzzle, the analyst is not aware of what the final picture 





Reinterpretation – Mauthner et al. (1998), described how over time, through increasing 
knowledge and experience, original interpretations often shift when previously collected 
data is revisited. This was exacerbated by being a single analyst on this project as the 
lenses through which I viewed the data changed over the years I was conducting the 
analysis. This limitation could not be avoided, but its impact was lessened with 
transparency measures adopted in the analysis and through supervisory peer debriefing. 
 
Triangulation 
During the interviews, respondents had access to their diffusion curve to stimulate 
discussions, but they were not provided with the timeline information, so as to not 
influence their accounts. However, there is the need for consideration of potential cross 
contamination of the data sources at the triangulation stage. The possibility that the 
knowledge I gained from generating the timelines could have influenced my 
interpretation of the Industry accounts is a limitation. But one might argue that this is 
not contamination, so much as additional analysis. 
 
3.8.3. Transferability (generalisability)  
As discussed in section 3.2.1, generalisability in qualitative research is not assessed on 
the same criteria as quantitative research. The onus is on the reader to use the 
information provided in the analysis to consider the degree to which insights are likely 
to be transferable to other settings. 
 
Sample – The value of qualitative research is not that this study represents in any 




that is has been able to generate new concepts and insights into the beliefs of an under-
researched group around the issue of diffusion. In this study, participant numbers were 
particularly constrained by the access process, including issues around diminishing 
corporate memory within current personnel of the brands involved (particularly if the 
drug had lost patent protection), the need for access to senior personnel and a limited 
pool of companies to involve as a result of company mergers. This coupled with the 
time consuming nature of interviewing, transcribing and analysis meant that the sample 
was small, but not inconsistent with other interview-based pharmaceutical industry 
research. Despite this, saturation of response was achieved within the sample obtained.  
 
The case study sample was diverse, covering various medical specialties; care settings 
(primary and secondary); political priorities; symptom and non-symptom based and life-
saving/lifestyle conditions. All four case studies brought something different to the 
discussion, which enabled a broad set of diffusion issues to be elicited. Four similar 
cases would not have achieved the same depth of variation.  
 
Provision of detailed context – Providing accounts of the context, methods used and 
examples of the raw data allows the reader to consider the researcher’s interpretations 
and develop alternative interpretations based on their own context. Detailed descriptions 
of the case study drugs are provided in Chapter 4 and Appendices 13 to 16 (Case 
specific background sections). Characteristics of the type of pharmaceutical companies, 
together with individual descriptions of the companies involved are provided in 
Appendix 17. Detailed descriptions of the methods used, the types of respondents who 
participated, transparency measures regarding the analytical process and provision of 




relevance (or transferability) of the conceptual research findings to their own contextual 
setting (Green, 1999).  
 
Industry definition – The pharmaceutical industry is not just one organisation. While 
they all share a common purpose to manufacture, supply and market medicines, each of 
the different business models that exist will hold different beliefs around what affects 
the diffusion of pharmaceuticals based on their own individual challenges. This study 
involved representatives from only the major R&D pharmaceutical companies, and only 
from marketing and managerial personnel from within those companies. This presents a 
limitation with regard to how the dataset is interpreted. It is representing only a narrow 
perspective from a specific subsector of the pharmaceutical industry that will not 
necessarily be held by different types of company, or indeed by other professional 
groups within the same company.  
It was not intentional to represent companies only from ‘Big Pharma’, but this was a 
consequence of the choice of case study drugs selected through the expert consultation 
exercise. While it is recognised as a limitation that only a narrow perspective is 
presented, ‘Big Pharma’ are worthy of researching in the first instance, as they are 
influential in setting agendas in the health care environment in the UK. Within the 
sample of ‘Big Pharma’ companies, variation did exist in terms of their size and 
available resources. Unless a conscious decision is made to purposively select cases 
from a range of different types of manufacturer, it is inevitable that in taking this 
approach to case study selection, the suggested cases were going to originate from 
within the ‘Big Pharma’ category of manufactures. The experts’ selection was most 




only successful case studies are ever researched. In adopting a drug class approach to 
the case studies however, it provided an opportunity to research a range of drugs less 
successful than the market leader, albeit the order with which they were chosen was 
influenced by their market hierarchy position. It is acknowledged therefore that 
inferences of the findings of this research to other types of pharmaceutical company 
cannot be assumed. The research intends only to provide an insight into some of the 
beliefs of this particular group of stakeholders, which can be built on by other 
researches in the future to provide a much deeper understanding of this group as a 
whole. 
 
Respondent bias – Respondents were self-selected by the companies involved and were 
of various levels of seniority within the marketing and market access departments, or 
senior management. Other groups within these companies, such as pharmacologists and 
clinicians would most likely have held different perspectives to those interviewed, but 
as the research project focussed on diffusion issues, it prompted the selection by the 
company of individuals who had experience with the drug at launch, or in the post-
launch period. Responses were based on individual perceptions, subject to memory 
recall bias and not necessarily representative of their companies’ views, or that of the 
Industry as a whole. Few participants had complete experience with the drug over its 
entire lifecycle and instead they tended to focus on specific areas of the curve they had 
direct knowledge of. Interviewees had comprehensive brand history knowledge and had 
often consulted with colleagues regarding explanations for past events on the diffusion 
curve, but ultimately these were second-hand accounts that could not be elaborated 




conceptualised at a general level does mean however, that the broad headings would 
most likely feature amongst different groups of Industry individuals. 
 
 
3.9. Chapter comment 
This chapter has outlined the quantitative and qualitative methods employed to achieve 
three data sources that provide separate accounts of the same story: i) the diffusion 
curve based on usage data; ii) the timeline based on published literature and augmented 
by clinical expert opinion and iii) the pharmaceutical company drug-specific accounts 
for four case study drug classes: atypical antipsychotics for schizophrenia; 
bisphosphonates for postmenopausal osteoporosis; PDE5 inhibitors for erectile 
dysfunction and statins for the prevention of first and recurrent cardiovascular events. 
The Industry accounts were then analysed thematically across case studies using the 
Framework approach to thematic analysis to generate a synthesis of Industry-derived 
generic themes they perceive to be important in the diffusion of pharmaceuticals. The 
criteria used to assess the quality of the methods outlining the strengths and limitations 






CASE STUDY RESULTS:  




The following chapter presents the results of the four individual case studies, 
comprising the drug diffusion curves and timelines of key lifecycle events that affected 
each class. These sources not only provided background information ahead of the 
Industry interviews, but served as triangulation sources against which the Industry 
accounts could be later compared. While respondents were shown their individual 
diffusion curves, they did not have access to the timelines. For confidentiality reasons 
the individual company drug-specific accounts provided by respondents are not 
presented in the thesis. They were however used as a data source for case specific 
triangulation in Chapter 6, and their content, while not presented chronologically as a 
narrative, is conveyed thematically across case studies in the qualitative analysis that 
follows this chapter.  
For each of the four case studies, further detail regarding background information on the 
disease, diagnostic criteria, clinical setting, drug pharmacology, dosage and 
administration protocols, regulation, safety, efficacy, cost, clinical guidelines and policy 
are outlined in Appendices 13 to 16. Profiles of the participant companies, including 




4.2. Case Study 1: Bisphosphonates for Postmenopausal Osteoporosis 
(PMO) 
 
Bisphosphonates (BPs) are drugs used to increase bone mass in a variety of diseases of 
excessive bone loss including osteoporosis, Paget’s disease, hypocalcaemia, osteolytic 
lesions and bone pain associated with malignancy. BPs were initially developed as 
detergents for use in hard water areas by Procter &Gamble in the early 1960s due to 
their high affinity for calcium and magnesium ions. By the late 1960s, their potential 
health benefits on calcified tissues started to become apparent. Disodium etidronate, the 
first BP, was initially used in dental products, but as it did not dissolve hydroxyapatite 
in the form of tartar and tooth enamel, its potential to prevent dissolution of bone 
(which is primarily hydroxyapatite in a cartilage matrix) made it a candidate as a 
treatment for diseases of bone loss. 
 
Osteoporosis 
Osteoporosis is a progressive systemic skeletal disorder characterised by low bone mass 
and micro-architectural deterioration of bone tissue. In adults, bone resorption by 
osteoclasts is closely coupled with bone formation by osteoblasts to maintain a state of 
equilibrium until around the age of 30, after which bone density starts to slowly decline. 
At menopause, oestrogen deficiency accelerates the activity of oseteoclasts. 
Consequently the net rate of bone resorption exceeds the rate of bone formation. The 
progressive decrease in bone mass leads to an increased susceptibility to fractures after 
minimal trauma or even normal load (WHO, 1994). BPs increase bone mineral density 
(BMD) by inhibiting osteoclast activity. They are indicated for both the treatment and 





Table 4.1: Definitions of treatment and prevention in osteoporosis 
 Definition 
Treatment  Reduction in fracture risk in postmenopausal women with osteoporosis (BMD < -2.5), 
with or without a previous fracture to prevent further fracture. 
Prevention Prevention of bone loss in postmenopausal women with osteopaenia (BMD between -1 
and -2.5) and increased risk of fracture to prevent osteoporosis from developing. 
 
The class consists of eight drugs: alendronic acid (alendronate), disodium etidronate 
(etidronate), risedronate sodium (risedronate), zoledronic acid (zoledronate)4, 
ibandronic acid (ibandronate)4, disodium pamidronate (pamidronate)5, sodium 
clodronate (clodronate)5 and tiludronic acid (tiludronate)5. At the time of case study 
selection, only three BPs were licensed for osteoporosis (listed in Table 4.2). Interviews 
were conducted with MSD regarding alendronate and P&G for etidronate and 
risedronate.  
Table 4.2: The bisphosphonate osteoporosis market 





Alendronate Fosamax MSD 1 2nd Sep 1995 
Risedronate Actonel P&G 2 3rd May 2000 
Cyclical 
Etidronate 
Didronel PMO P&G 3 1st Nov 1991 
 
BPs require complicated administration protocols, both as a result of their poor 
absorption from the gut and their potential to cause local irritation of the upper 
gastrointestinal mucosa (associated with the nitrogen-containing BPs alendronate and 
risedronate). Alendronate and risedronate have to be taken with 200mls and 120mls of 
water, respectively, and patients must remain upright for stipulated periods of time to 
                                                 
4 Ibandronic acid and zoledronic acid were not licensed for osteoporosis in the UK until September 2005 
and October 2007, respectively (insufficient data would have been available to pursue as case study 
drugs).  




avoid corrosive effects. To enhance absorption, patients cannot eat or drink before and 
immediately after administration (particularly products containing calcium). 
Figure 4.1 shows the diffusion curves for the BP class6. Figure 4.2 shows the literature 
and expert augmented timelines for etidronate, alendronate and risedronate to provide 
potential explanations for the upward and downward trajectories depicted in the 
diffusion curves. The timeline is separated according to primary research events (key 
empirical clinical trials), secondary evidence and policy (meta-analyses, systematic 
reviews, clinical guidelines and government policies), and safety and regulatory events 
(with publication dates also provided). Commentaries of the events represented in each 
timeline are presented in Tables 4.3 to 4.5. 
 
                                                 
6 Data is not indication-specific, however the majority of BP prescriptions are for osteoporosis 
(prevalence of Paget’s disease is 5% in people over 55 years and only etidronate and risedronate are 
licensed for this indication). Despite a potentially high prevalence, corticosteroid-induced osteoporosis 


























































































































































































Figure 4.2: Bisphosphonates - Timeline of Literature and Expert-derived Diffusion Factors  
Primary – Research Trials (See Table 4.3 for commentary)   
 
 
Secondary – Guidelines/Reviews/Policy (See Table 4.4 for commentary) 
 







Table 4.3: Bisphosphonates - Timeline Commentary for Primary Level Evidence  
 
Evidence summary: In women with established osteoporosis, alendronate, risedronate and etidronate are all effective in preventing vertebral fractures. 
Alendronate and risedronate also reduce the incidence of hip fractures. The evidence for this class of drugs however, is difficult to interpret for a variety 
of reasons (further detail provided in Appendix 13):  
• Clinical trials in osteoporosis can investigate a) an increase in BMD or b) a reduction in the rate of new fractures. Fracture reduction is the 
clinically relevant end point, while an increase in BMD is considered a surrogate marker for fracture reduction, but this correlation is still 
uncertain.  
• Results are complicated by subgroup analyses, loss of treatment arms due to ineffective dose ranging, data pooling and high rates of patient 
drop-outs.  
• Relative risk reductions are often presented when the actual risk reductions are small.  
• Due to the lengthy timescales involved to demonstrate comparative effectiveness on clinical endpoints, the majority of trials were placebo-
controlled. Only one head to head comparison trial was published at the time when the interviews took place, the results of which were viewed 
with some scepticism due to the use of surrogate endpoints. 
 
Trial Study drugs7 Importance Study design Outcome 







controlled trial in BPs 
to demonstrate 




controlled trial in 66 women with PMO over 
3 years. Patients had between 1 and 4 
vertebral compression fractures at baseline 
plus radiographic evidence of osteopaenia. 
Etidronate given cyclically - 400mg daily for 
14 days followed by calcium 500mg daily 
for remainder of the 90 day cycle.  
Vertebral fracture reduction (n=40 competed study) 8 
Significant reduction in fracture rate between etidronate and placebo groups from week 60 to 
week 150; (6 vs 54 fractures per 100 patient years).  
BMD: 
Vertebral: significant increase in BMD of 5.3% etidronate vs -2.7% placebo (mean difference 
(MD)=8%).  
Non-vertebral: changes not significant at the forearm. 
No significant adverse events were identified. 
                                                 
7 All women (placebo and intervention groups) with a calcium intake of less than 1000mg/day were also given supplemental calcium (range: 500-1000mg) and vitamin D (range 250-500 IU). Effects were 
therefore in addition to any benefit attributable to supplementation. 




Trial Study drugs7 Importance Study design Outcome 







Largest ever study 
conducted on 
osteoporosis at that 
time.   
Treatment: 
Randomised, double-blind placebo-
controlled trial in 429 women with PMO 
over 2 years. Patients had between 1 and 4 
vertebral compression fractures at baseline 
plus radiographic evidence of osteopaenia. 
Etidronate given cyclically - 400mg daily for 
14 days followed by calcium 500mg daily 
for remainder of the 90 day cycle.  
Vertebral fracture reduction (n=363 completed study): 
Rate of new vertebral fractures significantly reduced in the combined etidronate-containing 
arms by 50% vs placebo (29.5 vs 62.9 fractures per 1,000 patient years). 
BMD: 
Vertebral: significant increase of 4.2% and 5.2% in the two etidronate-containing arms of the 
study vs baseline. These changes were significantly different from placebo (approx 1.3%: exact 
value not presented. MD=approx 3-4%). 
Non-vertebral: changes were not significant at the hip and wrist.  
No significant adverse events were identified. 
Harris et al., 
1993 
 




Extension study of 
Watts et al. (1990) - 
first to show an effect 
on non-vertebral BMD 
(hip sites). 
One year extension study in 357 women with 
PMO (remaining study details as described 
in Watts et al., 1990). 
Etidronate caused a significant increase in BMD at all hip sites vs placebo: femoral neck 
(1.44% etidronate vs -0.60% placebo: MD=2.0%); greater trochanter (2.65% vs -0.07%: 
MD=2.72%); Ward’s triangle (2.14 vs -1.90: MD=4.0%).   









First major study of 
alendronate; first BP 






to the new WHO 




controlled trial in 994 women with PMO 
(defined as low BMD at the lumbar spine (T 
Score <-2.5), with or without fractures) over 
3 years. Alendronate given as  5mg or 10mg 
daily  for 3 years or 20mg for 2 years 
followed by 5mg for 1 year. 
 
 
Vertebral fracture reduction (n=881 completed study): 
Treatment with alendronate reduced the incidence of new vertebral fracture by 48% vs placebo 
(3.2% vs 6.2%), decreased progression of vertebral deformities (33% vs 41%), and reduced loss 
of height (all significant). Study not sufficiently powered to demonstrate a significant effect on 
non-vertebral fractures.  
BMD: Only mean differences between alendronate and placebo groups presented (not actual 
values). BMD increased significantly at all sites in all 3 alendronate groups vs significant losses 
at all sites in the placebo group. 
Vertebral: MD=8.8%. 
Non-vertebral: femoral neck MD=5.9%; trochanter MD=7.9%; total body MD=2.5%. 
No significant adverse events were identified.  
Presented at the 77th Annual Meeting of the Endocrine Society, June 1995 (5 months before 
publication). 





Trial (FIT 1):  
- vertebral 
fracture arm  








First mega-trial in 
osteoporosis. 
First study to 
demonstrate a 
reduction in incidence 




controlled trial in 2,027 women with PMO 
(defined as low bone mass and at least 1 
vertebral compression fracture at baseline) 
over 3 years. Alendronate given daily as 
5mg for 2 years and 10mg daily for a further 
year.  
 
Study ended prematurely after 2 years due to 
benefit in treated patients. 
 
 
Fracture reduction (n=1,946 completed study): 
Vertebral: incidence of radiographically defined fractures significantly reduced by 47% (8.0% 
vs placebo 15.0%) and clinically recognised fractures by 55% (2.3% vs placebo 5.0%). 
Non-vertebral: significantly reduced hip fractures (femoral neck) by 51% (1.1% vs placebo 
2.2%), and wrist fractures by 48% (2.2% vs placebo 4.1%). 
Risk of any clinical fracture (secondary endpoint) significantly reduced by 28% (13.6% vs 
placebo 18.2%). 
BMD (only MDs and not actual values between alendronate and placebo groups were 
presented. 
Vertebral: Significant increase at lumbar spine (6.2%); lateral spine (6.8%). 
Non-vertebral: significant increases at femoral neck (4.1%); total hip (4.7%); trochanter (6.1%); 
whole body (1.8%); proximal forearm (1.6%). 
No significant adverse events, including upper GI side effects such as oesophagitis were 
identified.  
(Presented at the World Congress on Osteoporosis, Amsterdam 18-23 May 1996, 7 months 





Trial Study drugs7 Importance Study design Outcome 
Cummings et 
al.,  1998 
(FIT 2):  
- clinical 
fracture arm  









First major prevention 
study. 
Prevention and treatment: 
Randomised, double-blind, placebo-
controlled trial in 4,432 women with PMO 
and low femoral neck BMD but no vertebral 
fractures at baseline over 4 years. Most 
patients were osteopaenic (preventative 
component), but 37% had T-Score of <-2.5 
which defined them as osteoporotic. 
Alendronate given daily as 5mg daily for 2 
years and 10mg for remainder of 4 year trial. 
 
 
Fracture reduction (n=4,272 completed study): 
Any clinical fracture (includes vertebral and non-vertebral): Reduction was non-significant (312 
placebo vs 272 in the alendronate; 14%). None of the reductions were significant at the non-
vertebral sites.  
This reduction was significant however, in the subgroup of women with osteoporosis (T-score 
<-2.5) =36% reduction. 
Vertebral: Alendronate significantly reduced the overall risk of developing a new radiographic 
vertebral fracture by 44% (2.1% alendronate vs 3.8% placebo). 
BMD: 
Significant increases at all three sites with alendronate vs placebo. 
Vertebral: lumbar spine (8.3% alendronate vs 1.5 % placebo: MD=6.8%).  
Non-vertebral: femoral neck (3.8% vs -0.8%: MD=4.6%); total hip (3.4% vs -1.6%: MD=5%). 
No significant adverse events were identified. 












controlled trial in 2,458 women with PMO 
(at least 1 vertebral fracture at baseline) over 
3 years. Risedronate given daily (2.5mg or 
5mg). 
 
2.5mg arm discontinued after 1 year 
(remaining groups n=1,628). 
Fracture reduction (n = 939 completed study): 
Vertebral: Risedronate significantly reduced the cumulative incidence of new vertebral fracture 
by 41% vs placebo (11.3% risedronate vs 16.3% placebo). 
Non-vertebral (wrist, hip and/or pelvis, humerus, leg, clavicle): significant cumulative reduction 
of 39% (5.2% risedronate vs 8.4% placebo).  
BMD: 
Vertebral: significant mean increase at lumbar spine (5.4% risedronate vs 1.1 % placebo: 
MD=4.3%).  
Non-vertebral: significant mean increase at femoral neck (1.6% vs -1.2%: MD=2.8%); femoral 
trochanter (3.3% vs -0.7%: MD=4%); midshaft of the radius (0.2% vs -1.4%: MD=1.6%). 
No significant adverse events were identified. 








Study demonstrated a 
non-significant 
reduction in non-
vertebral fracture in 
contrast to Harris et 
al., 1999.  
Treatment: 
Randomised, double-blind, placebo-
controlled trial in 1,226 women with PMO 
(at least 2 prevalent vertebral fractures at 
baseline) over 3 years. Risedronate given 
daily (2.5mg or 5mg). 
 
2.5mg arm discontinued after 2 years 
(remaining groups n=814). 
Fracture reduction (n=472 completed study): 
Vertebral: Risedronate (5mg) significantly reduced incidence of new vertebral fracture by 49% 
vs placebo (18% risedronate vs 29% placebo). 
Non-vertebral (wrist, humerus, hip, pelvis, leg, clavicle): reduction was non-significant (10.9% 
risedronate vs 16% placebo: 33% relative risk reduction). 
BMD: 
Only mean differences between risedronate and placebo groups presented (not actual values) 
Vertebral: significant increase at spine (MD=5.9%). 
Non-vertebral: significant increases at femoral trochanter (MD=6.4%); femoral neck 
(MD=3.1%); midshaft radius (MD=2.1%). 
No significant adverse events were identified. 











Key study to 
demonstrate 
equivalent efficacy of 
a once weekly 
formulation. 
Treatment  
Double-blind therapeutic equivalence trial 
comparing alendronate 70mg once weekly 
with alendronate 10mg daily in 889 women 
with PMO (defined as BMD T-score at the 
lumbar spine or femoral neck of <-2.5, or 
prior vertebral or hip fracture) over 1 year. 
Changes in BMD and biochemical markers of bone turnover were equivalent across all 
treatment groups. 
BMD: 
Vertebral: mean increase at lumbar spine (5.1% once weekly vs 5.4% 10mg daily - both 
significant from baseline). 
Non-vertebral: mean increase at femoral neck: 2.3% once weekly vs 2.9% 10mg daily; total 





Trial Study drugs7 Importance Study design Outcome 













Intended to be the first 
study powered to show 
effect of BPs on hip 
fracture. Beaten to it 
by FIT 1 that was 
fortuitously able to 
demonstrate impact on 
hip at earlier stage. 
Treatment: 
Randomised, double-blind, placebo-
controlled trial over 3 years in: 
Arm1 (n=5,445): women 70-79 years with 
osteoporosis (T-score at femoral neck of -4; 
or <-3 plus a non-skeletal risk factor for hip 
fracture (poor gait or propensity to fall); 
Arm 2 (n=3,886): women ≥80 years selected 
primarily on basis of non-skeletal risk 
factors (with ≥1 clinical risk factor for hip 
fracture, or low BMD (T-score <-4; or <-3 
plus hip axis length of 11.1cm or greater) – 
only 16% recruited on low BMD at femoral 
neck. Majority (58%) were recruited solely 
on basis of clinical risk factor e.g. fall-
related injury. 
Risedronate given daily (2.5mg or 5mg). 
Fracture reduction (n=5,100 completed study): 
Non-vertebral (hip):  
Risedronate significantly reduced risk of hip fracture among elderly women with confirmed 
osteoporosis, but not among elderly women selected primarily on basis of risk factors other 
than low BMD. 
Arm 1: hip fracture incidence significantly reduced by 40% (1.9% vs 3.2% placebo). Effects of 
both risedronate doses were similar. 
Arm 2: hip fracture incidence reduction was non-significant (4.2% vs 5.1% placebo: 20% 
reduction). 
Among all women assigned risedronate, hip fracture incidence was significantly reduced by 
30% vs placebo (2.8% vs 3.9%). 
 
No significant adverse events were identified. 

















First head to head trial 
on a comparable basis 
– same formulation. 
Used surrogate marker 
as outcome measure.  
Treatment: 
Randomised, double-blind, head to head trial 
in 1,053 women with PMO with low BMD 
(T-Score ≤-2.0 in at least one of four sites – 
not technically osteoporotic as none of the 
baseline BMDs were ≤-2.5 and only 12% 
had history of previous fracture after age 
45).  
Alendronate (70mg) or risedronate (35mg) 
given weekly over 1 year. 
 
BMD: (n=892 completed study): 
Both drugs produced significant increases in BMD after 6 and 12 months at all sites from 
baseline, but the increases with alendronate were significantly greater at all time points and at 
all skeletal sites. The use of BMD instead of fracture reduction however makes the outcome 
difficult to interpret. 
Vertebral: mean significant increase at lumbar spine: 3.7% alendronate vs 2.6% risedronate 
(MD=1.1%). 
Non-vertebral: mean significant increases at femoral trochanter: 3.4% alendronate vs 2.1% 
risedronate (MD=1.4%); total hip: 2.2% vs 1.2% (MD=1%); femoral neck: 1.6% vs 0.9% 
(MD=0.7%). 
Markers of bone turnover: 
Both drugs significantly reduced bone turnover, but the reductions were greater with 
alendronate. 
No significant differences found in upper GI tolerability between the two drugs. 
(Presented at the 26th annual meeting of the American Society for Bone and Mineral Research 




Table 4.4: Bisphosphonates - Timeline Commentary for Secondary Level Evidence and Policy 
Secondary Evidence and Policy Description 
WHO Consensus Development 
Conference, 1992   
The World Health Organization (WHO) in partnership with the International Osteoporosis Foundation (IOF) 9 organised the first official discussion by experts on 
redefining osteoporosis on the basis of low BMD. 
WHO Assessment of Fracture 
Risk Report, 1994  
(Technical Report Series 843) 
The WHO redefined osteoporosis to reflect change in perception amongst clinical experts, recommending that diagnosis of osteoporosis be based on BMD T-scores (the 
number of standard deviations below the average peak BMD in young healthy adults), with the aim of identifying and treating individuals at risk before they developed 
fractures (‘osteopaenia’ was a term created to describe this pre-osteoporotic state). Osteoporosis changed from a tangible fracture-based disease, into one of risk, and in 
doing so expanded the eligible patient population. Controversy surrounded the WHO definition: i) correlation between low BMD and increased fracture risk was 
contentious – BMD needed to be considered within the context of other risk factors such as increasing age and propensity to fall ii) use of a surrogate marker 
conceptualised a risk factor as a disease iii) comparison with normal subjects of the same age and sex (Z-score) would have been a more appropriate measure. 
DH Advisory Group on 
Osteoporosis report 
(Barlow, 1994) 
Department of Health Advisory Group on Osteoporosis established by Health Minister Baroness Cumberlege in 1993 to produce a comprehensive review of the issues 
pertinent to improving the management of osteoporosis. The recommendations of the report published in 1994 were: (a) better coordination of services in osteoporosis 
management, (b) greater availability of bone densitometry facilities for defined clinical indications, (c) provision of these facilities at the discretion of purchasers at a 
local level, and (d) the development of guidelines for osteoporosis management through the Royal Colleges. Baroness Cumberlege accepted the recommendations of the 
report in January 1995 and drew attention to the proposal that bone densitometry should be available to assist clinical decision making for certain patients identified as 
being at high risk.  The report led to the recommendation that guidelines on the prevention and treatment of osteoporosis be prepared under the auspices of the Royal 
College of Physicians (RCPs). 
European Commission/IOF 
Joint Policy Report, 1998 
Landmark publication ‘Osteoporosis in the EC - Action for Prevention’ resulting from a collaboration of the European Commission and IOF, which accelerated action 
on osteoporosis throughout Europe. The report outlined epidemiologic issues, provided an overview of bone physiology, information about the diagnosis and assessment 
of risk and contained eight recommendations for the prevention of fractures and for the management of patients with osteoporosis.  
RCP Guidelines: Osteoporosis 
prevention and treatment, 1999 
The Royal College of Physicians (RCP) guidelines recommended the use of BPs as one of several other treatments and lifestyle advice if osteoporosis is confirmed by 
DEXA scanning (T-score of <-2.5), or if osteopaenia is confirmed in the presence of previous fracture.  Alendronate and risedronate however, were the only 
interventions with grade A recommendations across all sites in terms of anti-fracture efficacy (spine, non-vertebral and hip) and all three bisphosphonates were graded A 
in their effect on prevention/reduction of bone loss.  
WHO Global Strategy on 
Osteoporosis    
- Interim report, (Genant et al., 
1999) 
- Full report (WHO 2003 
Technical Report Series 921) 
In recognising the global problem posed by osteoporosis, the WHO produced a global strategy for prevention and control of osteoporosis, focusing on three major 
functions: prevention, management and surveillance. Management included the bisphosphonates amongst other pharmacological interventions. A synopsis of the 
evidence to date was presented for etidronate, alendronate and risedronate, but with no specific recommendations as to which one should be used in preference.. 
WHO – Bone and Joint Decade 
(2000-2010), 2000 
 
The Bone and Joint Decade was a global campaign to improve the quality of life for people with musculoskeletal conditions including osteoporosis. It was launched by 
the WHO on January 13th 2000 following endorsement by the United Nations in November 1999, and several nations including the UK. The aim was to advance the 
understanding and treatment of these conditions through increasing funding for research, raising awareness and promoting cost effective prevention and treatment 
measures. 
RCP Guidelines Update, 2000 Royal College of Physicians reproduced guidelines to include an update on pharmacological interventions and an algorithm for management. 
NSF for Older People, 
 (DH, 2001a) 
The National Service Framework (NSF) for Older people set out eight standards which aimed to provide person-centred care, remove age discrimination, promote  older 
people's health and independence and to 'fit the services around people's needs'. Osteoporosis came under the remit of Standard 6: Falls. Its aim was to reduce the 
number of falls which result in serious injury and ensure effective treatment and rehabilitation for those who have fallen. However, reference to osteoporosis treatment 
                                                 
9 The IOF is a a non-governmental foundation in Switzerland which represents a global alliance of patients, medical and research societies, scientists, health care professionals and health industry. Its remit is to 




Secondary Evidence and Policy Description 
was minimal and very general “Drug interventions, for example, hormone replacement therapy, selective oestrogen receptor modulators (SERMS) and bisphosphonates 
will be most cost effective when prescribed in carefully defined, high risk, older people.” 
NHS Scotland policy for older 
people, 2002 
 
Scottish policy document ‘Adding Life to Years: Report of the Expert Group on Healthcare of Older People’ provided an overview and description of the major health 
problems of older people in NHS Scotland. Osteoporosis came under the subsection ‘Falls and fracture prevention’ in Chapter 4 which deals with the wider issue of an 
‘Overview of major health problems’. The document refers to the RCP guidelines, but also states that osteoporosis management should be an important part of any falls 
assessment. 
SIGN Guideline No. 71  – 
Osteoporosis management, 
2003 
In the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN) guidelines, all three BPs were recommended in women aged 60 and over with 2 or more vertebral fractures 
without the need for DEXA scanning. If patients have one vertebral fracture, BPs are only given if the BMD T-score is ≤-1.6 at the femoral neck or ≤-2 at the lumbar 
spine. In women with a non-vertebral fracture, alendronate and risedronate are recommended only if the BMD T-score is ≤-2.5 at the femoral neck or ≤-2 at the lumbar 
spine. In frail elderly women (aged 80+ years) with a diagnosis of osteoporosis, but with or without previous fracture, alendronate and risedronate are recommended. 
NICE Guideline scope - 
osteoporosis, 2003   
Guideline on the assessment of fracture risk and the prevention of osteoporotic fractures in individuals at high risk. The scope, published in June 2003 outlined that 
several pharmacological and non-pharmacological interventions that reduce the risk of fracture would be assessed in the guidelines. As the guideline however was to 
incorporate recommendations from the technology appraisals on the primary and secondary prevention of osteoporotic fragility fractures in postmenopausal women, it 
was put on hold for several years and was only published in August 2012.  
NICE TA (Technology 
Appraisal) Guidance – 
secondary prevention of 
osteoporosis,  2005 
Bisphosphonates were recommended as first-line treatment for the secondary prevention of osteoporotic fragility fractures in postmenopausal women (incorporated 16 
RCTs for alendronate; 11 RCTs for etidronate; 7 RCTS for risedronate). There was however, no differentiation between which of the three bisphosphonates should be 
used preferentially. The selection of individuals for treatment was based on the inter-related risk factors of age and low BMD, and takes into account age-independent 
risk factors. The choice was to be based on clinicians and patients need to balance the drug’s overall proven effectiveness profile against tolerability and adverse effects 
in individual patients. 
All Party Parliamentary Report 
(APPOG), 2004 
  
The All Party Parliamentary Osteoporosis Group (APPOG) was established in response to concerns that the NHS would not meet Standard Six of the NSF for Older 
People. Although the inclusion of osteoporosis within the NSF was a clear indication of priority, the subsequent apparent lack of endorsement for osteoporosis from 
Government and the exclusion of the condition from the General Medical Services (GMS) contract undermined the position of osteoporosis within the NHS. The 







Table 4.5: Bisphosphonates - Timeline Commentary for Safety and Regulatory Events  
Note: Not all licensing events that appear on the timeline are represented in the table below. Only those events that required additional context are presented. 
Event Description 
Cyclical Etidronate launch 
 Nov 1991 
 
The first BP entered an osteoporosis market populated predominantly with hormone therapies (oestrogen and calcitonin), vitamins supplements and sodium fluoride. As 
the manufacturer of the first BP on the market for osteoporosis, P&G had a significant challenge to raise awareness of the condition amongst clinicians and patients and 
encourage consensus agreement in diagnosis and treatment of the disease. Cyclical administration in conjunction with calcium avoided osteomalacia (‘soft bones’ as a 
result of impaired mineralisation) that became apparent with its continuous use in Paget’s disease. 
Alendronate daily launch, 
Sep 1995 
Alendronate’s increased potency (up to 10,000 times greater than etidronate) meant that it could be given at low doses continuously without risk of osteomalacia This 
was anticipated to increase patient compliance compared with cyclical etidronate regimens. 
MSD safety warning  –  
oesophagitis (alendronate 
daily),  
Apr 1996  
Ahead of publication of a post-marketing surveillance study, MSD released a ‘Dear Dr’ letter strengthening the importance of correct administration following concerns 
of oesophagitis. There was also a worldwide revision of the package insert for Fosamax (alendronate) to clarify the conditions of administration. The list of 
contraindications was also extended to include not only patients with active upper gastrointestinal problems, but those with abnormalities of the oesophagus which delay 
oesophageal emptying (stricture), or inability to sit/stand upright for at least 30 minutes. 
Post-marketing surveillance 
study (alendronate daily) 
de Groen et al.,Oct 1996  
 
Study published in the NEJM indicated the extent of the safety issues that had been reported with alendronate. In addition to the three cases of severe oesophagitis 
described, further analysis showed that between October 1995 and March 1996, from an estimated 475,000 prescriptions of alendronate, 1,213 reports of adverse effects 
had been received by MSD, of which 199 were related to the oesophagus. Symptoms were categorised as serious or severe in 51, and of these, 32 patients were 
hospitalised. The endoscopic findings generally indicated chemical oesophagitis, with erosions or ulcerations and exudative inflammation accompanied by thickening of 
the oesophageal wall. In the majority of cases however, the effects appeared to be due to incorrect administration; either taking with little or no water, lying down during 
or after ingestion, or continuing to take alendronate after the onset of symptoms. 
P&G/Hoechst Marion Roussel 
alliance  
May 1997 
In May 1997, P&G formed a global alliance with Hoechst Marion Roussel (now Sanofi-Aventis) to commercialise risedronate (Actonel) collaboratively in Europe, the 
United States and Canada. The role of the ‘Alliance for Better Bone Health’ was to promote disease awareness through numerous activities to support physicians and 
patients. This was in contrast to etidronate, which they launched independently. 
Raloxifene  and teriparatide 
launch (Lilly) 
Sep 1998 and Nov 2003, 
respectively  
Raloxifene (a selective oestrogen receptor modulator) and teriparatide (parathyroid hormone), both drugs manufactured by Lilly, were competitors to the BPs. However 
NICE guidance in 2005 recommended that they should be reserved for use in patients in whom BPs are contraindicated, those who are intolerant, or those who have had 
an unsatisfactory response. 
MSD fracture liaison clinics 
1999 
Few health authorities provided osteoporosis services in accordance with recommendations, particularly with regard to bone density (DEXA) scans. In response, MSD 
established Fracture Liaison Clinics with specialist nurse liaison to identify patients suitable for treatment. 
Alendronate once weekly 
launch 
Jan 2001 
The constraints of the complicated daily dosing regime prompted the development of a once weekly 70mg formulation of alendronate. It was regarded as a key 
breakthrough to improve compliance. Oesophageal turnover occurs in approximately 5 days, therefore a once weekly administration allowed time for regeneration of 
oesophageal mucosa between doses. 
HRT withdrawn as first-line 
therapy for osteoporosis 
prevention  
Dec 2003 
Two large studies reported that the balance of risks of using hormone replacement therapy (HRT) for this indication outweighed the benefits. This left this particular 





4.3. Case Study 2: Atypical Antipsychotics for Schizophrenia 
The atypical antipsychotics (AAs), or second generation antipsychotics, are not 
technically a class of drugs. Their only consistent feature is that they all act upon the 
dopamine D2 receptors. It is the way in which they interact with other receptors that is 
responsible for the subtle differences in their side effect profiles. While their therapeutic 
effects are broadly comparable, structurally and mechanistically they are all very 
heterogeneous, which from a marketing perspective has provided the grounds on which 
to distinguish these products. AAs were hailed as a major advance, principally because 
of their lower propensity to cause extrapyramidal symptoms (EPS) and tardive 
dyskinesia (TD). These are particularly unpleasant neurological side effects, often 
considered by many patients worse than the disorder itself, that had plagued the 
conventional antipsychotics (CAs) since their introduction in the 1950s. While CAs are 
effective in treating the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, AAs additionally reduced 
the negative symptoms.   
 
Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia is a mental illness characterised by a broad range of cognitive, emotional 
and behavioural problems. It is the result of alterations in brain chemistry, particularly 
over-activity of dopamine in certain regions of the brain. People with schizophrenia 
typically hear voices (auditory hallucinations) that often criticise or abuse them. Patients 
try to make sense of these hallucinations, which can lead to the development of strange 




The class consists of nine drugs listed in Table 4.6. Interviews were conducted with 
Lilly, Janssen-Cilag and AstraZeneca for olanzapine, risperidone and quetiapine, 
respectively.  
 







UK launch  
Olanzapine Zyprexa Eli Lilly (now Lilly) 1 5th Oct 1996 
Risperidone Risperdal Janssen-Cilag, 
Organon 
2 3rd Jun 1993 
Clozapine Clozaril Novartis 3 1st Jan 1990 
Quetiapine Seroquel AstraZeneca 4 6th Sep 1997 
Amisulpride Solian Sanofi-Synthelabo 
(now Sanofi Aventis) 
5 7th Oct 1997 
Remoxipride Roxiam AstraZeneca 6 2nd May 1991 
(withdrawn 1994) 
Sertindole Serdolect Lundbeck 7 4th Jul 1996 
(withdrawn 1999) 
Zotepine Zoleptil Orion 8 8th Nov 1998 
Aripiprazole Abilify Bristol-Myers Squibb 9 9th Jun 2004 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the diffusion curves for the AAs. Figure 4.4 shows the literature and 
expert augmented timelines for olanzapine, risperidone and quetiapine. Commentaries 
















                                                 






















































































































































































































Figure 4.4: Atypical Antipsychotics - Timeline of Literature and Expert-derived Diffusion Factors  
 
Primary – Research Trials (See Table 4.7 for commentary) Key: AA = atypical antipsychotics; CA = conventional antipsychotics 
 











Table 4.7: Atypical Antipsychotics - Timeline Commentary for Primary Level Evidence  
 
Evidence summary: The wealth of clinical evidence for this class of drugs is extensive. Several hundred randomised controlled trials (RCTs) and 
meta-analyses have been produced, either comparing AAs with placebo, with the CAs, or with each other in head to head trials. However, with the 
exception of clozapine (Wahlbeck et al., 1999; Jones et al., 2006), evidence of the superior efficacy and side effect profile of the other AAs has neither 
been consistent or robust (Leucht et al., 1999; Geddes et al., 2000; Davis et al., 2003; Leucht et al., 2003a; Leucht et al., 2003b). There is evidence 
suggesting AAs are associated with a lower risk of extrapyramidal symptoms (EPS) than CAs, and that fewer people stop treatment, however, with the 
metabolic risks of weight gain and diabetes, it is questionable whether they represent major gains in effectiveness or tolerability (Gardner et al., 2005). 
Clozapine and olanzapine are associated with more anticholinergic side effects and weight gain than the other atypicals, and risperidone with more 
prolactin elevation. Treatment decisions involve a trade-off between efficacy and acceptable side effects. 
 
Trial Study drugs11 Importance Study design Outcome 




people refractory to 
CAs (haloperidol). 
Trial defined new class of atypical 
antipsychotics. 
Randomised double-blind active-





In patients unresponsive to CAs, approximately 30% of patients 
randomised to clozapine responded compared with 3% on chlorpromazine. 
An issue with the trial was that response to CAs had already been flushed 
out prior to randomisation, but it did demonstrate clozapine was acting 
somewhat differently. First trial to offer a new development in this field 
since the original MRC trial showing efficacy for the first generation 
antipsychotics.  





Largest ever study undertaken on a 
psychiatric population. 
Based on their prior experience with 
fluoxetine (Prozac), Lilly were 
aware of the need for much larger 
scale trials in psychiatry, and 
conducted a groundbreaking mega-
trial for olanzapine. Most trials up 
to that point were recruiting 
between 200-300 patients. 
Multicentre, randomised, double-
blind, mega-trial in 1,996 patients 
over 6 weeks. 
 
 
Significant improvement in negative symptoms, EPS, prolactin levels and 
response rate in the olanzapine group vs haloperidol and significantly 
fewer discontinuations of treatment (66.5% patients in olanzapine group vs 
46.8% haloperidol group completed 6 weeks of treatment). 
A preview of the data was presented by Beasley (Lilly clinical research 
advisor and global physician for olanzapine) nearly a year before launch at 
the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology meeting in December 
1995. 
 






First head to head trial. Multicentre, randomised, double-
blind, head to head trial in 339 
patients over 28 weeks. 
 
Olanzapine demonstrated significantly greater efficacy in negative 
symptoms and overall response rate vs risperidone. EPS, 
hyperprolactinaemia and sexual dysfunction significantly lower in 
olanzapine treated patients. Significantly fewer adverse events were 
reported in the olanzapine group. 
The size of these effects has since been questioned in systematic reviews 
and large scale trials. 
                                                 
11 For this particular class of drugs, placebo-controlled trials are equally as important as head to head trials. Being able to demonstrate side effects as close to placebo as possible is the defining differentiating 




Trial Study drugs11 Importance Study design Outcome 





First long-term trial. 
 
The need for a long-term trial was 
critical, as up to that point, trials 
were all short-term, usually of 6 
weeks duration which is not 
reflective of chronic condition such 
as schizophrenia that can last up to 
50 years. 
Double-blind RCT in 397 patients 
for a minimum of 1 year. 
 
 
Adult outpatients with clinically stable schizophrenia or schizoaffective 
disorder have a lower risk of relapse if they are treated with risperidone 
than with haloperidol. 
 
 
Lieberman et al., 2005 
CATIE  
Clinical Antipsychotic 






ziprasidone vs CAs 
(perphenazine). 
 
Large scale publicly funded 
comparator trial. 
 
Due to the conjecture regarding 
effectiveness of AAs vs CAs, the 
National Institute of Mental Health 
in the USA sponsored a large-scale 
independent trial. 
Randomised, double-blind, 
active-control trial in 1,493 
patients over 1 year.  
 
 
No benefits of AAs over CAs. Patients discontinued all medications at a 
high rate (74% before 18 months and median time to discontinuation was 6 
months), indicating substantial limitations in the effectiveness of the drugs. 
Olanzapine was marginally better in terms of clinical efficacy but was 
associated with greater weight gain and increases in measures of glucose 
and lipid metabolism. The slightly higher then recommended dose of 
olanzapine used could account for greater efficacy but worse side effects. 
Perphenazine was not only as effective as three of the four AAs, but also 
did not cause more EPS side effects. 
 
Perphenazine was chosen as the comparator to deal with equipoise issues 
i.e. it would not raise antibodies unlike chlorpromazine as it would not 
have ever been used before in these patients. 
 
Jones et al., 2006 
CUtLASS 1  
Cost Utility of the Latest 
Antipsychotic Drugs in 
Schizophrenia Study  




risperidone vs CAs 
(mainly sulpride). 
Publicly funded comparator trial to 
consider economic impact. 
Multicentre, randomised active-
control trial in 227 patients for 1 
year. 
 
No disadvantage across one year in terms of quality of life, symptoms or 










Table 4.8: Atypical Antipsychotics - Timeline Commentary for Secondary Level Evidence and Policy 
Secondary Evidence and Policy Description 
American Psychiatric Association 
Practice Guidelines, 1997 
Major influence in prescribing practices in psychiatry in USA, with impact in the UK and Europe.  Supported use of AAs as first-line treatment. 
NIMH (National Institute of 
Mental Health) Guidelines 
(USA), Dawkins et al., 1999 
Guidelines stated that atypicals merit first-line consideration in the domain of antipsychotic drugs. NIMH later funded the CATIE trial (2005) that demonstrated no 
apparent difference between AAs and CAs. 
White paper. Saving Lives: Our 
Healthier Nation, (DH, 1999a) 
A Government action plan to tackle poor health and improve the health of everyone. There was a particular focus on the main conditions responsible for death 
including mental illness. The pledge was to reduce the death rate from suicide and undetermined injury by at least a fifth. 
Maudsley Prescribing Guidelines 
(UK), 1999 
Leading clinical reference guidelines (regarded as an institution in the UK) for all practising mental health clinicians. Annual publication produced in-house by 
Maudsley Hospital, but 5th edition (1999) was the first publicly available edition, and therefore had the potential for wider impact. Stated that patients with 
schizophrenia should be prescribed AAs.  
NSF (National Service 
Framework) for Mental Health, 
(DH, 1999b) 
Sets national standards and defines national service models in mental health; local action and national underpinning programmes for implementation; and a series of 
milestones to assure progress, with performance indicators to support effective performance management. 
Effective Health Care Bulletins  -   
Cochrane Schizophrenia Group, 
1999 
Systematic review of 11,390 participants in 19 studies involving AAs (amisulpride; clozapine; quetiapine olanzapine; risperidone; zotepine; ziprasidone) vs CAs. 
The bulletin was produced in December 1999 by the NHS Centre for Review and Dissemination at the University of York, based on work they had conducted for the 
NICE Technology Appraisal on AAs, which was not published until 2003. The conclusion was that AAs "may be a further refinement, but not a revolution, in the 
care of those with schizophrenia".  Potentially reduced the impact of the later published NICE guidance. 
Geddes et al., 2000  
 Meta-analysis 
 
Meta-analysis: 12, 649 participants in 52 randomised trials involving AAs (amisulpride; clozapine aripiprazole; quetiapine olanzapine; risperidone; sertindole) vs 
CAs (haloperidol or chlorpromazine). No clear evidence that AAs are more effective or are better tolerated than CAs. Dose of CAs used explained heterogeneity in 
results. When haloperidol dose (or equivalent) was ≤12mg/day, AAs had no benefits in terms of efficacy or tolerability, but caused fewer EPS. When comparator 
doses were too high, this disadvantaged CAs, as it caused the early emergence of EPS followed by early dropout rates. 
NICE TA (Technology 
Appraisal) guidance, 2002a  
(Atypical Antipsychotics) 
 
Systematic review of 172 randomised controlled trials involving AAs (amisulpride; olanzapine; quetiapine, risperidone; zotepine) vs CAs, of which 29 were head to 
head; 53 studies were either case-control, had more than 2 years follow up or more than 2,000 participants. The mandatory NHS guidance stated: “for new patients 
AAs should be considered within the choice of first-line treatments for patients with newly diagnosed schizophrenia. In patients on CAs with adequate symptom 
control, but with unacceptable side effects, or for those in relapse who have previously experienced unsatisfactory management with CAs, then AAs should be 
considered. Patients on CAs with good control of their condition, without unacceptable side effect control should not be switched to AAs”. 
NICE Clinical Guideline, 2002b 
(Schizophrenia) 
Practice and service guidelines for schizophrenia. Refers to NICE technology appraisal for guidance in relation to AAs. 
Davis et al., 2003 
Meta-analysis 
Meta-analysis of 18,272 patients in 124 randomised trials involving AAs (amisulpride; clozapine; olanzapine; quetiapine; risperidone; ziprasidone ) vs CAs 
(haloperidol or chlorpromazine). Some AAs more efficacious than CAs. Effect size of clozapine, amisulpride, risperidone and olanzapine significantly greater than 




Table 4.9: Atypical Antipsychotics - Timeline Commentary for Safety and Regulatory Events 
Note: Not all licensing events that appear on the timeline are represented in the table below. Ony those events that required additional context are presented. 
Events Description 
Restricted reintroduction of 
clozapine 
1990 
Clozapine was the first atypical, but was voluntarily withdrawn in 1975 as it was associated with a high risk of agranularcytosis (a potentially fatal reduction in white 
blood cells) and seizure. It was reintroduced with strict monitoring requirements in 1990 following psychiatrists’ requests to reinstate the drug based on its efficacy 
in refractory patients (demonstrated in the trial by Kane et al., 1988). 
Risperidone launch – 
schizophrenia Jun 1993 
With clozapine being reserved for second-line use, risperidone had to compete with a generic market, but its increased cost was not believed tobe an issue when 
there was such a need for a new pharmacological intervention. 
Remoxipride - withdrawn UK 
Feb 1994 
Remoxipride withdrawn in 1994 due to reported side effects of aplastic anaemia. 
Olanzapine launch – 
schizophrenia Oct 1996 
With olanzapine, there was no need for titration, which ultimately translated to ease of use for psychiatrists and patients. Olanzapine entered at an even higher 
acquisition cost compared with risperidone. 
Zeneca / Astra AB merger 
Apr 1999 




Sertindole was the third AA to be withdrawn due to safety concerns. It was voluntarily withdrawn in 1999 due to cases of arrhythmias and sudden cardiac death, but 
was later reintroduced under special prescribing conditions. 
Olanzapine Velotab launch 
Jan 2000 
The first orodispersible formulation called Velotab developed for patients unable or unwilling to take tablet forms. Once in contact with saliva, it dissolves instantly 
so the patient is unable to spit it out. 
Metabolic issues (diabetes)  
Apr 2002 
 
Dawning of adverse metabolic effects with regard to AAs and diabetes. Data mining analysis over 4 months of 38,632 patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and 
diabetes. Clozapine, olanzapine, quetiapine; risperidone vs CAs. Prevalence of diabetes was significantly increased for patients who received clozapine, olanzapine 
and quetiapine, but not risperidone (Sernyak et al., 2002). Committee on Safety of Medicines released a pharmacovigilance statement with reference to olanzapine 
recommending clinical monitoring for hyperglycaemia in diabetic patients. In 2003, the FDA required all AAs to carry warnings of hyperglycaemia and diabetes. 
Olanzapine launch - bipolar 
Jun 2002 
 
All three drugs now have additional indications for mania in bipolar disorder, but Lilly designed their clinical trial programmes to enable olanzapine to be the first 
AA to obtain the additional licence ahead of risperidone. Bipolar disorder causes alternating periods of depression and mania (abnormally elevated or irritable mood) 
or ‘mixed episodes’ where people have symptoms of both depression and mania.  
Risperdal (risperidone) Consta – 
long-acting IM launch Aug 2002 
The first long-acting intramuscular depot injection called Risperdal Consta administered once every 2 weeks. It conferred a lower risk of relapse due to non-
compliance and widened the choice of treatments for patients with psychotic illnesses. 
Risperidone Quicklet launch 
Jan 2003 
Quicklets were tablet forms of rispiridone designed to dissolve on the tongue and swallowed without the need for water.  
Metabolic issues (cholesterol)  
Feb 2003 
Dawning of adverse metabolic effect with regard to AAs and raised cholesterol. Randomised double-blind 14 week trial in 157 patients. Clozapine, olanzapine, 
risperidone vs haloperidol. Clozapine, olanzapine and haloperidol were associated with a significant increase in plasma glucose levels. Clozapine and olanzapine 
were associated with a significant increase in cholesterol levels. (Lindenmayer et al., 2003). 
Quetiapine launch – bipolar  
Jan 2004 
Quetiapine became the first AA to treat both the depressive and manic episodes associated with bipolar. 
Olanzapine - Rapid-acting IM 
launch Feb 2004 
Lilly launched the first rapid-acting intramuscular formulation called Zyprexa IM for rapid control of agitation. 
Safety warning – elderly 
Mar 2004 
‘Dear Dr’ letter released in March 2004 (MHRA, 2004a) in response to the Committee on the Safety of Medicines guidance to doctors stating that risperidone and 
olanzapine should no longer be prescribed for the treatment of behavioural symptoms in elderly patients with dementia due to the risk of cerebrovascular adverse 




4.4. Case Study 3: PDE5 Inhibitors for Erectile Dysfunction 
Phosphodiesterase type 5 (PDE5) inhibitors are oral drugs taken as needed by men with 
erectile dysfunction (ED) prior to planned sexual activity. They are potent, reversible, 
competitive inhibitors of the PDE5 enzyme. By blocking this enzyme, which degrades 
cyclic guanosine monophosphate (the chemical messenger responsible for triggering 
increased blood flow to the penis), erections can be sustained. PDE5 inhibitors therefore 
amplify the response to sexual arousal rather than cause an erection per se.  
 
Erectile Dysfunction 
Erectile dysfunction is defined as the persistent inability to achieve or maintain an 
erection sufficient for satisfactory sexual performance (National Institutes of Health, 
1993). Despite being primarily attributed to psychogenic causes, in men aged over 50 
years, ED is now considered to be mainly organic in origin resulting from vascular, 
hormonal or neurological complications (Kaiser, 1999). 
 
The PDE5 inhibitor class consists of three drugs listed in Table 4.10. Interviews were 
conducted with Pfizer, Lilly and Bayer, regarding sildenafil, tadalafil and vardenafil 
respectively. 







UK launch  
Sildenafil citrate Viagra Pfizer 1 1st Sep 1998 
Tadalafil Cialis Lilly 2 2nd Feb 2003 
Vardenafil 
hydrochloride 





All three have similar efficacy and toxicity profiles, but differences in the time of onset 
of action, the period of responsiveness and the conditions under which the drug is 
administered i.e. whether absorption is affected by food and alcohol impact on patient 
preference (Table 4.11). 
 
















Sildenafil 50mg  
(25-100mg) 
60 mins  
(35% ≤14 mins) 
1h 4h 6-8h Absorption 




(16% ≤16 mins) 
2h 17.5h  24h  






(21%≤ 10 mins) 
1h 4h 4-5h Absorption 
delayed by food. 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the diffusion curves for the PDE5 inhibitor class. Figure 4.6 shows the 
literature and expert augmented timelines for sildenafil, tadalafil and vardenafil. 




































































































































































Figure 4.6: PDE5 Inhibitors - Timeline of Literature and Expert-derived Diffusion Factors  
Primary – Research Trials (See Table 4.12 for commentary) Key: Sil = sildenafil; Tad = tadalafil; Var = vardenafil 
Secondary – Guidelines/Reviews/Policy (See Table 4.13 for commentary) 
 






Table 4.12: PDE5 Inhibitors - Timeline Commentary for Primary Level Evidence  
Evidence summary: 
• Efficacy studies had only been conducted against placebo at the point when the interviews were conducted. Differences between 
selection criteria in studies of the three drugs (particularly in the way patients previously treated with sildenafil were included or 
excluded), and differential reporting of outcomes between trials also prevented direct comparison of efficacy (efficacy in ED studies is 
usually assessed by patient-rated outcome measures from self-administered questionnaires) (Hackett et al., 2008). For consistently 
reported efficacy outcomes, all three drugs are similar, with rates of successful intercourse and improved erections between 59-65% 
and 71-76%, respectively versus placebo rates of 22-28% for both outcome measures (Moore et al., 2005).  
• Trial programmes followed a similar course for all three drugs i.e. demonstration of efficacy initially in a wide ED etiology, followed 
by subsequent studies in challenging to treat subpopulations. Quoted efficacy rates are lower for patients with diabetes (50-55%), and 
after nerve-sparing radical prostatectomy (37-41%) (Hackett et al., 2008). The recognisable differing pharmacological characteristics 
made it difficult to conduct randomised, double-blind, comparative studies, so head to head comparisons have been based on 
preference studies, many of which have been criticised for poor design that has introduced bias (Mulhall and Montorsi, 2006). One 
study that compared all three PDE5 inhibitors, demonstrated a preference for tadalafil based on its longer period of action (Tolra et al., 
2006). 
 
Pivotal clinical trials were mostly determined through assessment of the literature as a result of limited clinical expert input for this section. 
Key:  
*  Highlighted as major trials in ‘Key Clinical Trials in Erectile Dysfunction’ by Carson (2007) - identified equivalent trials for tadalafil and vardenafil. 
** Highlighted as trials of major importance in Hellstrom, 2003. 
***  Highlighted as major trials in the British Society for Sexual Medicine (BSSM) guidelines (preference studies). 
 
Trial Study drugs Importance Study design Outcome 
Boolell et al., 
1996*  
 
Sildenafil vs placebo.  
ED of no obvious 
organic cause. 
First significant 
publication on an oral 
therapy for ED. 
Small randomised double-blind, 4-way crossover trial 
(phase II) in 12 men. Sildenafil (10, 25 or 50mg) or 
placebo received in a crossover design on 4 different 
study days (min 3 days between treatments): design 
enabled evaluation with a relatively small sample size. 
Significantly longer mean duration of >60% rigidity with sildenafil 
during visual sexual stimulation at the base of penis: 3.2 mins 
(placebo) vs 31.8 mins (50mg) and at tip of the penis: 3.0 mins 
(placebo) vs 26.5 mins (50mg). Mild headache reported by 4 




Trial Study drugs Importance Study design Outcome 
Goldstein et al., 
1998* 
 
Sildenafil vs placebo. 
ED of various 
aetiologies.  
Pivotal phase III trial 
unequivocally 
demonstrated benefit of 
sildenafil in mild to severe 
ED. 
Two sequential, multicentre studies in 861 patients.  
1. Dose-response study:  Double-blind study in 532 
men randomised to receive  placebo or 25, 50 or 100mg 
sildenafil for 24 weeks (no more than 1 dose per day). 
2. Dose-escalation study with open-label extension: 329 
men randomised to placebo or sildenafil (50mg). 
Patients able to halve or double dose depending on 
response over 12 weeks.   
In the dose-response study, improved erections were reported by 
56%; 77% and 84% of the men taking 25mg, 50mg and 100mg 
sildenafil respectively vs 25% placebo. 
In the dose escalation study, 69% of all attempts at sexual 
intercourse for men receiving sildenafil (50mg) were successful vs 
22% with placebo. 
Headache, flushing and dyspepsia were the most common adverse 
effects. 
Rendell et al., 
1999** 
Sildenafil vs placebo in 
men with ED and 
diabetes (type 1 or type 
2). 
First major study in a 
challenging to treat 
subpopulation. 
Multicentre, double-blind, trial in 268 men with 
diabetes randomised, to receive sildenafil 50mg 
(n=136) with the option to increase or reduce dose 
according to response (no more than one dose per day) 
or placebo (n=132) for 12 weeks. 
At least 1 successful attempt at sexual intercourse was reported by 
61% of men receiving sildenafil vs 22% placebo. Improved 
erections reported by 56% of men receiving sildenafil vs 10% 
placebo.  Adverse events: headache (11% sildenafil, 2% placebo), 
dyspepsia (9% vs 0%) and respiratory tract disorder (6% vs 2%). 
Incidence of cardiovascular events comparable for both groups. 
Padma-Nathan et 
al.,  2001*  
 
Tadalafil vs placebo. 
ED various aetiologies. 
First major trial 
demonstrating efficacy and 
safety of a new PDE5 
inhibitor to rival sildenafil 
– no reference to longer 
period of action. 
 
Multicentre double-blind, phase II study in 179 men 




Equivalent study in vardenafil published 6 months later 
in Aug 2001 (Porst et al., 2001). 
69.8% and 70.2% of attempts at sexual intercourse for men 
receiving 10mg and 25mg tadalafil, respectively were successful vs 
26.6% with placebo. 
Improved erections reported by 80.6%  in groups receiving both 
10mg and 25mg tadalafil vs 17.1% placebo.  
Common adverse events included headache and dyspepsia. No 
alterations of colour vision reported (side effect associated with 
sildenafil). 
Brock et al., 2002 * 
 
Tadalafil vs placebo. 




demonstrated benefit of 
tadalafil in mild to severe 
ED. 
Integrated analysis of 5 x 12 week, randomised, double-
blind, placebo-controlled, parallel group trials 
conducted at 74 centres in 1,112 men.  Tadalafil doses 
used in included studies ranged from 2.5mg - 20mg 
(individual trials not specified). 
 
61% and 75% of intercourse attempts were successful at doses of 
10mg and 20mg, respectively, compared with 32% with placebo.  
Improved erections reported by 81% receiving 20mg tadalafil, vs 
35% placebo. 
Results were similar irrespective of the time the dose was taken 
between 4 and 36 hours previously. 
Hellstrom et al., 
2002** 
Vardenafil vs placebo. 
ED of various 
aetiologies.  
First pivotal phase III 
results showing key 
efficacy and safety profile 
of vardenafil. 
Multicentre double-blind, phase III study in 805 men 
randomised to receive vardenafil (5-20mg) or placebo 
for 26 weeks. 
 
 
64.7% and 66.7% of attempts at sexual intercourse for men 
receiving vardenafil 10mg and 20mg, respectively were successful 
vs 32.7% with placebo.  
Improved erections reported by 79.8% and 85.2% receiving 10mg 
and 20mg vardenafil, respectively vs 27.6% placebo at week 26. 
Common adverse events included headache, rhinitis, flushing and 
dyspepsia. No blue colour vision disturbances reported (side effect 
associated with sildenafil).  
Saenz de Tejada et 
al., 2002 ** 
Tadalafil vs placebo in 
men with ED and 
diabetes (mainly type 
2). 
First major study of 
tadalafil in challenging to 
treat patients. 
 
Multicentre double-blind, phase III study in 216  men 
with type 1 or type 2 diabetes randomised to receive 
tadalafil (10 or 20mg) or placebo up to once daily for 
12 weeks. 
 
28.4% of men taking tadalafil 10mg, and 29.1% taking 20mg 
achieved successful intercourse compared with 1.9% placebo.  
Improved erections reported in 56%, and 64% taking tadalafil doses 
10mg and 20mg, respectively vs 25% placebo. 







Trial Study drugs Importance Study design Outcome 
Goldstein et al., 
2003 ** 
Vardenafil vs placebo 
in men with ED and 
diabetes (type 1 or type 
2). 
First study of vardenafil 
demonstrating significant 
improvement in erectile 
function in ‘challenging to 
treat’ categories. 
Multicentre double-blind, phase III study in 452 men 
with diabetes randomised to receive vardenafil (10mg 
or 20mg) or placebo as needed for 12 weeks. 
 
 
49% and 54% of attempts at sexual intercourse for men receiving 
vardenafil 10mg and 20mg, respectively were successful vs 23% 
with placebo. 
Improved erections reported by 57% and 72% receiving 10mg and 
20mg vardenafil, respectively vs 13% placebo at week 12. 
Common adverse events included headache, rhinitis and flushing.  
Porst et al., 2003  Tadalafil vs placebo in 
men with ED of 
various aetiologies. 
Major study demonstrating 
the extended period of 
action of tadalafil up to 36 
hours. 
Multicentre double-blind, randomised, phase III study 
in 348 men randomised to receive tadalafil (20mg) or 
placebo for a total of 8 weeks. The 8 weeks was divided 
into two 4-week intervals where patients were requested 
to attempt sexual intercourse approximately 24 or 36 
hours after tadalafil or placebo dosing. 
Effectiveness evident up to 36 hours after ingestion.  
At 24 hours 52.9% of intercourse attempts successful vs 29.1% with 
placebo.  
At 36 hours, 59.2% of intercourse attempts successful vs 28.3% 
with placebo. 
Adverse events included headache, flushing, dyspepsia and myalgia. 
 
Carson et al., 2004   
(PROVEN study)  
Vardenafil vs placebo 
in men with ED 
unresponsive to 
sildenafil.  
First major trial in 
sildenafil non-responders – 
presented ahead of 
publication at Sexual 
Medicine Society of North 
America in Oct 2003. 
Multicentre, double-blind, randomised, 12-week, 
flexible-dose trial involving 463 men with ED (diabetic 
and non-diabetic) unresponsive to sildenafil (by 
history). Patients received placebo or vardenafil 10mg 
with the option to maintain dose or titrate by one dose 
level (5, 10 or 20mg) based on efficacy and tolerability 
at 4 and 8 weeks. 
46.1% of men taking vardenafil achieved successful intercourse 
compared with 16.1% placebo.  
Improved erections reported by 61.6% receiving vardenafil vs 15% 
placebo at week 12.  
Adverse events were representative of the PDE5 inhibitor profile. 
 
Comparative preference studies 
Eardley et al., 
2005***  
Tadalafil vs sildenafil.  
ED of various 
aetiologies. 
First head to head study 
based on preference. 
Multicentre, open-label, cross-over study in 367 PDE5 
inhibitor-naïve men randomised to receive sildenafil 
(25-100mg) for 12 weeks followed by tadalafil  (10-
20mg) for 12 weeks or vice versa (8 weeks of dose 
optimisation followed by 4 weeks of assessment). 
Patients then chose which treatment to continue during 
an 8 week extension. 
Patient preference for tadalafil (71%) versus sildenafil (29%). Major 
reason for preference was the ability to get an erection long after 
taking the drug. Efficacy of both drugs was very similar. 
Tolra et al., 
2006***  
Sildenafil vs vardenafil 
vs tadalafil. 




incorporating all PDE5 
inhibitors. 
Open-label, fixed dose, cross-over study in 132 PDE5 
inhibitor-naïve men randomised to sildenafil (100mg), 
tadalafil (20mg) or vardenafil (20mg). Drugs were 
taken at least 6 times over a period of 45-60 days with a 
washout period of 7 days. 
52% favoured tadalafil, 28% sildenafil and 20% vardenafil, with the 
possibility of achieving an erection well after taking the drug being 




al., 2006 *** 
 
Vardenafil vs sildenafil  






Double-blind, fixed-dose, pooled (prospective analysis 
on 2 studies) cross-over study in 1,057 men randomised 
to receive sildenafil (100mg) or vardenafil (20mg) for 4 
weeks. Following a 1 week washout, patients switched 
treatment for 4 weeks. Previous users of sildenafil 
included provided they had not used medication for 4 
weeks prior to study start. 
Study demonstrated a 38.9% versus 34.5% preference in favour of 
vardenafil with 26.6% expressing no preference. Efficacy was 






Table 4.13: PDE5 Inhibitors - Timeline Commentary for Secondary Level Evidence and Policy 
Secondary Evidence and Policy Description 
Dept of Health (DH) Circular: 
Sildenafil ban (HSC 1998/158) 
  (DH, 1998)   
The Secretary of State for Health issued a Health Service Circular (HSC 1998/158) placing a de facto ban on prescribing sildenafil on the NHS on the eve of 
its EU launch pending further consultation. It stated “doctors should not prescribe sildenafil until further notice.  Health authorities are also advised not to 
support the provision of sildenafil by NHS Trusts other than in exceptional circumstances, which are required to be cleared in advance”. 
Public consultation on DH 
proposals,   
The DH released a 6 week consultation document proposing restricting access to sildenafil on the NHS under Schedule 11 of the 1992 General Medical 
Services regulations to 6 patient groups (patients with diabetes; multiple sclerosis; prostatectomy; radical pelvic surgery; spinal cord injury; single gene 
neurological disease). A patient also qualified if a) they were receiving a course of NHS drug treatment for ED due to any condition on 14th  September 1998; 
or b) were suffering “severe distress” on account of their ED - determined only after specialist assessment. These restrictions were an attempt to limit the cost 
of ED treatment to around £10-12 million/year.   
BMA (British Medical Association)  
response 
The BMA condemned the proposals believing it was setting a dangerous precedent to discriminate against patients with equal clinical need. Following legal 
advice indicating the guidance to be unlawful, the BMA advised its members to disregard the restrictions and prescribe sildenafil to all patients who had a 
demonstrable clinical need, until such time that the Government guidelines were given the force of law (Abbasi, 1999). Some GPs had already taken the 
decision to ignore the ban, believing it to be in contravention of GPs’ terms of service, which placed an obligation on them to respond to patient need. 
DH circular: DH position finalised  
(HSC 1999/115) ( (DH, 1999c) 
In response to the consultation, the final DH position included a further 6 patient groups who could receive treatment for ED on the NHS under Schedule 
11(patients with renal failure treated by dialysis or transplant; spina bifida; poliomyelitis; Parkinson’s disease; severe pelvic injury; or men receiving 
treatment for prostate cancer).  The impact of these restrictions was that only around 17% of men were eligible to receive sildenafil on the NHS. 
High Court ruling Pfizer challenged the initial September 1998 ban in the High Court, claiming the decision was unprecedented and discriminatory and was in breach of EU law 
by asking doctors to act contrary to their ethical duty and terms of service. While accepting that the circular was not a ban as such, its effect was to act as a 
ban and that was the intention. The DH argued it was interim advice while consultations took place before a final policy was decided upon. The High Court 
ruled in Pfizer’s favour stating the Government had acted unlawfully under English law by deterring doctors from exercising their duty to use clinical 
judgement, and under EU law as it contravened the European Transparency Directive, which requires that reasons for exclusion must be based on objective 
and verifiable criteria (Dyer, 1999). Drugs can only legally be rationed with Parliamentary approval, which the Government only later sought to do. 
EDA (Erectile Dysfunction 
Alliance) Guidelines, 1999 - later 
became British Association for 
Sexual Health and HIV (BASHH) 
Recommended that treatment should be determined according to patient choice. Sildenafil was recommended (with the caveat of use being dependent on 
local/national availability) amongst other currently used therapies including intracavernosal injection of alprostadil, intraurethral alprostadil, or vacuum 
devices.  
The same guidelines were later published in the BMJ (Aug 2000) by guideline contributors Ralph and McNicholas. 
DH circular: 1 treatment per week 
(HSC 1999/148 ) (DH, 1999d) 
Policy restricted access to one treatment per week on the NHS based on i) data suggesting men aged 40-60 have sex once a week and ii) concern over the 
street value of some treatments for impotence leading to unlicensed use of these treatments. Doctors were allowed to use their discretion if more frequent 
dosing was deemed necessary. 
DH circular: Clarification of ‘severe 
distress’ (HSC 1999/177)  
(DH, 1999e) 
In response to the term ‘severe distress’ being considered obscure (thereby placing a heavy burden on specialist services from referrals), the DH provided 
clarification on the identification and management within specialist services of those men diagnosed as suffering severe distress on account of their ED to 
avoid misinterpretation of this exemption category. 
WHO co-sponsored 
recommendations   
Jardin et al.,  2000 
Recommended oral therapies as first-line treatment for ED (based on first international consultation on ED). 
NSF (National Service Framework) 
for Diabetes, 2001 (DH, 2001b) 
Indicated the need for regular surveillance for, and effective management of, other conditions that occur more commonly in people with diabetes, such as 
depression and ED, which can impact on the quality of life of people with diabetes. 
EAU Guidelines  (European 
Association of Urology)  
Wespes et al.,  Jan 2002 
(update:Wespes et al., May 06) 
The 2002 guidelines recommended oral therapies (including sildenafil and apomorphine), vacuum devices or psychosexual therapy as first-line therapies. In 
the 2006 update (published in advance in report form in Mar 05), while the three available PDE5 inhibitors were included as first-line therapies, the absence 
of controlled studies comparing efficacy or tolerability resulted in recommendations that patients be informed of the effects and possible disadvantages of 
each drug, as well as how to use the drug, and that each drug should be administered at least 4 times before being considered to be non-effective and replaced 




Secondary Evidence and Policy Description 
NICE Clinical Guideline (diabetes 
type 1), 2004a 
Recommended that men with type 1 diabetes should be asked annually whether ED was an issue and offer a trial of a PDE5 inhibitor drug if appropriate (no 
distinction was made as to the choice of PDE5 inhibitor). While ED was also featured prominently in Clinical Guideline 66: The management of type 2 
diabetes, it was not published until May 2008,  which was outside the time frame of the timeline and none of the former clinical guidelines on type 2 diabetes 
that it replaced (G, H, F, E)  made any reference to ED. 
AUA Guidelines  (American 
Urological Association)  
Montague et al., 2005 
Oral PDE5 inhibitors, unless contraindicated should be offered as a first-line of therapy for erectile dysfunction. At the time of publication there was 
insufficient evidence to support the superiority of one agent over the others. Prior to proceeding to other therapies, patients reporting failure of PDE5 inhibitor 
therapy should be evaluated to determine whether the trial of PDE5 inhibition was adequate. 
Moore et al., 2005  
Meta-analysis 
 
There are several meta-analyses of individual drugs, but none determined to be of major significance. Moore et al., 2005 was the first meta-analysis to 
compare all 3 PDE5 inhibitors, involving 12,580 participants in 50 randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial (35 sildenafil trials in 7,135 men; 8 
tadalafil trials in 2,071 men and 7 vardenafil trials in 3,374 men). Differences in trial outcomes reported limited comparisons, and the most useful outcomes 
were not reported. For common outcomes there was a similar efficacy between PDE5 inhibitors. All three drugs were well tolerated, with headache being the 
most commonly reported, and few serious adverse events. 
BSSM Guidelines (British Society 
for Sexual Medicine)  
Hackett et al., 2008 (available online 
from June 07) 
Recommended PDE5 inhibitors as first-line therapy and that at least 8 doses should be given before a man is considered a non-responder (emphasised the 
importance of adequate testosterone levels to achieve maximal response with PDE5 inhibitors). In non-responders second–line (intracavernous injection 
therapy or intraurethral alprostadil), or third-line therapies (penile prostheses) should be offered. Also highlighted the link between ED and cardiovascular 





Table 4.14: PDE5 Inhibitors - Timeline Commentary for Safety and Regulatory Events  
Note: Not all licensing events that appear on the timeline are represented in the table below. Ony those events that required additiona context are presented. 
Events Description 
Sildenafil USA launch 
Apr 1998 
The mass media attention that followed the USA launch of sildenafil raised levels of interest and expectations of the general public and clinicians in the UK ahead of 
its launch 5 months later. 
Sildenafil safety study  
(Morales et al., Jun 1998) 
In response to mounting cardiovascular safety concerns, high priority was given to rapidly peer-review a large scale study assessing safety data from 18 randomised 
controlled trials and 10 open-label studies in over 3,700 men, which detected no statistically significant difference in the incidence of myocardial infarction (MI) in 
sildenafil and placebo recipients. 
Sildenafil FDA deaths 
Aug 1998 
Just ahead of sildenafil’s European launch, the FDA reported 123 deaths linked with use of the drug. Most patients had one or more risk factors for cardiovascular 
disease contraindicating the use of sildenafil. Theories at the time pointed not to a direct side effect but to a strain on the heart from the physical exertion of sexual 
activity. 
Tadalafil: ICOS/Lilly joint venture 
Oct 1998 




Sublingual apomorphine (Uprima) was the first competitor to challenge sildenafil as another oral drug for ED. It had a faster onset of action of around 15 minutes 
compared with sildenafil which was around one hour. 
Bayer/GSK co-promotion 
agreement Nov 2001 
Bayer entered a co-promotion agreement with GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) for vardenafil in November 2001. Bayer was responsible for all regulatory and manufacturing 
activities, while both companies shared expenses for marketing.  
Sildenafil: Pfizer/Pharmacia 
merger Apr 2003 
In 2003, Pfizer acquired Pharmacia, becoming the largest pharmaceutical company in the UK. 
Tadalafil: Label update (36 hour 
effect) Jan 2004 
Tadalafil was initially launched on the basis of a longer period of action, but it was not until a year after launch that the label was updated to indicate a 36-hour 
duration of effect from a single dose (for which it gained notoriety as the ‘weekend pill’). This disconnected the act of taking the tablet from intimacy, thereby 
removing the associated time pressures and restoring an element of spontaneity. 
Vardenafil: GSK withdrew from 
co-promotion  agreement  Jan 2005 
In January 2005, GSK withdrew from the co-promotion agreement, transferring all rights back to Bayer in Europe, whilst retaining the arrangement in the USA. The 
decision was believed to reflect disappointing sales of the product. 
All: Label update -visual loss 
2005 
While the FDA were unable to conclude a cause and effect relationship between the use of PDE5 inhibitors and non-arteritic anterior ischaemic optic neuropathy 
(NAION), they required that all PDE5 inhibitor product labels be updated to advise patients to stop treatment in the sudden event of loss of vision in one or both eyes. 
PDE5 inhibitors are also contraindicated in patients with pre-existing retinitis pigmentosa. The EMEA followed with an update to the Summary of Product 
Characteristics (SPC) for all PDE5 inhibitors five months later. 
Sildenafil: New indication (PAH) 
Mar 2006 
Sildenafil was the first PDE5 inhibitor to receive an additional licence for the treatment of adult patients with pulmonary arterial hypertension classified as WHO 
functional class II and III, under the brand name Revatio to improve exercise capacity. 
Lilly acquire ICOS Jan 2007 Lilly later purchased ICOS Corporation in 2006, gaining complete ownership of tadalafil. 
Sildenafil: Patient Group Direction 
Feb 2007 
Sildenafil was launched without the need for an individual doctors’ prescription in three high street pharmacies in Manchester on Valentine’s Day. While it remained a 
prescription only medicine, it could be distributed under a Patient Group Direction allowing pharmacists to provide an initial pack of four tablets following a 
consultation. The patient was then required to see a private doctor by the pharmacy to buy further pills (Mayor, 2007). 
Tadalafil: once daily formulation  
Jun 2007 
Tadalafil once daily was launched in the UK in July 2007 for patients who have previously responded to an on-demand PDE5 inhibitor, but who required use at least 
twice weekly. At a recommended dose of 5mg daily, men can attempt sexual activity at any time between doses. 
All: Label update - sudden hearing 
loss   
2008 
The FDA announced label revisions to all PDE5 inhibitors to include a more prominent warning of the potential risk of sudden hearing loss. While no causal 
relationship could be established (as with NAION), the FDA believed there was a strong temporal relationship. In almost all cases hearing loss was unilateral, and 





4.5. Case Study 4: Statins for the prevention of first and recurrent 
cardiovascular events through lipid lowering 
 
Statins, or hydroxmethylglutaryl-CoA (HMG-CoA) reductase inhibitors, are oral 
therapies used to lower cholesterol in people with prior evidence of cardiovascular 
disease (CVD) (secondary prevention), or those at increased risk but with no overt 
evidence of CVD (primary prevention). Statins impede atherosclerosis, reduce heart 
attacks, strokes and cardiac death.  
 
Cardiovascular Disease 
CVD is defined as disease of the heart and blood vessels. CVD causes one in three 
deaths and for every one fatality, there are at least two people who have a major non-
fatal CVD event. It commonly manifests as coronary heart disease (CHD), also known 
as coronary artery disease and ischaemic heart disease, and is caused by an 
accumulation of a fatty material called atheroma that narrows the arteries that supply the 
heart. The narrowing can cause myocardial infarction (MI) and angina. Other forms of 
CVD include peripheral arterial disease, stroke and transient ischaemic attack. 
  
The World Health Organization estimates that blood cholesterol levels in excess of 3.8 
millimoles per litre (mmol/L) are responsible for more than 50% of CVD events (WHO, 
2002). Cholesterol, particularly low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C), which 
makes up around two thirds of total serum cholesterol (TC) plays a major role in 
initiating the development of atherosclerotic plaque. Extensive lipid accumulation and 
inflammation can then cause the plaque to rupture (NICE, 2006). In England, the 




comprises an average of 3.6mmol/L (NICE, 2007b). National guidelines and policies 
have set TC and LDL-C goals of less than 5mmol/L and less than 3mmol/L 
respectively, as a definition of adequate care (Department of Health, 2000). 
 
Table 4.15: Risk classification based on lipid profile (adapted from the National Cholesterol Education 
Programme Adult Treatment Panel classification, 2001) 
 
Classification  TC (mmol/L) LDL-C (mmol/L) 
Optimal  <5.2 2.6 - 3.3 
Borderline high 5.2 - 6.2 3.4 - 4.1 
High >6.2 4.2 - 4.9 
Very high - >5.0 
 
Statins are recommended for all high risk patients with established atherosclerotic 
disease (secondary prevention), in most people with diabetes who are at risk of CVD, 
and others with a 20% or greater 10 year risk of developing CVD (primary prevention) 
(NICE, 2006). This accounts for an estimated one quarter of adults aged 30-75 (around 
7 million people in the UK) (Laurie, 2008). Currently, one in five prescriptions for 
patients with heart and circulatory diseases are for statins (Trusler, 2011). 
 
There are five statins available in the UK: simvastatin (Zocor, MSD), atorvastatin 
calcium (Lipitor, Pfizer), fluvastatin (Lescol, Novartis), rosuvastatin calcium (Crestor, 
AstraZeneca), pravastatin (Lipostat, BMS). Cerevastatin (Lipobay, Bayer) was 
withdrawn from the UK market in 2001 due to safety concerns. Simvastatin was the 
first statin to become available generically in May 2003, followed by pravastatin in 
August 2004. Market entry and hierarchy positions are outlined in Table 4.16. 
Interviews were conducted with Pfizer and AstraZeneca regarding atorvastatin and 
rosuvastatin12, respectively. Although simvastatin was discussed as an example during 
                                                 




the general interviews with MSD, it was not possible to secure a separate interview to 
discuss this drug specifically.  
 








UK launch  
Simvastatin Zocor MSD 1 1st May 1989 
Atorvastatin Lipitor Pfizer 2 4th Mar 1997 
Pravastatin Lipostat Bristol-Myers Squibb 3 2nd Sep 1990 
Rosuvastatin Crestor AstraZeneca 4 6th Mar 2003 
Fluvastatin Lescol Novartis 5 3rd Jan 1994 
Cerevastatin Lipobay Bayer 6 5th Apr 1997  
(withdrawn 2001) 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the diffusion curves for the statin class. Figure 4.8 shows the literature 
and expert augmented timelines for atorvastatin and rosuvastatin (key events for 
simvastatin were also incorporated as they were influential on the whole class). 
Commentaries of the events represented in each timeline are presented in Tables 4.17 to 
4.19. 
                                                 
13 Lovastatin was the first statin, but it was not launched in the UK.  Interviewees often discussed 















































































































































































































Figure 4.8: Statins - Timeline of Literature and Expert-derived Diffusion Factors 
Key: Simva=simvastatin; Atorva=atorvastatin; Rosuva=rosuvastatin; Prava=pravastatin; Cereva=cerevastatin 
 
Primary – Research Trials (See Table 4.17 for commentary) 1o = primary prevention studies (remainder are secondary prevention studies) 
 
Secondary – Guidelines/Reviews/Policy (See Table 4.18 for commentary) 
 
 




Table 4.17: Statins - Timeline Commentary for Primary Level Evidence  
Evidence Summary  
The statins are effective in preventing major cardiovascular events and death in both primary and secondary prevention trials in a wide range of at-risk 
patient groups with a wide range of baseline lipid concentrations (Betteridge, 2011). Despite an extensive evidence suite, several issues relating to trial 
design raise questions about the extent of clinical utility of some of the studies. 
 
• Comparative trials: Comparative effectiveness trials on clinical endpoints have not been done in statins as it requires many years to demonstrate an effect. Head to 
head studies are therefore based on surrogate LDL-C lowering efficacy. Placebo trials were considered unethical following the landmark statin studies, therefore 
trials had to at least be conducted against standard of care. As a consequence, later entrants to the market demonstrated benefit in specific patient populations (e.g. 
acute coronary syndrome; diabetes; the elderly), or of intensive lipid lowering where uncertainty as to statin efficacy remained. While some of these trials appeared 
comparative, they often used different statin intensities in the two arms (either through a standard dose approach or titrating to a specific LDL-C guideline target) 
and so are not considered truly head to head studies. 
 
• Primary endpoints: In the absence of clinically relevant head to head studies, composite primary endpoints composed of various combinations of cardiovascular 
events (such as  death, MI, unstable angina, coronary revascularisation and stroke) have produced different patient populations, in which different extents of LDL-C 
reduction have been achieved. This makes it difficult to directly compare statin trial outcomes (Pederson et al., 2005). In some studies, primary endpoints have also 
been affected by control populations also receiving some form of lipid-lowering treatment by the end of the study, compromising the LDL-C lowering differential 
between the placebo and treatment groups and ultimately the achieved clinical impact. 
 
The trials are separated according to primary and secondary prevention. 
Trial Study drugs Importance Study design Clinical Endpoints14 Outcome 






Survival Study Group, 
1994 
Simvastatin 20-




Landmark study - first 
to demonstrate LDL-C 
reduction translated to 
reduced cardiac and all 
cause mortality. 
Randomised, double-blind, 
multicentre study in 4,444 
patients with: 
Angina or MI; 
TC: 5.5-8.0mmol/L and 
mean LDL-C: 4.9mmol/L; 






Statin therapy reduced the relative risk of : 
• Total mortality by 30% (p<0.001); actual risk reduction (ARR) 3.3% 
(8.2% vs 11.5% placebo). 
• CHD mortality by 42% (p<0.001); ARR 3.5%. 
• CHD events by 34% (p<0.001); ARR 9% (CHD death, non-fatal definite 
or probable MI, silent MI, resuscitated cardiac arrest). 
 
                                                 
14 Trials incorporating clinically relevant outcomes were included. Exceptions were the first head to head trials based on LDL-C lowering efficacy to include 




Trial Study drugs Importance Study design Clinical Endpoints14 Outcome 
58yrs); 
Av duration: 5.4yrs. 
Lipids:  
Mean reductions in TC vs placebo=25%; LDL-C=35%; TG=10%; HDL 
increase of 8%. 
Adverse events similar in both groups. One case of rhabdomyolysis in 
simvastatin arm. Resolved on discontinuation.  
 
CARE  
Cholesterol And Recurrent 
Events  
 








First study to show 
statins reduced risk of 
coronary events even 
in people with average 
base-line cholesterol - 
majority of patients 
with coronary disease. 
Double-blind, randomised, 
multicentre trial in 4,159 
patients with: 
Prior MI; 
TC: <6.2mmol/L (mean 
5.4mmol/L) and LDL-C: 
3.0-4.5mmol/L (mean 
3.6mmol/L);  
21-75yrs (mean age: 
59yrs); 




Reducing LDL-C from average to low levels significantly reduced the 
number of recurrent coronary events, but did not significantly reduce 
overall mortality Statin therapy reduced the relative risk of : 
• Total mortality by 9%: non-significant (ns); ARR 0.7%. 
• CHD mortality by 20% (ns); ARR1.1%. 
• CHD events by 24% (p=0.003) ARR; 3% (CHD death, silent or 
symptomatic non-fatal MI). 
Lipids: 
TC reduced by 20% vs placebo; LDL-C reduced by 28% (baseline LDL-C 
of 3.2mmol/L appeared to be an approximate lower boundary for clinical 










40mg)   
Lovastatin (20-




First study to compare 
the lipid lowering 
efficacy of all 
marketed statins. 
Open label, randomised, 
multicentre, parallel group 
trial in 534 patients with: 
LDL-C: ≥4.2mmol/L, but 
no CHD; 







Atorvastatin 10-40mg produced greater reductions in LDL-C (38% to 51%, 
respectively; P≤0.01) vs equivalent doses of other statins: 
Simvastatin (10-40mg) =28 to 41% 
Pravastatin (10-40mg) = 19 to 34% 
Fluvastatin (20-40mg) = 17 to 23% 
Lovastatin (20-40mg) = 29 to 31% 
Discontinuation of therapy due to adverse events: 



















First study to show 
mortality reduction in 
patients with average 
base-line cholesterol 
levels (CARE not 
designed to detect 
significant effects on 
overall mortality or 
mortality from CHD 
alone. 
Double-blind, randomised,  
multicentre trial in 9,014 
patients with: 
Angina or MI; 
TC: 4.0 to 7.0mmol/L and 
mean LDL-C: 3.9mmol/L; 
31-73yrs (mean age: 
62yrs); 
Av duration: 6.1yrs. 





Pravastatin significantly reduced mortality from CHD and overall mortality 
in patients with a broad range of initial cholesterol levels: 
Statin therapy reduced the relative risk of : 
• Total mortality by 22% (p<0.001); ARR 3.1%. 
• CHD mortality by 24% (p<0.001); ARR 1.9%. 
• CHD events by 24% (p<0.001); ARR 3.6% (CHD death, silent or 
symptomatic non-fatal MI).  
Lipids:  
Mean reductions in TC vs placebo=18% LDL-C=25% TG=11%; increase 
HDL-C by 5%. 











Pitt et al., 1999 
Atorvastatin 
(80mg) vs 







First clinically relevant 
endpoint study for 





multicentre trial in 341 
patients: 
Requiring angioplasty 
(stable coronary artery 
disease); 
LDL-C: ≥3mmol/L 
(approximately 80%  
dyslipidaemic); 
Mean age: 59yrs 
Av duration: 18 months. 
Ischaemic events. Intensive LDL-C lowering (to an average 2mmol/L) was at least as 
effective as angioplasty followed by usual care in reducing incidence of 
ischaemic events in low-risk patients referred for revascularisation.  
 
Intensive treatment with atorvastatin reduced relative risk of: 
• Ischemic events by 36% (p=0.048) ARR 8% (20.9% angioplasty vs 
13.4% atorvastatin). 
• First event after 6 months by 46% (ns); ARR 5% (11% angioplasty vs 
6% atorvastatin). 
Lipids: Reduction in LDL-C vs usual care=28%. 
MRC-BHF HPS (Heart 
Protection Study) 
 
Heart Protection Study 











Largest ever study 
conducted in statins 
(independently 
funded). Aimed to 
resolve remaining 
uncertainties in high 
risk groups: women; 
elderly; diabetics, 







UK study in 20,536 
patients with: 
± CHD + risk factors 
(diabetes); 
TC:  ≥3.5mmol/L (mean 
5.9mmol/L) and mean 
LDL-C: 3.4mmol/L; 
40-80yrs; 





Statins not only prevent coronary events and coronary revascularisation, but 
also ischaemic strokes and peripheral vascularisations. Advised initiation of 
therapy should be guided by estimated risk of suffering any vascular event 
and not just coronary events. 
Statin therapy reduced the relative risk of:  
• Total mortality by 13% (p=0.0003); ARR 1.8%. 
• CHD mortality by 17% (p=0.0005); ARR 1.2%. 
• Other vascular mortality by 14% (p=0.07); ARR 0.3%. 
• Non-vascular deaths: Non-significant reduction.  
• Major vascular events reduced by 24%  (p=0.0001); ARR 5.4% 
incorporating reduction in: 
o CHD events by 27% (p<0.0001); ARR 3.1% (non-fatal MI or 
coronary death). 
o strokes by 25% (p<0.0001); ARR 1.4% (fatal and non-fatal 
stroke). 
o revascularisation by 24% (p<0.0001); ARR 2.6% (coronary and 
non-coronary). 
No threshold cholesterol value below which statin therapy was not 
associated with benefit. No difference in reports of muscle symptoms 
(annual excess risk of myopathy was about 0.01%). 
STELLAR   
  











study to also include 
rosuvastatin against all 
other marketed statins. 
Open-label, randomised, 
multicentre, parallel group 
trial in 2,431 patients with: 
LDL-C:  ≥4.2mmol/L to 
<6.5 mmol/L; 
>18yrs (mean age: 58yrs); 




Rosuvastatin (10-40mg) produced greater reductions in LDL-C: 46% to 
55%, respectively vs equivalent doses of other statins (p≤0.001): 
Atorvastatin (10-40mg) 37 to 48%; Simvastatin (10-40mg) 28 to 39%; 
Pravastatin (10-40mg) 20 to 30%. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that comparator doses 2 or 4 times higher 
than rosuvastatin 10 and 20mg did not result in significantly greater LDL-C 
reductions. Drug tolerability was similar across treatments. No cases of 
myopathy were detected. 
                                                 




Trial Study drugs Importance Study design Clinical Endpoints14 Outcome 





Myocardial Infarction 22 
 








First head to head trial 
in statins based on 
clinically relevant 
endpoints (not directly 





multicentre trial in 4,162 
patients with: 
Acute Coronary Syndrome 
TC:  ≤ 6.2mmol/L (mean 
4.7mmol/L) and mean  
LDL-C: 2.8mmol/L; 
Mean age: 58yrs; 
Av duration 2yrs. 




Intensive atorvastatin therapy reduced the relative risk of: 
• Time to first occurrence of a component of the primary end point by 
16% (p=0.005) ARR 3.9% (death, MI, unstable angina requiring 
hospitalisation, coronary revascularisation or stroke). 
• Total mortality by 28% (ns) ARR 1%. 
Lipids:  
Median LDL-C level: 2.46mmol/L pravastatin vs 1.60mmol/L atorvastatin. 
Effect seen by 30 days and remained consistent over time (however follow-
up time was comparatively short. Not possible to extrapolate findings from 
acute coronary syndrome to all patients with CHD). 
Adverse events similar between both groups. No cases of rhadomyolysis. 
ALLIANCE  
Aggressive Lipid-
Lowering Initiation Abates 
New Cardiac Events 
 
 
Koren et al., 2004 
Atorvastatin 




max 80mg vs 
usual care. 
 
First atorvastatin trial 
to treat to a target as 
opposed to using a 
standard dose. 
Open label, randomised, 
multicentre trial in 2,442 
patients with: 
CHD;  
TC: mean 5.8mmol/L and 
LDL-C: 2.8 to 5.2mmol/L 
on lipid lowering therapy/ 
3.4 to 6.5mmol/L not on 
therapy (mean 
3.8mmol/L); 
18-75yrs (mean age 61yrs); 
Av duration 4yrs 3 months. 
Major CV events 
and mortality. 
Intensive statin therapy reduced the relative risk of: 
• Total mortality by 5% (ns) ARR 0.5%. 
• CHD mortality by 30% (ns) ARR 1.5%. 
• Cardiovascular event by 13% (p=0.02) ARR 3.5% (cardiac death, non-
fatal MI, revascularisation, resuscitated cardiac arrest) – mainly due to 
fewer non-fatal MI 4.3% vs 7.7% p=0.0002). 
 
Lipids: Reduction in LDL-C vs usual care = 11%; NCEP goals of 
<2.6mmol/L more likely to be met with atorvastatin (72.4% vs 40%).  
 
IDEAL  
Incremental Decrease in 
Endpoints through 
Aggressive Lipid lowering 
 







First comparative trial 
involving simvastatin. 
- compared different 
lipid lowering 
intensities but no 
difference observed in 
major coronary events. 
Randomised, open-label, 
blinded endpoint, 
multicentre trial in 8,888 
patients with:  
CHD (stable), prior MI; 
 TC varied: mean 
5.1mmol/L and LDL-C 
varied: mean 3.2mmol/L; 
≤80yrs (mean age 62yrs); 
Av duration 4.8yrs. 
Coronary and 




Atorvastatin and simvastatin were indistinguishable in the ‘major coronary 
events’ endpoint (10.4% simvastatin vs 9.3% atorvastatin (p=0.07 ns).  
No differences in cardiovascular and all-cause mortality, but there was a 
reduced risk of other composite secondary end points and nonfatal acute 
MI.  
No difference in serious adverse events (myopathy and rhabdomyolysis rare 







Stroke Prevention by 












Market development - 
new indication of 
preventive 
management in stroke 
– possible to conduct 
as a placebo-controlled 
trial as new indication 
Randomised, double-blind, 
multicentre trial in 4,731 
patients with: 
Prior stroke or TIA, no 
known CHD; 
TC: mean 5.5mmol/L and  
LDL-C: 2.6 to 4.9mmol/L: 
Stroke. Atorvastatin moderately reduced the overall incidence of subsequent stoke 
in people with a recent history of stroke or TIA, but without known CHD.  
Statin therapy reduced the relative risk of : 
• Fatal or non-fatal stroke by 15% (p=0.05) ARR 1.9%. 
• Total mortality by 2% (ns) ARR 0.2%. 
5 year ARR of major cardiovascular event=3.5% (p=0.002). Contrasted 













≥18yrs (mean 63yrs); 




of stroke among patients with prior cerebrovascular disease (potentially due 




Mean LDL-C reduced to 1.89mmol/L in the atorvastatin group as compared 
with 3.3mmol/L in placebo (p<0.001).  
Serious adverse events were similar between both groups. Elevated liver 
enzymes more common in atorvastatin group. Small increase in 
haemorrhagic stroke.  
 
PRIMARY PREVENTION OF CORONARY EVENTS – PATIENTS WITHOUT CHD 
WOSCOPS  










First prevention study 
- statins could prevent 
first time heart attacks 
and angina and reduce 
mortality in otherwise 
healthy men with 
hypercholesterolaemia 
(pre-heart attack 
patients) – much 
bigger market than 
post-heart attack. 
Randomised, double blind, 
UK multicentre trial in 
6,595 patients with:  
TC: mean 7.0mmol/L and 
LDL-C: mean 5mmol/L 
(no history of MI); 
45-64yrs (mean age 55 
yrs); 
Av duration 4.9yrs. 
 
 





Pravastatin significantly reduced incidence of MI and death from 
cardiovascular causes in men with moderate hypercholesterolaemia and no 
history of MI.  
Statin therapy reduced the relative risk of : 
• Non-fatal MI or death from CHD by 31% (p<0.001); ARR 2.4%.   
• Total mortality by 22% (p=0.051) ARR 0.9%. 
• Cardiovascular mortality by 32% (p=0.033) ARR 0.7%. 
No excess deaths in pravastatin group - alleviated concerns that statins 
increased deaths from non-cardiovascular causes. 
 
Lipids:  
TC reduced by 20%; LDL-C by 26% (no change with placebo). 
 
American AFCAPS/TexCAPS study (Downs et al., 1998) using lovastatin 





to prevent Heart Attack 
Trial;  Lipid-Lowering 
Trial 
 
ALLHAT Officers and 
Coordinators for the 
ALLHAT Collaborative 




40mg vs usual 





Major negative study 
for statins in primary 
prevention. 
Randomised, open-label, 
multicentre trial in 10,335 
patients with: 
Hypertension (well-
controlled) and ≥1 CHD 
risk factors; 
TC: mean 5.8mmol/L and 
LDL-C: 3.1 to 4.9mmol/L 
(mean 3.8mmol/L); 
≥55yrs (mean age 66yrs); 
Av duration 4.8yrs 
All cause and 
CHD mortality. 
 All clinical endpoint results were non-significant.  
 
Results suspected to be due to the modest differential in TC (9.6%) and 
LDL-C (16.7%) between pravastatin and usual care compared with other 
major statin trials. Almost one third of usual care patients began taking a 
lipid lowering drug during the study, contributing to the non-significant 
LDL-C differences.  
 





Trial Study drugs Importance Study design Clinical Endpoints14 Outcome 
ASCOT-LLA  
Anglo-Scandinavian 
Cardiac Outcomes Trial – 
Lipid Lowering Arm 
 






First study of 
atorvastatin based on a 
mortality clinical 
endpoint and in 
primary prevention. 
Randomised, double-blind, 
multicentre trial in 10,305 
patients with: 
Hypertension and  ≥3 CHD 
risk factors; 
TC: ≤6.5mmol/L (mean 
5.5mmol/L) and LDL-C: 
mean 3.4mmol/L; 
40-79yrs (mean age 63yrs); 
Av duration 5yrs (study 
ended early after 3.3yrs 
due to observed benefit in 
treatment arm).  
 
CHD death and 
non-fatal MI.  
 
Statin therapy reduced the relative risk of : 
• CHD mortality and non-fatal MI by 36% (p=0.0005); ARR 1.1%, 
• Total mortality by 12% (ns); ARR 0.5% 
• Cardiovascular mortality by  12% (p=0.051) ARR 0.2% 
• Fatal and non-fatal stroke by 27% (p=0.024). ARR 0.7% 
 
Lipids: Atorvastatin lowered TC by 1.1mmol/L after 3yrs.  






Table 4.18: Statins - Timeline Commentary for Secondary Level Evidence and Policy 
Despite the emphasis placed on lipid goals in guidelines, no trials have specifically evaluated the relative and absolute benefits of lowering cholesterol 
to specific TC and LDL-C targets in relation to clinical events. Instead they have used standard doses and the targets have been derived through 
extrapolation of benefits in major trials (British Cardiac Society et al., 2005). 
Secondary Evidence and Policy Description 
NCEP (National Cholesterol 
Education Program) guidelines 
(USA)  - Adult Treatment Panel  
(ATP)  I (Jan 1988), II (Jun 1993), 
III (May 2001) 
USA produced the first major clinical guidelines in relation to CHD risk reduction through lowering high blood cholesterol following the publication of the National 
Institute of Health Lipid Research Clinics-Coronary Primary Prevention Trial (LRC-CPPT) (Lipid Research Clinics Program, 1984). 
ATP I (1988): identified LDL-C as the primary target of therapy, emphasising clinical management of patients with higher levels of LDL-C. Statins, as new drugs, 
were advised to be used with caution. 
ATP II (1993): CHD risk stratification refined to 3 categories: i) patients with CHD, ii) patients without CHD who have ≥2 risk factors, and iii) patients without CHD 
who have <2 risk factors. The LDL-C target for patients with CHD became more stringent ≤100mg/dL (2.6mmol/L). Statins became classified as major drugs. 
ATP III (2001): included in the highest-risk category i) not only patients with CHD but also patients with CHD risk equivalents (other atherosclerotic disease, 
diabetes, and a calculated 10-year risk for CHD >20%). Category ii) split into 2 groups - calculated 10-year risk of 10–20% or <10%. Lowest risk category iii) 
remained the same. Result was to increase number of people with LDL-C goal of 2.6mmol/L (estimates suggested the guideline tripled the number of people with 
cholesterol levels classified as abnormal). 
JES (Joint European Societies) 
Guidelines:  
JES1: Pyorala et al., 1994;  
JES2: Wood et al.,  1998b;  
JES3: de Backer et al., 2003 
JES (1994): TC≤5mmol/L ideal. 
JES 2 (1998): TC<5mmol/L and an LDL-C goal of 3mmol/L in patients with established CHD, other atherosclerotic disease, or high absolute risk. 
JES 3 (2003): In general TC should be below 5mmol/L and LDL-C should be below 3mmol/L.  In patients with clinically established CVD and patients with diabetes 
the treatment goal should be TC<4.5mmol/L and LDL-C<2.5mmol/L.  
JBS (Joint British Societies) 
guidelines;  
JBS1 - Wood et al., 1998a; British 
Cardiac Society et al., 2000  
JBS 2 British Cardiac Society et al., 
2005  
JBS1 (1998): Defined TC target as 5mmol/L and LDL-C target as 3mmol/L.  Also put forward proposals for risk assessment and management in the asymptomatic 
population without CVD (published initially in December 1998 (Wood et al., 1998) and separately by the British Cardiac Society in the BMJ in March 2000 to 
coincide with the release of the NSF for CHD). 
JBS2 (2005): Set lower optimal TC  lipid targets as 4mmol/l and LDL-C targets as 2mmol/l, or a 25% reduction in TC and a 30% reduction in LDL-C whichever 
achieves the lowest absolute value.  
 
White paper ‘Saving Lives: Our 
Healthier Nation’ (DH, 1999a) 
Government commitment to reduce the death rate from CHD, stroke and related diseases amongst  people under 75 years by at least two-fifths by 2010 to save a total 
of 200,000 lives. The National Service Framework in CHD was intended to help achieve the ultimate target as set out in the White Paper. 
SIGN Guideline No. 40 –Primary  
prevention of CHD, 1999 
A patient should be considered for lipid lowering drug therapy  following lifestyle measures and other appropriate interventions (for at least 3months) when TC is 
5.0mmol/L and the 10 year risk of a major coronary event is 30% using the Joint British Societies Coronary Risk Prediction Chart For primary prevention of coronary 
heart disease. Statins (pravastatin and simvastatin) drugs of first choice for lowering lipids. 
SIGN Guideline No. 41 – Secondary 
prevention of CHD, 2000 
 If TC is 6.0mmol/L, drug therapy to reduce cholesterol should be initiated, titrated as necessary to reduce TC to <5.0mmol/L. Pravastatin and simvastatin are the 
drugs of choice for lipid lowering for secondary prevention of coronary heart disease following MI. 
NSF-CHD (National Service 
Framework  for Coronary Heart 
Disease) 
(DH, 2000) 
Set standards for the prevention and treatment of CHD in people with established CHD, and apparently healthy individuals at high multifactorial risk of developing 
CHD. Recommended the JBS1 coronary risk prediction charts for total CHD risk estimation in an asymptomatic population, indicating statins be targeted only at those 
asymptomatic individuals with a total CHD risk of ≥30% (JBS1 recommended intervention at lower risk threshold of ≥15%) 
Defined targets of TC ≤5mmol/L and LDL-C ≤ 3mmol/L or a 30% LDL-C reduction as target levels. The increase in provision of statins to patients was seen as one of 




Secondary Evidence and Policy Description 
NICE Guideline – Management of 
type 2 diabetes: management of  
blood pressure and blood lipids  
Inherited Guideline  H, 2002c 
Recommended that in people with type 2 diabetes and consistently high lipid levels, the goal with drug therapy was to reduce TC to <5mmol/L or to 75-80% of the 
level before treatment, whichever is lower; or reduce LDL-C to <3mmol/L or to 70% of the level before treatment, whichever is lower. 
QOF, Quality and Outcomes 
Framework,  2004 
The QOF of the General Medical Services contract, which offers incentive payments linked to several prescribing targets, provided an added incentive for GPs to 
regularly monitor and review patients with CVD or who were at high risk of CVD. QOF indicators for CHD, stroke and diabetes used target TC of ≤5mmol/L. 
NICE Guideline  – Hypertension 
CG18, 2004b; update 2006 
Lipid-lowering therapy should be considered alongside the use of antihypertensive therapy in patients at raised cardiovascular risk. Did not specifically state statins. 
No change to this reference in update. 
NICE Guideline  – Diabetes type 1 
CG15  2004a 
A standard dose of a statin should be recommended for adults in the highest risk and moderately high-risk groups. 
Cholesterol Treatment Trialist 
Collaborators.  
Baigent et al., 2005 
Influential systematic review: Included 14 randomised trials, involving over 8,000 deaths, 14,000 major vascular events, and 5,000 cancers among 90,056 participants. 
Showed statin therapy reduced the incidence of major coronary events and that relative risk reduction was related to the absolute reduction in LDL-C levels from 
baseline, but largely unrelated to the initial lipid profile or other presenting characteristics. 
NICE TA (Technology Appraisal) 
Guidance - Statins for the 
prevention of cardiovascular events 
TA 94, 2006 
Once the decision has been made to prescribe a statin, therapy should be initiated with a drug with a low acquisition cost (taking onto account required daily dose and 
product price per dose). Rosuvastatin assessed on surrogate endpoints. While there was no data to suggest the superiority of one statin over all the others in reducing 
cardiovascular events (comparative studies on clinical events were unavailable at the time of the TA), in view of the substantial price reduction of generic simvastatin, 
prescribing formularies used the guidance to support the preferential use of simvastatin. 
SIGN Guideline No. 97 – Risk 
estimation/prevention  of CVD , 
2007 
Adults over the age of 40 years who are assessed as having a 10 year risk of having a first cardiovascular event ≥20% should be considered for treatment with 
simvastatin 40mg/day. Patients with established symptomatic atherosclerotic CVD should be considered for more intensive statin therapy. 
In diabetic patients with mixed dyslipidaemia and elevated LDL-C, guideline supported prescribing statins to people with established CVD and for individuals with a 
CVD risk as low as 10% over ten years or with baseline cholesterol levels of over 7.5mmol/L. 
NICE Guideline  -  MI: secondary 
prevention MI  CG48, 2007a 
Statin therapy is recommended for adults with clinical evidence of cardiovascular disease in line with ‘Statins for the prevention of cardiovascular events’ (NICE 
technology appraisal guidance 94). After an MI, all patients should be offered treatment with a statin as soon as possible. 
NICE TA (Technology Appraisal) 
Guidance – Ezetimibe for the 
treatment of hypercholesterolaemia 
- TA 132, 2007b 
Guidance recommended that ezetimibe monotherapy be given to people in whom a statin is contraindicated, or co-administered with a person’s usual statin rather than 










Table 4.19: Statins - Timeline Commentary for Safety and Regulatory Events 
Note: Not all licensing events that appear on the timeline are represented in the table below. Ony those events that required additional context are presented. 
Events Description 
Simvastatin launch  
May 1989 
Simvastatin was launched into a cautious environment. While it was known that atherosclerosis was a major cause of cardiovascular mortality and morbidity, the role of LDL-C 
in reducing overall mortality was controversial (Davey Smith and Pekkanen, 1992; Oliver, 1992). Trials had shown that lowering LDL-C through various mechanisms (diet, 
drugs such as fibrates and bile acid sequestrants [cholestyramine, cholestipol], or surgery [partial ileal bypass surgery]) reduced CHD event rates, but there was no impact on 
overall mortality (Lipid Research Clinics Program, 1984; Buchwald et al., 1990). The modest reductions in TC achieved (approximately 10%) and the correspondingly modest 
reductions in CHD mortality were offset by small increases in non-cardiovascular mortality reductions (Gordon, 1995). The statins however, lowered TC by 20% or more, which 
provided the opportunity to effectively assess the overall benefits and risks of cholesterol lowering. 
Concerns regarding low 
cholesterol levels on 
mortality/rhabdomyolysis 
at high doses.  
Early to mid 1990s 
Despite the sea change in behaviour towards statin use caused by the 4S study in 1994, concerns remained about statin-induced rhabdomyolysis from high doses; and even the 
prospect of increased mortality related to persistently low lipid levels, which were making many clinicians wary of aggressive treatment (Anderson et al., 1987; Behar et al., 
1997; Davey Smith and Pekkanen, 1992). Studies, such as CARE were also suggesting a potential LDL-C threshold beyond which no further statin-derived benefit could be 
gained which impacted on statins claiming greater potency. 
Warner Lambert/ Pfizer 
co-marketing agreement 
Mar 1996 
Atorvastatin was originally developed by Parke-Davis, a division of Warner-Lambert. In 1996, just ahead of atorvastatin’s launch they partnered with Pfizer to co-market the 
drug to utilise their marketing power.  
Atorvastatin launch 
Feb 1997 
By the time atorvastatin was launched, the relationship between LDL-C reduction and mortality had been established which enabled atorvastatin to demonstrate superiority in 
comparative studies against competitor statins on the basis of LDL-C lowering ability alone.  A strategy based on greater potency however, was risky against the backdrop of 
potency-related concerns. Approval of doses up to 80mg however, gave the perception that the starting dose of 10mg, (which was below other available statins) was very safe. 




Pfizer acquired Warner-Lambert in June 2000, gaining total control of atorvastatin and creating the world’s second largest pharmaceutical company, after GSK.  
Cerevastatin  withdrawn 
Aug 2001 
Bayer voluntarily withdrew cerevastatin following reports of 52 deaths worldwide from rhabdomyolysis (many of these patients were also prescribed fibrates). The entire class 
came under scrutiny, but other marketed statins were able to distance themselves, largely due to the vast amount of safety data accumulated during large scale clinical trials. The 
simvastatin Heart Protection Study a year later was reassuring to clinicians due to its scale, but made it difficult to make the case to use any other statins first-line. 
Rosuvastatin UK launch 
Mar 2003 
Rosuvastatin was the most potent statin on the market following cerevastatin’s withdrawal and was labelled a ‘super-statin’. Pfizer’s message of ‘lower is better’ had primed the 
market for rosuvastatin’s introduction. Its increased potency meant it was less expensive than its competitors at equivalent efficacy doses. 
Simvastatin – generic 
May 2003 
 
As simvastatin 40mg could reduce LDL-C by around the same amount as 10mg or 20mg atorvastatin (i.e. 30-40%, which is in line with most guideline targets), prescribing 
policies were adopted to switch patients from these doses of atorvastatin to generic simvastatin. There was concern however, that some patients who required more intensive 
therapy were being inappropriately switched. 
Rosuvastatin safety  
warning 1 
May 2004 
A year after launch, rosuvastatin was linked to the same safety issues that had been responsible for cerevastatin’s withdrawal (four cases of rhabdomyolysis and one case of renal 
impairment secondary to myositis (muscle inflammation) in patients initiated on doses of rosuvastatin greater than that recommended) (MHRA, 2004b). This prompted the 
release of a ‘Dear Doctor’ letter reminding health professionals of the importance of starting patients on the lowest dose (10mg). 
Rosuvastatin safety  
warning 2 
Jun 2004 
Within a month of the first safety alert, a second ‘Dear Dr’ letter was released that included specific prescribing advice that i) all patients must start on the initial dose of 10mg 
rosuvastatin once daily and should only be increased to 20mg if considered necessary after a four week trial of 10 mg, ii) the 40mg dose is contraindicated in patients with 
predisposing risk factors for muscle toxicity and iii) specialist supervision (with international normalised ratio [INR] monitoring) is recommended when the 40mg dose is given. 





Simvastatin OTC (over 
the counter) - primary 
prevention 
Jul 2004 
Pharmacists were able to provide low dose simvastatin (10mg) to people with moderate CVD risk (10-15% 10 year risk). This included all men aged 55 years or older without 
other risk factors; men aged 45-54 or women 55 years and older with one or more risk factors (smoker; obese; family history of premature CHD; or of Asian ethnicity).  
 
Category M generic tariff 
pricing 
Arp 2005 
The price of generic simvastatin remained comparable with branded statins until May 2005 following the introduction of Category M generic tariff pricing. The significant price 
drop meant that manufactures of branded statins could not present an argument at low doses (cost savings were estimated to be near £250 million), but in those patients requiring  
intensive lipid lowering, simvastatin even at its highest recommended dose could not achieve the same degree of lipid lowering as the higher doses of atorvastatin and 
rosuvastatin. Enabled a differentiation strategy to be adopted based on potency, with the branded statins competing for niche patient groups (Pfizer used their extensive safety 
data as the basis of their argument to not switch from atorvastatin, in the knowledge it would take many years for AstraZeneca to develop a similar evidence suite).  
Inergy UK launch 
Jun 2005 
Inergy is a combination formulation of simvastatin and ezetimibe. Ezetimibe reduces LDL-C by an average of 18% and can be used in addition to statins to enhance lipid 
lowering efficacy due to its complementary action. As Ezetimibe was also available as a separate drug (Zetia, Schering Plough – launched April 2003), it was often used in 
combination with generic simvastatin to enhance its lipid lowering efficacy at a reduced cost compared with Inegy. Even with reductions to the price of generic simvastatin, the 
additional cost of ezetimibe made this combination more expensive than high dose monotherapy with either atorvastatin or rosuvastatin. 
National Lipid 
Association Statin Safety 
Task Force, Jun 2006  
McKenney et al., 2006 
A post-marketing analysis of safety reports to the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) during the first year found patients taking rosuvastatin were eight times more likely to 
develop rhabdomyolysis, nephropathy, renal failure or proteinuria than patients taking pravastatin and 6.5 times more likely to develop those complications than patients taking 
atorvastatin (Alsheikh-Ali et al., 2005). Fearing concerns that rosuvastatin would be reserved as a second-line therapy after failure of the more established statins, a series of 
safety reports including the National Lipid Association Statin Safety Task Force Report supported by AstraZeneca, were published assessing data from several hundred thousand 
patients, concluding that all currently marketed statins have a similar low risk of serious adverse events (Shepherd et al., 2004). 
Rosuvastatin low dose 
(5mg) Nov 2007 
A new lower dose of 5mg was launched, still capable of lowering LDL-C by around 40% in patients predisposed to myopathy (elderly, renally impaired) with the aim of 
reducing safety concerns (Teramoto and Watkins, 2005). 
 
4.6. Chapter comment 
This chapter presented the results of the case study specific components of the research. An extensive array of events were identified for 
each case study from the literature and prioritised with clinical expert input. Drug-specific unannotated diffusion curves provided the basis 
for discussion with interviewees. The timelines were not supplied to interviewees, but provided background preparatory information and 






THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRY INTERVIEWS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter is a presentation of the 10 themes inductively derived across all case 
studies from the interviews with the pharmaceutical industry. The data is presented 
across all case studies by theme and subtheme with elucidation of the inter-connected 
relationships to construct an interpreted reality of influential diffusion factors from an 
Industry perspective.  
The thematic analysis is entirely a presentation of my inferences from the content of the 
views expressed by Industry respondents. Each theme is augmented by supporting 
quotes, with the key sections of the text highlighted in bold font. To enhance 
transparency, the majority of the corpus of interview material is presented. Reasons for 
not including a quote were predominantly due to duplication of a concept, in which case 
the best exemplifying quote was selected.  
This chapter is presented according to the final framework categories, but their iterative 





5.2. Thematic Framework  
1. CLINICAL NEED 
1.1. Discontent with current therapies 
1.2. Innovation inertia: Desire for something new 
in a stagnating field 
1.3. Vocational need to alleviate distress 
1.4. Disparity between clinician and patient–
driven needs 
1.5. Need to satisfy innovator pursuit 
1.6. Industry response to unmet clinical need 
 
2. CLINICIAN/PATIENT EXPERIENCE 
(EFFECTIVENESS)  
2.1. Subjective evaluation based on personal 
clinical experience 
2.2. Clinician-patient interaction 
2.3. Inappropriate drug use 
2.3.1. Distorted experience 
2.3.2. Safety warnings/concerns 
2.4. Patient insight 
2.5. Industry response to experiential barriers 
3. CLINICAL EVIDENCE  (EFFICACY) 
3.1. ‘Marketing’ evidence 
3.2. Impact of clinical evidence 
3.2.1. Trial design  
3.2.1.1. Functional versatility of evidence 
3.2.1.2. Novel trial perspective 
3.2.2. Evidence translation: 
Relevance/limitation of trial outcomes 
3.2.2.1. Head to head comparisons 
3.2.2.2. Surrogate markers versus 
clinically relevant outcomes 
3.2.3. Temporal impact of evidence 
3.2.4. Journal quality/Publication control 
 
4. HEALTH SERVICE/POLICY 
ENVIRONMENTS   
4.1. Health policy environment  
4.1.1. Political priorities 
4.1.1.1. Favourable policy environment 
4.1.1.2. Adverse policy environment 
4.2. Independent guidance/guidelines 
4.2.1. Differentiation 
4.2.2. Perceived importance/ strength of 
message 
4.2.3. Timeliness 
4.3. Health service environment  
4.3.1. Clinical priorities 
4.3.2. Clinical setting of disease management 
(specialist/non-specialist) 
4.4. Industry response to environmental barriers 
 
 
5. ADOPTER ATTITUDE  
5.1. Clinician conservatism 
5.2. Disease perception  
5.3. Non-specialist risk mitigation 






6. COMMUNICATING RELATIVE ADVANTAGE  
6.1. Differentiating relative advantage 
6.1.1. Real versus perceived benefits 
6.1.2. Market entry position 
6.1.3. Perception of brand identity 
6.2. Conveying relative advantage 
6.2.1. Simplicity/ clarity of message 
6.2.1.1. Tailoring the message to adopter 
needs 
6.2.1.2. Targeting the message 
6.2.2. Product awareness (advertising) 
6.2.2.1. Managing expectations 
6.2.3. Product justification (representative 
detailing) 
6.2.3.1. Competitor objection handling 
 
 
7. MARKET DEVELOPMENT  
7.1. Market research 
7.2. Raising disease awareness 
7.2.1. Patient group role  
7.2.2. Public figure/celebrity endorsement 
7.2.3. Media role 
7.3. Market leadership  
7.3.1. Corporate philanthropy: subsidy of 
health services  
7.4. Research: new formulations/new indications 
7.5. Dispensing/supply issues 
 
 
8. KEY OPINION LEADERS (KOLs) 
8.1. Early engagement/collaboration 
8.2. Hierarchical cascade of influence/peer 
credibility 
8.3. Advancing the field through collegiate 
agreement 
 
9. COMPANY CULTURAL HERITAGE/ 
PERCEPTION  
9.1. Cultural influence on company perception 




10.1. Price setting 







5.3. Thematic Analysis 
1. CLINICAL NEED (Clinician/patient) 
An analysis of respondent views indicated that clinical need is a somewhat multi-
stranded concept, with each aspect rooted in the desire of clinicians or patients to 
find solutions to clinical problems, which cannot be addressed with existing 
technology. This was a theme raised by all respondents during their discussions as 
they considered unmet clinical need is a powerful driver of diffusion on which many 
other influences depend; new drugs that meet genuine needs were considered to face 
few barriers to diffusion. Industry respondents conceptualised various manifestations 
of clinical need.  
It's not necessarily evidence as such, but it was meeting clinical need.  So again, a clinical need is a 
big driver in terms of shifting and kicking the line (G1.2).  
How do you actually make sure that, when you're communicating your product you're talking about 
things that the doctors are interested in and are going to switch the doctor on in terms of when 
they're making that decision that it's your drug that they use versus the other. So you have to 
understand the drivers to prescribing, whether it be efficacy, safety, patient convenience.  And it's 
different for every market (G1.2). 
 
1.1. Discontent with Current Therapies 
The consensus Industry view was that discontent with current therapy drives clinical 
need due to deficiencies within existing classes of therapies such as the need for 
greater efficacy, fewer side effects, or an improved formulation to increase patient 
compliance. An inference that can be taken from these views is that once this need 
has been met by an innovation, further clinical need may then result from subtle 
inadequacies within a class. For example, the BPs were believed to effectively fill a 
‘pharmacological void’ as no treatments existed beyond calcium and vitamin D 




ageing rather than a preventable disease (see Theme 5: Adopter Attitude: subtheme 
5.2: Disease perception). Within the class, respondents indicated additional need 
developed from patients’ discontent with the complicated administration protocols 
necessary to reduce the risk of adverse side effects. A complex regime therefore did 
not appear to fit comfortably with the physical needs of an ageing patient group.  
An analysis of respondents’ views demonstrated that defining clinical need is not 
necessarily limited to the realms of clinicians. With patients becoming increasingly 
informed about their conditions, comes the prospect of changing expectations around 
what treatments should be available. Respondents highlighted across all case studies 
how patient dissatisfaction with therapies can potentially lead to compliance issues, 
which has significant implications for diffusion of drugs, particularly for chronic 
conditions. Improving patient compliance through new formulations was viewed by 
respondents as a way of driving diffusion, even in the absence of improved 
effectiveness. 
I think we genuinely underestimated the grumbling amount of discontent about daily products…and 
I think it’s a mistake we probably would learn from (CS1.2).  
It’s a breakthrough because you’re actually hitting a major innovation for the category. Suddenly 
you’re offering a product that is offering a much easier compliance, and you’re offering this into a 
background where doctors are saying ‘I would use them, but I keep getting people that don’t want 
to take them in the way that they’re meant to take them so I'm not’.  Patients were saying ‘I don’t 
like it this way’ (CS1.1). 
 
Clinical need for AAs was attributed to the undesirable side effect profiles of their 
predecessors. Similar issues in the PDE5 inhibitor case were believed to be the driver 





There are relatively few drugs that completely change the dynamic of a market place. I mean really, 
the options were pretty grim before Viagra you know, there was surgical or it involved 
injections…and those sorts of things.  Suddenly here was this rather elegant tablet…so the unmet 
need was there, and of course with the publicity, that led to that amazing take off (CS3.1). 
 
1.2. Innovation Inertia: Desire for Something New  
Respondents indicated that lack of innovation in a particular clinical field over a 
prolonged period inducing clinical frustration can accelerate the diffusion of a new 
drug. The assertion therefore is that innovation inertia heightens anticipation and 
expectations amongst adopters, but this could potentially be at the expense of 
rigorous scrutiny if the need is great enough.  
The first atypical antipsychotic was actually quite eagerly awaited because before you had 
conventional antipsychotics, and they’ve been around since the 1950s, and there hadn’t really been a 
great move in terms of medication since the 1950s,  and although those drugs were quite good on 
efficacy so that they were reasonable at controlling the symptoms, side effects were a major issue, 
particularly what we call extra pyramidal side effects which is basically sort of shaking of the body, 
which is quite marked with the older drugs, so I think from a psychiatrist’s point of view they were 
actually quite excited to have a new class of drug in the atypical antipsychotics with Risperdal 
(risperidone) really being the first (CS2.1). 
The thing that really differentiates Zyprexa (olanzapine) was just the sheer level of interest by 
physicians.  It wasn’t a case of, you know, there was no push of the drug onto the market necessary, 
there was a real pull for it.  I’ve never known demand for a drug like it.  You know, even pre-launch, 
when we weren’t doing anything promotionally, obviously, because we weren’t allowed to, there was 
a real demand for it., and  the treatment of schizophrenia was a pharmacological museum up until 
that point. The main stay of treatment in hospitals up and down the UK were drugs which were first 
licensed in the 50’s and 60’s.. And it had been so long since a real breakthrough I think, you know, 
the pent up demand was unprecedented. We were positively surprised by the enthusiasm which was 
met by Zyprexa.  Very positively surprised. It did exceed our expectations (CS2.4). 
 
1.3. Vocational Need to Alleviate Distress   
The ability to alleviate a patient’s distress appears to underpin clinical need in that 
respondents indicated they believe conditions with overt symptoms, such as 
schizophrenia, can create a heightened sense of need to use something that may 
achieve a response over and above current treatments. This in itself can be a 




suggests respondents believe there is an emotive element that underpins this form of 
clinical need in that it is closely related to how traumatic the symptoms of the disease 
are, highlighting a linkage between clinical need and clinician experience (see 
Theme 2: Clinician/patient experience). The suggestion that witnessing a positive 
impact of treatment will also reinforce prescribing behaviour to perpetuate continued 
use is supportive of this view.  
No matter what product you launch you’ve got to know what the needs of your patients and your 
prescribers are. For this one it’s so traumatic, you know, we do a lot of customer research prior to 
launch and after launch around what the goals of treatment are, and for the prescriber their number 
one goal of treatment is to protect against relapse and that’s because just what they see the patient 
go through and how hard it is to build that trusting relationship that they need with the patient once 
they have relapsed (CS2.2). 
I think also a recognition of what really helps, what gains more empathy with the patient and with 
the doctor.  Here [immediately post-launch] you can't sell a drug that isn't efficacious, it's got to 
work.  The doctor wants to know it works.  Does it do something?  You know.  Once they’ve got used 
to the idea ‘I know this thing works, I know it's a good drug’ what they want to do is focus on ‘there’s 
real benefits for my patients here.  This is making me feel good that I'm giving them the best’ (CS1.3) 
 
1.4. Disparity Between Clinician and Patient-driven Needs  
A perspective elucidated from analysis of respondents’ views, predominantly from 
the PDE5 inhibitor case study but touched upon in some of the other cases, was the 
concept that there is a relationship between the physical manifestations of a disease 
and which of the different user group’s needs then take priority, be that patients or 
clinicians. There was a belief amongst respondents that in symptomatic conditions, 
diffusion was largely patient-driven, with the needs of clinicians prevailing when 
outcomes were related more to explicit clinical measures. The inference is that while 
they are not mutually exclusive, they can be quite distinct and diffusion can depend 
on whose priorities prevail. 
We came into a market that was massively...or we thought was massively satisfied in the mind of the 
physician, why would they do anything else?  You know, what's driven this a lot has been the patients 




So if you take the asthma market, it's very patient-orientated.  So there's a big patient drive to 
basically support the patients, meet the patient's needs, be very patient friendly, because it's 
symptomatic, the patients obviously notice it and you have to get them fine with inhaler use and so 
on.  But if you go to a market like cholesterol, where you don't have any symptoms, then for the 
doctors they're much more GP driven needs, so, to make sure that the patient doesn't get side effects, 
because if they're not actually having any symptoms it can be very frustrating to try and maintain 
compliance, but at the same time keep the workload down, so they hit the target cholesterol level, and 
they're not having the patient in and out.  Because they have to manage workload. So there the driver 
to prescribing and the needs of the doctor is much more about achieving target, getting to target 
quickly, getting to that efficiently, getting there without loads of side effects on the way, getting 
there in a cost efficient way (G1.2). 
 
The choice of case studies characterised this diffusion influence well in that 
schizophrenia and erectile dysfunction are distinctly symptom-based, while patients 
with osteoporosis and hypercholesterolemia, at least in their initial stages, may be 
unaware of the existence of the condition. Based on the insights provided by 
respondents, in symptom-based conditions, the motivation behind clinical need from 
a patient’s perspective appears to be related to their need to restore ‘normality’, 
taking into account social as opposed to just functional implications. 
It's not the restoration of the erection per se which is the fundamental thing for a patient. It's more 
around...just to give you why that's the case...Vacuum pumps were out, injections were out, you know, 
other things were around.  If it was just about restoring the erection then, you know, why would 
Viagra, and Cialis be so successful?  Why would men want to take an oral tablet that you take an 
hour before, then wait, then have sex instead of just taking an injection and it's done.  It's not the 
erection itself, it's what it allows you to carry on doing.  What this did, it not only solved that basic 
requirement of giving an erection back but also being able to give men more freedom of the time that 
they're able to have sex, spontaneity, bring their love life back.  So patients got this (CS3.2). 
If you ask physicians what they think of tadalafil (Cialis), they'll say that's the one that lasts a long 
time.  That's the one that lasts for 36 hours.  And then they'll stop.  What they won't tell you is so that 
allows them to x, y and z and it means that this is what happens et cetera.  And so when we did the 
research with physicians we felt well the uptake will be x amount.  But what you found was that you 
then went to the patients and said to patients 'We'll give you a medication that lasts for 36 hours' 
and they got it instantly.  They thought 'Hang on a second.  That means over this weekend I can be 
pretty much ED-free.  That means that I can take it well in advance and not have to think about it'. 
When you look at something like ED, it's more of a personal thing to the man.  Physicians are very 
focused on solving the problem and the problem is a loss of an erection.  Therefore I can solve that 
problem. I sort it; my job is done.  But the patient feels the wider impact of that and their partner 
does. So I think there's a disconnect between the physician, what they believed that they were 
treating and what their role was, versus what the patient really saw as a true benefit (CS3.2). 
 
Even in the absence of symptoms, a patient’s consciousness of their condition and its 




clinical need. Based on some of the case study examples, it seems to be dependent on 
how much their life is impacted upon not only by the condition, but also the effects 
of therapy, as to whether patient need is the predominant driver for change. 
Respondents in the BP case felt that patients were influential in driving need for a 
treatment for osteoporosis that had long been trivialised as a condition of ageing.   
I think people’s expectations have dramatically changed. You now probably have well over a third of 
your life to live after menopause, whereas life expectancy being different in those days you probably 
didn’t have a huge expectation of what your life would be after menopause, so I think people were 
really thinking if they hit menopause at 45 and the average woman now can live comfortably into her 
80s, you know 35 years of your life, how you live them and what your physical ability to cope in that 
area is going to be very much a driver in what shapes you interests (CS1.1). 
I mean a patient who really is conscious of this will…seek treatment from the menopause all the way 
through and they can maintain good, bone health for a much much longer period of time than their 
parents would have done.  And they can live a much more active life as a result, and that’s got to be 
good (CS1.3). 
 
Patient dissatisfaction with complex administration protocols for BPs then became 
the driver for a formulation that was more convenient.  
But then things changed dramatically here, and that was the introduction of 70 milligram once a 
week. And the once a week overcame this barrier. Because once a week, easy, I only have to fast, 
swill it down once a week, wasn’t a huge…wasn’t 7 times the size of a tablet, it was actually a small 
tablet, very nice packaging which was very patient-friendly, and that overcame the cyclical nature, 
once a week, very easy to use, patient convenient, supported by this terrific suite of evidence, that 
changed everybody’s behaviour. The nature of the drug facilitates this because it has a very, very 
long half life, so the drug stays around in the system for a long, long time, so you could quite easily 
move to this type of a presentation of the drug, and off it went (CS1.3). 
Fosamax (alendronate) really took off when it did, and it really just comes down to the biggest issue 
in that was actually the patient’s desire not to go through a complicated administration review. 
Didronel (etidronate) you still had to take it in a certain way.  And that’s quite inconvenient, 
particularly for the type of patient we’re talking about (CS1.1).  
 
While schizophrenia is a symptomatic disorder, the affected individual may not be 
aware of the symptoms during certain phases of the illness and so in these 
circumstances respondents considered the needs of clinicians are likely to prevail in 
determining treatment choice. But in terms of staying on long-term therapy, 




with fewer debilitating side effects compared with those of existing treatments that 
compromised any sense of restoring normal life for the patient. 
In the statin case, Industry views suggested that need was strongly driven by 
clinicians and their necessity to achieve cholesterol targets set down by government 
policy in the incentivised Quality and Outcome Framework (QOF) (see Theme 4: 
Health service/policy environments; subtheme 4.1.1.1: Favourable policy 
environment). Respondents believed the asymptomatic nature of 
hypercholesterolaemia presented a challenge for clinicians as their need was related 
to ensuring eligible patients presented for treatment and maintained compliance with 
therapy in order to meet their targets, which is problematic in asymptomatic disease. 
There's a relationship between the NSF and QOF and once you've got cholesterol indicators in the 
QOF and you've got indicators around creating disease registers, and patients having to have 
cholesterol readings, then that's going to drive use (CS4.3). 
 
An analysis of Industry views suggests different degrees of clinical need can exist for 
patients with the same condition. While ED is not a life-threatening condition, for 
some patients their need was thought to be so profound, they were prepared to try 
any therapy irrespective of how unpleasant it was. This is often a mentality 
commensurate with treatment decisions in life-threatening conditions. However, at 
the other end of the spectrum, respondents believed there were patients whose needs 
were constrained by social stigma, which was an indication to respondents that a 
shift in cultural perceptions was required or a more acceptable mode of 
administration made available before  patients would be prepared to come forward 





If you think that everything that had been used for impotence or erectile dysfunction for years and 
years and years had either been injections or bizarre and unpleasant remedies that didn't work you 
know, and yet people who'd been trying to find a cure for this you know, for literally hundreds and 
thousands of years, it’s just, it was one of the great ironies that we knew that we were going to go into 
discussions with the Department of Health about whether this should be reimbursed or what sort of 
restrictions be placed on it, but also simultaneously knew that this was something that people had 
been desperately seeking to find a cure for because it had such a distressing effect on people 
(CS3.1). 
 
1.5. Need to Satisfy Innovator Pursuit  
Respondents suggested that clinical need can also arise from the innate personal 
characteristics of innovators; the need to be the first to experience new technologies 
and witness their effects in patients. Analysis of a limited number of views on this 
issue, leads to the notion that while not technically the scientific innovators of the 
drug, early adopters effectively become ‘clinical innovators’ through involvement in 
clinical trials. Respondents felt that this sets them aside from their peers by giving 
them knowledge insight that elevates them to the status of opinion leaders in their 
field (See Theme 8: Key opinion leaders; subtheme 8.2: Hierarchical cascade of 
influence/peer credibility). The danger of such innovator pursuit for novelty is that it 
may generate a need where there may not otherwise be a clinical justification for a 
new technology to be adopted. 
I think really the key innovators who are really running the basic science involved in the big clinical 
trials as lead investigators, they want the next thing, they want to know something new, something 
that’s not been tried with the products, something that’s a new indication, a new area, a new 
formulation, a new piece in the lifecycle management (CS1.1). 
Opinion leaders, the innovators, also want to be the first to try things, even though they probably 








1.6. Industry Response to Unmet Clinical Need 
Some critics of the Industry assert that they ‘create’ clinical need through the 
medicalisation of ordinary life. Respondents consistently presented the view 
however that they believed the origin of clinical need has to come from elsewhere 
(i.e. clinicians or patients) for it to be a genuine driver of diffusion. Unlike some 
clinical settings such as the medical device industry where surgeons may be 
involved in co-developing new technologies, the pharmaceutical industry relies on 
its relationships with influential clinicians (see Theme 8: Key opinion leaders; 
subtheme 8.1: Early engagement/collaboration) and utilises market research with 
clinicians and patients (see Theme 7: Market development; subtheme 7.1: Market 
research) as a means of identifying and understanding the issues pertaining to 
clinical need so as to know how best to meet them. 
Interview data indicated that innovations can be: 
• designed specifically to address the needs of a clinical problem – with the 
AAs, a new molecule was created to minimise side effects without impacting 
on efficacy; 
• applied to a new clinical problem to answer a need, but where that specific 
clinical need was not the driver of development – PDE5 inhibitors were 
originally developed to treat hypertension, but the identification of a 
serendipitous side effect presented an opportunity for an oral candidate for 
ED; 
• tailored/redesigned to answer a clinical need – with the BPs, a reformulation 




presented an acceptable administration protocol for patients and improved 
compliance. 
One respondent discussed how their attempt to influence what clinical need meant in 
the case of the AAs by redefining interpretations of efficacy from that of immediate 
alleviation of acute symptoms to one encompassing long-term outcomes (for the 
purpose of differentiation), was unsuccessful, as need in their view is defined 
ultimately by the adopter and not the diffuser. 
It’s not just meaning you get a patient better now, but you should think about the long-term as well, 
because if you think about some of our competitors, they have issues with some fairly bad side effects 
that could get worse over time, so it was about kind of trying to change a doctor’s perception of what 
was important (CS2.3).  
The other thing we learnt there was if you go into a doctor and try and, at the time though we tried to 
kind of redefine what efficacy meant to a doctor, but efficacy to a psychiatrist shouldn’t mean that 
patient immediately gets better, it’s that patient immediately gets better and then stays well. It would 
sound a very reasonable thing to try and focus people that, when you make a prescribing decision 
think about now and the long-term, but actually I think in this market that doesn’t really work, 
because doctors might have that discussion with you and agree, but then the next time they are faced 
with somebody that’s acutely unwell, it probably isn’t front of mind. Psychiatrists don’t think like 
that, they think here and now (CS2.3). 
 
 
Some respondents highlighted how the extent of clinical need could be viewed as a 
potential barrier to the adoption of a new drug due to the financial implications that 
could arise from its introduction. While there was a need for BPs, respondents made 
the point that the prospect of treating all eligible patients would have been 
overwhelming and counterproductive to support their introduction by the NHS. 
Instead they targeted a tangible subgroup with manageable numbers to maintain a 
level of engagement with clinicians. The PDE5 inhibitor case demonstrated how the 
prospect of the sheer numbers of eligible men was considered to result in 
counterproductive restrictive government policy that severely compromised the 




From the GPs perspective, it's not in their interest for them to have a floodgate of people coming 
through the doors, and if that happened all at once, it would probably be counterproductive, because 
it would be unmanageable and more likely to have negative impact on the product, if they thought 
you were the instigator of driving that (G1.1). 
It's understanding how you can translate those features into benefits which relate and press the 
buttons for those customers which are relevant to their disease area. In this case it was actually trying 
to narrow it down to those who had already had a fracture, so there was already clear clinical 
evidence that someone had had an incidence of the disease and I think the number of people having a 
fracture was more like I think 300,000, as opposed to 3,4, 10 million, and therefore actually 
communicating and discussing where this drug might fit in with a much smaller patient audience, 
and then one or two patients per GP a month was a much more palatable proposition than it would 
have been to say 'there's 10 million people out there with potential kyphosis that is developing into 
osteoporosis’. The danger of doing that in your communications is that you will just switch doctors 




2. CLINICIAN/PATIENT EXPERIENCE (EFFECTIVENESS) 
In contrast to clinical need (Theme 1) which describes an ideal solution for a clinical 
problem, experience is the reality that is forged from using what is available in a real 
world clinical setting.  
In the context of the case studies, respondents indicated four distinct aspects to 
experience that they considered were impactful on the diffusion of the case study 
drugs discussed: 
• the need for clinicians to witness the effect of the drug for themselves, a 
subjective tangible evaluation based on personal experience;  
• linking an improved experience to an innovation that makes the interaction 
with the patient easier (usually through more acceptable modes of 
administration);  
• the lasting negative effect if a clinician’s experience is distorted through 
inappropriate use of a drug, which could, in some cases result in safety 
warnings; 
• the importance of clinicians gaining an insight into the patient’s experience. 
 
2.1. Subjective Evaluation Based on Personal Experience 
Respondents indicated that clinicians perceive they have individual requirements that 
experience has to bear out before they accept the claims made to support a change to 
their behaviour. In this context, their perception was that evidence plays an important 




prescriptions, but once a drug is in use, the impact of evidence reduces and 
experience prevails in decision making.  
What evidence will do is convince somebody to give something a go.  But at the end of the day there’s 
no substitute for good old fashioned personal clinical experience. By the time it gets to guidelines 
people have formed an opinion through their own clinical experience anyway (CS2.2). 
 
Respondents expressed the view that when professional experience does not align 
with messages conveyed in clinical trials (even good quality studies), personal 
experience takes precedence. Once personal experience (or that of a respected 
colleague) confirms the benefits of a technology, adoption rates can accelerate 
through confidence to use the drug in patients previously excluded.  
What’s really important is customers’ personal experience.  If they have used the drug and it hasn’t 
worked, they are probably not going to use it again, unless their colleagues say well actually I have 
used it and it worked, so I think they are perhaps more driven by their experience and the experience 
of their colleagues (CS2.3). 
You got real market expansion because the doctors gained confidence.  They said ‘now I can see the 
patients, I always thought they would never be able to take these drugs’, but this one  they can give 
it to them, so they had confidence in doing that.  And that drove a complete change in attitude to the 
use of this class of drugs (CS1.3). 
At this stage here in the beginning you're just...almost getting yourself a ticket to entry.  It's a case of 
'here's our unique point, this is why you should take any notice.  And then you've also got a phase 
which says actually, you know, we're second and better though, you know.  Look at the advantages 
that this is going to bring.  Look to your own patients.  Look from your own experience.  And I think 
certainly at that stage...and that's about three years in, that people start saying actually, what would I 
prefer to do?  I have enough experience now to be able to make a decision on how these work 
(CS3.2). 
 
Even those clinicians who may have been involved with the development of the drug 
from an early stage were believed to want to witness what is the real life impact these 
drugs have on patients outside a clinical trial setting.  
They [KOLs] are also interested in seeing how the drugs perform in real life after they’ve seen the 





Even when later stage, head to head trials become available, the assertion was that a 
clinician’s own experience continues to take preference – positively or negatively for 
an individual drug. 
The head to head study against risperidone was published, I think something like a year after the 
initial launch.  And I think, by that time, people’s own personal experience had really helped to form 
their opinions.  And the publication of the Tran Study merely, I think, reinforced in a clinical paper 
what people had already seen for themselves clinically (CS2.2). 
 
Respondents suggested that views established in this way by clinicians remain deep 
rooted and can potentially lead to conflict with others, such as payers, whose 
decisions are more likely to be governed by published evidence. This was 
exemplified by the AAs where psychiatrists were thought to have brought their own 
reality to the data irrespective of what the evidence from clinical trials demonstrated, 
even if that reality was informed through erroneous use of the product at a 
suboptimal dose, as was the case with quetiapine (Seroquel). 
There’s been two big government studies recently, CATIE and CUTLASS, one in the States and one 
here, that actually is questioning the value of atypicals, that some people, particularly payers I think - 
are taking notice of. Psychiatrists I think are more sceptical of the data because they’ve had the 
clinical experience and they see a difference. I think most psychiatrists, you know, would say no, I 
think atypicals are better. Payers are perhaps taking more notice of the data, so it would be 
interesting to see longer term what happens (CS2.1). 
Regardless of what your clinical data says, doctors don’t perceive Seroquel to be as effective as 
either olanzapine or risperidone (CS2.3). 
You then get things like experience use of product, and that would be at a wider population level and 
at a personal level because people always end up taking their personal experience significantly into 
account even if n=1 or invariably the patient got better, or the patient didn't, and that tends to affect 
their prescribing quite significantly thereafter (G1.1). 
 
An interesting insight into the wider issue of experience provided by one of the 
respondents related to how certain innovations can give rise to idiosyncratic 
responses in patients. In this case, there is thought to be a greater chance patients will 
be switched between medications and clinician experience becomes even more 




lots of different drugs or combinations to achieve the symptom control they need, 
compared with statins for instance, where clinicians can be reasonably confident that 
nearly all patients will respond to a particular statin in a certain way. The impact on 
diffusion was considered to be subtle, but over time could prevent a drug reaching its 
full diffusion potential. If this is indeed the case, it does provide an opportunity for 
late entrants to a class to gain some degree of market share. 
 
Nobody really knows how psychiatric drugs work… it’s all theory, and you still do get an 
idiosyncratic response from patients so they’ll do well on, you know, somebody will do well on 
Risperdal (risperidone) and bad on olanzapine, and we don’t know why, so psychiatrists do like to try 
lots of different drugs and they use combinations of drugs to try and get the symptom control that 
they need (CS2.1). 
 
Respondents described that offering drug samples is a way companies enable 
clinicians to gain experience without incurring a cost to themselves, or the patient. 
Sampling was particularly relevant in the PDE5 inhibitor case, not due to the 
unpredictability of response, but as a means of giving patients the opportunity to gain 
experience with the drug before deciding whether to bypass NHS prescribing 
restrictions and pay for a private prescription. 
All three companies sample their products, so my impression from talking to doctors is they kind of 
softened the subject by saying look, I do have a free sample that you can try of the product that I am 
going to prescribe for you, therefore if you take that product and it works, you can come back and 
get some more on private prescription (CS3.3). 
 
2.2. Clinician-Patient Interaction  
There was a consensus view from Industry respondents that changes to formulation 
e.g. from injection to oral, or from titration and routine monitoring to single doses, 
that make innovations easier to use can have a favourable impact on both the 




collectively was that ease of use ultimately translates to an improved social 
interaction between the patient and clinician.  
What Viagra did was significantly change the market for impotence, you know, before all they could 
have done is prescribe an injectable and now you know, when Viagra came to the market, they had 
an oral treatment that made their life a lot easier, so I think there's an emotional tie to it as well 
because it kind of saved the day for them and so they feel very positive towards it (CS3.3). 
It’s probably the first atypical that you could use routinely, yeah, I mean you didn’t need to do any 
monitoring for it for example, there aren’t any particularly nasty side effects, I mean it has some side 
effects but it’s not like clozapine where you, you know, you have to monitor patients for the side 
effect (CS2.1).  
The thing that prescribers loved about Lipitor (atorvastatin) was that it was, at its starting dose, 
because these drugs have a starting dose and then you can titrate up according to the kind of 
cholesterol lowering level, at its starting dose, it was as effective as the highest licensed dose of 
simvastatin, so it was a bit of a sort of, fire and forget mentality that people had.  I don't want to 
make that sound, irresponsible and it was a very convenient way of treating cholesterol and that 
remained really the kind of unique selling point if you like for most general practice prescribers for a 
long time, certainly , through to sort of '03, '04 (CS4.1). 
 
Experiential associations with other drugs were believed to be influential in 
generating irrational long-lasting perceptions that can potentially affect the diffusion 
of new drugs. Respondents highlighted instances where clinicians’ prior experience 
with certain formulations can pose a barrier to adoption of new drugs that utilise the 
same mode of delivery, even if used in a totally different context.  
Psychiatrists actually have concerns about the prescribing of an injection. It really stems back to the 
very first, very old, treatments on the marketplace were mainly depots, but they had quite nasty side 
effects. The oral atypicals were launched with Risperdal (risperidone) and olanzapine and the others, 
and people really moved away from that depot medication and moved to the oral medication. So they 
hold quite negative views about injections in general, so even though Risperdal Consta is a long-
acting atypical injection, they still have concerns about giving the injections to patients, and they 
also I think, what adds to it, is that if a patient is very unwell and is admitted into hospital and is very 
florid in their symptoms, what they sometimes have to do is they have to forcibly inject the patient 
just to calm them down with a short-acting antipsychotic. And that, you know, I think also gives 
injections a bit of a negative perception (CS2.1). 
 
2.3. Inappropriate Drug Use  
A predominant theme highlighted by nearly all respondents, involved the detrimental 




can alter the clinician or patient experience to such an extent that it can be very 
difficult for a drug to ever demonstrate its anticipated potential. The case studies 
highlighted how inappropriate use was believed to result in scenarios that ranged 
from distorted experiences of efficacy, to the more serious outcomes leading to the 
issue of formal safety warnings. 
 
2.3.1. Distorted experience  
Respondents indicated that confusion arising from unclear messaging, or insufficient 
differentiation of a drug from its competitors can lead to the clinician’s experience 
becoming distorted and consignment of the drug to an unintended position in the 
treatment pathway. 
For the AA class, improved efficacy was not the main driver of innovation. 
Respondents’ understanding of clinical need was for a treatment with reduced side 
effects. Quetiapine produced fewer side effects at a dose that achieved equivalent 
efficacy to its competitors. However, the correct starting dose was not effectively 
communicated, partly due to various regimes being used in clinical trials. The 
resulting confusion led to quetiapine being used at too low a dose to achieve 
separation from its competitors on efficacy. Clinicians observed reduced side effects, 
but also witnessed inferior efficacy, and so the relative advantage was not 
experienced. This perception according to respondents proved difficult to rectify. 
The doctor has been told the Seroquel (quetiapine) works, but we know they are not so much clinical 
evidence-based but own experience.  They use Seroquel, they use it at too lower dose, it doesn’t 
work as well as olanzapine, it doesn’t work as well as Risperdal (risperidone), so they then have 
kind of negative perceptions, so yeah, it doesn’t have very many side effects, so they really buy into 





In the PDE inhibitor case, respondents felt that failure to position vardenafil correctly 
in the treatment pathway resulted in the agent being reserved for refractory cases 
when it was intended as a first-line competitor.  
I think if you look at Levitra's (vardenafil) usage, it's predominantly after; it's a very determined 
patient of which in this market there aren't many, who has tried Viagra (sildenafil), failed, tried Cialis 
(tadalafil), failed and thought well I'll give this a go because it's that or the injectables, I know what 
I'd prefer, so we're getting the patients that have failed on the other two treatments. This wasn't our 
intention, because the chances are that they'll fail on ours, so then the doctor's experience, first 
experience with our treatment is that it's a treatment that doesn't work, rather than it's a treatment 
that does work because you've got a fresh naive patient who's not tried anything before.(CS3.3) 
 
2.3.2. Safety warnings/concerns 
Unlike clinical evidence where claims are based on statistical assertions of truth 
(discussed further in Theme 3), safety warnings may be issued on the basis of a much 
smaller number of events depending on the severity of the issue that has come to 
light through use in the general population. Safety warnings concerning their drugs 
were considered by respondents as the most detrimental as they can have a profound 
impact on diffusion and can leave drugs permanently tainted in the minds of some 
clinicians.  
 
To have two [Dear Doctor letters] was unprecedented to be honest with you, and to recover from 
two has been a massive success. You've got to add in competitors and how they use it and so 
obviously they'll use it negatively against you and positively against them.  So you have to really get 
your positive message out into the market one way or another. Whether that's through sales force or 
it's through meetings, through a combination of both really (CS4.2). 
It's difficult to recover from a safety warning. There will be some physicians who would never, never 
touch it again with a barge pole.  There will be others who will want to see longer term data, and 
there'll be others that will base their judgment on their own clinical practice and what they've 
observed (CS4.3). 
But when you have an issue of adverse tolerability like this which is causing oesophageal irritation.  
They’re caustic drugs, they’re designed in a way, it's a nasty acid but it diffuses once it gets in the 
gut, but you know, with an elderly population you often get reflux and that can push the acid back into 
the oesophagus. And the competition made hay with that.  And consequently we got a relatively slow 
uptake curve, even though we were promoting quite extensively doing a lot of education and 
advertising, calling on doctors, we couldn’t change behaviour because this was the message that 
they’d got in their head from the competition, and, to be fair, patients were referring…you know, we 





Industry views suggest a spectrum of impact of safety issues. Those with most 
significance were considered to be the mandatory warning letters issued by 
authoritative bodies such as the Committee for the Safety of Medicines (CSM)16 that 
have national coverage.  
Probably the biggest impact on Risperdal (risperidone) negatively was this - the CVAE17 warning 
from the MHRA, that, you know, Risperdal shouldn’t really be used in elderly patients, that had 
quite an immediate impact upon sales…I’ve not seen anything like it before or since then I don’t 
think, but in terms of like the letter went out from the CSM, and it was literally patients were 
switched, which, you know, is unusual but it happened very fast (CS2.1). 
 
For the particular case studies concerned, the safety warnings were not due to the 
products per se, but resulted from incorrect or unapproved use of the products by 
clinicians and patients (AAs: off-label indications; BPs: non-adherence to 
administration protocols; Statins: use at too high a starting dose). Nonetheless, 
respondents indicated the need for a robust response to limit the damage to the drugs’ 
continued diffusion. 
When rosuvastatin was first being used, it perhaps wasn't being used appropriately by clinicians. 
They'd been used to using simvastatin and atorvastatin for however many years at kind of 
reasonably high doses, 20s and 40s, and they were using rosuvastatin in the same way despite the 
starting dose being 10mg.  And they were actually four cases of rhabdomyolysis associated with 
starting patients on higher doses of rosuva than there should have been which prompted a letter 
from the regulatory authorities to remind prescribers that the starting dose was 10mg.  And so once 
you send a letter from regulators and with what looks to be a safety concern then that's going to 
have an impact (CS4.3). 
 
Off-label (off-licence) use of drugs is a discretional practice that is more likely to be 
associated with safety risks as the drug has not undergone licensing trials for that 
indication. While respondents indicated it is not a practice Industry can endorse, they 
                                                 
16 The Committee for the Safety of Medicines became part of the newly established Commission on 
Human Medicines in October 2005. 




suggested it can enable clinicians to gain experience with a drug. In the case of BPs 
off-label prescribing was not regarded as a strong driver of diffusion. 
I mean if people have used it in a certain area and found it works very well, then, you know, once it’s 
licensed they would be inclined to use more of it (CS2.1). 
We were very clear and ethical about this, that if you’d got somebody on HRT who is osteoporotic 
you’ve been treating with HRT to treat osteoporosis, then, yes use alendronate, that’s a very good 
alternative for you. But if you’ve got somebody on HRT and they’re 50 and they’re doing this for 
menopause management it is not appropriate to use alendronate at that stage.  Some doctors would 
out of their own choice, but it's not what we were saying.  And you will see on that chart of adoption 
of HRT when it does come down there is some change to our growth curve but it's not that dramatic, 
it's not the driver (CS1.3). 
 
Off-label use however, attributed to a significant increase in usage of AAs but the 
subsequent safety issue that practice incurred was responsible for a tangible decline 
in their diffusion. 
Risperdal (risperidone) was increasingly being used in elderly patients with psychosis, some of the 
prescribing was off-licence, you know, that the clinicians had just decided to use that, but once 
Melleril (thioridazine) was advised not to be used by the Committee for the Safety of Medicines, a lot 
of patients were actually switched over to Risperdal.  What then happened here was that there were 
some studies done with Risperdal and some of the other atypical antipsychotics, which actually 
suggested that Risperdal probably had some risks as well in elderly patients, it was an independent 
study. And then what happened was that patients - some of the elderly psychosis patients were 
switched off Risperdal onto other drugs, so we gained there and then began to lose business here 
(CS2.1). 
I tell you what happened here, it was safety concerns, we had dear doctor letters, and so did 
Risperdal. Issues with dementia (CS2.2). 
 
Analysis of respondents’ views highlighted how the sensitivity of both regulators and 
prescribers to safety concerns can be influenced by previous and concurrent 
incidents, not necessarily limited to the particular class in question. Respondents 
discussed how withdrawal of cerevastatin resulted in an atmosphere of caution 
amongst regulators, such that the tolerance for issuing a safety warning was much 
lower for newer statins, when the issue was perceived by respondents as being due to 




I think that the regulators were also a bit more cautious and were keen to issue a letter because of 
what had happened with cerivastatin. Because it was rhabdomyolysis which, they had fatal cases of 
rhabdomyolysis; I think there were 50 odd cases of fatal  rhabdomyolysis so the regulators are now in 
a more cautious place and keen to act quickly. So once you kind of send a letter, a prescribing 
reminder that's citing a risk of rhabdomyolysis in a market where there's already been a product 
withdrawal because of rhabdomyolysis then that spooks physicians and that's responsible for some 
of that uptake. This is also kind of the time frame when there was a real gearing up behind 
simvastatin as well. So put those two things together and that's the kind of flattening off, the less 
steep trajectory of that line around kind of late 2004 onwards (CS4.3). 
And at the same time, kind of 2004, you had the withdrawal of Vioxx and various other kinds of 
scares, so for rosuvastatin being a new entrant into a market where there'd already been scares that 
definitely has an impact on diffusion (CS4.3). 
 
While a safety warning may be produced to call attention to and rectify issues of 
adopter misuse, from an Industry perspective, the release of a formal safety warning 
is detrimental because it highlights a potential problem with the drug in the minds of 
prescribers and patients. The impact may extend beyond that of the affected drug to 
impinge on the whole class, which can give rise to polarised responses from 
competitors. Respondents indicated how the bearing of regulatory concerns can be 
lessened if competitors respond altruistically with a view that it could be potentially 
damaging to the perception of the whole class. Alternatively if the problem is 
perceived by competitors as drug-specific, then the warning may be utilised to 
distance that drug from the rest of the class.  
Bisphosphonates are not a very nice class of drugs to take.  Didronel (etidronate) was a cyclical 
bisphosphonate so you took the active ingredient for a certain period of time, and then you took 
calcium for a certain period of time.  It was not a very easy thing to take but people were used to 
doing it.  Our once daily came in, we had a fracture intervention trial which came through in 
publication ’96, the FIT trial, so that gave you the evidence base, it was very quick after launch, 
and every expectation would have been then that this drug would have flown. There’s a big 
population which is under treated, existing therapy not particularly attractive for anybody to take, 
patient, doctor.  But, at the same time as we had this, we did have an incidence of adverse 
tolerability particularly in the United States which led to a world-wide need for us to write a ‘dear 
doctor’ letter.  You know, an awareness letter to the doctor saying ‘watch out for tolerability’.  Well 
then you see your competition, some will walk away from that, and say ‘that’s going to be really bad 
news for growing this market’ and some will say ‘that’s great news, I’ll keep my market share’, so it 





At the other end of the safety spectrum is the gradual change in attitude towards a 
drug based on experience of safety concerns that arise only after long-term use. For 
the AAs, the initial perception that their side effect profiles were more acceptable has 
become the subject of scrutiny during the later stages of their lifecycle.  
In the last probably eighteen months people do have real concerns about the metabolic effects. It is 
causing people to switch away from olanzapine gradually in schizophrenia, but they’ve not moved 
away rapidly because again I think the efficacy is still seen as the most important thing, and the 
company have done quite a good job in trying to minimise how the side effects are viewed (CS2.2). 
 
Other case studies however, provided a contrasting view on the impact of safety 
issues. One respondent highlighted how safety concerns can be utilised in a positive 
capacity by Industry as a means of demonstrating how thoroughly the drug has been 
tested, which from their perspective adds to the credibility of their messages. 
I think it was very helpful that it had a nitrate contraindication in some respects, because I think 
people knew that we'd checked.  I mean obviously we are always going to check what the side effect 
profile is, but you know, as somebody put it to me; somebody pointing out where the iceberg was, 
meant that you knew how to sail the ship. So think that was very important (CS3.1). 
 
2.4. Patient Insight  
As well as witnessing the effects of the drugs in patients, respondents suggested that 
the experience of clinicians is augmented by patient experience. This has a greater 
impact for those drugs that produce tangible benefits (such as PDE5 inhibitors), but 
for other drugs particularly for osteoporosis, it may take several years before efficacy 






This is a market place which is extremely receptive to both noise and people talking to you about it, 
because for a physician it's something they can do something about, as well.  It's not a long drawn 
out  treatment and a difficult area to treat and pretty much the patient will tell you, if you ever get 
feedback, but the patient will tell you has it worked or hasn't it.  And the patient is able to define that.  
It's not a case of...to take osteoporosis that you mentioned earlier, you know.  If you've got a lady 
with a couple of vertebral fractures, how do you know if your bisphosphonates have actually been 
efficacious, because you've got to wait ten years.  And if she has a hip fracture at eight years, does 
that mean that she was...that it didn't work?  Or does it mean that she would have got it at two years? 
(CS3/ INT2). 
 
A clinician’s experience impacts on prescriptions, but a patient’s experience 
indirectly impacts on diffusion through compliance. As with clinical need (Theme 1), 
patient experience is heavily influenced by the course of the disease and symptom 
severity. In the case of the AAs for example, respondents indicated for some patients 
with schizophrenia the fear of experiencing a relapse of their symptoms may be of 
such magnitude that it is sufficient to offset issues related to the adverse side effects 
of the drug. If patients also experience a sense of benefit from the medication, they 
also have a greater incentive to continue taking it. Conversely, in conditions such as 
osteoporosis and hypercholesterolaemia, a lack of apparent initial symptoms and 
therefore no obvious medication benefit, can potentially lead to complacency, which 
respondents viewed as a major barrier to compliance. Respondents considered that 
where patients feel some control over their medication, compliance may improve, 
which ultimately via feedback to prescribers, can have a positive impact on diffusion. 
I think, you’ve got to be able to have that conversation with them [the patient] around, you have a 
side effect and you have to offset that with the benefit of what you’re getting from it.  And this is a 
patient that you don’t want to de-stabilise if you’ve managed to get them well, that’s why you have to 
manage side effects and all products have side effects. That’s a dialogue between the prescriber and 
the patient but we need to help with that dialogue, so we put a lot of stall around helping the 
prescriber have that dialogue with the patient, which is yeah you’ll get side effects from the 
medication so let’s talk about what they are, let’s talk about….it’s risk versus benefit, don’t ever 
forget what you’re giving up around keeping you well. You’ll probably never see one of these 
patients in relapse but what they go through is pretty horrific and no patient ever wants to go back in, 
one thing they fear most is relapse (CS2.2). 
We also know through market research databases that are available to us how long people stay on 
therapy.  And so we know there is a big decay curve for nearly all chronic therapies, and that’s a big 
problem for, well, it's been opportunity lost to the industry, but it's been cost for the health system 




With lipids a lot of patients don’t, they realise they’ve got it but they’ve got no real side effects from 
it, then you find the patients take the high cholesterol a bit more seriously when they’ve had an MI 
or a stroke or something else.  Therefore the motivation to take the tablets is a lot higher in 
Parkinson’s, cancer, whatever, where you can physically see what the drug’s doing to you in terms 
of curing your symptoms that you’ve physically got (CS4.2). 
 
Respondents discussed the notion that a drug’s ‘worth’ may be judged by a patient 
with greater scrutiny for asymptomatic compared with symptomatic conditions. In 
asymptomatic conditions, the disconnection between the physical act of taking the 
drug and experiencing an improved health state can reduce a patient’s tolerance to 
inconvenience, such as adverse side effects or administration complexities. In the BP 
case, where symptoms of osteoporosis are not immediately obvious, the respondents 
believed that patients were not as willing to accept a new drug that impacted 
adversely on their daily life.   
The other thing with these drugs is that you do have to take it with a large volume of water in a 
fasting state at the beginning of the day. Well, for an elderly population that is often very 
inconvenient. You know, your 70 year old lady in this country, not necessarily the wealthiest part of 
the population, you know, they like to get up in the morning and have their cup of tea don’t they? So 
that was also a barrier (CS1.3). 
 
Respondents indicated that they underestimated the impact of complicated dose 
regimes of BPs for the patient. Their belief was that by shifting from a cyclical 
dosing regimen to single daily dosing, this would overcome patient compliance 
issues, but due to the associated risk of oesophagitis with alendronate, the complexity 
issue re-emerged through complex administration protocols. In the PDE5 inhibitor 
case, respondents suggested low compliance resulted from patients perceptions that 
therapeutic effect was inconsistent with normal sexual activity i.e. intimacy and 
spontaneity were compromised due to the pharmacological constraints of the drug. 





It's little known that about two thirds of patients discontinue their therapy within three to six 
months. The reason for that is generally because...you've got to almost put yourself in the mindset of 
a man who's 40 plus with ED. You know, you never really thought this was going to happen.  Nobody 
ever talks to you about it. Then it does happen and, as a man, you don't talk about it. That's the last 
thing that you do. And not only do you lose your erections, you also lose all the intimacy that you 
have with your partner. You start withdrawing from some of the daily things that you would do.  
Not the act of sex itself, that's an absolute no-no.  But what you stop doing is, you stop holding 
hands.  You stop cuddling on the sofa. You stop the little bit of banter between you and your partner 
or your wife of 20 plus years because what happens if it leads to that thing which I can't do any 
more? And so it becomes a psychological barrier. You go and get treatment and you take your 
medication and for Viagra to work you need to take it on an empty stomach, take it an hour before 
anticipated sexual activity and you've got four hours in which it works. So ultimately as an efficacy 
restorer it will restore your erections.  But what it doesn't allow you to do is completely restore those 
other elements because under government regulations in the UK you can...the recommendation is 
that you get four treatments per month, enough for one per week, which is pretty much  interpreted 
as four per month.  And if I have four in the cupboard I only have four opportunities lasting for four 
hours each time, I'm going to plan.  And I'm going to ensure that I do not waste that tablet.  So it's a 
case of 'Do I use them all in the first week and have a normal life as it was before but then don't 
have any for three weeks?'  Or 'Do I ration them out?'  I'm going to ration them out because that's 
what men generally do, which means that you start to completely plan your sex life.  So it will restore 
the erection back but it's not going to restore the other bits of intimacy (CS3.2). 
 
The consensus view from Industry was if clinicians and patients cannot be convinced 
on the basis of their experience that a drug offers relative advantage that meets their 
needs and expectations, whilst uptake may not initially be affected as that experience 
is being gained, the drug’s overall diffusion may be reduced.  
 
2.5. Industry Response to Experiential Barriers 
Analysis of respondents’ views suggested experiential barriers are particularly 
difficult to uncover and can be difficult to change. While adopter behaviour is 
beyond their control, respondents described a perceived sense of responsibility for 
inappropriate use, seeing it as a failure in their communication efforts. 
Communication strategies employed by respondents to encourage clinicians to re-
evaluate their practice and view the drug in the desired way had varying degrees of 
success and increasing patient compliance was equally challenging, even once the 




We did a lot of work in terms of understanding what were the misconceptions, what needed to be 
communicated more clearly, and also what materials we could provide that may support the 
customer.  So what could support the GP or the specialist to make it easier for them to work with the 
patient, so if they had some uncertainty around what they needed to do, they would have some 
support items that were purely educational and they'd be able to sort of say, okay, if they gave the 
drug, or any drug, to the patient 'here's the leaflet to say this is what you should do and how you 
should take it' (G1.2). 
Regardless of what your clinical data says, doctors don’t perceive Seroquel (quetiapine) to be as 
effective as either olanzapine or risperidone. Even when NICE guidance says it is, our doctors don’t 
believe it, because their experience is it doesn’t work as well. So unless you get them to kind of re-
evaluate and use it at the right dose…their perception won’t change (CS2.3). 
One of  the holy grails of the industry is to find a way to support doctors and patients to help the 
patients to keep taking medicines because any drug that we do any kind of research on, we find that 
there's an enormous drop off from the first prescription, very few people are still taking even 
chronic medicines 12 months after they were first prescribed them, people just stop, they don't like 
taking medicines, which is not good for them and its certainly not good for the prescriber who's, 
made an investment of his time, his or her time and NHS funds to make the medicine available 
thinking that they are embarking on a chronic course of treatment and actually they weren't, but 
despite every which way we've tried to sort of help with educational materials or reminder 
programmes or programmes put into pharmacy, I don't think anyone has really convincingly 
shown that any programme really has an impact on how long people continue taking medicines 
(CS4.1). 
 
The unique characteristics of the pharmaceutical market were highlighted by 
respondents as an explanation why from their perspective it is critical to get 
communication accurate at launch.  
Basically, we're completely unlike any other market, that if you look at all the data, you essentially get 
one bite at the cherry in pharma, and if you're not successful the first time around you never can be 
again.  I mean it's not like making a cereal or something, because if that doesn't work you can change 
the formulation.  You can't with a drug, you've got what you've got, and the only things you can 
therefore affect are price, packaging to some extent, and that's quite limited, our promotion is actually 
quite restricted under the guidelines, the conduct and so on and so forth.  So actually if you don't 
make the best you can of that and try and get rapid uptake, you will never regain that (G1.1). 
 
Where adoption was affected by miscommunication, the factor that made the 
difference to the continued diffusion of a drug appeared to be related to the manner 
in which the Industry reacted to the problem. Respondents indicated how 
development of services to manage the impact of side effect issues was employed to 




view that a holistic approach to perceived problems can be successful in minimising 
any negative impact on an individual agent or class of drugs. 
We talked about weight, diabetes and those being issues, well it’s not….these patients have those 
anyway but then our customers are still having to manage those patients, how can we help? Weight 
gain is clearly a side effect of our drug so we need to develop a service, you know, the other side 
effects aren’t but could we just stand back and say we’re not going to do anything about it? Well 
actually no because that’s not going to help our throughput of patients long-term and it’s not going 
to help our customers understand the issue. We’ve got a service that we’re now training NHS 
personnel on…how to manage physical health in schizophrenic patients that’s endorsed by all the 
advocacy groups, endorsed by the government and that’s taken us a lot of time and a lot of money but 
we think that’s really important and as we are the market leader we should be leading the way on the 
other issues that need to be addressed (CS2.2). 
 
An analysis of respondents’ views, suggested that new drugs entering a class that has 
experienced safety issues are at risk of condemnation by association. Respondents 
indicated the importance of dissociating the new drug from any features or 
descriptions that could lead to a connection with the outlier. In these circumstances, 
tensions can exist between the need to emphasise the key points of difference to 
make it a desirable alternative, with the need to remain sufficiently synonymous with 
the class to prevent it from being more closely aligned with the outlier. 
There was a lot of anticipation, it was called the superstatin and megastatin and all kinds 
of…gigantastatin and all kinds of odd names before it came to launch which helped and hindered of 
course…cerivastatin had been withdrawn and that was dosed differently to other statins, it was dosed 
in micrograms.  So it seems a more potent statin and then you come with a megastatin, I quote, and 
all of a sudden people are trying to link that back. The fact is that cerivastatin was a completely 
different molecule really to the rest of the statin class.  Hence it’s dosed in micrograms, it was very 
lypophylic, the side effects profile was slightly different to the rest of the statin class which are largely 
exactly the same. It wasn't just us who had to move cerivastatin to the side, it was the whole class. 
(CS4.2).  
I think cerivastatin came to the market claiming superior efficacy and gets withdrawn. Effectively 
rosuvastatin had to kind of try and do something similar, new statin to the market, proven superior 
efficacy in order to get usage, definitely had an impact. What you have to do is to show the safety 
data and say look here's the adverse event reporting data, you can see rosuvastatin is in line with 
the other statins and cerivastatin is on here as well and it's off the scale. Other than that, it's 
actually quite difficult because it's quite an emotive response you're dealing with amongst physicians 





The response to safety warnings also needs to be managed sympathetically to 
reassure prescribers and abate any concerns that may be further fuelled by 
competitors.  
It's just a case of reassurance, to present the safety data in context against the other statins.  To try 
and demonstrate to physicians that look, it's exactly in line with the other available statins. Perhaps 
we did have a bit of a problem in terms of the way that the product was being used, that's now been 
addressed and the initiation rates at the start dose are actually very good and actually much better 
than what you'd get from the SPCs of the other statins (CS4.3). 
When the dear doc letters came out in some ways there was a programme of meetings to sort of say, 
you know, don't worry about it.  I often do wonder if the fact that you say to someone don't worry, 
they worry more. Like don't worry about flying, the first thing you do is like it's going to crash.  I think 
that maybe was a mistake to go so passionately across the country saying don't worry, it's alright.  It 
might have just been better just to say carry on almost as normal and say yeah, we do have side 





3. CLINICAL EVIDENCE (EFFICACY) 
Clinical evidence is the data derived from trials involving sufficient numbers of 
patients to demonstrate the statistical truth of an assertion. It differs from experiential 
evidence (Theme 2) in that it is the generation of data under controlled ideal 
conditions rather than real world clinical settings. It ranked highly with respondents 
when discussing influential factors on diffusion in generic terms, but in the context 
of the case studies, respondents did acknowledge that it sometimes played a 
peripheral role in decision making compared to some of the other themes.  
3.1. ‘Marketing’ Evidence 
An analysis of respondents views revealed that clinical evidence appears to serve two 
distinct functions from their perspective; the first is to fulfil regulatory requirements 
for licensing; the second is in a market access capacity to communicate information 
to clinicians and payers involved in decision making processes during the adoption 
phase, or as a means of potentially reviving interest in a drug during the later stages 
of diffusion.   
Clearly the trial designs that are done for regulatory purposes need to also meet the needs of being 
able to communicate the benefits of the medicine to the wider community, because you won't have 
typically in market studies for some years until after the medicine is launched.  So you need to have 
robust data which is going to be able to present to people, regulators, to payers, to physicians, to 
everybody that actually gives a compelling story of why we would use the drug. So marketing gets 
involved before launch is what I'm saying (CS1.3). 
I think possibly one of the reasons why we stay down this end of the market is because we don't do 
as many studies or trials as the other two products, and we all know; it's almost like a self-fulfilling 
thing, we don't do as many because we're not making as much money, but you know we might 
make more money if we do more studies, so I think it definitely; from a marketing point of view, it 
really helps, because you can keep saying the same things but bring new data to the package which 
then makes it sound new and interesting, whereas if you've got old data that you're just sort of re-
hashing all the time, you struggle to make something sound new or interesting, so I think clinical data 





The use of evidence as a tool to promote the diffusion of a new drug inevitably links 
it to marketing. Some respondents believed that the usefulness of evidence, 
regardless of its quality, in aiding clinical decision making was directly related to a 
company’s ability, and budget to communicate findings. Without this level of 
promotion, respondents indicated that the potential impact of good evidence could be 
lost, rather than consider the possibility that this information might be sought 
independently by prescribers. Others preferred to see evidence as a separate entity, 
regarding it to be an independent endorsement of marketing claims.  
It's a very highly regulated industry in terms of what you can and what you can't present to clinicians.  
We can convey the results of clinical studies and you can say that that's marketing, you can say that 
that's science.  But I think there's a case to say that it's…certainly in the UK it's, it's pretty difficult to 
over market a drug just because of the level of regulation.  It's that relationship between regulation 
and marketing and some of the sign off procedures that we have to go through internally such that 
the representatives can actually share the material with a physician are kind of ludicrous but it's 
there to protect the industry and the clinicians (CS4.3).  
The data possibly helped to drive some of it, but I think more of that increase you can see was actually 
driven by the use in elderly patients, I mean the Csernansky data was very very good data. You 
probably could have argued that we didn’t do enough with it, you know, in terms of promoting the 
data, because it’s very good data. Just limits in terms of marketing spend, you know, Jansen-Cilag 
would generally have a much lower marketing budget than Lilly for example (CS2.1). 
We had good effective marketing that was key in driving the success of the brand. We had to have 
the clinical data as well, but the marketing activity I think really had more of an emphasis on 
driving the brand’s success. Now I think you can - you still have to invest in the marketing, but unless 
you have the clinical data to back up the marketing, it’s far less effective (CS2.1).  
 
3.2. Impact of Clinical Evidence 
Analysis of responses has indicated that there is a loose correlation between the type, 
volume and quality of evidence and its impact on clinical practice. Respondents 
discussed numerous examples where ‘experiential evidence’ has taken precedence 
over clinical trial evidence. In contrast, other examples such as the statin case have 





The first large scale trial in the AAs merely served the function of confirming 
clinicians’ experience. The need in that area for a new drug was so great, respondents 
felt evidence was almost peripheral to the decision to prescribe. For a later entrant to 
that class, while there was evidence to indicate a more favourable profile, it did little 
to elevate its market position, suggesting that other factors were influencing their 
decisions. Respondents discussed how evidence from one of the major trials in the 
BP case did not impact at the point of publication, but instead was only applied once 
other barriers to the use of the drug were removed. In the PDE5 inhibitor case, robust 
trials indicating alternative preferences to the market leader were perceived by 
respondents as doing little to alter prescribing behaviour, and in the statin case, the 
trial that did change behaviour was only able to do so by demonstrating tangible, as 
opposed to surrogate endpoints at a point in time when perceptions were already 
believed to be starting to move in that direction.  
 
From the respondents’ perspective, evidence does not seem to change behaviour by 
itself. Rather it is one of a number of factors that influence diffusion, the importance 
of which is often dependent on market entry position. For the first and early entrants, 
evidence appears to serve a role to change consensus approaches to practice, while 
for later entrants evidence becomes a tool to differentiate between drugs and so may 
be more likely perceived as marketing. Only in the case of safety concerns was 
independent evidence seen by respondents as crucial for its credibility to reinstate 
confidence in a ‘tainted’ drug. 
I think if we hadn't had these Dear Doctor letters this gap here shows you the evidence is not that 
important.  It is now because this happened and people want to see evidence, so if you start it again 
here, you'd say yes some of the trials have been important but during that first dynamic phase 





Our objective is to become the number one oral atypical, and actually, if all these drugs work exactly 
the same, you know, so in terms of their level of effect is the same, and that’s what NICE says, why 
is it that the drug that actually causes patients the least problem is only 3rd not 1st in the market?... it  
should be a lot higher up than it is (CS2.3). 
 
Phase III trials were regarded by respondents as the most powerful in terms of 
influencing behaviour, but while a first entrant can reap the benefit of its position by 
using licensing trials against placebo as marketing tools, the suggestion was that the 
bar is raised for later entrants as quality becomes synonymous with the ability to 
show differentiation from class competitors through head to head studies. In doing 
so, it is replicating real world clinical settings that are of practical use in clinical 
decision making (see subtheme 3.2.2.1: Head to head comparisons).  
Quality of the data is absolutely paramount to us for a successful product launch. We have to do 
placebo for regulatory reasons. Physicians want head to head, how do you compare with other 
products on the marketplace?  If you’re lucky enough not to be, you know you’re first in class then 
it’s slightly different but quality data is critical (CS2.2). 
Trials get you your position in guidelines, and there are different qualities of trials of course. You’ve 
got your phase III regulatory filing, which is against placebo, which just shows the thing works. If 
it's a highly competitive field, people like to have head-to-head studies versus the leading 
comparators, or use drugs in the field at the right dose so that they can make a valid judgement call 
saying ‘well this one is better than that one’ and they can say they’re efficaciously the same but one 
does this with less side effects and therefore is better pay off for the doctor and the patient.  And that 
will then influence the positioning in the guidelines, so you have to have the trials, the best form of 
course, which really prove outcomes (CS1.3). 
Efficacy, that has to be proven with all drugs, so you have to have clinical data that shows you’re 
efficacious, and clinical data that shows that you’re well tolerated as well, but efficacy is probably the 
one driver across all brands. The most powerful data is sort of, you know, the early clinical data, so 
the phase IIIb, particularly if you have randomised head to head, you know, double blinded type 
data, I mean that’s regarded as the most powerful data. The systematic reviews are generally 
regarded as not quite as robust sometimes, although they can be very useful in terms of gathering lots 
of different opinions together and forming and overall consensus (CS2.1). 
 
3.2.1. Trial design  
Trial design was a factor highlighted by most respondents as being influential and yet 
its effect on diffusion can easily be overlooked. Respondents discussed examples of 
where one company’s strategy can be undone by a competitor’s trial, often 
fortuitously, if it allows the competitor to make claims in certain subgroups in 




may not be viewed with the same degree of confidence as prospectively planned 
outcomes, respondents indicated how they diminish the impact of subsequent trials 
specifically designed to report these outcomes. 
 
I think what disappointed us, and I think there’s two things, one is fortuitous, I think that the 
bisphosphonates are a very good class of drugs, so I will be honest with you I think they all work, and 
they’re all substantially above what you’re basic calcium vitamin D does, so that’s the great news 
for the class yes?  The bad news, because they all work, that when you try and plan in 1993 what 
you’re expecting breakthrough to do, which was that we were planning to show a significant 
reduction in hip fracture that no one else would have, we actually got trumped by Fosamax 
(alendronate) because they showed fortuitously because it was never powered to show it, they 
showed fortuitously that they did significantly reduce hip fracture in their trials, because they had a 
good drug, and we had a good drug, you know, so the reality is that had they not shown hip fracture, 
had they only ever shown vertebral fracture, which is what we were predicting at the time, then 
ours, because it was powered to show hip fracture, should have been able to do the bit where it 
became the market leader (CS1.2). 
 
3.2.1.1. Functional versatility of evidence 
Several respondents highlighted issues in relation to how evidence has to serve 
multiple functions for different stakeholders, making trial design complex. They 
provided an insight into how in the first instance, trial design is heavily influenced by 
regulatory requirements. However failure, for example, to satisfy the regulator 
requirements in one country can have adverse knock on effects globally. Regulatory 
scepticism from an authoritative source was considered to inadvertently impact upon 
the initial uptake rate of a drug in other countries.  
 
Regulators around the world all have different, slightly different nuances on what data they want to 
see, which makes it expensive to bring a medicine to market, because you can't necessarily use the 
same file around the world, and that is a frustration through the industry, and it slows access to 
medicine down.  And it costs us money.  So that’s a frustration, but that’s the world that we live in 
(CS1.3). 
There is genuinely a concern that etidronate as a first generation bisphosphonate, that if you give it 
in too higher a dose then it causes osteomalacia which is basically malformed bone, so that the 
bone that it's making is not of a sufficient quality.  And we know that, it came out from the sciences, 
and the solution from a scientific point of view was to give it in cyclical regiment, so that’s why it 
became Didronel PMO (etidronate) and had a cyclical regimen of 14 days of Didronel followed by 
the calcium, vitamin D…that’s all done to stop osteomalacia occurring because in that dosing cycle it 
doesn’t happen.  The US has higher concerns about that than the European regulators, so, it's not 
unusual that different regulators have different concerns. You could, as a company, submit new 
data to shift the opinion of the regulators, but you reach a point relatively quickly when you get 




becomes unviable to bring it to market within the time space you have back to actually recoup your 
additional costs and your base costs. It (etidronate) went on and got a licence in Europe, but it never 
managed to get a licence in the US (CS1.1). 
 
An analysis of respondents’ views showed how adaptation of clinical evidence to 
fulfil functions beyond licensing requirements is dependent on designing a trial 
programme from the outset that takes account of the needs of all stakeholders 
involved at different stages in the diffusion process. Such foresight to accommodate 
cost effectiveness outcomes within the clinical effectiveness studies was believed to 
pay dividends in terms of diffusion by reducing any potential delay in overcoming 
both the regulatory and payer hurdles to the market. The Fracture Intervention Trial 
for alendronate was designed to produce outcomes relevant to all those concerned in 
a timely manner soon after launch. Respondents highlighted how carefully planned 
trial programmes can also lead to approval of new indications many years ahead of 
competitors, as demonstrated in the AA case where olanzapine obtained a secondary 
indication in bipolar disorder four years ahead of risperidone, despite entering the 
market for schizophrenia three years after risperidone (see Theme 7: Market 
development; subtheme 7.4: Research - new formulations/indications). 
For registration you have to have two placebo controlled studies for licence, so that's why people 
produce placebo, because we have to, the regulations to actually get the drug licensed.  What the 
regulators want versus what the market access side want, are completely different things (G1.1).  
In the alendronate case for us it was very important that we had the fracture intervention trial which 
was published in about 1996.  For a big outcomes trial, three year outcomes trial on fracture which 
really no fracture data of that scale existed in this field before that trial, and to bring that to market 
less than a year after the launch of the drug was a hugely important thing to do in getting the diffusion 
of the drug in a very under treated disease.  So, that was a good example of a huge …of this designing 
the trials correctly for phase III to be extended to produce the outcomes which gives you every 
argument (CS1.3).  
One of our key things is who do we need to talk to?  Where is the funding?...Who needs taking into 





The concept of multifunctional trials can however be a costly and risky strategy for 
Industry, particularly as the impact of evidence on diffusion, as demonstrated by 
some of the case studies, is variable and not necessarily the panacea in clinical 
decision making that wider general consensus generally alludes to. 
 
3.2.1.2. Novel trial perspective  
Analysis of Industry insights suggests that having a unique angle in trial design can 
increase its impact. The case studies have often shown that despite a plethora of 
primary evidence, only those pivotal trials that offered a unique angle such as 
unprecedented trial size or length of study, were recalled by respondents as being 
used to promote the product. The minimum trial size is set by the primary outcome 
being investigated in order to statistically show a difference in effect, but large 
numbers of participants may be recruited as a means of lending greater credence to 
the trial. Prior to the Tollefson et al. study (1997) that included nearly 2,000 patients, 
AA trials had included hundreds rather than thousands of patients. But respondents 
indicated how this then became the benchmark for subsequent trials.  
 
We only actually used two or three studies at the time of that launch.  The most pivotal of which 
was the Tollefson data. I recall at the time it was the biggest ever study undertaken on a psychiatric 
population (CS2.2). 
Trials and guidance do influence, well, trials do.  Mega trials are very important in terms of getting 
the opinion leaders to buy into the science quite frankly (CS1.3). 
 
The 4S megatrial in simvastatin that was notoriously attributed to changing the way 
coronary heart disease was managed involved over 4,000 patients, but these numbers 
were necessary to prove an effect in clinically relevant outcomes such as morbidity 
and mortality, which was the unique feature that this trial offered.  
 
What was going to change the cholesterol lowering market were big trials. If ever there was an area 




so I think it was 1994 that the first sort of big landmark study came out, the 4S study, and there for 
the first time was a demonstrated impact on total mortality, not cardiovascular mortality, but total 
mortality in a population of middle aged men with existing heart disease and I think that was the 
turning point at which people started to really kind of, sit up and take notice.  I mean there had been 
pretty good evidence beforehand, but not in such a simple, elegantly designed, big trial as happened 
then and I think you really start to see from the back end of '94 that things really start to take off 
(CS4.1). 
Large scale trials do carry weight but I think the problem is that as soon as they carry some weight 
they also become the next benchmark (CS1.2). 
 
In addition to intimidating the competition with trial size, respondents suggested how 
insightful trial design can also provide a means of managing the impact of 
competitors. Clinical trials are expensive to conduct and therefore their design and 
magnitude are related to the resource allocation provided by the manufacturer. 
Respondents discussed how companies that are in a position to allocate substantial 
resources to their clinical trial programmes can generate what is effectively an 
‘evidence barrier’ by conducting trials covering many possible patient group 
scenarios. This was demonstrated in the PDE5 inhibitor case, where Pfizer from the 
outset conducted studies in multiple patient groups, and in doing so raised the bar in 
terms of the evidence level required, forcing its competitors to compete on a much 
more uneven playing field. 
 
The thing that Pfizer did very well I think was, we studied Viagra in everyone. This is the point, this is 
where the evidence I think became increasingly important because we could say, here's our data on 
diabetes, here's our data in spinal cord injury and you know, psychological cases, and no 
competitor during that period was ever going to have anything like that. It showed its effectiveness, 
but it also forces people to compete across loads of different areas, which is very difficult for them 
to do and raises the cost of entry so we were always going to have a very high market share, you 
know, very early on (CS3/ INT1). 
 
 
3.2.2. Evidence translation: Relevance/limitations of trial outcomes  
For evidence to impact on prescribing decisions an analysis of Industry views 




prescribers, and secondly have to be translated into a usable form with meaning 
consistent and relevant to their clinical practice. 
 
3.2.2.1. Head to head comparisons 
When there are several competitors in the market, there is usually a desire from the 
clinical community for head to head comparison trials. The importance of 
comparative trials was a factor that was raised by most respondents during the 
interviews. Their view suggested that those companies that design their trials to try 
and meet the needs of prescribers are likely to have a greater impact. However, it is 
unsurprising that respondents indicated a reluctance from companies to conduct head 
to head trials according to what is often termed ‘clinically relevant’ outcomes unless 
there is likely to be a clear advantage of one drug coming out ahead of another. There 
was the suggestion that when there is a limited time frame in which to recoup the 
costs of R&D, then to conduct a head to head trial that may consume the remaining 
half of the patent life (which would be the case in a condition like osteoporosis to 
demonstrate a reduction in fracture risk), is not financially viable for a company and 
would be detrimental to the drug’s diffusion whilst waiting for the outcome. 
 
Our cost of entry is becoming increasingly higher and there’s not going to be a head-to-head trial on 
hip fracture between any drugs, because when they all work as well as all of these do you’re talking 
about 50,000 patients, five years before you even stand a chance of seeing any difference, and when 
you see the difference it's unlikely to be clinically that significant and meaningful to actually knock 
one out of the market and favour the other (CS1.2). 
 
For first entrants, head to head trials may involve drugs from a different class if that 
class represents the current standard of care. Respondents described the challenge 
this sometimes poses in ensuring the right agent at the right dose is used as a 




where the comparator is not relevant to the UK, respondents suggested that clinicians 
have to make a judgement as to the likely impact of the difference. Once a class has 
become established the use of intra-class trials becomes more relevant as differences 
on which to prove relative advantage become less apparent. The onus then usually 
lies with later entrants to provide the data. If two drugs are being developed in close 
proximity, comparative data may not be available for several years after they reach 
the market.  
At that time we had no head to head data versus risperidone.  The differentiation was against the 
typical antipsychotics, notably haloperidol which did present some problems in the UK because 
haloperidol, although the standard of care in the US, is less commonly used in the UK and indeed 
across much of Europe.  So haloperidol was really seen as a proxy for typical antipsychotics and 
people were left to draw their own conclusions about what that meant against their own personal 
standard of care.  Be that another typical, such as chlorpromazine or against risperidone.  But I 
remember one of the great needs and the great pleas from our sales forces at the time was we need 
head to head data versus risperidone which we simply didn’t have (CS2.2). 
It's sometimes quite difficult to work out what your comparators need to be. In some therapy areas, 
standard care in other countries is now not the same standard of care in the UK, so that in itself is 
proving quite problematic. What we're starting to see in the UK is divergence of clinical practice 
from the rest of Europe so from some therapy areas potentially oncology, the drugs that are now 
standard in the rest of Europe are not standard in the UK so…it becomes incredibly expensive, I mean 
the clinical trials are tremendously expensive to run and it can be quite difficult if you were having 
to run them for individual countries, and they cost £30 million, £40 million a trial, and you're never 
going to make the money back (G1.1). 
 
Despite several head to head PDE5 inhibitor preference studies (patient preference 
being the only basis on which any new entrant could attempt to compete with such a 
dominant first in class), methodological issues compromised the validity of the study 
results. Even a preference study designed to counteract these issues did not cause a 
change in behavior, indicating the importance of other factors in this case. 
Respondents believed that this brings into question the utility of comparative data, 
which is both expensive and time consuming to generate, for if it does not align with 






There are a whole load of different preference studies which were being used at the time but they all 
had methodological problems. So different doses comparing each other and different instructions 
and all sorts of weird things going on (CS3.2).   
If you actually look at the wealth of information out there I think Viagra's got something like, I don't 
know, five, ten times more clinical papers than we have on the sheer numbers of it.  But if you look at 
our numbers of head-to-head studies versus them and if you looked at, say, preference, although 
each of the drugs have got some studies or abstracts which show a preference for one of the other, 
there's probably more out there, both sponsored and independent, which would show a preference 
for tadalafil.  But that hasn't swayed things (CS3.2).  
 
In the statin case, despite the initial lack of head to head studies, Industry views 
suggested that clinicians filled this gap by comparing the outcomes of placebo-
controlled studies as a proxy for a direct head to head trial. There is a risk however, 
that a drug may be at more of a disadvantage in this situation than it would be if it 
was part of a designed head to head trial, where conditions are controlled to provide 
a fairer comparison. 
 
MSD staked their place as market leader for many years really with the 4S trial; they had what was 
probably of the available statins, the most effective lipid lowerer and they had the evidence to say 
this drug saves lives and I think, that's reflected in their usage relative to the others. The other drugs 
were either later or less convincing with their trials, so there was actually very good evidence for 
pravastatin, but pravastatin probably published more landmark trials, through the nineties than 
Merck did behind simvastatin, but the drug was less effective at lowering cholesterol and it was the 
most effective drug in the market place that benefitted (CS4.1). 
 
3.2.2.2. Surrogate markers versus clinically relevant outcomes 
Surrogate markers as outcome measures were acknowledged by respondents as being 
controversial as links to clinically relevant outcomes may not be firmly established in 
certain disease areas. This was true of the osteoporosis field, where the link between 
increased bone mineral density and reduced fracture risk still remains uncertain.  
In statins, it required trials that demonstrated clinically relevant outcomes of reduced 
all cause mortality and morbidity to be able to justify the link between LDL-C 




been established, subsequent new entrants to the class could exploit surrogate 
endpoint evidence to demonstrate greater efficacy. While extrapolations to clinical 
outcomes cannot be claimed from surrogate endpoints, interview data suggested that 
tacit links may be sufficient if the argument has been proven by others in the class. 
Until evidence came of mortality benefits which came with the 4S study, there was very little 
treatment even though we were saying, you know ‘you need to treat, you need to treat’, but nobody 
believed until you got the evidence.  You eventually got the evidence and the treatment paradigm 
changed overnight, from flat to whoosh like this, and then just powered on to be the biggest market in 
the world. Well, you know, there’s still massive under-treatment of that, even though it's the biggest 
selling drug (G1.2).  
You have to really ask the question do you believe that it's an LDL story or not? So from 4S onwards 
every single statin trial that's come out has shown that lowering LDL cholesterol is beneficial.  So 
are you saying that one statin is a miracle drug, or are you saying it's really largely its ability to 
lower LDL cholesterol?  Now if you look at all them together and say okay, then you have the ileal 
bypass trial (POSCH18), which saved lives without any statins, by lowering LDL cholesterol...And so 
if you draw a line from the top to the bottom, you can plot all these trials on a line that basically 
shows you the lower the LDL cholesterol the better your outcome is. So that's your surrogate 
market argument. We can lower LDL cholesterol, we can prove it does things to atherosclerosis 
(CS4.2).  
Some physicians will be completely closed off in terms of if there's no clinical outcomes data I'm not 
touching it, and that's fair enough. Others are willing to accept that there's a relationship 
demonstrated in other studies in the past between reducing cholesterol and reducing CV events. We 
have to be very careful in our marketing because we're only licensed for cholesterol. We cannot imply 
in our marketing that Crestor (rosuvasatin) reduces CV events because that data has not been 
demonstrated. We can show evidence from other studies, but we have to clearly associate them with 
the drugs that were in those studies and say Crestor lowers cholesterol then it's up to them to make 
the link if they want to (CS4.3). 
 
It may be perceived as an avoidance strategy of Industry not to use clinically relevant 
outcomes in trials, but respondents explained how surrogate markers at least provide 
some basis on which to compare drugs in view of the financial and time constraints 
imposed on Industry by a finite drug lifecycle. Where trials reporting clinically 
relevant outcomes can be produced in the lifetime of the patent, then their impact on 
diffusion can be valuable.  
                                                 
18 The Program on Surgical control of Hyperlipidemias (POSCH trial) showed that the use of ileal 
bypass to reduce cholesterol levels resulted in marked cholesterol reductions and a significant 





It's very difficult to do head-to-head trials to prove clinical difference versus an existing field in a 
drug which you need to do a three to six year study, in a massive population to be powered 
statistically to prove anything.  It's extremely difficult.  So you’ve got to find other markers.  In this 
case that’s typically done through bone mineral density which you can actually measure at a 
relatively short phase and see change, and that would be typically what people will do to try and get 
an edge over each other (CS1.3). 
Along came Lipitor, atorvastatin; more effective still and by the time we launched, in the late 
nineties…the kind of medical world had made its mind up that cholesterol lowering was a good 
thing, that there was probably a class effect at work here, so probably all of the statins worked, and 
so which one were you going to use, well you were going to use the ones which lowered the 
cholesterol the most, and that's what led to the early uptake of Lipitor.  As our clinical trial 
programme progressed, we began to publish trials that indeed demonstrated that Lipitor shared the 
benefits and in fact may have a greater effect on mortality than simvastatin did, and that's when you 
saw the real kind of take off , through the early 2000s when there was the confirmation that that 
additional cholesterol lowering did translate to real benefit and of course, the period of sort of 2001 
through to 2004 was enormous for us (CS4.1). 
 
A few respondents highlighted how outcome measures must also be recognisable to 
prescribers. This is a problem in some specialties more than others. In psychiatry, for 
example, a reduction in positive and negative syndrome scale (PANSS) score, while 
familiar to clinical trial investigators may be less tangible to a prescriber, compared 
with reduction in LDL-C levels in coronary heart disease, which is more widely 
understood.  The implication is that even amongst specialists, the use of primary 
evidence (clinical trials) in formulating a behavioural change may just be the 
mainstay of a small percentage of innovators involved in clinical trials that have a 
full comprehension of the findings. 
I think in psychiatry, I think you would struggle to identify a really ground breaking study that kind 
of meant people used atypicals instead of typicals, one, because of the nature of the illness and the 
nature of how clinical trials are done. So when you measure, do a trial for a statin and you are 
measuring cholesterol, you have your primary outcome measures for that trial will be things that 
doctors that are prescribing them, totally understand. If I talk about a PANSS score or a Weimers 
scale or any of those scales they are kind of, not artificial but they are a thing that is done in order to 
get clinical trial results and not just by the industry but that’s how you measure the effectiveness of 
the drugs.  Your jobbing day to day psychiatrist may not really understand exactly what a reduction 







3.2.3. Temporal impact of evidence 
Views amongst respondents on the point at which data has sufficient impact to form 
what is considered to be ‘evidence’ i.e. whether the adopter is convinced to use the 
innovation, were varied.  
 
People go to conferences to get the latest stuff so they definitely take note of what’s presented at 
meetings, but you can’t beat peer review journal publications (CS2.2). 
I think once an abstract's presented at a conference everyone knows about it.  And you're just waiting 
for the manuscript to come out then.  So I think once it's presented at congress or it's presented in a 
journal at abstract stage that's when it becomes evidence. People know it's coming anyway.  So the 
people change their habits overnight (CS4.2). 
 
Interview data suggested that clinical trials do not always have an impact at the point 
of publication. Their significance may not be realised until other events take place at 
later stages of the lifecycle, which then bring a new perspective on the findings. This 
temporal bearing on evidence impact was demonstrated by MSD’s Fracture 
Intervention Trial (FIT1). It was a mega-trial involving over 6,000 patients, 
investigating the effectiveness of alendronate as a once daily therapy. MSD had 
previous experience with the landmark 4S statin trial and so were aware of the 
requirements for a study to be well received. Respondents indicated however, that 
post-publication, the FIT1 trial did not achieve the level of impact in the UK that was 
expected of such a prestigious trial.  Respondents perceived this to be a consequence 
of a combination of tolerability issues and opinion leadership loyalty to their 
competition (see Theme 2: Clinician/patient experience; subtheme 2.3.2: Safety 
warning/concerns and Theme 8: Key opinion leaders; subtheme 8.2: Hierarchical 
cascade of influence/peer credibility). With the introduction of the 70mg once 
weekly formulation some 4 years later, the FIT1 trial results were believed to regain 




(as demonstrated by FIT1) to the new weekly formulation once smaller trials had 
demonstrated equivalence. 
They were preferring to use alendronate maybe than the competition because they’ve got the fracture 
intervention trial plus other evidence, plus the 70 milligram formulation (CS1.3). 
 
In contrast, the AA case study demonstrated the power of early conference level 
publication. While the ABPI Industry Code of Conduct restricts pre-marketing 
activities such as advertising using the drug’s name, it is possible to publish clinical 
trial results in journals and present data at conferences. Full results from one of the 
pivotal trials in the AA case were presented a year before launch. Respondents 
believed this was responsible for fuelling the level of anticipation amongst 
psychiatrists that contributed to the drug’s rapid uptake. Publication of the full trial a 
year later and subsequent head to head data was felt to merely serve to reinforce 
clinical experience already gained. 
There was such a pent up demand for this drug.  I remember being at some of the congresses where 
the phase III data were presented prior to its launch.  And it was standing room only in some of the 
auditoria where the data were presented.  People really were excited about this.  That it did 
represent a breakthrough (CS2.4). 
 
Analysis of the interview data suggested that most respondents felt clinical evidence 
can lose its impact for later entrants to a class as there becomes less to prove. 
Reforms to the prescribing environment with initiatives such as the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework can however, bring new significance and interest in the 
evidence for a late entrant if it has bearing on being able to meet the objectives set 
out in the policy. The impact of evidence is therefore heavily influenced by the 
environment in which is generated (see Theme 4: Health service/policy 
environments). 
There's not much more evidence you can collect really because most of it's been done in terms of 
placebo controlled trials, most of it's been done now.  It's mostly unethical to do the trials anymore.  




the answer I think.  Make sure that your product is pharmacoeconomically positioned to take 
advantage of the health system as it is now (CS4.2). 
There was awareness of the clinical data before launch and that it looked fairly strong.  Other things 
that were in place like the QOF which physicians were starting to get wind of which directly 
incentivises them to go and find patients who were eligible for statin therapy and to treat them to a 
certain level, those two things together, that's some of the reason behind that (CS4.3). 
 
3.2.4. Journal quality/ Publication control 
Analysis of respondents’ views indicated that journal quality is not necessarily 
proportionally related to diffusion impact, as often indicated in the literature. While 
most respondents considered publication of study findings in one of the high impact 
factor journals would have a significant impact on the uptake of a drug, the case 
studies revealed certain incompatibilities with this perspective.  
 
It’s not really until you get a full blown publication, if you can in a prestigious journal, that would 
have the most impact, so, you know, if it was in like the Lancet, the BMJ, the data published in those 
journals would have more impact than data published in a lesser renowned journal (CS2.1). 
 
Most of the major trial findings for the BPs for instance were published in some of 
the most prestigious medical journals, yet the one highlighted as being instrumental 
in changing the trajectory of the diffusion curve for alendronate was the study by 
Schnitzer et al. (2000) detailing the results of the once weekly dose published in 
what would be considered a comparatively low key journal with limited readership.  
 
One respondent discussed how the restrictions imposed by prestigious journals were 
detrimental to the diffusion of their drug. The measures journals put in place to 
maintain prestige, such as embargos on gradual release of trial results can misalign 
with Industry aims of building awareness and anticipation for the drug. Additionally, 
the time taken for a large scale trial to reach completion, coupled with a lengthy 
peer-review process poses a substantial risk that any unique outcomes of the trial 




We were very heavily focused on securing a very credible publication for our hip fracture trial 
published in NEJM and NEJM is still regarded as the highest impact factor publication, out of all the 
publications you can have.  The downside is that they’re very fastidious about how things work, so 
the first thing is that you can't do the gradual release it has to be brand new to the world, otherwise 
it never gets into NEJM, and so it puts a lot of blocks on what you can do, because from a marketing 
point of view, we want to be able to build up to it, but they won't do that, and that’s why they're so 
prestigious (CS1.2). 
 
Respondents felt they were to some degree at the mercy of journals, giving rise to a 
sense of disempowerment in this aspect of the diffusion process.  This theme 
interacts with several other themes, including how the journal restrictions impact on 
the clarity of the messages the Industry want to convey (see Theme 6: 
Communicating relative advantage; subtheme 6.2.1: Simplicity/clarity of message). 
The frequency of this predicament however, is likely to be low as it occurred mainly 
as a consequence of inexperience in trial design from lacking a classic 
pharmaceutical heritage.  
 
The other element is that they shape the publication, so actually it's from a technical point of view it's 
not the best written publication, it doesn’t do justice to the dataset that supports the publication, but 
we again don’t have a lot of say in that because it's NEJM and they have a lot of say in what they 
want and how they want it written. I think if we’d gone for a slightly lower impact journal, I think 
we would have had a publication that was more reflective of the data that we actually had, I mean I 
think we do make mistakes…. We had an issue that we wanted to do too much in one trial, so what we 
chose to do was we chose to have an over 80s group, and again a potentially big market, a potentially 
big unmet need, but we complicated it... And so I think that’s maybe our inexperience (CS1.2). 
 
Interview data suggested how journal quality is often used as a proxy to determine 
how much kudos a company affords to criticisms about its product, and to decide the 
extent of their response as more prestigious publications tend to reach a wider 
audience and what they are presenting is viewed with credibility by prescribers. 
 
It will depend on the quality of the study and where it’s published as to whether we would react to it. 
You’ve always got to look….you know we have to present lots of evidence for our products and so we 
tend to….if we get an individual study that comes out and look at what is the body of evidence that 
either backs that study up or disagrees with that study, if it’s a one off and there’s loads disagreeing 
with it I probably wouldn’t bother with it. If it’s one of a series and I think longer term it’s going to 




4. HEALTH SERVICE/POLICY ENVIRONMENTS 
The health service and policy conditions governing the environment into which a 
new drug diffuses were raised by most respondents as an important influence on 
diffusion. Unlike some of the other diffusion factors discussed, decisions about 
public policy were viewed as being out of the control, if not the influence, of 
Industry. For the purposes of this discussion, ‘health policy’ is that under the 
direction of the Department of Health, whilst ‘guidelines’, which are the instruments 
through which policy becomes operationalised, emanate from organisations outside 
direct Government control (e.g. NICE, Royal College of Physicians etc.).  
 
4.1. Health Policy Environment 
 
4.1.1. Political priorities 
The alignment of key commercial messages to defined national priorities was 
regarded by respondents as an opportunity to drive diffusion and adoption. At the 
point of development, while it is not certain what the political priorities will be at 
launch, the National Service Frameworks have identified such priorities for the NHS 
and any related guidance is seen as having enhanced significance. Respondents 
highlighted that where possible, drugs are endorsed by their ability to achieve the 
outcomes set by policy.  
The BP case illustrated how the degree of political priority afforded to a disease area 
can dictate the impact of national guidance. Although a relevant policy document 
existed in the form of the NSF for Older People, osteoporosis was mentioned only as 




perspective, the effect of marginalising such issues diminished the potential impact 
of that policy. 
It wasn't on the government's agenda, as it still isn't now, because even though the sales look terrific 
compared…it's still relatively low.  If you look at the actual number of patients seen in a typical 
month, it's much lower than say for the A2As19 and statins. Equally, when you look at the different 
quality outcome framework measures and the different disease areas which have been prioritised, 
osteoporosis maintains a very low priority compared to things like cholesterol and hypertension, and 
so I think it's still….it's not given the kudos and the priority that it needs (G1.2). 
I think the overall driver is how important is this a priority for the health services that we work in?  
So you know, if you take something like say a statin, where clearly now a lot of the focus of the 
overall health service is on statins, and prevention of coronary heart disease, then a national 
guideline in that area is likely to get a lot of traction and be a very major event in the diffusion 
curve of the drug or how it's adopted.  If you’ve got another area that’s probably much further 
down on the political medical radar and it gets much less priority then even if you get a national 
piece of guidance on it, it can drop a little bit by the wayside.  Osteoporosis is not a bad example, 
because if you look at it in terms of the national guidelines, it is covered by an NSF but it's a 
subclause of the NSF for the elderly and a subclause of falls and fractures which then leads you to, 
okay yes there's a national piece of guidance there saying…we need to do something about this, but 
it's not sufficiently high enough up anyone’s agenda to really make a difference.  So whilst it could 
be the trump card in terms of what changes the adoption of a particular class of drugs, it will only be 
that if it reaches a certain critical mass that gets it there (CS1.1). 
 
The NSF for Mental Health was believed to have had little impact on the AAs. While 
it outlined best practice, the means to implement the changes were not considered to 
be a high political priority. In contrast, erectile dysfunction, which had not been 
regarded as a political priority, was elevated to the forefront of the political agenda 
with the development of the first oral PDE5 inhibitor sildenafil, due to fears of the 
projected uptake costs to the NHS. Interview data suggested that while this drug 
raised the profile of ED, the provision of services for the condition did not become a 
political priority and as such, related policy as represented in the NSF for Diabetes (a 
recognised cause of ED), did not have a significant impact on the management of 
patients with ED. If a condition has symptoms that straddle several government 
priority areas, in some contexts respondents perceived that this can be used as a 
                                                 




means of deflecting accountability from the issue becoming any one service’s 
responsibility. 
  
NSF was not very useful. Lots of best practice and that’s what we should do but not a lot to really 
help the NHS make those changes. Interesting documents to read, you know, good visions for where 
they need to be but then you’ve got to make it happen on the ground haven’t you (CS2.2). 
How many diabetes centres as a result of the NSF for diabetes now run ED clinics? And how 
willing to proactively to turn round to all their diabetic men and openly talk about ED? We've 
generally found you almost get good centres and bad centres and I'm not doing them a disservice in 
that, but you generally  find that they will move...that they're almost  forward thinking or they believe 
that yes, this is a cause of it, you know, diabetes...we will treat this like we treat people's feet and 
their eyes and everything else that diabetes impacts on.  This is just another part of the disease, 
because it's a vascular disease, so let's deal with it.  And you'll get other centres which will say well 
that's a urological problem, isn't it?  Yes there's a link obviously with diabetes but we'll refer patients 
over to deal with ED. I'm not saying one service is better than the other but you look at it from a 
patient's point of view and if I'm a diabetic man and I come for treatment and they check my eyes in 
that clinic or even check my feet but then they do nothing about my ED.  They'll say, you know, 'Any 
problems down there?  If so, go speak to my colleague'. So policy in that respect hasn't seemed to 
have had a huge impact...which is very, very unfortunate. I mean 50% of diabetic men over 18 will 
have ED (CS3.2). 
 
4.1.1.1. Favourable policy environment 
Several respondents indicated that policy resulting in the new General Medical 
Services (GMS) contract was instrumental in setting the health priorities in primary 
care. Technologies that can be linked to meeting the Quality Outcomes Framework 
(QOF) indicators are introduced into a receptive environment resulting from 
established, albeit incentivised clinician interest. This was identified as one of the 
important factors in driving use of statins. Drugs unrelated to the QOF can 
potentially face an infrastructural barrier to diffusion. This was proposed by 
respondents as being detrimental for BPs, as osteoporosis indicators were not 
included in the original QOF, only later being added in April 2012 when all three 
case study drugs were off patent.  
I think if we said what is the one thing aside from the availability of clinical evidence that has driven 
the use of statins in this country; you would probably say it was the GP contract. That's not so much 




The physicians were starting to get geared up for the QOF and the GMS at the beginning of 2004 
and therefore having good LDL and total cholesterol data perhaps it was a favourable time to have 
that with where the focus…where the minds were starting to move…There was recognition that 
statins should, could be used more widely, as well as things like the QOF which incentivised 
physicians to go out and find patients who would be appropriate for statin therapy (CS4.3).   
There are different barriers of access, and GPs are busy and the GP contract has changed things 
because I mean they’re very focused about getting their points (CS1.3). 
There's a relationship between the NSF and QOF and once you've got cholesterol indicators in the 
QOF and you've got indicators around creating disease registers, and patients having to have 
cholesterol readings, then that's going to drive use (CS4.3). 
 
This approach however, does not appear to be immune from wider commercial 
influences. The QOF, once a driver for diffusion of branded statins, was later 
perceived by respondents as a barrier with the introduction of cheaper, generic 
simvastatin. 
 
I think you had a sort of cumulative effect of several things, going back so that certainly the NSF , 
really kind of put this on the map, cholesterol, heart disease prevention through cholesterol 
lowering. The first GP contract of course then gave QOF points for treating cholesterol and that 
certainly pushed the market again, very good thing too, right thing for patients. I think the NICE 
guidance of, when was it, beginning of '06  has had a positive effect on continuing to boost statin 
usage in primary prevention as opposed to just in secondary prevention although, commercially we 
probably haven't benefited from that because it's been the cheap generic statins that have tended to 
be used in those lower risk patients, so I would say yes, the things that have had the big effect have 
been NSF and GP contract (CS4.1). 
 
4.1.1.2. Adverse policy environment 
Analysis of respondents’ views suggested that policy can provide the justification for 
prescribing restrictions purely on the basis of cost containment when the decision 
cannot be made on clinical grounds. In the case of the PDE5 inhibitors, policy 
presented a major barrier to diffusion by restricting their use to subpopulations with 
certain comorbidities, whilst also excluding the most significant of these 
subpopulations (cardiovascular disease) as it presented a major opportunity cost 






They reviewed Schedule 2 just prior to tadalafil and vardenafil launching, and they had over 200 
responses of which only one said, don't increase the categories of patients, all the other 199 or 200 
said you should include patients with cardiovascular disease, because the link between erectile 
dysfunction and cardiovascular disease is a perfect link almost, but the Department of Health then 
said, whilst we've had all this feedback to say change the categories and that and add cardiovascular 
patients, to do that, we would have to take money from cancer treatment…There is a huge link 
between cardiovascular disease and ED.  I mean still, it’s unfair that they were you know, picked out 
rather than patients with diabetes, it’s almost like you want to get diabetes as well, because at least 
then you’d get your treatment on the NHS (CS3.3). 
Schedule 2 reduced the number of people that had free, or NHS access to it, to about 40% or 
something like that from the volume that you would have otherwise have had.  Now you know, some 
people will pay for it privately, but you know as a nation we are not very good at paying for our 
medicines unless they're pretty vitamins in which case, no problem at all, but you know, we don't 
really like paying prescription charges, we certainly don't want to be paying £40 for a pack of Viagra, 
so inevitably it will limit it (CS3.1). 
 
Respondents perceived such policies as creating confusion for patients and 
discomfort for their doctors in having to manage the prospect of discrimination 
without sound clinical grounds. This links back to clinician experience (see Theme 2: 
Clinician/patient experience; subtheme 2.2: Clinician-patient interaction), for while 
the oral mode of administration of sildenafil enhanced the clinician-patient 
interaction, the policy restrictions counteracted it.  
 
We should either make men pay for this drug or provide it on the NHS, one or the other and the 
reason why I say that is for a clinician, what they've said is it's very difficult to explain to a patient 
'Yes, you qualify' or 'No, you don't but here's the reason why'.  And the guy says 'Well, so hang on a 
second, say I had coronary heart disease because I'm overweight and I've eaten too much'.  'Yes you 
do have to pay for it.' 'Okay, but if I had diabetes and I had diabetes because again perhaps I was 
overweight and I'd eaten too much and abused myself that way, do I qualify for it?'  'Yes.'  That's a 
difficult thing for clinicians to be able to explain and so their feedback is that they'd prefer it one way 
or the other, 'cos it feels like they're discriminating (CS3.2). 
 
Policy restrictions that challenge a clinician’s autonomy in the clinical decision 
making process were viewed as not being generally well received and can have 
unpredictable consequences on diffusion. In the case of the PDE5 inhibitors, 
interview data suggested that the initial outright ban on the use of sildenafil, was met 
with defiance from clinicians as an infringement to their profession prescribing 




Theme 2: Clinician/patient experience). When the restrictions were lessened to those 
under Schedule 2, the Industry respondents believed specialists often took a 
pragmatic approach and used the ambiguity of one of the permitted exclusions of 
men suffering ‘severe distress’ on account of their ED, as a means of widening 
access to the drug and reducing discriminatory barriers.  
 
Contrary to the NHS being free healthcare at the point of delivery according to clinical need, I 
mean that was a pretty sacrosanct principle and still is in effect, and this was a very high profile 
contravention of that for a drug which people knew was effective, so again clarifying that was not in 
debate.  It wasn't like this sort of vague notion of efficacy, it worked in 70-80% of people on average, 
and it was safe, you know and to all intents and purposes it wasn't expensive. It was £5 a tablet, so 
that's £20 a month and that was absolutely in the middle or the lower end of what most monthly 
medicine costs, so there was no reason to ban it, other than a fear about its uptake.  So anyway, we 
contested that, it was lifted, but what was put in its place was Schedule 11 which is now Schedule 2, 
which when it was reimbursed it was only for people with; the largest group was diabetes, so new 
patients presenting with diabetes could have it, and then there was a whole load of lesser 
conditions…there were twelve, so multiple sclerosis, motor neurone disease, spinal cord injuries, 
radical prostatectomy, transurethral resection of the prostate. But the one which was the confusing 
one for people, which wasn't helpful actually, was that anybody that was experiencing severe 
distress as a consequence of their erectile dysfunction as diagnosed by a specialist, of course that was 
very much in the eye of the beholder. I would say there were probably about 20 GPs who were 
experts in the area all pretty much took a view that if you were; if you had plucked up enough 
courage to go and see a GP about erectile dysfunction, you were probably pretty distressed by it and 
therefore, qualified (CS3.1). 
I think, Schedule 11 was designed to do something other than what it was subsequently used to do 
with Viagra, it was something to do with where a drug has two indications and its only approved for 
use on the NHS in one indication but not the other, whereas with Viagra, they used it to say okay, only 
with certain aetiologies...so Frank Dobson said you cannot use it, and that was his guidance to the 
medical community on the basis that it was going to cost a billion pounds…And of course a lot of 
people as you can see from the take off curve, a lot of people ignored that and it produced a pretty 
big reaction from, obviously Pfizer, but also the BMA; I mean influentially we have no links with the 
BMA, the BMA is entirely independent, but they just thought that was an infringement of GPs' rights; 
their professional freedoms (CS3.1). 
 
4.2. Independent Guidance/Guidelines   
Guidance or guidelines provide the conduit through which policy aims can be 
implemented in clinical practice. They are used to influence the environment, either 
as barriers or enhancers of diffusion depending on the central message. In the PDE5 
inhibitor case, respondents discussed how guidelines had little impact other than to 




transition from prescribing in secondary to primary care. In the BP case, guidelines 
were produced too late once practice was already established. For the AAs, guidance 
had little impact for the individual drugs as it did not attempt to differentiate between 
products, but did enhance a collectively positive message for the class.  In the statin 
case, guidelines encouraged more extensive use of statins, but the market had 
become generic at the point when the NICE appraisal was produced, and so the 
respondents believed they did not benefit from the increased use. 
 
4.2.1. Differentiation 
Analysis of respondents’ views indicated they had mixed feelings when guidelines 
considered technologies as having a ‘class effect’. Class endorsement by key opinion 
leaders was seen to be useful in early stages of diffusion to initiate a shift in clinical 
perceptions towards a new class (see Theme 8: Key opinion leaders; subtheme 8.3: 
Collegiate agreement). Guidelines however, may only materialise late in the 
diffusion process once experience has formed opinion regarding class function, and 
what is sought is advice on differentiation within the class to assist in prescribing 
decisions. Respondents acknowledged that while a positive guideline 
recommendation of a class at this stage is helpful, impact stems from drug-specific 
endorsement. 
NICE guidance for instance on the AAs achieved a positive message for the class, 
stating they should be used in preference to the older generation drugs, but it did not 
go so far as to distinguish between them. Respondents therefore felt it had a diluted 
impact on the diffusion of the individual drugs within the class. The same was true 




between the PDE5 inhibitors, but rather to ensure they were prescribed in the most 
appropriate clinical setting. 
I think guidelines were useful in terms of driving the class of atypicals because the guidance 
recommended that atypicals for new patients should be considered as first-line treatment, or patients 
that were on older conventionals who had side effects should be considered for a change to atypicals, 
so I think as a class it helped to drive the atypical class, but it didn’t really go into the detail of 
specifying differences between the different products, so I don’t think it made any difference to the 
individual products, it was more driving the atypical class (CS2.1). 
Guidelines in ED are rare, they tend to be local, and they're driven by the urologist in order to 
manage their waiting lists. From what I've seen from the vast majority of guidelines are; ED is easily 
treatable in the majority of cases with a tablet and can be done so in the community. You should 
only be referring patients into the urology department if they've tried eight to 12 successive tablets 
and failed, so then they may need an injectable or something like that which tends to be initiated 
within the secondary care arena, so most of the guidelines I've seen have just said any PDE5 
inhibitor, but in the community please and then when you've tried several times and it doesn't work, 
then you have permission to refer that patient  (CS3.3). 
 
For some drugs in a class the implied nature of equivalence from a class effect 
guideline was perceived to be advantageous, particularly if it has been subject to 
perception issues of reduced efficacy, as in the case of quetiapine. Equally, a lack of 
guideline differentiation can be beneficial in circumstances where one drug may have 
a less favourable side effect profile by diluting its impact. 
 We then moved away from that later to just really focusing on efficacy, let’s not try and change it, 
let’s just convince them that actually, just like NICE says, Seroquel is equally as good as olanzapine 
or risperidone, because NICE says they all work exactly the same (CS2.3). 
 
Interview data did confirm however, that where guidelines indicate a degree of 
differentiation, these opportunities are maximally utilised in Industry messaging to 
indicate it as the drug of choice in a particular situation that has been endorsed by 
independent validation (see Theme 6: Communicating relative advantage; subtheme 
6.1: Differentiating relative advantage). 
What NICE did do though was say there was a need for atypicals and that from our perspective is a 
good message. You still have a lot of typical use going on here…they are an advance, atypical 
antipsychotics, we should be thinking of using them ‘cos the older typicals had and still do have very 




differentiate on drugs and olanzapine for instance….was pulled out for crisis in the wards, rapid 
tranquilisation.  And then that way that does help us because you can then actually use that to say 
olanzapine has been the drug of choice in this situation (CS2.2). 
 
Guidance rarely endorses individual drugs, but the use of language within the 
recommendations such as ‘lowest acquisition cost’ will favour the cheapest in that 
class and in doing so imposes a degree of differentiation. In a market of branded 
medicines, some respondents indicated that there remains scope for competitive 
pricing, but in a market that has become generic, this recommendation does little for 
the diffusion of branded drugs in the class. 
NICE TA stated that statin therapy as appropriate for people who have established cardiovascular 
disease, who have events or evidence of cardiovascular disease, but also those who are deemed to be 
at greater than 20% ten year risk of developing a cardiovascular disease over the next ten years, that 
was the first outcome. The second was therapy should usually be initiated using a low cost statin 
which generally means simvastatin or pravastatin (CS4.3). 
 
4.2.2. Perceived importance/strength of message  
The impact of clinical guidelines was perceived by respondents as being related to 
the credibility of the source of the guidelines and the strength and clarity of the 
message being conveyed.  
We tend to look at sort of prescribing behaviour on a macro scale and say ‘did the guidelines change 
behaviour?’ I think it's how dramatic they are (CS1.3). 
Very strong recommendations from NICE I think, but it depends on the wording and how strong it 
is, so I think the fact that they were positive about atypicals did have an impact (CS2.1). 
 
There is seen to be a clear hierarchy of guidelines with NICE at the apex, due to the 
credibility with which this organisation is viewed worldwide and the mandatory 
authority of its appraisals. Guidelines from Royal Colleges are also held within high 
regard within their respective fields, but when, as in the case of BPs, they are very 
closely associated with developers of the technology, doubts about wider credibility 




So would we all be supporters of the Royal College guidelines? Yes. So did all of us as in every 
single company that was in the osteoporosis field, pharmaceutical company or diagnostic company.  
All of them have to be supportive of the Royal College guidelines, because it is the national guideline 
for the UK for those products (CS1.1). 
The prescribing incentive schemes, like the league tables, the better care, the better value indicators 
in some of the software, were borne out of that NICE TA guidance if you like.  That guidance gave a 
lot of local prescribing advisors the ammunition they needed to try and do what they were doing 
anyway, which is try simvastatin. I mean you can argue, might some of that stuff have happened 
anyway without the NICE guidance? Possibly. But in terms of the timing of it, a lot of those tools 
seemed to come into place in 2006 and that technology appraisal for statins was published at the 
beginning of 2006…I think it's fair to say it's had an impact definitely (CS4.3). 
 
Irrespective of the weight of importance of some guidelines, respondents suggested 
that affordability and whether the recommendations are commensurate with 
clinicians’ personal beliefs will still present a barrier to guideline adoption and their 
subsequent influence on clinical practice. In the statins case, respondents felt that the 
Joint British Society guidelines (JBS2) that supported lowering cholesterol targets 
chimed more with clinical practice than government policy. Such was the clinical 
support for these guidelines, it required Department of Health intervention to clarify 
that these guidelines were not commensurate with national policy.  
A lot of people don't even follow guidelines anyway, I mean you can have the best written guidelines 
in the world, but whether they can afford them and whether they believe that that's what they should 
do is something entirely different (G1.1). 
In terms of policies, I guess you would assume that those have been influenced by the data.  And other 
things have been important, the Joint British Societies' collection of professional bodies; their 
guidelines have been useful in that they've reminded people that, with the need to treat more 
aggressive cholesterol lowering targets, those have never been adopted to date by Government as 




By their very nature, the advisory capacity of clinical guidelines is dependent on data 
which may not be available until products have become established. The same 
paradox is true for systematic reviews. Respondents indicated how this may limit 




informing clinician opinions by then. Some interview data almost trivialised the 
impact of guidelines, suggesting that conference or abstract material has far greater 
potential to impact on diffusion by aiding a more rapid uptake of the product during 
the early phases.  
The fact that NICE Guidance was produced relatively late in the lifecycle meant that impact on 
people’s prescribing habits was probably fairly limited. Had they come along three or four years 
earlier than they did then it might be a different answer, but they came along so late in the lifecycle 
(CS2.2). 
If something about a statin came out in abstract form next week at congress it'd change the policy 
overnight, without waiting for the guidelines (CS4.2). 
 
Producers of guidance, especially NICE, need to ensure that they retain high quality 
standards. This invariably increases the time to publish and, arguably reduces the 
usefulness of their outputs, which was highlighted by respondents as a particular 
issue for the BPs. The RCP guidelines published much earlier were perceived by 
respondents as having had a greater influence on prescribing behaviour. 
Then you’ve got NICE which can take many many years, as osteoporosis has done.  And it's a bit 
embarrassing because the length of time it's taken, so many events have taken place it's made 
everything they’ve done redundant (CS1.3). 
 
Respondents agreed on how timing of guidance production can give rise to unfair 
advantages to some drugs in a comparative analysis.  Later entrants to the market 
may be discriminated against by guidelines as the compounds will not carry the same 
weight of evidence as that first to launch. This was a particular issue for the PDE5 
inhibitors when the class was subject to review by the Drugs and Therapeutics 
Bulletin within a year of tadalafil and vardenafil being launched, while sildenafil had 




The Drugs and Therapeutics Bulletin did a review, and I think both Levitra and Cialis were probably 
only about a year post-launch, if not, less than that, so whilst we had one or two studies that were 
fully published, we didn't have lots and they reviewed all three PDE5 inhibitors. Now the Drugs and 
Therapeutics Bulletin will not accept abstracts or posters from meetings, they only accept peer-
reviewed published papers, so automatically they're advantaging Viagra, and they came out and said 
there's no reason to prescribe either of the two new ones, because the bulk of the data is with 
Viagra.  Well it would be, it's the oldest treatment (CS3.3). 
In contrast, a late entrant from a different class in the statin case was considered at an 
advantage by respondents, as consensus thought in the field had advanced such that 
evidence requirements may not have been as stringent as for drugs assessed at earlier 
stages.  
Extremely surprised how NICE reacted to it. When they did the statin one, they said it was important 
to have endpoint evidence for statins.  When they did the ezetimibe one they said the LDL theory is 
now proven.  It's like, okay, 18 months down the line the whole world's changed it seems, which I 
thought was a bit out of kilter to where they position themselves in terms of evidence (CS4.2). 
 
4.3. Health Service Environment 
 
4.3.1. Clinical priorities 
In contrast to political priorities, clinical priorities focus on the needs of patients, but 
are not free from financial considerations. While conditions, such as erectile 
dysfunction, can cause considerable distress to a patient, analysis of respondents’ 
views indicated that when it comes down to prioritising resources, the clinical 
priority is for innovations that are life-saving rather than life-modifying.  
 
The other thing that happens is, in some areas the clinic is funded by the PCT, but then part way 
through the year when the funding starts to look like it's; you know the money is not going to stretch 
to cover everything, it's the ED services that get pulled, because they’re considered non-essential; 
no-one's ever going to die of having an erection problem, or that's what people believe, although 
some people have tried suicide, but that's extremely rare; people will die of cardiovascular disease or 
cancer but people don't die from having erection problems, so therefore, they'll pull the funding back 
on erection services to maintain some funding in another area that they see as more critical 
(CS3.3). 
Do we spend money on cancer care or on people's sex lives; well you know, put like that it's a 
difficult question to answer, but I mean you know the important thing that we had to get across was, 





Respondents in the BP case described how for some diseases, such as osteoporosis, a 
vicious circle ensues. Lack of political attention means a lack of clinical 
prioritisation, which results in limited resources. In such circumstances respondents 
indicated how they aim to raise disease profiles that would otherwise find it difficult 
to draw attention away from major clinical priority areas such as cardiovascular 
disease and cancer (see Theme 7: Market development; subtheme 7.2: Raising 
disease awareness).  
It wasn't actively being supported by the key opinion leader community in the hospital so they would 
be sending people out, but it was fairly minimal. So even in fracture clinics there was under-
diagnoses, there was also a lack of facilities available, such as DEXA scanning across the country, so 
lack of resources to actually actively look for and identify people who were just osteopaenic for 
instance, and you know, early stages of the disease (G1.2). 
I think again it's an area where the lack of understanding in the market amongst the customers was 
very high, so even the GPs, their knowledge of osteoporosis, their ability to be able to actively 
diagnose or identify an issue.  And their desire and their willingness to do so was actually really low 
(G1.2). 
 
With the resources that are available, there is significant pressure to utilise them in 
the most efficient way. In the statin case, the clinical priority was to reach cholesterol 
targets set out in the QOF, but in the most cost effective way so that more patients 
could be treated. This was achieved through generics, which ultimately curtailed the 
diffusion of branded drugs. 
Universally every local PCT, LHB20, has a guideline formulary in place which says simvastatin is 
first-line and that undoubtedly has an impact on this with all the kind of infrastructure that goes with 
it. You've got the better care, better value indicators as well.  So there's a lot of infrastructure around 
driving proportionate statin use that is generic. Incentive schemes that's a good way to get 
physicians to do what you want, prescribing incentive schemes, league tables, there's the 
ScriptSwitch software on clinical systems…it's a service that the PCT can buy in to drive the 
prescribing that they want, for example if where you had the ScriptSwitch software in place for a GP 
to prescribe atorvastatin it would flash up, I'd get a window flash up and say actually do you realise 
that local policy is to use simvastatin?  And it would default to simvar and create an exception report 
if you chose to override it to write atorvastatin.  So there's those kind of point of prescription 
influences as well as the things that go on in the background (CS4.3). 
 
                                                 





4.3.2. Clinical setting of disease management (specialist/non-specialist)   
The complexities of the clinical setting in which prescribing takes place can have a 
bearing on diffusion. Respondents highlighted how in mental health, local variations 
in how services are configured can make it difficult for them to determine who are 
the key people that influence practice. This can result in a dilution of Industry efforts 
compared with conditions managed predominantly by GPs within primary care, such 
as statins.  
In mental health the structure can be very different from one area to another. So in some areas there 
are moves generally to move patients out into primary care faster, because traditionally they’ve been 
managed in hospitals, kept in hospitals for perhaps, you know, four to five months, and then they’ve 
been discharged back into the community but looked after by mental health trusts. There are moves to 
change that, to keep the stay in hospital much shorter, so bring it down to perhaps a month or so, six 
weeks, discharge the patient faster back into the community and then they’ll be looked after by 
nurses in the community, so mental health nurses, but that would be funded by the PCT, so it is all 
shifting, but mental health is - has quite a fragmented structure, so you can literally go from one area 
of the country twenty miles to another area, and the way that mental health services are set up can 
be completely different, and that makes it quite hard to deal with the primary and secondary care 
interface because you’ve got to deal with it on very much a local level (CS2.1). 
There was enough knowledge around statins for GPs to be really comfortable with them.  It was 
generally a primary care managed disease and by exception you send them to secondary, and as I 
said because of the sheer number of patients, that's the way it has to work, so the marketing was both 
to primary and secondary care (CS4.3). 
 
This was also demonstrated in the PDE5 inhibitor case. Despite significant market 
research ahead of launch, interview data suggested later entrants to the market may 
not have appreciated the continuing importance of secondary care specialists in 
influencing prescribing decisions as a result of the focus placed by the first in class 
on shifting the management of erectile dysfunction into primary care. 
We scaled back our specialist care sales force… because we believed that primary care was where 
everything was at.  But although 98% of the prescriptions are maintained in primary care, a third of 
them...there's a point where the specialists get involved in certain numbers of the patients and so 
those specialists are the ones who then advise the GPs, so then you've got a combination between the 





The importance of national guidance was conceptualised by respondents as being 
related to the care setting in which a condition was predominantly managed. 
Respondents suggested that they are seen to be more significant for conditions that 
are managed predominantly in primary care by providing a framework for ensuring 
consistency in practice, thereby instilling a degree of confidence for non-specialists 
(see Theme 5: Adopter Attitude; subtheme 5.3: Non-specialist risk mitigation). There 
was a perception amongst respondents that specialists were seen to have achieved a 
level of autonomy, which allowed them to prescribe as they saw fit. 
The impact of the clinical setting was an important feature in the PDE5 inhibitor case 
study. Mode of administration of drugs can generate a barrier by restricting 
innovations to certain clinical settings. The development of an oral medication for 
ED that did not require specialist administration was perceived by respondents as a 
critical success factor for this class of drugs. It enabled the movement of the 
management of ED out of secondary care into a primary care setting. As there are far 
more GPs than urologists, this ultimately translated to increasing the number of 
patients that could be treated and the ceiling of the diffusion curve could be raised. 
The policy restrictions however, forced prescribing decisions regarding initiation of 
treatment back into the realms of specialists. 
There were probably three or four things that we were focusing on in the sort of two year run up.  One 
was, how do we get GPs equipped for the arrival of Viagra, which was; it had two aspects to it; both 
commercial, but one almost had; well actually had a responsibility because erectile dysfunction 
which as you know was primarily treated using injections, was entirely secondary care, pretty much 
entirely secondary care focused, apart from some primary care clinics, and we knew that patients 
would turn up in thousands at GPs door steps saying please can I have Viagra, you know that was 
absolutely certain, and so as well as it being in our interest to move the management of erectile 
dysfunction into primary care because there's 40,000 GPs and there's only 2,000 urologists, it was 
also in the interests of patients who didn't have to go and see the urologist, but it was also responsible 
for GPs to be expecting that and have some sort of training. So a very significant effort was around, 





While the change of formulation may have addressed a physical barrier to widening 
access, some respondents believed a social barrier was created by losing a degree of 
specialist involvement. Specialists are the ones who tend to drive interest in new 
therapies and without their involvement this may have affected adoption of 
subsequent PDE5 inhibitors by compromising the choice of treatment options 
presented to patients. One respondent felt this was a particular issue for the second in 
class, as an appreciation of the additional benefits it brought to patients was not 
necessarily recognised and communicated by non-specialists.  
 
If you look at the numbers of specialists, there's maybe 1,000 that will have a clinic run in their 
department or under them that a nurse may lead with a specialist registrar that they're responsible 
for.  So they'll see a number of those patients all in one go. They actually have an interest as well, 
because ‘it is a consequence of the prostate surgery which I perform therefore I could do more about 
this and men will come back to me and constantly talk to me about it’. Whereas if I'm a GP and I see 
one new patient every two months, what are my interest levels going to be? (CS3.2). 
 
The physicians that are interested offered the choice and said 'Okay Mr Jones, you have erectile 
dysfunction, you have pretty much two options.  You've got Viagra, you've probably heard of.  This is 
how to take, this is what you do.  Think about your sex life for that.  Or here's Cialis.  This is how 
you take it again, you know.  Think about your sex life.  This is what it could do for you.'  That's a 
true offer of choice between the two.  What you found a lot of physicians did on the offer of choice 
was to say there's long-acting and short-acting, what do you want?  That's very different.  So a lot 
of it was around... giving a true offering of choice.  Specialists get that a lot quicker than GPs 
because they treat more people.  They hear more of the impact of ED on that person's life (CS3.2). 
 
4.4. Industry Response to Environment Barriers 
 
 Conversion of policy objectives to Industry aim 
Interview data highlighted the reflexive responses of pharmaceutical companies to 
the policy environment. If the focus of a guideline or policy is not commensurate 
with a company’s message, or the content is ambiguous, respondents discussed how 
attempts are made to draw attention to issues, such that their interests are 
represented. The aim is to subtly influence policy by providing a link, however 




Even when respondents had reservations about a policy’s impact, they felt it was 
necessary to be engaged with the process as it is important for them to reflect the 
policy environment in their messaging. In the BP case, respondents indicated how it 
was necessary to create the understanding of how falls, which formed the focus of 
the NSF, were related to osteoporosis, which then provided the scope for 
pharmacological interventions to be introduced into the discussion.  
 
We have to work in the environment that we’re given, we end up working in such a way that even if 
something like a national piece of guidance like an NSF we believe is not going to have a huge 
impact, we can't necessarily afford not to be aware of it, engaged with it, and try and ensure that we 
believe it's moving in the right direction to make sure that the access to our treatment is 
proportionately represented as one of the elements, and I think another good example in the 
osteoporosis world is where’s the emphasis?  Is the emphasis on falls or is the emphasis on 
osteoporosis treatments?  I mean the end goal is to prevent fracture, but you could, depending on how 
the policy’s arisen in the Health Service and I think the NSF for older people was very much from 
that sort of social dynamic, it went much more the falls route, than the osteoporosis route.  So at a 
very minimum we needed to create some understanding and education about how they could 
interplay and how they would link together, so that’s the sort of role that we would play to try and 
connect the dots to make sure that you got the piece of policy and understanding of that (CS1.2). 
 
In the PDE5 inhibitor case, it was a case of trying to tie in ED with cardiovascular 
policy through inclusion in the QOF framework as an early marker for underlying 
cardiovascular disease, as respondents indicated that this carried a far higher political 
priority.  
They started reviewing the QOF points beginning of last year and we let the British Society of Sexual 
Medicine know that they were reviewing the QOF points, and two GPs that specialise in this area, 
they put together a presentation on the link between cardiovascular disease and ED, but their way of 
approaching it, is that you should be, in your consultation with men of a certain age, or with certain 
comorbidities, you should be asking them about their sexual function.  The whole idea is basically, 
particularly for cardiovascular disease, the arteries in the penis are one of the smaller arteries in the 
body, so if they're affected, then there's a good chance that at some point in time, your bigger arteries 
are going to be affected too, so you could manage that patient's cardiovascular disease very much 
sooner, if you just asked them about their erection function and from what I understand that's still in 
discussion, it's hasn't been resolved (CS3.3). 
 
The strategy in the statin case focussed on achieving acceptance of lower cholesterol 
targets within policy (reduction from 5mmol/L (total cholesterol) and 3mmol/L 




supported by some guidelines and commensurate with the beliefs of clinicians. At 
these lowered targets, it would render generic simvastatin, even at its highest dose, 
unsuitable as it cannot lower cholesterol to that extent alone.  
Simvastatin gets about 65% of people to five and three. So it's looking for a 35% market share, or 
market place you're fighting for between ezetimibe, atorvastatin and Crestor. If the QOF went to four 
and two, it all of a sudden becomes a 50% marketplace.  So overnight you know you've got half the 
market to go at as opposed to a third of the market, which obviously has a commercial impact 
(CS4.2). 
Economics is what drives guidelines. Can the population afford four and two cholesterol guideline? 
QOF's had a massive impact, the next stage is will QOF go to four and two? (CS4.2). 
 
Utilising guidelines to change focus of message/deflect drug-specific issues 
An analysis of respondent views indicated that the importance of guideline messages 
can shift in accordance with events that occur during the drug lifecycle. While a lack 
of differentiation in the AA guidance was initially perceived as inconsequential for 
some of the drugs in that class, the guidance took on a new significance when some 
were later associated with adverse reactions. Highlighting evidence that the emerging 
side effects were also a potential feature of the disease provided justification to 
include surveillance of physical health within national guidelines in disease 
management. In doing so, the result was to deflect the emphasis from being that of a 
single drug issue to one of a class issue (disease-induced as opposed to drug-
induced).  
A good example is the whole physical health associated with patients with severe mental illness, it’s 
very poor, there’s a lot of education needed and psychiatrists are not used to dealing with anything 
other than the mind.  But these patients are at more risk of getting diabetes they have poor diet, they 
don’t exercise, they tend to be overweight, there’s lots of things they need to manage, they tend to 
smoke, they tend to drink a lot, so you’ve got to really look holistically at how you manage the 
patient and we put a lot of money into trying to educate people on that, trying to make sure there’s 
guidelines, we did a lot of work with NICE, lobbying NICE to say physical health is a priority 
(CS2.2). 
We take them [weight gain side effects] very seriously because I think they’re serious issues and I 
think again it goes back to the body of evidence, you look at the body of evidence and what does it 
tell you and it tells you that there are issues with all atypical antipsychotics, so therefore that’s why 




Providing the means of implementing policy objectives 
Respondents perceived their role as being central to how the recommendations from 
policy or guidelines are implemented. They leverage the objectives of policy to 
justify the use of their products in helping to achieve them.  
 
What’s the environment like, what are the key priorities in the UK, are there government policies 
and pressures that we can leverage from the communication perspective that says you should...this 
is really important to you because the government are asking you to do this and our product will 
help you do that? (CS2.2). 
 
The messages have to be communicated effectively through the correct channels, 
otherwise the impact is limited. Industry representatives can act as the conduits 
through which the information is conveyed, or alternatively respondents indicated 
how they sometimes provide the financial resources to communicate the 
recommendations to as wide an audience as possible, providing the message is 
conducive to their product or the disease area. 
 
It's a double edged sword.  If we had very, very close relationships with those guidelines and the 
development of them, the guidelines would lose a lot of credibility that we need them to have as the 
Industry.  So we have to take a very much arms-length view of those guidelines.  What we have to do 
is through the activities that we do, through the scientific education, we hope at least that we’re 
laying out our stall as to how we see the world, how we see what's important, how we see the factors 
that are critical, and those are taken in with the same view that other companies are putting out 
around their products and the view that the clinicians themselves are developing and sharing, but 
when it actually comes to the production of those guidelines, no, we don’t get any significant input.  
What we do often, is to make sure that once they have decided what they want to do, who they want it 
to go to, what they want to say, we can get involved in the how (CS1.1).   
In the classical Royal College thinking, ’I produce the guidelines and the fact that I've done it is 
now enough’. The fact that no one knows where they are, or what they say, or no one’s aware of 
them, and no one’s doing anything with them, used to be irrelevant.  I mean ‘I‘ve done it, it’s there’. 
So I think where the Industry does work, I wouldn’t say collaboratively but they’re all working in the 
same direction is that we’re all interested in making sure that once they’ve (guidelines) been done 
they get a wide dissemination in audience, and that’s where we would, for example, support, you 
know, if things cost money to reproduce and reprint, or to distribute, they could be done from sales 
representatives, we would do that.  But we would be very ill-advised to get very close to the shaping 
of them, because that would then, in all likelihood, backfire. Because you would end up with 






Accepting and adapting to the imposed limitations of policy 
Sometimes the policy response of the NHS has forced the Industry to change 
strategic direction. In the case of generic simvastatin, the cost implications for the 
NHS were such that original messages became untenable. 
The drive for simvastatin by the NHS probably has been quite unprecedented.  Statins are such a 
high focus class, the NHS chose to kind of prioritise these as an area to save money.  It was chronic, 
and five million patients treated. The NHS demonstrated that it was a bit more sophisticated than 
perhaps what it used to be in terms of exerting its will on prescribers and that's a model that's likely 
to apply to the big markets going forward I think so they've now seen what they can do whereas they 
weren't sophisticated enough to be able to do that in the past (CS4.3). 
Shortly after the launch, simvastatin went generic and at that point you have to have a look at things 
and say okay, our activities need to be credible, so is it appropriate to be asking for new patients as 
the first-line patients to be on rosuvastatin?  Well probably not.  The price of simvastatin, it actually 
took a while for the price of simvastatin to fall, but soon or perhaps it was probably about a year after 
simvastatin went generic the NHS kind of really started to gear up behind generic simvastatin, it 
was the right thing to do, the price dropped to £4 a month on simvastatin 40 at that time and 
therefore that kind of prompted a strategy change to say look, we need to think carefully about the 
kind of patients that we're asking for. So doing the right thing for the NHS and also being seen to be 
credible as well. So at that point, our marketing was very much around use simvastatin first, and if 
that doesn't get your patient to target then rosuvastatin is the right statin to use second-line (CS4.2). 
I think it took a little while for us to kind of get to grips with the extent of the NHS drive behind 
simvastatin and what that actually meant. It was quite unprecedented, the scale of it, it, internally it 
took a little while for everyone to kind of really sit up and understand it if you like and work through 
the implications (CS4.3). 
 
In response to this restricted prescribing environment, interview data described how 
the branded statins now target high risk patients that require more potent drugs than 
maximum dose simvastatin to get them to cholesterol targets. It is a fraction of the 
original market, which has had a significant impact on their diffusion. While 
accepting of the NHS argument, respondents did raise concerns that incentivised 
switching policies implemented by the NHS were being imposed at the expense of 





Individual prescribers started to change a bit, but PCOs21 got hold of this; we can treat four or five 
patients with simvastatin for the price that we can treat one with atorvastatin, and we started to see 
restricted prescribing policies and actually over and above that, active switch policies,  getting 
people off low dose Lipitor and on to high dose simvastatin and there was actually financial 
incentives put in places by some PCOs, so we were in I think an unprecedented situation of PCOs 
literally paying the GPs in some parts of the country to get people off our drug …now let’s be 
objective about it, you could see why they would do that,  you've got pressure on healthcare costs, you 
had the NHS in a period of financial crisis through 2006, you could see why they would do that.  
The concern that we had was that…the policies that had been put in place were sometimes quite blunt, 
literally get people off Lipitor and get them onto simvastatin and while a clinical case could be made 
for people being transferred from 10mg of atorvastatin to 40mg of simvastatin, that wasn't always 
interpreted that precisely, so we did see patients being switched off higher doses of Lipitor and those 
patients probably needed to be on those higher doses because they were giving a magnitude of 
cholesterol lowering that couldn't be achieved with simvastatin, so we were very concerned about 
that, so higher dose Lipitor; atorvastatin, is continuing to grow because it's more effective than those 
statins that are available generically, but we've seen quite a decline in the 10 and 20mg doses as a 
result of switching across to the generics (CS4.1). 
                                                 




5. ADOPTER ATTITUDE 
 
‘Attitude’ was a theme that encompassed the breadth of social philosophies held by 
either clinicians or patients identified by nearly all respondents as either enhancing or 
hindering the diffusion of an innovation (more usually the latter). This theme has 
manifested itself in three very different ways in the cases studied through the:  
• characteristics of professional groups;  
• altered perception of certain diseases; 
• risk mitigation behaviours of non-specialists. 
 
 5.1. Clinician conservatism  
 
The slow rate of technology adoption in the UK is well reported and has been linked 
with the conservative attitude of clinicians in the UK maintaining the status quo. 
Respondents viewed conservatism as an ingrained philosophy of the risk-adverse 
clinical culture in the UK, but views were polarised as to its impact on diffusion. 
Some believed that this conservatism delayed the use of new drugs, whilst others 
thought it displayed valued clinical judgement. In the PDE5 inhibitor case, the notion 
that conservatism can benefit the first entrant in a class was raised by respondents. 
The first in class generally has the challenge of overcoming the status quo, but in 
some ways it has far more points of differentiation on which to change attitudes than 
subsequent entries within the same class once the first has been widely adopted, even 








Staying with what they’re used to and status quo is one of the biggest barriers to diffusion (G1.2). 
If you’ve got a technology that offers a benefit, as long as you believe that the eventual peak of your 
curve where adoption rests and stops is the right level, then does it matter that it's quick or does it 
matter that it's slow? I mean if it's quick you should actually be getting the best benefit for the most 
people more quickly. I think the problem that people worry about is that it overshoots, and it goes to 
somewhere that it shouldn’t be, and then they have to bring it down again. But if I look at most 
disease areas and I look at what we spend, take statins for example, however fast they’ve been 
adopted, I think we’d say we’re still way off target from the number of people that could benefit 
versus where we are  (CS1.2). 
Conservatism is not a bad thing if you believe that quick adoption gives you unnecessary risk, or a 
quick adoption leads you to adopt a category more than you should be doing normally. So I think 
some people could argue, if you say look across the Atlantic at the US you might say that they may 
be taking a little bit of risk too early because it really depends on what’s driving adoption and there 
are arguments in the system that say there may be some structural things that they have that might 
drive it too quickly. And you might say it drives it too high so that you lose some of the things that we 
would prize in the UK, clinical judgement, and personal relationship. But I would say on the whole 
even things like evidence-based medicine is striking a blow at individual freedom for physicians to 
do exactly what they wanted, and I'm not sure that you’ve got hugely good healthcare when people 
do exactly what they wanted.  So I don’t think it is a bad thing (CS1.2). 
Medicine uptake tends to be faster in other countries than it is in the UK. We are inherently more 
conservative and have more kind of, you know, mechanisms to slow the uptake of new drugs than is 
the case elsewhere now. I guess sometimes, the first product on the market benefits from that when 
new drugs come in, but I think basically there is an awareness of Viagra, a trust in it, I mean it's one 
of the very few pharmaceutical products that has a genuine brand image, you know people talk about 
Viagra in the way that they talk about Hoover you know, it’s become a sort of a genericised trade 
name. It's the one that people ask for, it's the one that Doctors have been comfortable with and trust 
and you know, I'm not saying that there's a loyalty to it, but I think it’s incumbent on the new 
entrants to say well what is the advantage of our product over Viagra and you know, I think the 
honest answer is, there's little advantage, so in the absence of any kind of cost efficacy advantage, 
they're probably going to get used less (CS3.1). 
 
Some respondents perceived conservatism as part of the British cultural identity, but 
others were mindful that there are other factors within the health system that 
encourage this attitude, such as the publicly funded nature of the NHS and its 
structural hierarchies. Interview data alluded to the reliance on the judgements of 
recognised authorities, be that opinion leaders within the field (see Theme 8: Key 
opinion leaders), or from guidance bodies, such as NICE before a new technology is 
adopted by the majority of prescribers.  
Different in other countries. The rate of adoption in other countries is incredibly quick, which by 
itself tells you that other people are trying it for themselves, they won't necessarily…and that they 
[UK clinicians] need somebody in authority, or a recognised authority to tell them that it's good. 




If you look at the UK specifically there is a challenge there because we’re the slowest adopting 
country probably in the globe, but at least in the Western world we have the most structural barriers, 
with conservatism built into the system in terms of how slow it is to adopt new technologies (CS1.1). 
Physicians want to find a way of taking indirect trial, because direct trial with their own patients is 
in its own right is quite risky, because they’re actually giving patients things that change their health 
state, so they want to be confident through indirect trial through clinical trials, colleagues 
experience, endorsement by their senior people, guidelines that they are actually mitigating a lot of 
their risk when they choose to use that product (CS1.1). 
If on the NHS something doesn’t work the patient will come back and you can give him something 
else.  If in Germany that doesn’t work the patient might change their doctor, so the doctor has a 
motivation to give the best possible treatment, whereas I don’t think that’s quite the same. And as a 
nation we’re more conservative in our trial of new things, we’re more ‘let’s wait and see’ whereas, I 
mean you find some markets where they’re …particularly Japan, the uptake of new drugs is 
fantastically quick, they're more innovative, and I think that’s a character thing actually (G1.1). 
 
Some respondents perceived conservatism as being an embodiment of clinicians’ 
need for experiential evidence (see Theme 2: Clinician/patient experience). The 
degree of comfort associated with products that have been on the market for several 
years and accrued safety and effectiveness data was perceived as preventing rapid 
switching to new products. The notion was that it takes time for clinicians to build up 
the level of experience required to tip the balance of changing their practice. 
 
For some clinicians, five years on the market is not enough for them. They would always choose 
something that's been on the market longer. I guess Atorva's been on the market for 11 years now, 
and therefore they're more comfortable with that (CS4.3). 
I mean they’re quite conservative, you know, well all physicians are quite conservative as a group so 
they don’t - particularly in the UK - they don’t rapidly try new drugs, you know, they’re quite 
cautious and they will try anything in a couple of patients and then build up some gradual clinical 
experience, so they didn’t switch overnight by any means, you know, they gradually built up their 
experience with Risperdal and gradually over the last sort of fourteen years they’ve been switching 
patients to atypicals, and I think most psychiatrists now will - although not payers - most 
psychiatrists accept that there are marked benefits of the atypicals over the older drugs (CS2.1). 
 
While these mechanisms serve to absolve risk from the decision making process for 
an individual clinician, respondents did indicate that delays resulting from this 





I don’t think always being very slow to take up new drugs is particularly beneficial for patients. To 
think that some of them don’t become widely used until 20 years after, when they’ve gone off patent, 
(a) that doesn’t particularly benefit those patients, and (b) it doesn’t reward the pharma company 
that invested all that money in developing it. I'm not saying necessarily you should put all your 
patients onto a brand new drug in the first year, but I do think it’s a bit sad that we’re very slow to 
adopt new medicines in the UK (G1.2). 
 
In addition to the conservative attitudes of adopters towards the uptake of new drugs, 
this attitude may also extend to the companies involved (also see Theme 9: Company 
cultural heritage/perception). There was a view from some interviewees that negative 
perceptions of the Industry from some groups within the NHS did present a potential 
barrier to adoption of new drugs. While respondents felt they are working towards 
the same aim as the health service, they were often regarded by some to have an 
entirely opposite agenda.  
What I find quite interesting is the level of hostility towards the industry from…not from doctors but 
from the paying side.  Really interesting.  I've been to a number of conferences where I was made to 
wear different coloured badges, even though I was a delegate and not a sponsor, where people said 
to me things like 'oh you're the enemy' and I'm thinking it’s really interesting, because actually 
we're not. We clearly represent some difficulties, but we actually find the solutions.  If we didn't 
provide the drugs we wouldn't be able to treat patients, so, I find it really interesting that there is 
quite a level of hostility back towards the industry, that the industry does not feel towards the NHS 
payers. Certainly not towards the clinicians and so on (G1.1). 
 
5.2. Disease Perception  
The failure of clinicians, patients or the wider society to recognise the significance of 
a particular condition was cited by respondents as a barrier to adoption. In the BP 
case, the view that osteoporosis was traditionally considered a feature of ageing 
slowed diffusion. Respondents felt these perceptions are often formed through a lack 
of knowledge or understanding about the condition and continue to persist until 
specific treatments become available that provide a basis on which to address the 




become prevalent with age, particularly if comorbidities discourage a position of 
active intervention by clinicians.  
They knew about bone thinning, bone loss, I mean it may not have had the established criteria of 
defining the disease, but the condition was there and the symptoms were very much acknowledged 
because even dowager’s hump was…has been there eternally, it's just that people didn’t give it a 
particular name or understand exactly how you defined the disease that was behind it. I think they 
were actually as dismissive as ‘this is just a natural part of getting old. Hey it's not really a condition 
it's just something that happens when you get older’ (CS1.1). 
I think they didn't really necessarily understand the extent of the problem, because some of it is 
almost they say 'well this is part of getting old'.  And two, I don't think people actually appreciated 
and really understood the whole process of osteoporosis and what it actually meant and what was 
physically happening. Because it was much more of a dominance in older women, I think it's a bit like 
the menopause, there was an element of trivialisation of the disease, and perhaps not taking it as 
seriously (G1.2). 
Because they’re elderly they’ve got other concomitant conditions which take priority, so they come 
in not complaining about osteoporosis they come in complaining about back pain, they’re coming in 
with depression, they come in they’re hypertensive, they’ve got hypercholesterolemia, you know, 
they’ve got GI problems, and as soon as you say ‘you’ve got GI problems at 70…oh you’ll never 
take something like this, caustic, so not going to even bother, I’ll give you calcium instead’ and just 
hope that that’s good enough.  So, you know, they do tend to treat on a holistic basis (CS1.3). 
 
Embarrassment on the part of clinicians about discussing certain conditions was also 
seen as a barrier by respondents as it can result in failure to explore alternative 
treatment options or provision of advice that can aid patient compliance.  
I think our market share reflects our expectations now, I don't think it reflected our expectations at 
launch, and I don't think our expectations at launch were unreasonable, but what we find is that 
there's…hugely latent prescribing around Viagra.  Some patients will come in and they will just ask 
for it, and the GP, embarrassed to have a conversation that goes into any depth says yes okay, and 
writes the prescription for it, without suggesting that they might know better, so there's quite a lot of 
that goes on…it's a cultural icon (CS3.3). 
The other thing that we have an issue with is all of the information you need to take these treatments 
effectively, GPs weren't necessarily giving to patients.  I mean we did some research last year which 
showed that nearly half of all consultations, the patient gets the FP10 and that's it, no advice, no 
leaflets; all three companies do product leaflets that help the patient get the most out of their 
treatment, take it appropriately, leave the right amount of time, you know, not put too many 
expectations on themselves or their partners, really good advice; they weren't being given out for 
half the cases, all due to embarrassment (CS3.3). 
I know NICE put some guidelines on diabetes education which is when we sort of focused on it here, 
but actually what people were doing was taking the sexual function or erectile function question off 
their template locally on the computer system rather than ask it, or skipping over it rather than 





Similarly, the embarrassment faced by men with erectile dysfunction and the 
trivialisation and stigmatisation of the disease prevented potential patients presenting 
for treatment. 
There were some groups that criticised the medicalisation of what is a very normal part of getting 
old, you know and the shift from the use of terms like impotence to erectile dysfunction was associated 
with that. I would still to this day completely disagree with that, I mean this is a real medical 
condition and it needed to be seen and treated as such. It needed the correct terminology applied to 
it, but you know, there still remain people that don't take the condition seriously and say it's just 
part of ill health and getting old; well it isn't (CS3.1). 
The stats are like 40% of men over 40, 50% of men over 50, 60% over 60.  So you've got absolutely 
loads of men out there [with erectile dysfunction].  But of those, only one in ten come forward.  So 
when you whittle it right down you're only ever treating a very small population at any one time. If 
you think that two thirds of these men are dropping off at any one time as well, you've got men coming 
in...as many men coming into the system as there are going out.  Market growth really for these drugs 
is only around about 10%.  You still have a massive amount of patients out there, because they don't 
come forward, because a) men don't particularly pay any attention to their health, which is terrible, 
and b) this is just embarrassing, this is really very, very personal to talk about (CS3.2). 
 
5.3. Non-Specialist Risk Mitigation  
The vast majority of drugs are initiated within secondary care by specialists, but then 
managed in the community though primary care services once a patient’s condition 
has stabilised. For some conditions such as schizophrenia and osteoporosis, interview 
data implied there is sometimes a resistance to this transition. Lack of confidence 
amongst non-specialist doctors to manage certain conditions was seen by 
respondents as being the reason for reducing the number of potential prescribers, 
which presents a barrier to widespread diffusion. In this case, patients would be 
referred, perhaps unnecessarily, to specialist secondary care services to mitigate any 
perceived risk for the generalist. 
The other factor is there aren’t five osteoporotic patients coming in and asking for osteoporosis 
treatment every day into the doctor’s surgery.  It's not like pain or GI problems where they’ve [GPs] 
got people in every minute.  If they see one a month it's a lot, so it's relatively low down in their 
mind set. And this isn't a criticism of them, it's an observation, you know, this is the way it is, it is just 
another disease which is very low down in their priority list, they don’t really feel confident about 




Whilst there’s an interface with primary and secondary care, primary care do not like dealing with 
severely mentally ill patients. Even today where PCTs are holding the budget etc. this is a group of 
patients that they do see that the specialists need to own and manage (CS2.2). 
GPs are not confident in prescribing atypicals for the indications that they are licensed for. They 
might use them outside for other things, but the average jobbing GP is not going to be comfortable 
prescribing for schizophrenia, and we found that when they do make changes, they will phone the 
psychiatrists up or they will do something else, so they won’t make initiations (CS2.3). 
 
Industry views suggested that the perception of how serious the consequences of a 
disease are also affects the relative priority afforded by prescribers on treating certain 
conditions. In this sense, risk mitigation can force chronic conditions that raise 
predominantly quality of life issues down the list of priorities when compared with 
those with fatal consequences.  
 
Then of course there is a spectre of litigation if you’re not treating, which does factor into the 
doctor’s psyche. Never going to appear with the treatment of this [osteoporosis].  You know, they’re 
not going to say…I mean it should have done, because ‘that fracture, that hip fracture is preventable 
if you had treated this, you know doctor’ but they don’t have that same worry factor as they do with a 
heart attack. There are different grades of worry shall we say (CS1.3). 
 
5.4. Industry Response to Attitude Barriers 
– Counteract conservatism by aiding decision making 
With the belief that conservatism is an innate professional characteristic, respondents 
discussed how they are limited in what they can do to change their behaviour, but by 
aiding the decision making process through education and awareness, they can 
accelerate uptake rates. By shifting the diffusion curve further to the left, the aim is 
to engage the early/late majority, who are responsible for the exponential increase in 
growth at a much earlier stage in the lifecycle before competitors have an 
opportunity to become established in a field. 
  
We’re not necessarily trying to change the eventual diffusion curve, because I think I'm a great 
believer that your product is as good as your product is, and it fits into the disease area as well as it 




We try to make sure that the general barriers that people have to adoption, and they’re pretty 
common, it's like I need to know that there’s an option that I need to make.  I need to be thinking 
about making a decision, decide that I actually want to do something, evaluate my options, which 
will sort of start with gathering data, and then critically appraise them. And so that’s what I think we 
do, we can accelerate, and I think successful marketing in the pharmaceutical world accelerates the 
decision making process that people would normally have so it allows you to have your early 
adopter to move faster, you’re moving the majority more faster, and if you can halve the time that 
they take to make their decisions you can speed up the adoption (CS1.1). 
 
– Counteracting disease perception by obtaining disease recognition 
According to respondents, altering disease perceptions can be a significant driver in 
diffusion of a drug. Disease awareness campaigns (also discussed further in Theme 
7: Market development; subtheme 7.2: Raising disease awareness) serve to 
counteract negative attitudes and perceptions held by patients and clinicians towards 
certain conditions that are otherwise not readily discussed, whether as a result of 
social stigma as with mental health disorders, or attitudes of apathy towards 
conditions of ageing as with osteoporosis, or as with erectile dysfunction, that was 
subject to both. To achieve that change, it may require that a collection of symptoms 
is formally recognised and acknowledged as a ‘disease state’. Respondents suggested 
that this may only happen once understanding has reached the point where it 
becomes possible to clearly define the condition, and there is a tangible means of 
prevention and/or treatment, as in the BP case. 
 
Everybody expects old ladies to look like coat hangers, it's just ‘ah you’re getting old’ you know.  I 
mean you look at the elderly triangle sign on the Department of Transport and they’ve got dowager 
humps haven’t they?!  I mean they use the Department of Transport to say you’ve got osteoporosis.  
You know, it's a natural state.  Well it isn't a natural state, and it is actually treatable, and you’ve got 
to break that sort of mindset and acceptance. And you can only do that with the power of 
communication (CS1.3). 
Did we create the disease, could be a criticism that we often face, not in this case, I mean 
osteoporosis just hadn’t had any suitable treatment apart from calcium you see.  Everybody knew 
osteoporosis needed, bone health needed to be treated, but we treated it in diet and exercise and 
undoubtedly diet and exercise do have an effect on bone health, and of course we’d all understood 
and accepted that there was a degeneration of female bone health, particularly after the menopause, 
but we had nothing to do, we couldn’t treat it, so it was accepted.  It was just sort of one of those 
things, it's growing old. And today we don’t have to accept it and that’s great. You know, it's no 





For the PDE5 inhibitors, respondents believed that by adopting the scientific 
terminology for impotence of ‘male erectile dysfunction’ it helped to change 
attitudes towards the condition to one of a distressing, but treatable disease rather 
than a lifestyle problem. Respondents felt however, that the impact of this change in 
terminology resonated more with clinicians than patients.  
Impotence doesn't somehow sound as serious as erectile dysfunction and we wanted it to be serious, 
because for many people it is serious…you wouldn't need to sample too many men's opinions on what 
they value most in their lives, to actually find out that they value their sex life very, very highly.  I 
mean this is intuitive to us, but you know, we could foresee people just dismissing impotence, so 
evolving it to erectile dysfunction was part of that.  Erectile dysfunction is just a better scientific 
term as well, people sort of associate impotence with a lack of libido (CS3.1). 
If you look at the number of searches on the Internet of erectile dysfunction versus impotence, Joe 
Public is still putting in impotence a lot. I think medicalising the term has had more of an impact on 
physicians to take the issue seriously (CS3.2). 
Impotence has become a slightly pejorative term...you describe somebody who is impotent, you are 
not necessarily commenting on their kind of you know, sexual abilities, I mean it's a sort of character 
thing almost really, so it needed to be a more precise term that was about the medical condition with 
less baggage attached to it… we needed to get good messages out about what erectile dysfunction 
meant to people, the fact that it was a distressing medical condition, which it is, people's lives and 
relationships are suffering dreadfully as a result of what is a treatable medical condition; one 
question is whether we overplayed that, but I think it was important to be quite…austere about it in 
order to kind of make the point. I mean, there was a danger, particularly with the level of media 
involvement, that it all did become a bit of a smutty joke (CS3.1). 
 
– De-stigmatisation  
The so called ‘medicalisation’ of a condition was seen as an important facilitator of 
diffusion where embarrassment is a barrier. In the case of erectile dysfunction (ED), 
the challenge for Industry was that disease perception was intertwined with the social 
construction of masculinity. They needed to dissociate these two concepts, and by 
focusing on the tangible medical causes of ED such as diabetes and cardiovascular 
disease, respondents described how ED became a symptom, much the same as 





Men with ED take about 18 months on average before they'll seek treatment. In addition to that, 
their erectile dysfunction, if it's caused by an organic cause, ironically it tends to be intermittent, so 
if it's caused by diabetes, one time they'll be able to get an erection and the next time they won't, the 
time after that they will, then they will, then they won't; it gets gradually worse and worse until it's 
almost complete ED and they can't get it any time they try, and you have interwoven in that, some 
performance anxiety, because each time they're attempting they're thinking, well the last time it 
didn't work, so will it work this time and it kind of puts them off a bit, and it's…integral to their 
definition of them as a man.  All the research that we've done with men with ED, says when they get 
erection problems, they don't feel whole or complete and they don't feel like they're fulfilling their role 
within their relationship, but they don't want to bother GPs about it because they think that it's just a 
sexual thing and not a medical thing.  So one of the things that, I think all three companies have tried 
to do and we've really tried to do particularly, is to say, it's a medical thing that causes this (CS3.3). 
Many men don't know that their ED is probably, or can be caused by coronary heart disease, by 
their diabetes.  They don't know that it's because of the other comorbid conditions that they've got. So 
I think there's a huge amount of work to be done with the public on that and for them to understand 
that it's not, you know, it's actually not their fault (CS3.2). 
Even if ED is included on the QOF, it's going to be a hell of a hurdle to overcome people's 
embarrassment about asking that question.  Some of it comes from people feeling that it's personal 
or it's an invasive question to ask, but some of the ways we've seen it done really nicely is, 
particularly with patients with diabetes is to say well ‘it's quite common for patients with diabetes to 
go on and have problems with their erections, is this something that you might have witnessed 
yourself you know, with your erections?’...I've seen people do that with patients and that really helps, 
because it kind of, it's not blaming them and it's just saying, this might happen, and even if they say 
no it hasn't happened yet, it's planted that thought in their mind then that they can then come back 




6. COMMUNICATING RELATIVE AVANTAGE  
 
Relative advantage is the extent to which an innovation is perceived as being better 
than its predecessor(s). Analysis of respondents’ views indicated that while clinical 
need ultimately determines the value of an innovation’s relative advantage, a key 
determinant in successful diffusion is firstly ensuring that a drug’s relative advantage 
is sufficiently differentiated from its competitors, and secondly that these features are 
clearly communicated to adopters. All respondents raised issues about the 
communication of relative advantage, predominantly because they conceptualised 
this as their role. Furthermore, as a drug only has one opportunity in its lifecycle to 
establish the concept of relative advantage, poor initial perceptions of prescribers can 
be hard to overcome (see Theme 2: Clinician/patient experience). 
 
 6.1. Differentiating Relative Advantage 
Early communication of relative advantage was seen as critical by respondents, with 
a clear view that tangible benefits were a necessity for clinician acceptance of such 
advantages. 
I think first and foremost it’s a fantastic product.  You don’t get an uptake curve like that if it doesn’t 
deliver what we say it will do. If something doesn’t work and doesn’t work in the right way people 
aren’t going to use it irrespective of any input from the company behind it. Nor would we expect 
them to (CS2.2). 
The debate about marketing, is it better to have a good drug marketed badly or vice versa is over, 
you've got to have the drug (CS4.1). 
What we do is we help people to understand the benefits of drugs, but ultimately what makes them 
successful is are they good drugs or not, and Viagra is a very good drug, it does exactly what it says 
it does and it does it very well, consistently, and repeatedly. It's a lot easier to market and sell a very 
good drug that works and one that's got such a distinctive profile as well (CS3.1). 
 
Most respondents indicated those innovations that do not offer a sufficiently large 




often portrayed by Industry critics that good marketing alone can make a success of a 
poor product, or one for which a clinical need does not exist. 
 
If you have just gone from using typical antipsychotics which are perceived as being you know, fairly 
unpleasant for patients to take, and go into Risperdal (risperidone) or olanzapine, you’d have a step 
change in how well these drugs are tolerated, so the fact that Seroquel (quetiapine) is better than 
they are, you probably don’t kind of notice as much (CS2.3). 
 
The graph tells the story; it's not captured the imagination of prescribers because I think, it had even 
less differentiation from Viagra to be honest. Lilly had a proposition to put forward on the basis of 
longer half life…it was a point of differentiation; there's really very little meaningful differentiation 
for vardenafil (CS3.2).  
 
First movers generally maintain an advantage over their lifecycle over subsequent entrants unless 
one of those entrants does bring to the table genuine differential advantages. And I think Zyprexa 
(olanzapine) entering after risperidone but having genuine advantages is a good example of that.  
And based on what we’ve seen quetiapine, also a good drug, but arguably didn’t offer anything more 
than Zyprexa (olanzapine) (CS2.2). 
 
Analysis of interview data suggested that an element of compromise between a 
drug’s characteristics may be required to translate to relative advantage, rather than it 
being a case of a new drug having to be consistently better than its predecessor in all 
respects. In the AA case study for example, later entrants to a market where relative 
advantage had been defined by improved side effects had to balance increased 
tolerability against reduced efficacy to prove relative advantage. 
Really the market sort of falls into two categories I would say, well, for the atypicals, Risperdal 
(risperidone) and olanzapine which are viewed as having good efficacy but having some side effects, 
so with olanzapine it’s weight gain, Risperdal it tends to be EPS (extrapyramidal symptoms) or 
prolactin, and then you’ve got the newer drugs like aripiprazole and quetiapine that are seen as 
being very well tolerated but not seen has having the same efficacy as Risperdal and olanzapine 
(CS2.1). 
 
In contrast to some consumer products however, respondents did highlight how 
pharmaceuticals within the same class do at least offer more significant 
differentiating features with which to appeal to adopters. 
Looking at its relative benefits versus its competitors, and obviously in pharmaceuticals compared 
with other industries you’re actually lucky because there is probably a lot more in terms of 




between one atypical and another than two different cans of baked beans, so you would be looking 
at basically what attributes doctors find most important, so we do some market research around that 
and then also look at and then compare that with what actually our attributes are, and something 
like you can identify which are the key attributes you are going to promote to customers (CS2.3). 
 
Diffusion of innovations theory states that innovations that are simple to understand 
and use will prevail in the marketplace. This was borne out by both the AA and BP 
cases where less complex dosage regimes, in terms of single as opposed to titrated 
doses and regular weekly doses compared with cyclical regimes, were thought to 
have facilitated eventual market leadership. 
 
A unique issue that affects the diffusion of pharmaceuticals is the typically large cost 
reduction that occurs with the arrival of generics which can diminish the impact of 
established points of differentiation. Several respondents believed that clinician and 
patient preference may remain for drugs that offer ease of use as their differentiator, 
but prescribing policies favouring generic formulations may reinstate older more 
complex drugs driven by cost savings. Simvastatin, once superseded by more potent 
drugs with lower costs and side effects (atorvastatin and rosuvastatin), came back 
into favour once it went off patent. The progression of time and accumulation of 
clinical experience with a drug however, can reduce complexities surrounding a 
drug, such as the removing the need for titration with some of the earlier statins. 
Competitors were forced to adopt new strategies to differentiate in order to retain 
some market share. 
We try and get that message across to physicians saying well, they’ve got to take a drug so why not 
take a drug that’s low dose, gives you the same benefit as something that could be higher dose and 
obviously you tend to get more side effects as you go up the dose range in any drug…When there's 
no generic simvastatin on the market it was a lot easier because you're basically saying 10mg as 
opposed to 40mg gets you the same end point, which is easier and less expensive (CS4.2). 
I think there's a realisation that you need to be yet more aggressive with high risk patients and I think 
Lipitor is still gaining growth and more usage through the use of higher doses in really seriously high 
risk patients who need really quite aggressive therapy. With the genericisation of simvastatin and 




have been prepared to say, I'm not going to worry so much about sort of starting doses, I'm going to 
use the highest licensed dose of simvastatin to treat the majority of my standard patients if you like, 
because it’s just so cheap to do so (CS4.1). 
 
 What that is really, is an amalgamation of continued growth in the higher doses and a drop off in 
the use of the low doses, so there's quite a bit of dynamics sitting behind that flat line (CS4.1). 
 
6.1.1. Real versus perceived benefits 
Analysis of responses indicated how Industry is reliant on clinical evidence to 
demonstrate relative advantage, but clinicians may inform their own reality about 
relative advantage through their own experience, or that of their colleagues (see 
Theme 2: Clinician/patient experience). This opens up the possibility for 
misconceptions of relative advantage based on perceived rather than actual benefits.  
Atorvastatin is a very, very good drug.  People are very comfortable with it.  You've just got to show 
there's an advantage…it's like anything isn't it? You've got to make people move from their comfort 
zone and the only reason they'll move is because they believe in something. So you've just got to try 
and make them believe that yours is better than X, Y, Z that they're using currently. Our policy is to 
try and present as much evidence as possible (CS4.2). 
 
The doctor has been told the Seroquel (quetiapine) works, but we know they are not so much clinical 
evidence-based but own experience. They use Seroquel, they use it at too lower dose, it doesn’t work 
as well as olanzapine, it doesn’t work as well as Risperdal (risperidone), so they then have kind of 
negative perceptions, so yeah, it doesn’t have very many side effects, so they really buy into that, but 
end up reserving it in a kind of second or third line position (CS2.3).  
 
Perceptions, according to respondents, can be influenced by many factors, both 
logical and illogical. Interview data suggests that perception as opposed to reality can 
be both beneficial and harmful to a drug’s diffusion. If a drug is perceived to be 
better than it actually is the positive effect is obvious on diffusion, but conversely, 
perceptions of reduced capability acquired through inappropriate use can be 
damaging to continued diffusion. 
 
Doctors’ perceptions are very different from reality across any market you look at, and so it’s like, if 
you have got a situation where this drug is actually a lot more capable than what the doctor thinks it 





I've sat in market research where GPs have seen blinded product profiles and they have not liked 
Viagra.  You unblind that product profile and suddenly they rush to justify their Viagra prescribing, 
because that's what they've been doing but, you can't take it with food, it takes an hour to work, it 
finishes within four hours you know, both Cialis and Levitra are advances in terms of convenience for 
the patient and efficacy, but they still stick with what they know best (CS3.3). 
They have obviously done more research there in terms of looking at what the perceived attributes of 
the product are versus its real attributes, because let’s face it, if it was just about clinical trials there 
wouldn’t be a single drug company that had a big sales force (CS2.3). 
 
Respondents indicated that they may only have a short period of time to convey 
relative advantage before the commercial opportunity is lost. In the BP case, 
risedronate offered tolerability advantages over alendronate, but the company was 
unable to capitalise on this feature before a weekly formulation of alendronate made 
daily BPs effectively obsolete. 
Quite honestly they stole the march on us on that. As I say it [risedronate daily] is a genuine product 
innovation, but I think we underestimated the grumbling amount of discontent about daily products. 
I think we genuinely underestimated how much of a difference that would make and it [alendronate 
once weekly] just came at the right time where there was a lot of things coming together at once and it 
usually is that sort of crescendo effect of more than one activity coming together at once that gives 
them that little bit of a tipping point (CS1.2). 
 
Monitoring and correcting misperceptions early in the lifecycle was thought to be 
important. The PDE5 inhibitor case highlighted this, as a few respondents indicated 
the importance of education in correcting beliefs that the drugs could be misused; a 
factor that was potentially jeopardising uptake. This case also illustrated how 
perceptions about these drugs were influenced by the skilful use of language to imply 
benefits without actually stating them. 
I think a very important thing is, it was a difficult drug to abuse, in an area where if there had been 
abuse of it, it would have been very difficult to manage, so you know, you had to be sexually 
stimulated for it to work. If you took it in overdose, you know, to be really frank you didn't get a 
better erection, you didn't get better at sex, you didn't have longer sex, it was just, it only did what it 
was meant to do…it's a normalising drug as opposed to an enhancing drug…even today, there are 
people that still assume that Viagra has an aphrodisiac effect or is you know, somehow it’s going to 
you know, boost the libido which it absolutely doesn't (CS3.1). 
One of their big commercial successes has been the way...what they say versus the way it's been 
interpreted. So if you ask health care professionals which of the three PDE5s gives you the hardest 




They say they give a hard erection. They say it that much though, that it gets this thing of ‘harder’ 
(CS3.2). 
6.1.2. Market entry position 
Analysis of the interview data found that the extent to which companies have to 
differentiate themselves from their competitors depends, in part, on their market 
entry position. The first drug in a class to reach the market assumes leadership, but 
first entrants can be displaced by second entrants providing differentiation messages 
are successful. Subsequent entrants may find this harder, but not impossible, 
providing they offer relative advantage genuinely valued by clinicians. Atorvastatin 
for example, was fourth to market and rosuvastatin, which came after had an 
impressive initial uptake attributed to its greater potency that offered a means of 
easily meeting policy objectives of the QOF, before safety concerns and generics 
prevailed (see Theme 2: Clinician/patient experience; subtheme 2.3.2: Safety 
warnings/concerns). 
I know that it [atorvastatin] came as close as any drug can come to being abandoned as a project 
because it was going to be the…I think the fifth to market worldwide and I think the sense was, who 
wants to be fifth then, and I think it was literally down to one or two scientists keeping the belief alive 
that led to Warner-Lambert choosing to reinvigorate its development and then bring it to market 
because they believed that it had genuine differentiation. We weren't at the forefront of a race to get 
a new technology, we were debating whether or not our technology was differentiated enough to be 
worth launching (CS4.1). 
 I think all other things being equal you'd want to be first in class. But if you're second to market 
and you're not too far behind the first drug and you've got a good argument then that might be a 
better place to be but rosuvastatin has certainly suffered significantly as a result of being sixth to 
market. The impact of the genericisation of the market has been kind of immense...I mean the curve 
looks quite substantial and looks highly successful but it is a 4% market share after being on the 
market for five years, so it's not the most fantastic of uptakes.  This initial phase was considered to be 
a really good launch.  This early phase was above AstraZeneca's expectations and kind of widely 
regarded as being a really strong launch (CS4.3). 
 
Respondents indicated that whilst being first to market offers obvious and lucrative 
benefits, it can also be risky. There was a belief from some respondents that arriving 
in an immature market with low priority and lack of disease management consensus 




development). Ultimately the first is paving the way for subsequent entrants who 
then face fewer barriers and less cost. This does not necessarily only apply to the first 
introduction of the molecule, but also being the first to introduce a new formulation 
if that requires a change in adopter behavior. 
The one that came first wasn’t the one that won the market, the one that came second did, and I think 
generally there’s a big advantage to being first and second, but maybe coming second, so somebody 
else had done all the hard graft (CS2.3). 
It's not the most competitive field by any means; it's quite a niche field is this. Risedronate came yes, 
and it did look very similar and they tried to get to emulate the evidence suite.  It's always difficult to 
second entrant because your customer is going to be asking for ‘well are you better than the one 
that I use today?’ (CS1.3). 
There are some disadvantages, because if you’re first in class you’ve got to sort of carve out that 
part of the market, to give you an example with Risperdal Consta we’re the first atypical long-acting 
injection, so we’ve had to really sort of create the benefits of that. But I think normally if you look at 
products that are first in class, they normally do quite well, I mean sometimes second in class can, 
you know, not be a bad position either because you can learn from first in class and the market isn’t 
saturated, and for example olanzapine did quite well as being second in class, Risperdal oral was the 
first atypical but actually olanzapine came in second and did well. I think it’s harder if you’re then 
coming in third, fourth, fifth in class in the market, but I think first and second, you know, you can 
still come in second and do very well and sometimes overtake the first in class (CS2.1). 
In a way it was great entering a market heavily dominated by one company because they'd done a 
lot of the pre-work for you.  I guess you could...you could view it in a couple of different ways.  You 
could view it as the market's absolutely happy and satisfied and everybody knows about that one, so 
that's really, you know, really difficult.  Or you could view and say well the taboos of ED, some of the 
barriers have come down, men expect and have the idea and notion that a tablet would actually 
work for them.  You know, so they're used to that concept.  But you do obviously have challenges of 
getting over a big brand (CS3.2). 
 
While the consensus view was that the position of first entrant is associated with 
many benefits, other respondents highlighted how first entrants also face the prospect 
that if the majority of the 10-12 years of remaining patent life following approval is 
substantially consumed by building the market, there is limited time to recoup 
investment before the market becomes generic. If the market is established, or even 
partially established at the time the second entrant is launched, then its remaining 
patent life can be far more profitable than that of the first in class, providing it can 
demonstrate intra-class relative advantage. This can prove more challenging than the 




You’ve got to look at the lifecycle of drug development really and say where do certain events come 
into play?  Typically from molecule patenting, registering the molecule which then gives us sort of 20 
years of commercial life, but in the first 10 years of that typically that is just governed by regulatory 
trials, and safety and efficacy trials.  So you’re really just trying to find what’s the right dose? Does it 
work and is it safe?  And so you’re identifying the population in which it will be efficacious in.  And 
that will give you your licence. So typically we've only got 10 years of marketing of the drug when it 
is actually available for use within whatever population (CS1.3). 
 
In compensation, Industry views suggested that first entrants do benefit from a level 
of interest that later entrants may not have, and usually a period of exclusivity from 
class competition, allowing time to secure uptake by as many adopters as possible. If 
clinicians have established experience with one brand, switching is less likely to 
occur when competitors enter the field. 
Viagra had this sort of window of several years if you like in which it was the most effective, the 
most convenient method (CS3.1). 
I think it’s harder to be first to market because you tend to do a lot of the market preparation for 
other products.  Unless you’ve got something absolutely unique that no one can touch for ten years 
and then you can reap the rewards, but with this market in particular, the market preparation was 
done by simvastatin to a large degree or pravastatin.  They’d sold the fact that lower is better and so 
on (CS4.2). 
 
Formal cost effectiveness analysis is an increasingly important factor in diffusion and 
respondents had conflicting views on how market entry position could have an 
impact on assessment. While first entrants typically had accrued a greater evidence 
base at the time of assessment to substantiate claims, proving cost effectiveness can 
sometimes be an easier prospect for the second entrant compared with the first in 
circumstances where there is no standard of care.  
 
If you're first in class you may have to invest quite a lot more in education, than if you're second in 
class or sort of its well-established how to treat that condition already. We would traditionally say 
first in class will get the highest market share traditionally, but the situation now is that with NICE 
particularly where you've got your cost benefit, if you are first in class you may end up comparing 
yourself versus nothing, because with quite a lot of conditions standard of care is nothing.  So to 
produce a cost effectiveness against that can sort of be quite challenging. So actually it's much easier 
sometimes to be second in class and compare your cost benefit, versus the first in class.  So actually 
I think one of the consequences of NICE is it discriminates against innovation. We would never not 




Statins are the single biggest class of drugs in terms of NHS spend by some margin, even with 
simvastatin generic and kind of cheap as chips, it's by far the most costly if you like in terms of what 
the NHS, what the NHS pays out. So at local level you're always going to have drugs and 
therapeutics committees creating local guidelines, formularies and what are you going to choose?  
They want to choose a drug that's got best evidence and that's the one that's first to market because 
it's done the studies (CS4.3). 
 
6.1.3. Perception of brand identity 
Analysis of views amongst respondents suggested that associating a strong brand 
identity with a drug, even in a market where direct to consumer advertising is 
prohibited, is another means of differentiating relative advantage. While branding in 
a pharmaceutical market appeared less essential as with consumer goods, interview 
responses suggested that a brand embodies both relative advantages and company 
values that can influence prescribers’ and patients’ perceptions of the product and the 
manufacturer. This provides an additional point of difference in crowded markets 
where opportunities to differentiate on a drug’s characteristics alone diminish for 
later entrants.  
 
If you've got a problem with erectile dysfunction, you're going to want Viagra, you know you are 
going to feel a little bit fobbed off, you want the most well known one you know, not because of any 
kind of desire to be fashionable or anything, but just because you tend to trust the established 
brands you know, so that's why you buy Hoover, that's why you use Biros; the originator brand will 
tend to do well…interesting in pharmaceuticals, It’s not always the case…but I think that's probably 
because there is less branding in pharmaceuticals, so you know, Tagamet will get overtaken by 
Losec, because there's no loyalty, because what's Tagamet, what's Losec, nobody really knows, but 
with Viagra… there is a trust and an understanding of the first brand (CS3.1). 
 
Perception of brand identity however, can become just as much a barrier to diffusion 
if it does not resonate with adopters’ values. Respondents indicated how the 
iconography associated with a brand image, while appealing to some, can ostracise 
others. The perception of one brand may also impact on others if efforts to 





When you think of that brand, it conjures a very hard image in your mind…I think there is still 
some of that that we have to get over.  I mean one of the things that we had at the time was the media  
played on people's perceptions of what Viagra did, but at the same time they then just said well 'and 
this is going to be for 36 hours'.  So you are going to be a Viagra person but for 36 hours. If you 
have safety concerns you are going to have those concerns, but over 36 hours (CS3.2). 
 
They did market it [sildenafil] quite aggressively. If you look at worldwide imagery for Cialis you'll 
always find a couple in it. You'll never find a man particularly alone in it and so you build up a 
brand identity which is...it is for couples, it's for, you know, for people to bring their love life back 
and therefore it's not aggressive in that sense (CS3.2). 
 
6.2. Conveying Relative Advantage 
Even if relative advantage is clearly differentiated, the manner in which this 
information is communicated can impact upon diffusion. Respondents discussed how 
effective communication firstly relies on creating awareness of a new product’s 
relative advantage in those most likely to adopt. Awareness stimulates interest, but it 
is the detail offered by drug representatives that translates the importance of those 
relative advantages to clinical practice. Communicating a drug’s relative advantage is 
just one component of marketing. 
 
Immediately [post-launch] it's around awareness, it's just around trying to make physicians aware of 
obviously the launch and aware of the key data, and aware of the benefits. Then I guess as you go on, 
you perhaps need to be more sophisticated once you've made them aware. Obviously some of them, 
you present your initial argument if you like and that's going to work for some people, but then you 
need to think about for those physicians who are not using the product what are the kind of 
arguments that are going to be necessary for them to give them the comfort to use the product?  So 
that might be things like the cost effectiveness or the long-term safety, those kind of things. So you'd 
try and make as many physicians as possible aware and aware of the key data and then look to be 
more sophisticated based on your uptake thereafter (CS4.3).  
I've very high faith in the professional ability of the enormous majority of physicians to make a good 
decision about which drugs they're going to use and sales and marketing in this industry for me is 
about just making sure that people have access to the information to make those decisions (CS4.1). 
 
6.2.1. Simplicity/clarity of message  
Message clarity relating to relative advantage and correct use appeared critical for 
successful diffusion. Complex or inconsistent messages that lack a clear point of 
focus create confusion that can impact on clinician and patient experience and was 




for drugs in the AA, BP and PDE5 inhibitor classes (see Theme 2: Clinician/patient 
experience). To avoid some of these issues, respondents indicated that advisory 
boards composed of key health professionals in the field are used for honing 
messages. 
We run advisory boards as well, which - the purpose of them is not to raise awareness, it’s to gauge 
feedback from customers on for example the clinical data or the proposed messaging (CS2.1). 
One of the world opinion leaders has said to me, one of the things he likes about our drug is that it 
succeeded almost in spite of its marketing, instead of because of it. Some of the clinical trials were 
designed with too low a dose. It was a real confused picture over what dose should a customer use, 
what is the best dose, whereas, with the statins say, with simvastatin, it very clearly says where the 
evidence is, 10mg works but 20mg is the dose you should use, it’s very clear; in this case there was 
never a clear dose message (CS2.3). 
When you actually look at...and there's a clinical paper talking about PDE5s published in the 
European Journal of Urology, it says okay a lot of people fail, but are they truly failures because the 
companies say that these drugs work at 70% to 80% efficacy rates, so why are they failing?  And all 
they did was re-educate them, gave them enough dose...enough  dose of six to eight tablets to be able 
to actually try the medication properly and put them on a high enough dose that they...you give them 
the best chance of success.  And they found that of those failures, about three quarters of them, 
actually it worked perfectly fine for them. It's just that they hadn't been told, with Viagra for 
instance, you can't take it on a full stomach etc. etc. and you need to plan that.  It's simple things like 
GPs forgetting to tell men that...or men not hearing, because we're not exactly the best listeners, men 
not hearing that they need sexual stimulation to get an erection still.  So they literally take their 
tablet, wait and an hour and nothing happened.  So I've...it obviously doesn't work for me (CS3.2).   
 
For another of the PDE5 inhibitors, respondents from that case believed the complex 
and changing messaging that lacked a strong differentiating focus failed to secure 
that drug’s intended position in the treatment pathway.  
 
You give them [clinicians] a really good differentiator for your product and a reason to believe that 
that's an important differentiator, which is what I think, we've done really in the last year, and we're 
really focused on the differentiator, but leading up to now, we've changed our messaging an awful 
lot as well, so … I think has added some confusion in the GP's mind, so if you said to them, what 
does Levitra stand for, if you asked 100 GPs you would probably get about 30 different answers, 
whereas if you ask them what Cialis stood for, with them, it would be ‘it's long-acting; and it works 
for the whole weekend’ and it's really those phrases we've come across because, from pre-launch, all 
the way through to now, their main message is, they last 36 hours (CS3.3).  
They promoted a couple of papers saying they [Levitra] would work for patients who had failed on 
Viagra.  They said that they would work in men who were...who'd suffered with diabetes.  And they 
also came with a message which was we're very potent. From a physician's point of view, I've just 
heard you're working in my difficult to treat patients because you're potent.  I'll use you there. So I 
have a diabetic man who suffers with ED who's failed on Viagra…how often do those men walk 





In the BP case, the necessity to explain complex dosing regimes to patients, or a 
journal’s requirement that explanation of unexpected trial outcomes be included in 
publications, all contributed to losing the cleanliness of the messages about the drugs 
in this class. Similarly, reactive communication following a safety warning in the 
statin case deviated away from the core message. The resulting confusion amongst 
clinicians was perceived by respondents as having compromised the drug’s rate of 
market recovery. 
 
I think we do make mistakes and I think we probably, as a company, we maybe jumped a step in 
terms of dose ranging so we have an issue in the sense that, it's not a problem from a clinical point of 
view, but I have an issue from a trial point of view that our 2.5 milligram arm disappeared out of the 
trials and so that’s not good because you have to explain it, so we should maybe have dealt with that 
in a different way. So instead of one nice clean crisp message we ended up with sort of ‘well I have 
to explain a few things about my trial before I can now give you my clean crisp message’ so it's not 
so clean and it's not so crisp (CS1.2). 
 
Keep to core messages. Don't, you know, flip around all the time from loads of different messages.  
Because during that first dynamic early phase the message was, you know, low dose to target once a 
day. And then we had Dear Doctor letters it was all over the place for a bit to be honest, there wasn't 
clear messages, so I think having clear messages is the key to what you want (CS4.2). 
 
6.2.1.1. Tailoring the message to adopter needs 
Clarity of message can be enhanced by tailoring the communication materials to the 
meet the needs of the different adopter groups in diffusion. Respondents believed 
each adopter group wants something different from the communication materials, 
which is in accordance with Rogers’ adopter categories i.e. innovators want early 
evidence, while late adopters are more likely to be influenced by peer-pressure.  
The innovators and the early adopters might have actually quite low usage but they drive a huge 
amount of influence to drive acceptance of these as established treatments for the people that 
follow, so you usually only start to see the pickup when you’ve got the early adopters and you’re into 
the early majority that’s when you see the take up. So they tend to follow those curves so I think each 
bit of material has a role to play in how you educate those different groups, because they want to 
hear something different (CS1.1). 
For your innovators clearly they're looking for things like the evidence. Actually your laggards will 
probably be peer pressure (G1.1). 
There's a population of GPs and specialists out there who are interested in this...your innovators.  




can point them in the direction of a clinical paper, the evidence can come through and it stays with 
them, because they're interested. That's probably 1%. The only time when a GP would come across 
this is when a representative pretty much brings it to them, or their PCT was to say something to 
them or...It has to be something of that magnitude.  It's not just a paper being published (CS3.2). 
By the time you’ve got a peer review publication, or you’ve got a full systematic review or meta-
analysis, it's a little bit too late to be taking that information to the people that are your innovators 
and early adopters. Those are wonderful tools that can actually help address the concerns of the 
middle majority (CS1.1). 
 
Messaging can also change over the lifecycle of a drug to accommodate the needs of 
the different adopter groups who are the prominent prescribers at particular stages. In 
the BP case, one respondent described how early promotion focussed on the science 
of the treatment to appeal to the evidence-driven innovators. During later stages as 
the properties of the drug had been established, the message softened to focus on 
more emotive factors  
The advertising campaigns, they give an image of how you're projecting…in this one we started off 
with a sort of bionic woman image, you know, it all focused round the skeleton and the strength of 
the skeleton. And it became much more emotional here [later stages of lifecycle] about 
grandmothers that could be active with their grandchildren and that kind of thing (CS1.3).  
 
We just dealt with it by not necessarily having a one size fits all approach, so talking to GPs in one 
way, talking to nurses in another way, talking to consultants in another way, and making sure that 
what we were saying resonated with them and supporting them where possible in either promoting 
their clinics or, maintaining their clinics (CS3.3). 
 
6.2.1.2. Targeting the message  
Respondents described how clarity could be enhanced by targeting messages towards 
specific groups of adopters through disease-specific journals for advertisements or 
focussing representative activity on demographically receptive areas. Messages 
therefore, have to resonate with the intended audience for it to have an impact. In the 
PDE5 inhibitor case, some respondents described how the decision to focus on 




If you are in osteoporosis surely you want to deal with the people who treat osteoporosis, so you 
would be very targeted to a particular…I mean therefore the trade magazines which they read for 
instance.  If it's a GP product then you would go to Pulse, GP, that kind of thing (CS1.3).  
The impact of the representative is important and who they go to see is important, and we can 
determine a number of ways for a drugs launch. We can do this by sort of listing of GPs as a target 
list and say to them ‘these are the ones that are most likely to adopt the drug because they treat a lot 
of patients like this’ so osteoporosis is a very non-homogenous distribution of disease, it tends to be 
in the elderly and it tends to be treated in the socio-economically active area…so you tend to find that 
there’s certain geographies where there’s a great deal of use, and there’s certain geographies where 
it's just got much more transient, a young population, no point in going there, that’s just waste.  So 
you will find that, and you’ll find surrogates for how to identify those GPs and off you go and see if 
you can see them and tell them the story. And that’s part of the diffusion. And there’s quite a lot of 
skills involved in doing that (CS1.3).  
We went from a very broad market to only looking at patients with diabetes, so then the GPs were 
saying, well I'm not the GP who runs the diabetes clinic, therefore this isn't resonating with me, so 
we had our messaging and our targeting of GPs weren't perfectly matched, and so we went back out 
to a broader messaging, because we were targeting a broader group of doctors to make sure that if 
they weren't interested in diabetes and they weren’t managing patients with diabetes, we still had 
something of interest to say to them (CS3.3). 
 
6.2.2. Product awareness (advertising)  
Awareness was conceptualised by respondents as the knowledge that something 
exists. The general consensus amongst respondents was that while advertising 
increases awareness of a new product, whether this then translates to increased 
prescriptions is uncertain due to a lack of an effective tangible measure of its impact 
on prescribing decisions. 
 
Then of course there’s advertising.  Difficult to prove the value of it. You can only measure really 
the inputs on that. You can't really measure the outputs. I can't do a sort of return on investment 
calculation on advertising, because you can only really measure awareness by market research, so I 
can go and advertise something, and I come and talk to you and say ‘can you remember an ad for this 
osteoporosis product?’, ‘yes’.  Okay ‘can you tell me the name of it?, no’.  ‘Maybe it began with an 
‘F’?’, ‘ah, Fosamax (alendronate)’, right so you're getting a prompt rather than spontaneous, and 
from that you can get message diffusion. Do you get use of the drug because of that?  Possibly not, 
but what you are getting is an awareness that the drug exists and so when you get any 
representative calling, that recognition is triggered ‘ah yes, I'm aware of that, that’s for 
osteoporosis’.  Right, okay, now I can engage with you about that subject, so it's sort of a necessary 
part of the mix (CS1.3).   
 
It would not be unreasonable to suggest that awareness drives demand for an 
innovation, but respondents indicated that unlike other markets, a greater depth of 




what can be delivered by advertisements. In this sense advertising merely serves as 
the hook on which Industry representatives can then engage with clinicians on the 
detailed arguments that are the key to influencing prescribing behaviour. Most 
respondents indicated that advertising is therefore limited to raising awareness 
around launch, or when there is something new to highlight about a drug such as a 
change to formulation to increase interest, rather than as a continuous reminder 
throughout the drug lifecycle. It was seen as a useful tool in crowded markets such as 
the statins where there is a need to concisely highlight points of differentiation, but 
its impact diminishes over time as other factors become more important in 
influencing prescribing decisions.  
 
Advertising is great at launch to raise awareness …but in my experience, very, very rarely, does it 
actually initiate a prescription. Doctors need to know an awful lot more about your product before 
they'll consider initiating a prescription (CS3.3). 
Seroquel is 10 years old, Seroquel is not the newest drug in the class, they know the drugs. You know 
when we have done market research, psychiatrists, 100% of them are aware of Seroquel, so why 
advertise, you only want to advertise if you do something new (CS2.3). 
Advertising generally is a tool.  It’s used only to generate awareness of a brand.  It’s designed to 
stimulate an individual up to the point of trying a drug after which personal experience takes over 
(CS2.4). 
 I would put advertising…in this market [osteoporosis], very low down in priority. It's not a 
widely…you know, your awareness is more important to come from a diffusion out of secondary 
care experience of the drug, help in identifying the right patient …I mean if you go into statins, 
advertising will be a bigger, you know, it's a noisy, noisy market, people are pounded with messages 
they need a strong image of what is their choice. That was less important in this field. (CS1.3). 
 
The suggestion from one respondent was that a drug could diffuse independently of 
advertising providing the environmental conditions are right, such as in the AA case 
where the level of pre-market excitement was such that it compensated for any 





With hindsight one of the things I’m less proud of now was the initial advertising campaign which 
we used at launch. But that also gives me… you know, it gives me reassurance that it really was the 
quality of the medicine which led to the uptake and not any of the sales and marketing effort put 
behind it.  I just don’t think it was very impactful… it sort of went against what conventional wisdom 
would now teach us as a good advertising campaign…it didn’t really differentiate our drug, you 
know, from other drugs within the class (CS2.4). 
 
There was a perception amongst some respondents that messages conveyed in the 
form of advertising are often viewed sceptically due to the overt association with the 
company.  A degree of disassociation between the manufacturer and the message 
about the product is therefore necessary in the health sector in order for it to carry 
any credibility. Arguments conveyed by key opinion leaders are therefore seen as 
being stronger with regards to influencing behaviour (see Theme 8: Key opinion 
leaders), with advertising providing a channel for reiterating relative advantage. 
Advertising does work, I mean people are responsive, but it depends on what grounds you’re selling 
that advertising. It’s easy to say that in an ideal world advertising should be the reminder and not 
the argument. And I think there are much better tools suited to be the argument, and that’s usually 
ones where there is a high degree of trust as to the person presenting the argument. Quite rightly 
there’s natural scepticism if the drug company says something you know, indeed the manufacture of 
anything, I mean it's like there's a real healthy scepticism whereas if it's said by other people where 
there’s a higher degree of trust you’re more likely to believe it, but then sometimes you still need the 
reminder to actually ‘yes, I remember that’ (CS1.1). 
 
In direct contrast to the view that credibility comes with dissociation from the 
product, other respondents expressed frustration that the Industry is unable to 
communicate directly with patients. In the PDE5 inhibitor case, respondents felt that 
information was not always accurately communicated to patients by clinicians as a 
result of embarrassment that either affected the patient’s perception of the drugs or 
limited the choice of options available (see Theme 5: Adopter attitude; subtheme 5.2: 
Disease perception). 
The one thing I would like to see and I feel that would be kind of righting a wrong, is the ability of 
companies to be able to communicate sensibly and factually about the prescription medicines that 




right to hear from the manufacturer, what they see the benefits and risks of that medicine being 
and our inability to communicate with patients is a problem I think. What I'm not necessarily 
advocating is the US style , broadcast media approach. I think the one thing that we would like to see 
in Europe is the ability to communicate directly, factually and responsibly with patients about the 
medicines that they take (CS4.1). 
 
6.2.2.1. Managing Expectations 
By raising awareness, there is a risk that the developing interest in a product can 
result in raised expectations of the drug’s abilities. Respondents indicated the 
importance of managing expectations, especially for eagerly awaited new drugs, such 
as the AAs. Most respondents expressed the view that exaggerated claims about a 
drugs performance will be quickly exposed and that it is important for successful 
diffusion that performance meets expectations. Interviewees made reference to the 
practice of ‘underpromising and overdelivering’ as a tool to manage expectations. 
Very few people were sceptical when they first came across the drug because of the lengths we had 
gone to not to overpromise and therefore underdeliver.  People went into their first few half dozen 
trial patients with realistic expectations and therefore there was a greater chance of exceeding those 
expectations which in itself leads to more repeat usage of the drug (CS2.4). 
 
Respondents disputed the fact that Industry only ever reported positive evidence, 
arguing that once clinical experience became out of step with Industry messages, the 
opportunity for further use was severely compromised. 
There was conditioning of people internally.  You know, to be fair to physicians and fair to their 
patients, do not, when this drug becomes available, position it as a panacea, as a … you know, as a 
cure all in the area of mental illnesses/schizophrenia because it is not.  I mean only refer to the data 
which we have, only refer to the results that we have, it’s not a perfect medication and people need 
to understand the true objective profile of this drug, you know, the good bits and the bad bits 
(CS2.4). 
We were strictly told at the time was 'Here are some preference studies.  This is where it's at’.  But 
also ‘here are the study limitations and here are the things that every single time that you sit in 
front of a physician that you must point these things out and then let them...then discuss it’ and see 
whether this actually does or does not reflect what they've seen in their own clinical practice (CS3.2).   
We were very, very careful not to overpromise and to be very conservative in the claims and the 
positioning for Zyprexa (olanzapine) at that time.  So as not to damage expectation and damage the 




general, not just within schizophrenia is littered with examples of where drugs have been launched 
which promised the earth but deliver inevitably substantially less.  And so we were at pains to train 
the sales force and to tailor our marketing materials to really almost undersell the drug.  Because I 
think there was such excitement at the time of the data being presented on the academic circuit pre-
launch.  People of a more optimistic personality type might be tempted to call olanzapine, clozapine 
without the side effects.  Which, of course, a claim of which cannot be made without head to head data 
which we didn’t have at the time.  So we were at great pains to point out the efficacy data which we 
did have, the side effect data which we did have, but also proactively urge people not to draw too 
optimistic a conclusion from that until head to head data became available (CS2.4). 
 
The shape of the diffusion curve immediately post-launch was thought to be a 
product of the amount of anticipation and awareness generated in the pre-launch 
period. Respondents believed that the uptake of the AAs was invariably a 
consequence of the interest amongst clinicians, but the unprecedented media hype 
surrounding a new treatment for ED in the PDE5 inhibitor case was responsible for 
fuelling anticipation amongst patients. Respondents indicated how this was a far 
more difficult situation for them to influence, as they were unable to communicate 
with patients directly to manage their expectations.  
There probably wasn’t a psychiatrist in the land that wasn’t aware of Zyprexa (olanzapine) a year 
before its launch let alone at launch because of the excitement that had been generated in the 
academic press and so, you know, arguably one could have pressed ahead with the launch of 
Zyprexa with no advertising whatsoever other than to let them know it was available (CS2.4). 
There was 100% awareness before launch, in the population…not even just amongst the medical 
world, I mean, everyone knew about Viagra, I mean, and the pent up demand of course, was 
phenomenal. The States caused enormous difficulties in the UK. We were always going to launch in 
September, October, subject to the vagaries of the regulation process; the States launched in June 
and…boy was the cat out of the bag then, I mean that's what led to the press…this was every radio 
station, every news station, every newspaper for about six months. We had to manage a very 
exasperatingly difficult media situation in the UK, because we're not allowed to talk about, I mean 
this is the thing that people often don't realise that you know, we cannot…we can respond to 
questions, but there's no way we can sort of issue press releases unless it is sort of, I can't remember 
what the code definition is, but unless it's of very significant public interest (CS3.1). 
 
6.2.3. Product justification (representative detailing) 
Respondents confirmed that interpersonal relationships play a significant role in 
diffusion. Unlike advertising, respondents indicated that drug representative product 




far more effective in persuading an individual to accept a new idea, compared with 
mass media channels. Product justification needs a more personal approach that 
offers the opportunity for clinicians to scrutinise the claims being made in a two way 
exchange of information. 
There are very few elements that actually work on their own, because if there was one element that 
worked entirely on its own we wouldn’t do anything else. The one in the model that people are 
finding it very difficult to potentially walk away from is rep selling. Some have tried it and I think the 
bottom line is that rep selling does work, it's a personal level, a personal direction (CS1.1). 
If you look at how people take information on and how much time they have to take information on 
and I think there's always that role for the person to come and talk to you about the profile of the 
drug.  Now, whether that is a medic who has experience in the trials, or whether that's a rep going 
to GP surgeries, it depends on the drug (G1.1). 
 
Whilst there was agreement that the interpersonal approach was important for 
continued product justification, respondents disagreed on the mechanisms involved. 
Some believed it was simply the weight of repeated messaging from a field sales 
force – so called ‘share of voice’. Any means of increasing the scale of this approach 
through mergers or partnering with other companies, translated into an increased 
trajectory of the diffusion curve. It not only brings additional financial resource, but 
also additional skills and experience. In disease awareness terms there is a combined 
impact of a large number of different companies talking about the same condition, 
even if the product messages are different. 
I think the other difference between these two is that this [etidronate] is P&G on its own, and this 
[risedronate] is in an alliance with Hoechst Marion Roussel. One of the things that we can't offer as 
a non-traditional pharma company is the scale of an MSD attack, so partnership is then critical.  if 
you’re talking about one sales force or two sales forces promoting a drug it's a huge difference, so 
we would always have been a little bit under what MSD was able to do because they were a much 
bigger pharmaceutical company, and we only really became able to do that when risedronate was 
launched, because we were in a partnership with a bigger pharmaceutical company (CS1.2). 
I think Pfizer has been very good at being able to have high levels of contact with general practice 
and to get a message out relatively quickly to a large population of people (CS4.1). 
I think the thing that partners bring, is a wealth of experience that we don’t have. Partnership gives 
you different things, but it gives you some money, your speed to market because it can bring 
additional resources to it. Every time our partners go through mergers they bring, you know, every 




I think we increased investment in the product, and we’ve gradually increased the size of the sales 
force that we have behind it (CS2.1). 
I think the amount of investment we've put behind these products has been appropriate, but I guess, 
unlike some companies, we've been able to because we've had a very successful base and we've had 
the funds available to do it, and that in itself is also contributing to the uptake and the development 
of those adoption curves that you see (CS4.1). 
 
In contrast to the size argument, in other cases the impact was perceived to be as a 
consequence of the trust on which these relationships are based, built over many 
years, which enables the same impact to be achieved by a smaller number of 
representatives. It that sense, it becomes not just about the sheer number of 
interactions, but the quality of those interactions that are of importance in influencing 
diffusion.  
Representatives were perceived as an important conduit for relaying information in 
amongst an environment of information overload for clinicians. All respondents 
indicated how representatives account for their biggest spend and tends to be an area 
where any increases in investment are channelled. The personal element ensures that 
a message is conveyed about their product in a way they want it to be received, as 
opposed to relying on the information in a standalone capacity.  
 
I know that the industry has its critics and so on but I think it’s very insulting to GPs when people 
write this stuff to say that just because a rep comes and visits them, they're going to kind of ignore 
all those years of scientific training because somebody gave them a post-it note, they are going to 
decide to prescribe their medicine, I just, I don't believe people operate like that. What is clear is GPs 
are bombarded with so much information, so many magazines, so many publications, so many 
clinical papers, so much continuing medical education, that if you don't send representatives in to 
see them, they'll probably never really come to appreciate your product and take it seriously…so our 
large field forces have given us the ability to have reasonably regular contact to share that 
information. I don't think it's given us the ability to sort of brow beat or somehow cajole people into 
prescribing for us, I mean I don't see that it works like that (CS4.1). 
I guess we have always tried to match them in terms of the level of marketing. It's not always possible 
to do, but particularly in terms of representative capacity to see doctors, we try and stay on a par 
with the opposition.  Certainly in this early phase there was very much the thought process that your 
uptake would be related to the amount of representative coverage that you've got, it's now far less 
the case with some of the tools and things that we talked about, the market's now much more 
sophisticated.  But in these early days whilst if you like there was still much more prescriber 




It’s our biggest spend from the marketing channel perspective, to keep sales force running and then 
the materials we give them.  So they’re always going to factor right up there  (CS2.2). 
 
The success of this model is based on the longevity of the relationship with the 
clinician and the trust that becomes established, such that information exchanged is 
viewed with credibility. Respondents expressed the view that clinicians value the 
knowledge possessed by Industry regarding a drug’s technical features, affording 
them the status of credible educators. 
Then of course you’ve got our most expensive component with marketing which is the representative, 
the individual, and we you know are an industry which still relies on that for diffusion of the 
education and the message and the awareness of the drug and how to use it.  And it's still extremely 
valued by the customers.  I mean I know there’s a lot of cynicism around this but the doctors do need 
this. A good representative will provide an awful lot of information for the doctor and give a lot of 
reassurance on how to use the drug, which patient to use it in, then give the doctor confidence that 
they know, what to look for (CS1.3). 
Customers, they’re well attuned to knowing which new products come on the market place and are 
hungry for information (CS2.2). 
If you take say a rheumatologist who we would view as a key physician category in the area of 
osteoporosis probably spends less than 5% of their time managing this disease versus the rest of 
their workload. So from everyone else’s opinion a very highly skilled specialist versus one of our 
sales representatives who is spending 100% of their time potentially on osteoporosis, or a medical 
adviser, or one of our medical directors again spending 100% of their time on a particular disease 
area, that the level of knowledge is often quite weighted towards the person who has got that degree 
of dedication (CS1.1). 
 
Respondents also believed that this personal contact continued to justify the 
investment, affording confidence not just in individual drugs, but in the company as a 
whole. 
One crucial event which doesn't really kind of pick up here; I suppose because it's quarterly it's sort of 
flattens it out a bit, was when we split with GSK, because we launched with GSK and then at the 
beginning of 2005, we split up with GSK and lost their field force resourcing, so we halved our field 
force resourcing, but I think within a few months, we were pulling it back up again. I think 
representatives can be very good, and that's why I was surprised that there wasn't a bigger dip 
because a lot of the GSK reps were experienced, they had good relationships with doctors. Doctors 
over time had learnt that they could trust that representative, therefore you send them in with a new 
product, you've already got some trust brought in, just because it's that person's familiar face.  We 
had contract sales forces working for us on Levitra over the years and I think, because they have a 
high turnover, we didn't get the level of trust brought into it, and it made the job more difficult for 
us (CS3.3). 
Good rep selling would tend to be based on trust in the sense that these are, like any other 
relationship, I mean the first time …if you’ve got a brand new rep in the field going to call on a 




prescribing habits, but if that person has been calling on him for 10 years, and they understand that 
they can actually,…there is a benefit on both sides of the relationship, then it's much more likely 
that when they come with something different there probably and hopefully would be a halo effect 
that you don’t have to re-establish a trust on every brand that you work on (CS1.2). 
Looking back you would say at that point we acquired a lot of much more specialist medicines and 
probably didn't do enough to retain some of the talent that really knew how to communicate with 
specialists and had that depth of experience and knowledge with the compounds to continue to 
communicate well, and I think we probably lost some ground for a while in terms of that (CS4.1). 
 
6.2.3.1. Competitor ‘objection handling’ 
Respondents indicated that when adoption hinged on ability to precisely differentiate 
relative advantage (as opposed to factors such as diagnostic barriers etc.), 
representative contact was the favoured medium. In a detailing situation with a 
clinician, a representative’s awareness of a competitor’s profile provides a further 
opportunity to differentiate the relative advantages of their own drug in response to 
potential objections raised by adopters. In doing so, it can influence diffusion by 
either retrieving, or preventing further loss of patients who are prescribed their drug. 
Interviewees indicated that by researching the literature they could be fairly certain 
of the likely approach taken by competitors even prior to launch and prepare 
strategies accordingly. 
If it’s around differentiating just on the ground, my product’s better than your product, sales force, 
that’s where you throw your money (CS2.2). 
You almost act as if I was launching this product, how would I position it into the marketplace, what 
does the data say, what can we say and you have to train your sales force to handle a new competitor 
so you go into their profiles and you do objection handling with them and make sure that the data 
they launch with we know as well so that we can talk about the pros and cons to our customers 
(CS2.2). 
All companies will publish some data in the phase 2 trial, so you can search that, and you build up, 
if you like, a competitor profile of what you think, and of course you always get taken by surprise 
sometimes, but hopefully not much (G1.1). 
 
The extent of response to competitor activity was described by respondents as often 




the view that aggressively competing against a new entrant with their existing 
product was an unnecessary distraction given that their next generation product was 
imminent. Strategies are also dictated by the proportion of market share a drug has 
access to. In crowded markets, respondents indicated that there is perhaps a stronger 
driver to maintain share through counteraction of their competitors’ arguments. With 
fewer entrants in a field, there was the suggestion that objection handling is likely to 
be less of a priority as respondents were amenable to the view that the market is 
capable of supporting more than one product. 
If this is your sole product you may try and out promote the competition but the fact that risedronate 
was coming… and in fact meant to come earlier, I think we probably tried to stay in lock step, or we 
never actually competed (CS1.2). 
I think there was definitely space in the marketplace for more than one product, and you can tell that 
by where everything goes eventually, and I still argue that we’re not over prescribing, I think this is a 
disease area where I still think that you may be…you’re not even over prescribing in terms of the 




7. MARKET DEVELOPMENT  
Market development (also referred to as market expansion or market shaping) is the 
process by which Industry attempts to alter the shape of the diffusion curve by 
increasing the number of patients eligible for treatment. An analysis of respondents’ 
views indicated that expansion is achieved by entering new segments of the market, 
converting non-users into users, and/or increasing usage per user (in the 
pharmaceutical market the user can refer to both the prescriber and the patient 
depending on the context). The process occurs at all stages of the product lifecycle, 
preparing for arrival, ensuring initial uptake and assuming various levels of priority 
as an activity as the company’s market share fluctuates. 
If your typical drug has an uptake curve like that, there are three ways where you can actually try to 
improve that.  And that uptake curve will depend on its profile and what I mean profile is its efficacy 
profile versus its competitors, its safety, administration, i.e. dosage and flexibility in how you give it, 
and costs.  And it will have an uptake curve that would normally happen without promotion, so there 
are things that you can do to affect it. One is to obviously make the curve happen for a bigger, larger 
amount of curve, that is can you increase the overall usage. So if you like that would be your 
commercial effect. The other would be to try and make it happen faster, and there's all sorts of 
things that you could potentially do to speed up that. Everything from investing a lot in medical 
education so that people understand how to use the drug, particularly if it’s a new class, or 
investing a lot in clinical trials, so you've got a lot of data to prove that it’s more efficacious. And so 
on and so forth, everything through to PR and all sorts of things that you might do there. And then the 
third thing that you can do is to make sure that your curve then goes up again at that point where it 
would have tailed off, so that might be another indication you go into, it might be another 
formulation that you derive or something. So in terms of your marketing strategy I think the question 
is how do you extend one, two and three?  And of those three, speeding up the rate of adoption has 
the biggest impact (G1.1). 
 
7.1. Market Research  
Respondents discussed how market research is an important aspect of market 
development. A clear view was expressed by respondents of the importance of 
identifying and understanding the clinical needs and attitudes of patients and 
clinicians in order to gauge how the attributes of a new product will be perceived and 





We would research a new therapy area in terms of how large the market was, who were the key 
competitors, what changes are expected in the marketplace, and then also speak to some customers 
and find out what their drivers were for using various products in the marketplace. From that we 
would do more in-depth market research focusing on certain areas, so we might want to find out, 
you know, from prescribers what are the areas that they feel are still unmet in the marketplace and 
if a new product was coming in, what areas would they like it to address (CS2.1). 
Once you know what the product profile is, what the product is that you're going to launch, we do a 
lot of work in terms of understanding, in any particular disease areas, what do the doctors desire?  
What are their needs? What are their drivers to prescribing? What are their barriers to prescribing?  
What are the unmet needs in that disease area? What's really going to turn them on and what's not 
going to turn them on? How do they respond initially to our clinical profile without any of the 
whistles and bells on it. How are they going to respond to that? What are the things that they see as 
unique or they pick up on? And then it's starting to think about how are you going to dress up that 
product, and how are you going to communicate the benefits and messages around that product 
(G1.2). 
We think it through in the market planning by looking at what audience do I need to communicate 
with? And what message do I need to communicate that audience with in order to encourage their 
behaviour in the use of a particular medicine for whatever benefit that would have for them and for 
their patients. So you’re always looking at it in terms of benefit for them and their patients, and I 
know many people might think that that’s cynical, of course we’d say that, but actually, unless it 
does give them a benefit and it gives the patients a benefit they’ll never use it. You know, that’s the 
same for you and I with any consumer brand. So, it's exactly the same sort of mindset that is applied 
(CS1.3). 
 
Through understanding disease issues respondents described how it helps to identify 
where patients are lost from the patient pathway. In doing so, this enables the 
expected parameters of the diffusion curve to be estimated reflecting the potential 
patient population if these barriers can be overcome. 
How does the patient flow through that system? Is it very clear, is it complex, where could we 
intervene and educate? In terms of the channel mix though, that goes back to strategically what are 
you trying to tackle, so if it’s diagnosis you’re going to throw all your money at educational 
programmes and disease awareness and thought leader consensus around guidelines. If my leakage 
is further down the patient pathway and it’s around which treatment do they get, you focus then on 
differentiating your product from product X (CS2.2).   
At the start of your planning you will have done some kind of size of the market in terms of untreated 
patients. What’s the patient population? And therefore what’s the expected penetration of that 
patient population?  So you know when you’ve saturated the market and when you haven’t (CS1.3). 
 
Key opinion leaders (KOLs) have an important advisory role at this stage in terms of 
identifying areas of unmet need and providing feedback on what messages and 
approaches will resonate most with their peers. Together with other clinicians and 




enhance both the quality and clarity of their communication strategies (see Theme 6: 
Communicating relative advantage; subtheme 6.2.1: Simplicity/clarity of message) 
and to assist in pharmacoeconomic decisions in advance of launching the product. 
 
It depends on what we’re trying to find out and how quickly we’re trying to find it out, but for a new 
product you test focus groups or key players, what they think, what they need, the brand, the data 
and you get them building, you literally use customers to build your messages. If I showed you this 
data what you think? If I show you this, what resonates better, why, how would you order this story? 
We literally use them to build our materials (CS2.2). 
Prior to launch we have advisory boards and they sign consultancy agreements and have input into 
the data and the quality of the data and what does this trial say to you and if we were to make this 
claim with it, how would that go down, what more do you need to see? (CS2.2). 
Our advisory boards would be a group of people who would say look at the clinical profile for this 
drug, pre-launch often, and where do you think it will fit into the pattern of prescribing, and that can 
be clinical people and it can be payers.  As I say there are a number of payer advisory boards as well, 
as in, look at the clinical profile for this drug, look at the cost we're thinking of charging, do you 
think that it will get approved for use by independent bodies? (G1.1). 
 
Market research is also used post-launch to assess attitudes and barriers to uptake. 
Respondents however, indicated their frustration of their dependence on market 
research, which is due to the confidential nature of prescribing information as it is 
perceived as an indirect measure that can only ever give them a limited insight.  
A marketing team will have a means of tracking the product that they can…work out perhaps the 
reasons why the product's being used and the reasons why the product isn't being used.  So that's 
kind of a continual process looking at what might further drive uptake (CS4.3). 
In that first six months at the end of that we would be re-evaluating communication, making sure 
that the recall was getting across and identifying what the issues were. Maybe doing more 
qualitative research to get an initial toe in the water of what they thought about the drug, how they 
would be using it, if they did use it, what were the issues they faced? Things like that, so we've got an 
initial sense of what, if there were any problems, what they were (G1.2). 
I suppose one of the key things is you have to have the data and given that we can't get prescriber 
level data from doctors we are always living in the dark about who is using the drug, so that’s 
always a barrier for us, and it's done for good reason, you know, anonymity, blah, blah, blah, I 
accept all those arguments, but that’s our environment that we have to operate in. So we do have to 
buy quite a lot of market research to get information about behaviours and understanding of 
disease and willingness to treat and attitudes and things like that.  So that’s, because that’s again 
important in the diffusion of the drug, unless people’s attitudes are right they’re not going to do it. 
There’s a huge market in data provision, a huge market, because the Industry’s entirely dependent 





The AA case highlighted how market research uncovered a barrier to their adoption 
that was rooted in differing perceptions between Industry and prescribers as to what 
was defining clinical need. Industry believed improved side effects were the driving 
factor in prescribing decision, only to find subsequently that this was not the case.    
Now when we did the pre-launch research, we identified that the thing that differentiated Seroquel 
from the other two atypicals, was on basis of side effects, it’s going to work as well but its tolerability 
is a lot better…, so this slow increase is probably because we sold on side effects whereas we now 
know from our insight that although psychiatrists will say the side effects are really important to 
them, if you have got patients acutely unwell you know, probably the thing that drives their 
prescribing is efficacy, so taking efficacy as a given was kind of perhaps a mistake (CS2.3). 
 
7.2. Raising Disease Awareness  
Disease awareness (DA) aims to increase the number of patients eligible for the 
treatment of a condition rather than an individual drug. It is not subject to 
promotional restrictions on timing or audience, as is the case with product awareness 
(see Theme 6: Communicating relative advantage; subtheme 6.2.2: Product 
awareness), and helps prepare the market and identifies potential barriers. 
So we did a lot of GP education before launch and we produced you know; worked with, the 
necessary kind of authority of clinical bodies to produce guidelines and that sort of thing, so that 
people, okay as I say, we wanted people to be able to use the product for commercial reasons, but 
also we wanted it to be used in an absolutely robust scientific way (CS3.1). 
If I’m launching a product and my issue is diagnosis, so they come in but it’s quite a hard disease to 
diagnose, my strategy prior to launch would be having a lot of education around the disease area 
and trying to get consensus on how you diagnose it in the UK, guidelines in place before you go 
with these products for instance (CS2.2). 
 
Respondents described how DA, whilst having a prominent role before launch, 
occurs throughout all stages of the drug’s lifecycle. The information was believed to 
equip patients with the confidence and a legitimate basis on which to approach their 
clinician to facilitate a dialogue about treatment options. For this reason DA 




respondents agreed that DA is particularly important in asymptomatic conditions, or 
to highlight symptoms of serious illness that may be confused with other conditions. 
 
You’ve got to get disease awareness into the population so that not to scare them but to make people 
aware of what they have, and the problem with a disease like osteoporosis it's a silent disease 
(CS1.3). 
Do they [patients] perceive they have a disease, so for diabetic retinopathy for instance they 
wouldn’t perceive they have it because there’s no symptoms. So you’ve got to do a lot of work from 
the marketing perspective on education around the importance of getting your eyes checked etc. if 
you wanted those patients to come into our system. And they’ve got to come into the system if we 
want products sold. Do they seek treatment for the disease? If they seek treatment do they get a 
diagnosis for that disease (CS2.2). 
We had the very famous sort of disease awareness campaign where it was the mannequins, we 
showed how osteoporosis progressed by using shop window mannequins you see, and it was a very 
clever campaign, very eye-catching and again it gets patients aware and the population it sensitises 
them to the condition and makes them engage in that conversation with the doctor (CS1.3). 
 
Typically the burden of awareness activity is borne by the first entrant with those 
following benefitting from the work (see Theme 6: Communicating relative 
advantage; subtheme 6.1.2: Market entry position, in relation to how market entry 
position affects extent of product differentiation required). For conditions that are in 
the initial stages of disease classification, diagnosis and management, respondents 
believed DA has a pivotal role to promote the major bodies of evidence to counteract 
any controversial views that could be detrimental to uptake, and to reach a consensus 
view on treatment. 
The cholesterol lowering market in the mid 90's was unbelievably different than today. I think it was 
1992 that there was an editorial in the BMJ entitled 'Time for a Moratorium on Cholesterol 
Lowering Drugs'; There was all of this debate about whether actually lowering cholesterol was a 
good thing or not, and we had these amazing extrapolations of findings from some of the early 
studies that patients taking cholesterol lowering drugs might suffer more violent deaths and, 
suicides and this sort of thing and all kinds of theories were being put forward for why that might be 
the case.  Flying in the face of the major kind of bodies of evidence that said look, if you've got high 
cholesterol, you die of heart disease, if you've got low cholesterol, you don't and we can demonstrate 
from intervention studies that actually changing somebody's cholesterol level has an impact on 
survival, so it was a market in a very embryonic stage with a lot of controversy associated with it, so 
you see very modest growth despite having a major impact on cholesterol levels and it just had very 
slow uptake because the medical community were not really convinced, and certainly general 
practitioners weren't, of the value of prescribing these drugs (CS4.1). 
By 1992 we still don’t have a lot of sales there, but by the time we actually get to a launch we’re 




have been developed, that I think that was really the work and the conditioning, but you can actually 
say this is against an environment where people didn’t really understand this was a condition, they 
didn’t understand what limits they should put around the condition to ensure that you weren't going to 
get over-prescribing or use in people that you didn’t need, they didn’t understand how to use the 
products. So I think a lot of the work that we did in the Didronel [etidronate] days was really linked 
to actually educating the whole area and trying to get people to focus on this (CS1.1). 
I think that a lot of disease awareness work had been done, Atorva had been on the market for six 
years by then. Simva had been on the market since '89, so there would have been a lot of disease 
awareness. There was good awareness of cholesterol lowering so you know I think most of the 
disease awareness had been done (CS4.3). 
 
DA was conceptualised by respondents as something slightly different and softer 
than the ‘education’ that takes place between representatives and prescribers in 
product awareness activities (see Theme 6: Communicating relative advantage; 
subtheme 6.2.3: Product justification). Communicating information about diseases 
was described as increasing and enhancing adopters’ existing knowledge. This subtle 
difference dilutes the perceived influence of Industry on the process making it appear 
a far more passive acquisition of knowledge. By doing so, it is a far more conducive 
way of engaging health professionals who are the Industry’s major conduit through 
which to relay information to patients, which is essential to ensure the success of a 
DA campaign. 
 
At the start there was relatively low understanding of this condition, relatively low experience of 
dealing with it; I think we worked hard and I think, did a good job to, I don't want to say educate, 
but to supply information that those that were interested you know, took on board and then shared 
with patients, and I think that has grown over time and you know, practice nurses got very involved 
with a lot of educational work with nurses and so on, so I think in the main, you would say, you know, 
compared to ten years ago now, if a patient presents to primary care services, you will get good 
advice, a receptive environment and good counselling alongside any medicine that's treated, but it 
was a different situation at the start (CS3.1). 
You need to engage the healthcare professionals to help you with it [disease awareness], you can’t; 
you know, we’ve all tried doing it on our own with websites and leaflets and things, and unless the 
healthcare profession are brought it, they are not necessarily going to hand them out (CS3.3). 
 
7.2.1. Patient group role 
Respondents described how patient groups can provide a conduit through which to 




Industry. In the absence of direct to consumer advertising in the UK (prohibited by 
law), respondents highlighted how relevant patients can be targeted with educational 
material that may stimulate a dialogue with their clinician that leads to treatment 
initiation. The restrictions placed on brand endorsement through this route, whilst 
signifying credibility, was thought by most respondents as limiting patient group 
impact to a class rather than a drug effect. 
 
One of the things we did do, was working with the Sexual Dysfunction Association and helping to 
advertise, because they would provide information on local clinics, so if somebody had gone to their 
GP and their GP had said to them, at your age you shouldn't be having sex…which was quite 
common, therefore, go away and don't darken my door with your erection problems again, and the 
man could ring up and they would say okay, well in your area we have these sympathetic GPs who 
run clinics or these urologists who run clinics and you can go and seek treatment from them (CS3.3). 
There are moves to try and encourage patients to have more of a say in their medication and 
patients to be told about the different side effects of the drugs, so that they can make a decision. We 
would support that and we try and support people like the National Institute of Mental Health who 
are driving that, you know, because we think it’s right as well. We believe patients should also be 
given a choice between taking a tablet every day or an injection once a fortnight and, you know, some 
people would prefer an injection once a fortnight and not have to worry about it, some would prefer to 
take a tablet every day, so we believe it’s important that patients discuss that, but the evidence is that 
that doesn’t happen as much as it probably should (CS2.1). 
I think they're [patient groups] effective in educating, but I don't think they affect sales or curves.  
They raise awareness of the high cholesterol which helps the statin group as a whole. I don't think 
it will have affected the rosuvastatin curve. Anyone who goes to the GP and asks for a statin is going 
to get simvastatin 40. They’re not going to get rosuvastatin 10 (CS4.2). 
 
7.2.2. Public figure/celebrity endorsement 
The use of celebrity endorsement is another way respondents explained promotion 
could be disassociated from companies to raise the profile of a disease, especially if 
the individual’s personality is sufficiently renowned. The choice, however, has to be 
carefully considered, with respondents suggesting that figures who were affected by 





For a couple of years we used [a sports celebrity] as a spokesman for our disease awareness 
campaign because he had ED as a result of having his prostate removed, and it was very important 
for us that we had somebody whose erection problems were caused by a medical cause. He talked 
about it in a very mechanical way, you know, if I had a car and there was something wrong with the 
engine, I’d take it in to get it fixed, and as far as I’m concerned there is something mechanically 
wrong, so I’ve gone to the Doctor to get it fixed…We saw more GPs getting involved as well. I think 
patients felt a bit more empowered…I think people seeing him saying that thought well, you know 
what, if he can say it, and he can go and get it sorted, then I can (CS3.3). 
 
[Another sports celebrity] didn't do any good for men with erection problems because he stood up 
there and said "well if I had it, I would go and go and get it treated", and actually what they want to 
hear is someone going, "I've got it and it's not that bad, and it can be treated, and it's not you, it's 
not because you are less of a man, it's a thing that happens when you have diabetes or when you 
have your prostate removed". I think the medicalisation of it needed to have some celebrity 
endorsement (CS3.3). 
 
Disease awareness amongst the public, if you’re going to do that kind of thing it tends to be a public 
affairs effort rather than a marketing effort, because you can't mention brand, you know, there are 
all sorts of rules. But what you can do is get journalists that are interested in this and say 
‘osteoporosis is an awful silent disease and it kills X number of people and [a celebrity] has it and is 
the chair of…’ so you get a celebrity type situation and they actively write up their stories and …I 
think when we did the research we were getting about 6% of patients were actually requesting 
treatment, they were actually asking the doctor ‘Am I osteoporotic?’ (CS1.3). 
 
7.2.3. Media role 
The media were perceived as having the potential to rapidly and efficiently reach a 
wide target group of both patients and prescribers and can also be targeted to access 
people most likely to be affected by a particular condition. Set against this, some 
respondents considered such coverage as difficult to control (compared with 
advertising which was considered a controlled means of dissemination), and 
depending on the media’s agenda in a particular situation, respondents indicated it 
may have either a positive or negative effect on diffusion. 
 
There was obviously a lot of attention at the time with media.  And so it gives that initial boost of 
patients going in and knowing what they want and asking for something, which obviously drives 
things a lot (CS3.2). 
If you take ED as a whole, we hardly get any information which comes down which motivates 
people to come forward, but you get one splash in the media and it makes a big difference.  You look 
at these things for motivating men on cardiovascular, you've millions and millions going in publicly 
to make this happen. But men still aren't particularly coming forward.  One little splash and this 
happens (CS3.2). 
Viagra, maybe not at the outset, but became sex, money and politics which are the three things that 
drives the media in my opinion, you know that's a gross oversimplification, but it was certainly sex, 




that cured, in inverted commas, your impotence was; people hadn't even been able to conceive that 
that might be possible (CS3.1). 
There's lots of different audits out there that tell you what's the best form of media. So if you're 
targeting 40 to 60 year old women, then you will be aware which magazines they tend to read, on 
television what times of the day are they most likely….so you know the TV-am slots or Richard and 
Judy, things like that where Dr Chris Steel might be on and there might be a topic of osteoporosis 
and so you try and target your media or whatever it is that you're going to do, and newspaper articles. 
A lot of companies use patient associations, so in this case the Osteoporosis Society (G1.2). 
The uptake wasn't as significant as we'd expected, I mean if you look on this chart here you've got 
tadalafil and that angle of growth was massive compared to ours. They were in a [red top 
newspaper] as the 'Le Weekender', and so they really got their duration of action which is their USP, 
they got it out in consumer media significantly over the preceding year, so they warmed the market 
up, anticipating a new PDE5 inhibitor, a new treatment for ED.  We made a decision not to do that, 
so; and then they launched six weeks ahead of us, so the idea was, we were going to race them and 
hopefully we would have taken off with a flying start (CS3.3). 
 
The perception that the media however has to reflect emerging big news items, 
however, makes planning coverage an uncertain business. This was exemplified in 
the PDE5 inhibitor case, where interest in the topic was displaced by current affairs.  
The other thing was that at launch it was at the time when we were just about to embark on the 
beginning of the Iraq war, so a lot of the consumer papers were focused on that happening.  I think 
the week of launch you know, like the first 12 pages of every newspaper was all about the Iraq war, 
and any new technology or health technology was just not of interest to them (CS3.3). 
 
If what is reported misrepresents the product, it creates a very frustrating situation for 
Industry as respondents indicated there is little they can do to redress the balance due 
to the restrictions imposed on communicating directly with the consumer. While this 
was acknowledged as an issue, it was also recognised by respondents that it still has 
an effect by raising awareness. 
 
Richard and Judy did a three patient study on their show. You know, so they gave three people 
Viagra and they said it worked in two, so therefore it’s about you know, it’s effective in two thirds of 
the people, and here we are with, as I remember now, 21 randomised placebo controlled studies 
with 3,000 patients in, and we weren't allowed to talk about that you know, and so we were endlessly 
on the back foot and we were caught on the back foot as well, you know, we had a media department 
of like, two people or something you know, we're a pharmaceutical industry, we'd never 
communicated really before, and so you know, we were doing our best to at least try and get some 
sensible comment into newspaper stories (CS3.1). 
There was this guy who'd done a study and claimed that it was affecting sperm motility and I 
looked; and it was written up in [a tabloid newspaper] or something like that, just one column, and 




in this study, you know, and this was the kind of nonsense that we were getting, but we couldn't 
respond to it and so; and we knew this was going to be triggering all sorts of restrictive practices in 
the NHS because in the absence of any information from Pfizer or the volume of information that 
they were getting from the press, they were going to assume this was going to break all kinds of 
financial records and so that was very influential but of course the positive aspect for us was that 
everybody knew about it.  100% of the public; it was from nothing to icon in about, a couple of 
months and it was absolutely stunning (CS3.1). 
With the Boots thing, now that's an interesting one, because it's not actually over the counter is it? 
'You can walk into a pharmacy now and get Viagra over the counter', is what hit the headline.  But 
actually you've got to go into...only one of those three pharmacies in Manchester and it's by patient 
group direction, and when you look at the patient group direction, you had to not have diabetes and 
not have raised blood pressure and not have a psychological element and not have...when you whittle 
it down, there's hardly anybody that will qualify. But the amount of PR that that generated was 
massive (CS3.2). 
 
7.3. Market Leadership 
An analysis of respondents’ views indicated market development activities assume a 
higher priority in a company’s strategy when a drug holds the market leadership 
position. Market leadership can be conferred in two contexts: either as the first 
entrant to a class where there are no other competitors, or alternatively as the one that 
possesses the greatest market share. There was a sense that respondents believed that 
their drugs had the capability of achieving market leader status based on the benefits 
offered by their innate characteristics, but yet they were acutely aware that the 
market conditions at the point of entry may prevent that aspiration.  
 
Share is obviously important, I mean it's unlikely that we would be hugely proud of being  number 2 
in a market place, in the areas that we choose to build up a capability in, and I think that’s an 
important element...We would never, for example, have invested in risedronate if we did not believe 
it had the right to be a market leader. Do we expect risedronate to become market leader?  I think 
that’s very unlikely because we’re now in a generic sized marketplace where our competition is no 
longer Fosamax (alendronate). Our competition is generic alendronate and in fact it isn't even a 
competition any more you know. I think to maintain and grow some share is realistic, but I don’t 
think it's going to be realistic to reverse market leadership (CS1.2). 
I don't think we ever expect to be number one you know, by the time we'd probably get any closer to 
that, Viagra will either be available over the counter or off prescription (CS3.3). 
 
Respondents indicated, implicitly, that market leaders had a duty to further develop 




more prescriptions in an expanding market. Conversely development activity is 
likely to be stopped if results are of no direct benefit to a company. 
Until you have market leadership, or until you are close to market leadership, the idea of market 
expansion is generally of very little benefit (CS1.1). 
As soon as you’ve got over 50% of the market you can gamble. It is a gamble, but it's a valid one.  
For the next 100 patients that come in you will get X percent of that, so you will get a bigger share 
of it, so it's money well invested in the market to look for patient case finding (CS1.3). 
At the point where we took market leadership, I think, your attitude to the market changes because 
at this point [early phase of lifecycle] you are trying to penetrate the market. You’ve got a market 
share battle with the competition and your goal is to take share, you know, it's the market leader’s 
job to lead the growth of the market, and as I've said before, that market leader didn’t have any 
ambitions in that way, they would argue probably differently, but I would say that they didn’t 
demonstrate anything. But when we got market leadership our job was then to increase the number 
of patients treated (CS1.3). 
We put a lot of time and effort behind getting people to come forward and seek help, but still most 
patients are getting Viagra, so you know, at the end of the day you've got to start thinking, well is it 
worth our while expanding the market for 50% of that market to be prescribed Viagra (CS3.3). 
 
A sense of responsibility is placed on the market leader to provide solutions to issues 
that can be potentially detrimental to the entire class. The example of the physical 
health issues in the AA case highlighted how in attempting to distance the drugs or 
class from being the cause of certain adverse effects, and instead pursuing the 
argument that those symptoms were a feature of the disease, there was still a role for 
Industry to intervene to improve the health of these patients through supplementing 
services (see Theme 2: Clinician/patient experience; subtheme 2.5: Industry response 
to experiential barriers). Ceasing these activities on patent expiry does however, 




Talking about acting as market leader, we try and invest a lot back...on education and on services 
that will help manage in this case patients with severe mental illness (CS2.2). 
Even though we had this massive growth in the once weekly, if you look at the market again now, the 
number of new patients is flattening off again because there's lack of promotion in the market, 




patients in the market that were actually being treated effectively. It's a real shame really in a way 
because effectively what we've done is halted the market, so potentially a lot of patients are going to 
remain undiagnosed and undertreated (G1.2). 
 
Respondents considered that the actions that embody a market leader are important 
as they influence the way they are perceived by their competitors. Expectations are 
for heavy investment and addressing issues of policy, safety and NHS infrastructure 
that are detrimental to the whole class. The interview data suggested that a market 
leader that stays in market share mode is not perceived in a favourable light by its 
competitors.  
You can be the market leader and just take your sales or you can be the market leader and try and 
lead the way from education and service operators. I think we try and make sure we do both 
(CS2.2). 
There was a need for us to write a ‘dear doctor’ letter. Well then you see your competition, some will 
walk away from that, and say ‘that’s going to be really bad news for growing this market’ and some 
will say ‘that’s great news, I’ll keep my market share’, so it depends on whether the motivation of 
the competitor is market share or market expansion.(CS1.3).   
 
While recognising that market development fulfils their own needs, respondents also 
tied the concept of identifying additional patients or ‘case finding’ into clinicians’ 
priorities once they have become comfortable with a drug. Whatever activities are 
employed, respondents indicated that 100% market penetration is never expected 
within the patent life of a drug.   
Once the product’s been used, and in the market for a while, and you’re starting to see some 
adoption, you know, real use of the product, you can then compliment your marketing activities with 
other …you know, within the later phase of the lifecycle of the drug, given that you’ve got 10 years, 
you know, you’ve got the early launch and growth, how do you then drive greater growth and greater 
penetration and use of the drug. Typically of the drugs that are accepted, the doctors are 
comfortable using it, they’re seeing the benefits of it in their patients, then they’re probably looking 
for help in finding cases in supporting the use of the drug so that ‘how do I find more….how do I do 
more patient identification? I know I'm not treating everybody, how do I know I want to treat a lot 
more patients because I see the benefits of it, so how do I get them?’, well then that can be 
supplemented with programmes of support for audit and audit design so that the doctors can trawl 
through their patient lists and say ‘ah yes, these are all at risk’ (CS1.3). 
I've never seen any market where we’ve got to within 10 years of entering a new class of drugs, a 
new disease area where we’ve got anywhere near saturating the market in terms of penetration.  
And in there you’ve got a mixture of people who should be taking it and some that shouldn’t, you 




We spend a lot of time thinking about how do you get them [clinicians] to be a bit more active in their 
intervention and checking and evaluating the patient to identify the opportunities (G1.2). 
 
7.3.1. Corporate philanthropy: Subsidy of health services 
A market leader development strategy may involve funding initiatives in the health 
service to identify eligible patients that the NHS would otherwise be unable to 
support. Respondents discussed how the provision of those services may be 
necessary to assist in connecting the dots between diagnosis and treatment and 
removing the bottlenecks to prescribing, as demonstrated by the introduction of the 
Fracture Liaison Service subsidised by Industry to identify patients with fractures in 
the BP case. 
In some markets it's important to have everybody DEXA scanned, in order to be able to prove 
they’re osteoporotic. Well, there’s just not those facilities available on every street corner in this 
country. We just couldn’t fill the gap, I mean it's just too massive, so you had to find other surrogates 
of what is osteoporosis and hence when you see it in guidelines now, you know, it's basically if they’re 
over 65, and had an incidence of a fracture. So that’s why the fracture clinics became really 
important, and the fracture register became important, because you needed the secondary care 
centre to tell the GP ‘this person has had a low trauma fracture, they’re osteoporotic, treat 
them’(CS1.3). 
We were aware of MSD’s fracture intervention clinics. I mean they were coming from the position 
where they had the market dominance in terms of the share at the time, and their question was 
really an issue of can I get people to actually find… I think that it was very clever, and I think also 
very valid.  I mean we come down to fracture as one of the biggest causes, and it's the one that we 
should probably go for the most, and it also makes what is a bit of a fuzzy disease in terms of its 
definition, something quite solid (CS1.1).   
There’s very tight governance rules under our code of practice about what we can do, but, in 
principle, what you’re doing is providing assistance to support the doctor’s objective of what he 
wants to do and you don’t couple any of those services with the prescribing of the drug. What you 
do is provide the service and if the doctor’s chosen your drug well good for you and that’s really 
down to you and your skills of selling the drug to the person in the first place (CS1.3). 
 
The provision of subsidies, while portrayed in some regard as corporate 
philanthropy, is usually dependent on more patients being identified and is often 




Respondents indicated that ideally the aim is to partner initiatives that have a strategy 
in place for the service to become eventually self-sustaining. 
At some point quite honestly we have to say that if we’re providing blanket support services, even 
though we would never ever do anything that would try and…you know, we would never link a 
service to any kind of prescription requirement, but at some point you actually look at it and you 
say ‘for every dollar I'm investing into scanning, I'm getting 50 cent back out’, I mean I can't do 
that for very long because that would….I mean for every dollar in I should at least have to make a 
dollar out and if I don’t do that then I'm not going to be here (CS1.1). 
I think every company used to do that sort of thing, to be the….as a gesture of really goodwill to the 
communities worked in.  Nowadays we think much more like ‘okay, what's my exit strategy out of 
that funding?’ as I give it to you let me work in partnership about how I actually…my objective is to 
fund you enough so you won't need another funding. I think the objectives should be unless you’re 
going to make a long-term commitment to be in it forever, which, given that we have a nine year 
patent life usually, eight to nine year patent life in market, it seems unlikely that I'd want to fund 
you beyond that patent expiry (CS1.2). 
 
7.4. Research: New Indications/New Formulations 
Research into new formulations was perceived by respondents as a market 
development strategy that widens the appeal of the drug so it can be used in more 
patients, such as in the BP case with the introduction of the once weekly formulation.  
Patients that have previously tried these drugs and dropped out because they didn’t like the regime 
and it's unpleasant, blah, blah, blah, and they said ‘well look, now I can come back and I can start 
again and I can comply with it’, so I think you’ve got that. You’ve got an extra period there where 
more patients took the drug for longer than they did in this period, so that would add to the sales 
curve, because if a patient is only taking 6 months-worth but now they take 10 months-worth in any 
one year, you can get a 40% increase in sales per patient. So you got that, and you got real market 
expansion because the doctors gained confidence. They said ‘now I can see the patients, I always 
thought they would never be able to take these drugs’, but this one they can give it to them, so they 
had confidence in doing that.  And that drove a complete change in attitude to the use of this class 
of drugs (CS1.3). 
 
If clinical need however, is not a driver then it was perceived by most respondents 
that these ‘life-extension’ strategies are unlikely to significantly influence diffusion. 
This was highlighted as a reason by some respondents in the AA case for the lack of 






People will try strategies of trying to extend the life of the drug in other forms. New indications don’t 
really help you unless it's a very specific dose so that the dose won't be made generically, but an 
extra indication and the drugs available generically, it's still going to get dispensed generically so 
you’re not going to get any extra life out of that in this market. So life extension strategy…new 
formulations are modest in their success.  Some are good, where they’re slow release and the BNF 
have decreed that it has to be done this way because there’s real patient benefit, but there are 
relatively few of those (CS1.3). 
I think the Velotab, the rapid dissolving formulation, that again met a small unmet need for certain 
types of patients which I think did differentiate Zyprexa versus others on the market at the time 
(CS2.2).  
There’s a Quicklet form which is a dissolvable form. People took to it to a certain degree, but not 
massively because we didn’t have data to show that it had a faster onset of action, so it was just a an 
alternative formulation really, it was more convenient for some people to take. So it didn’t have a 
great impact, and the injections had much more of an impact. (CS2.1). 
 
In some instances, the relative advantage offered by a new formulation or a new 
indication at later stages of the lifecycle can be such that the rate of uptake can 
mirror that of the drug’s initial introduction to the market (as was the case for some 
of the AAs on gaining a bipolar licence). A few respondents highlighted however, 
that there is a greater imperative with extension strategies to reach the market first in 
order to capture the market share. The impact that competitors offering the same 
indications or formulations can make at this late stage was thought to be far more 
diluted than what was possible with the original indication. 
Olanzapine also got a bipolar licence faster than we did, which is something that they did quite well, 
so when they launched they launched with one indication which was schizophrenia, but then they got 
another addition to their licence which was bipolar, and it took us longer to get the bipolar addition 
to our licence, even though we were first on the market, so they’d done a better job at actually, you 
know, constructing their clinical trial programme, and I think that helped to drive some growth as 
well for them (CS2.1).  
 
New formulations were also thought to help protect companies from the effect of 
generics entering the market. Respondents indicated how patients can be switched 






Previously this was all tablet use, and then in, August 2002, we launched a long-acting injectable 
version of Risperdal (risperidone), which again was the first atypical injection in the marketplace. 
It was eagerly anticipated, because one of the big problems with oral medication is compliance, so 
patients who have schizophrenia often don’t have a lot of insight, so they don’t think that they’re ill, 
so when they’re in hospital they can be encouraged to take the medication, but when they’re back in 
the community and not supervised, they often don’t take the medication, and that means that 
they’re far more likely to relapse. So, with Risperdal Consta they have to have an injection once 
every two weeks but that then gives them medication cover for two weeks, so it was a combination of 
the older depot type medication which were injections, with the new atypical medication (CS2.1). 
 
7.5. Dispensing/ Supply Issues  
Compromising the supply of a medication was thought to impact on the uptake and 
diffusion of a drug and yet it is not often recognised as an influencing factor in 
pharmaceutical diffusion outside of the Industry literature. Interviewees described 
several scenarios including the sometimes challenging logistics involved in 
supplying to levels of demand, counterfeit medications and the presence of illegal 
imports through parallel trade that had a bearing on the diffusion of their drugs.   
 
They’ll have ensured that the product was stocked in and it was early stocking in so there wasn’t any 
delay in availability. It’s that sort of 18 months prior to launch that really starts digging into our 
own marketplace and mapping it out and how will we train and how we get it stocked in and we go 
down to the weeds really of implementation (CS2.2). 
It's a very complicated environment, these days because of course the one thing we haven't talked 
about is that an enormous proportion of the supply of Viagra, in inverted commas, is over the 
internet, which won't be reflected in those figures.  A proportion of it is counterfeit, but it's virtually 
impossible for us to gauge how much. So there will be imported Viagra that's used in the UK, there 
will be fake Viagra and then there is this whole range of other sort of pseudo-Viagra treatments 
that you'll have heard of that complicate the picture as well, so have we reached our growth peak?  
Well, if we can continue the efforts that we are currently putting in place to try and combat 
counterfeit use and you know, illegal supply and so on, then they'll be the prospect of higher sales 





8. KEY OPINION LEADERS (KOLs) 
Opinion leadership support was a theme that all respondents emphasised was 
influential in the diffusion of a drug. Key opinion leaders (KOLs) were described as 
clinicians who as result of their experience, technical competence or social 
accessibility are experts in particular fields and are held in high esteem within the 
social system of the clinical community. Respondents conceptualised them as having 
innovator adopter characteristics and occupy a unique influential position at the 
centre of interpersonal communication networks through which they can convey 
their influence. 
Interview data indicated that providing KOLs are seen to remain independent, they 
were thought to exert their influence in two ways at various stages of the drug 
lifecycle; firstly as advisors to Industry and secondly as advocates for certain 
treatments amongst their peers. Through these two roles their involvement spans 
throughout the lifecycle of a drug, from before launch as clinical trial investigators, 
through to raising disease awareness, generating consensus agreement in disease 
management, education of peers, message reinforcement and market expansion. 
 
8.1. Early Engagement/Collaboration: Advisory 
The involvement of opinion leaders at early stages of development was considered 
important in gaining their support. Early engagement with Industry gives KOLs 
privileged access to exclusive information and an understanding of the data, which 
supports their credibility and esteem. Interviewees stated it is a somewhat symbiotic 
relationship in that it extends the opportunity for KOLs to influence trial design as 




Well key opinion leaders play a very important role, and I would rank them number 1, because they 
tend to get involved at possibly even Phase I stage. Because they will often be using multicentre trial 
based sites, and they will often be the people that are leading that research, so they will be involved 
with our researchers, often long before the marketers get anywhere near it (CS1.3). 
Endorsement is one of the key things we look for at product launch to ensure that the key names in 
psychiatry or whatever disease area you’re going into, understand our data and could place X 
appropriately. It has a lot more credibility, we have investigators standing up on the day of launch 
saying you know I’ve been involved in the trials, these were some of the results and this is how a 
patient did (CS2.2). 
Many of the key opinion leaders have been involved but they were involved in the studies through 
Phase II and Phase III.  And by being involved in the studies they were involved, albeit in a blinded 
way, to the medication and involved in some of the early study manuscripts prior to formal 
publication (CS2.2). 
 
Several views were expressed that suggested early engagement allows KOLs to gain 
their early experience of a drug in clinical trials. Respondents suggested that those 
trials regarded as having the most significant impact on diffusion were ones 
involving KOLs in that field, as their association gives the trials enhanced credibility. 
Input from KOLs also helps Industry best understand the role of their technology in 
the broader management of a disease and any potential sensitivities that could 
surround its introduction. 
We had a set of very clear messages about how we viewed this condition which was obviously done 
in concept with those people who had been treating it for years, because I mean you know, to 
recognise that some people had been you know, professionally trying to treat erectile dysfunction and 
then along comes Pfizer and there's a sort of you know, we didn't want to sort of make it look like 
we'd arrived, now everything was okay (CS3.1). 
We work with a faculty of people which is about 20 specialists drawn from general practice, 
urology…all the kind of established authorities if you like in the field. They were the authors if you 
like and certainly if not the authors, certainly the reviewers of all the educational material that we 
put out for GPs and nurses and guidelines and any patient information and all the rest of it, and that 
was important you know to have, if you like, peer credibility but it was also important that we, to be 
frank, that we completely understood the area.  You know, we needed to demonstrate that we weren't 
going to just rock up into what is a sensitive condition that can be multifactorial and just flick 
people some tablets and say there you go, that does it doesn't it? (CS3.1) 
 
The Industry indicated that the value of advisory boards, sometimes involving KOL 
input, is to guide the content of a company’s education and promotion materials. 




peers’ receptiveness to their messages (see Theme 6: Communicating relative 
advantage and Theme 7: Market development due to the linkages to message clarity 
(subtheme 6.2.1.) and market research functions (subtheme 7.1.) that KOLs 
influence, respectively). 
The KOLs tend to be on the advisory boards, they would do more high level, look at the quality of 
your science, look at the quality of your studies, tell you which ones you should use and how it 
supports your message and your marketing strategy and then you know the individual psychiatrist, 
what we would call the more jobbing side, who do the day job, they tend to come to focus groups 
(CS2.2).  
 
Respondents from the BP case study indicated that when there is an innovation in a 
developing clinical field, a situation may arise where the expertise may only exist 
within the company. Those people then become responsible for leading the field and 
building networks of influence. Interview data suggested that in the BP case, such 
close associations with the manufacturer did not appear to damage their credibility as 
they became recognised as established authorities on osteoporosis. The loyalty that 
was then afforded to the originator company however, was highlighted as a barrier to 
access for competitor drugs, creating a scenario of institutional inertia.  
I think the advantage that we have in that is that we were there at the very, very beginning because 
you could say that the key expert was someone inside of P&G and they also…I mean the way we run 
our company, we are a very commercial company otherwise we wouldn’t be a successful company, 
but that is we don’t believe that should be at the expense of great science, and again as I say we’re a 
science company by background, so these people had the opportunity to build really established 
relationships on a high level of trust, with those key opinion leaders. I mean they felt like very much 
co-collaborators, and I think that was pretty unusual even in the day, a different model that I think is 
getting more common now, but it was a little bit ground breaking (CS1.1). 
 
Respondents believed that KOLs do not necessarily have to come from within 
companies to show allegiances. The cases demonstrated that if companies develop 
strong relationships with leading experts in the field, through support of research, or 




loyalty may manifest itself as scepticism towards the newcomer. Respondents 
explained how establishing trust between new entrant companies and KOLs requires 
delicate handling over many years for competitors to gain recognition. In this sense, 
scepticism, whilst overtly indicative of a conservative approach to claims made about 
new drugs, may according to respondents, be used to almost validate or rationalise 
loyalty issues.  
We were promoting this directly to key opinion leaders and GPs principally at this time.  Key 
opinion leaders were very loyal to the competition, because you know, they said ‘the trade-off here is 
not great enough so I'm going to stay loyal to the competition’ and this particular group of opinion 
leaders are, because it's not a big field, there’s not a lot of drugs in it, they tend to be loyal to those 
people that have supported their research…it was a heritage factor involved in that (CS1.3).  
There was a scepticism of the new person at the table. So I think there might have been a period of 
time, and sadly it looks like that can, you know, not surprisingly last three or four years before they 
will actually trust you And so maybe there’s that element where I think they didn’t shift because they 
didn’t necessarily give …maybe they had an access problem to the people that were influential 
(CS1.1). 
 
8.2. Hierarchical Cascade of Influence/ Peer Credibility: Advocacy 
An analysis of respondents’ views indicated it was important for them to be aware of 
the hierarchy of influence that exists amongst KOLs, those with the most established 
reputations internationally having the greatest effect on diffusion. Their messages are 
viewed with trust and authority and diffuse down through the tiers of influence to 
change the clinical practice of the many. 
 
You’ve got to understand the network of opinion leaders and understand the diffusion effects that 
opinion leaders have in their local network, say who respects who, who listens to who, whose 
opinion counts? And that’s an exercise which we have to understand who to talk to about a 
particular medicine (CS1.3). 
KOLs are the thought leaders of where patient care, disease management should be going. So 
you've got to interact with them. You've got to keep ahead of what they're going to be telling people 





Whilst most KOLs are typically secondary care specialists, the important factor is 
who initiates treatment. Non-clinical actors are also important in deciding what drugs 
can be accessed through formularies. Failure to understand the interaction of all 
actors was thought to potentially have a detrimental effect on diffusion. The 
misplaced assumption in the BP case that GPs were able to act independently of 
KOLs, was thought to have led to a scenario of total lack of KOL support. Similarly, 
a plateau in the diffusion curve of one of the PDE5 inhibitors was attributed to 
scaling back sales force activities in secondary care to focus on primary care, not 
having appreciated the impact specialists had on GPs prescribing behavior in this 
field. 
Our market understanding of the behaviours in this field were flawed. We underestimated the impact 
of the opinion leaders versus that of the GP. I think we went in with the perception that the GP 
would be able to identify the patients and just willingly treat and couldn’t give a damn what the 
opinion leaders said. Well actually it's completely the reverse, and we didn’t have a great deal of 
opinion leader support through this period, largely because of the way we entered this market. You 
have to get them on side so that they feel engaged and involved with how patients are treated in the 
community, because, at the end of the day, they pick up the mess for wrong treatment elsewhere, so 
if they’re not engaged with that they will argue themselves into a position where they think you’re 
wrong. I think we in hindsight we got that wrong, but we got it right through this period because we 
overcame all the barriers, they could clearly see the advantage that they would be able to treat 
patients more freely and easily, and give GPs more confidence in being able to initiate therapy 
(CS1.3). 
 
The belief amongst respondents was that credibility is essential to maintaining a 
KOL’s position in the hierarchy of influence. Their status is dependent on them 
being viewed by their peers with an element of trust, and by being transparent about 
their relationships, their position as advisors becomes a credible one. Their ability to 
manage conflict of interest was highlighted by respondents as a feature which 







I think if you can motivate specialist care to be able to talk to GPs and give their professional 
opinion, then that's going to be of far more ...not power, but relevance and it's far more trustworthy 
because they're the specialists. This is their area that they specialise in. So even as an influencer, 
you've got to respect that cascade of influence (CS3.2). 
We had relationships with all of the individuals [KOLs] that were there. And so did all the other 
companies as they were coming in, and that’s again just the nature of…if you were looking for the 
expertise that’s where you would gravitate, I don’t think that’s that unusual. But I think I will be 
really honest, I've never seen in all of my experience in dealing with any of the people at that level, 
have never actually seen them have any major issue with managing a conflict of interest.  I think 
they're aware more than anyone else, they understand the old maxim which is, it takes a lifetime to 
build up a reputation and one night to lose it, so I think they really understand that  (CS1.2). 
 
Adopting a position of neutrality was thought to be a means of maintaining their 
position of credibility amongst their peers. The only circumstance in which the 
respondents suggested KOLs will take a preferential position on individual drugs is 
when there are no other competitors in the field. Some respondents highlighted the 
impression of impartiality can raise the issue internally of what tangible benefits they 
can bring to a company, but their influence is subtle and mediated through raising 
awareness of a disease. This impacts on all drugs for that condition and appeared to 
justify their value. Respondents explained that KOLs have to maintain a fine balance, 
as the respect in which opinion leaders are held was thought to be easily lost if their 
views are perceived as being too closely aligned with those of Industry. 
 
I think KOLs are important in driving the sense of why you should use a statin.  I think getting a key 
opinion leader to say oh you should use this statin over another statin is quite difficult.  But I think 
the key opinion leader's role is to say use a statin in this disease area.  It's our role to make it our 
statin that's chosen.  Because you shouldn't be expecting people whose job it is to distribute evidence 
around the health and the disease area to sell our drugs for us, that's our job, that's what we're paid 
to do (CS4.2). 
I think the people that manage the relationships with opinion leaders in the Industry are continually 
having to justify to more commercially minded colleagues why would we be investing in these 
individuals from the amount of time that we spend with them, the amount of information we share 
with them, when they actually deliver tangibly so little. Because in a competitive marketplace with 
more than one product they’re the last people to take sides.  It's not in their interest to do that 
because it would start to jeopardise their relationship, they will only ever do slight preferential 
positioning based on the real solid data that they really understand and that they’re signed up to.  The 
only time when you would actually get them taking sides is when you’re coming into an area that’s 





To maintain this balance, the suggestion from respondents was that KOLs appear to 
be more reliant on evidence than any other adopter group to justify their position on a 
therapy as they are acutely aware that their credibility is being judged on the 
outcome of their recommendations. On this basis, a clear view was expressed by 
respondents that drugs have to offer true relative advantage before receiving any kind 
of endorsement from a KOL. Where a trial does not receive KOL support, its impact 
can be significantly reduced. Respondents believed this was the reason behind the 
limited impact of the Fracture Intervention Trial (FIT) for alendronate. 
 
I'd put opinion leaders alongside evidence in terms of importance  because most people assume that 
the opinion leaders are talking with a good base of evidence behind them, otherwise, very few 
actually put their head up above the parapet and say, this is a good treatment, unless they've seen a 
really good amount of evidence to support that. The notion that you can take them off to fancy places 
and buy them a fancy dinner and then they'll stand up and say it's the best thing since sliced bread is 
somewhat over simplistic (CS3.3). 
The FIT trial really didn’t get them on board there at the beginning due to the tolerability issue. It 
was a huge issue and I don’t think we’d warmed up the opinion leaders properly. It happened in 
other countries, but it didn’t happen here, and I think it's just…huge loyalty from the opinion leaders 
to the competitor. We battled to win them over until we got here, and when we got here [once weekly 
formulation]…there was such a transformation in how people saw the attributes of the product. It's 
extraordinary and you will see that around the world that the adoption of 70 milligram was just 
incredible...a dramatic change in use of the medicine at a critical…at a certain point in the lifecycle 
of the drug. It's a wonderful product (CS1.3). 
Doctors I don't think saw it as a landmark trial in the sense it was, but it was never seen in quite that 
same ethos because there weren't the people there supporting and shouting about it in the same way 
(G1.2). 
 
The motivations of KOLs were seen by respondents as multifarious. A desire to 
remain up to date via trial involvement or conference proceedings allows them to 
maintain an educational role (often reflected in their joint clinical and academic 
appointments). Additionally driving improvements in clinical practice serves a 





Typically they [KOLs] are motivated to try and improve treatment.  I mean they want to use not just 
the latest gismo because it’s sexy, but because it works better. It brings patient benefits and that they 
want to communicate that and it can make sure that their customers, i.e. their peer group or GPs in 
particular, use the medicines appropriately and opinion leaders typically are in a secondary care 
setting, a more academic setting, and so they like to get out to educate people, not to promote a 
medicine, but to promote a therapy. You know, to say ‘look these are therapeutic options, these are 
guidelines, this is where you should use these’ because their vested interest is getting….is preventing 
inappropriate patients coming to secondary care. And they are motivated by that. They really want to 
improve care in the community so that they aren’t getting unnecessary cases coming into hospital 
which could be prevented by appropriate care and by early identification of the patient by the doctor.  
It can almost sound altruistic, but I think as a general statement that is what does motivate them.  
Because they know they’ve got waiting lists and limitations you know, they’re well aware of that 
(CS1.3). 
When you’re talking about the people that have key influence, these are the people that are really 
sort of shaping the way that people view the disease area at a country level. Those individuals are 
really still wanting to hear the news early, and probably the earliest the better, because what I think 
keeps them in their status as being key opinion leaders is access to information that’s not normally 
available through all the normal channels (CS1.1). 
 
A high level of interest and enthusiasm amongst specialists inevitably generates 
further interest further down the cascade, so that in some cases drugs are well known 
about even before launch without any form of promotion.  
There was obviously clinical trials ongoing and there was a high level of awareness amongst 
specialists that here was a more effective statin and if you're going to be engaging in research in 
this area, well use the best drugs, I mean they were very interested in atorvastatin and word got out 
that here was something that was better than what was currently available. We scientifically shared 
the data that said this is a more effective drug, but I mean, that was not promoted at all (CS4.1). 
 
Interview data suggested that for drugs mainly prescribed in primary care the 
influence of a local KOL may supersede that of those on the international stage. 
However, it is likely that the local KOLs would have been influenced by 








There are KOLs which are obviously more national and then local KOLs, the local specialists. And 
what you find is, particularly local GPs they have a strong interrelationship and a trust and respect 
relationship with local opinion leaders, so, people who they're working with perhaps on a more 
regular basis, local specialists. You've got the UK ones influencing the local specialists and then 
internally influencing the GPs, so, the national ones are not always the best influences of the local 
GPs directly. There will be different networks and relationships and influence according to the 
different disease areas.  But the same logic applies it will just be one KOL for one area is not going to 
be valid for another, so it is specific to the disease area (G1.2). 
Obviously the bulk of prescribing is done in primary care. Your GP will tend to look at their local 
opinion leaders, perhaps the local cardiologist or diabetologist or where the GP sees their patients 
going and what they come back out on.  So I think they'll be more influenced by that than say a big 
national key opinion leader (CS4.3). 
 
8.3. Advancing the Field Through Collegiate Agreement: Advisory 
Analysis of respondents’ views suggested that even more powerful than individual 
KOLs’ opinions are those manifested as part of a collegiate effort such as consensus 
guidelines. Industry indicated that bringing together such groups was an important 
activity in accelerating diffusion, although it was necessary for companies to remain 
distanced from the outputs. In conditions managed predominantly by non-specialists, 
Industry views suggested there is greater reliance on collective specialist views to 
guide practice, although this may take an earlier form than official guidelines.   
I think when you’re talking about something where there isn't a consensus or understanding, I think 
opinion leaders are absolutely critical because none of the bigger third party bodies, you know 
neither the colleges or the WHO or public policy will align itself behind something that the experts 
can't agree on, so there is no hope of potential for it until you start building a core nucleus of, or 
there is a core nucleus of experts that actually can do that (CS1.1). 
We developed I think critically national advisory boards of the key, the really key opinion leaders, so 
you’re talking about a scale of maybe 10, 12 key clinicians in the area in the UK. And what was 
interesting was that the board that we created was administered and run by us or facilitated by us, 
but chaired and directed by the clinicians themselves. So we set up something where there was a 
nominated chair, the chair changed, but where they wanted to go, what they wanted to do, we had a 
table to say where we thought we should be going, but it was really them …it was a board for them 
run by them but organised by us.  And I think that also was very helpful, because that, when you’re in 
a fledgling field it helps build up a lot of credibility. And a lot of things sort of sprang out of that, 
such as the need for Royal College of Physician Guidelines which were developed (CS1.1). 
Well statins are predominantly a primary care drug. The difference is that primary care still look to 
secondary care for the okay which is a bit surprising really. I think secondary care is obviously an 




9. COMPANY CULTURAL HERITAGE/ PERCEPTION 
A few respondents highlighted the importance company heritage and culture has on 
diffusion. Analysis of their views suggested heritage appeared to be a concept not 
just defined by the specialist clinical areas a company has experience in, but also 
their cultural background and mind-set, their corporate identity and the impact this 
has on influencing their behaviour, beliefs and ethics of business conduct. It became 
apparent through the case studies that companies need to be aware of the various  
behaviours, relationships and networks of adopter influence that exist in different 
clinical disease areas. While prior experience may provide a company with an in-
depth knowledge of the psychology in one clinical area, the assumption that the same 
beliefs will translate to other disease areas, however, can be fundamentally damaging 
to the uptake and diffusion of a new drug. Respondents explained it is certainly not 
the case of a ‘one size fits all’ approach, a perception that has been to the detriment 
of some of the companies interviewed.  
 
 
9.1. Cultural Influence on Company Perception 
Respondents suggested that the culture within which a company operates can affect 
how people perceive them, as it ultimately influences their behaviour and can 
influence adopters’ decisions. Culture is very difficult to define, but in the inaugural 
BBC Today Business Lecture in 2011, former Barclays Chief Executive Bob 
Diamond, suggested that culture can be captured by the values that prevail in how a 
company or how its people behave when no-one is watching. While some companies 
are known for an aggressive style of approach, other companies may be more 




continuum was seen as a potential drawback. A company’s approach ideally has to 
be responsive to the specific needs of the disease area into which the drug is entering.  
Apart from investor relations media work, we didn't do any consumer media work at all pre-launch. 
We notified them when we launched, but as I said the papers were just full of the Iraq war then so 
they were like; another treatment for ED and they weren't interested, so I think culturally we were 
quite conservative… and it was like "we've got this drug and it's quite good really" rather than 
being sort of very gung ho and aggressive about it, but that approach can alienate people as well 
(CS3.3). 
 
Respondents described how past experiences adopters have had with a company can 
be important in the diffusion of their subsequent drugs based on their conduct and 
their claims, especially where positive interactions have built credibility, linking this 
theme closely with clinician experience (see Theme 2: Clinician/patient experience). 
Preserving reputation therefore seemed of utmost importance and respondents 
indicated how companies will employ ‘rescue strategies’ in order to maintain that 
credibility if one of their drugs is the subject of controversy during its lifecycle. 
Being seen to respond to a problem was regarded by respondents as ‘good customer 
service’. While this is possible to do with clinicians, respondents indicated frustration 
at not being able to defend their reputations directly to patients (see Theme 6: 
Communicating relative advantage; subtheme 6.2.2: Product awareness). 
Then you have obviously I would say things like reputation, you clearly have an advantage if you're a 
Pfizer or a Glaxo versus a company no one's ever heard of (G1.1). 
I think it’s experience with the brand and the company and it’s about sort of trustworthiness really 
and creditability. You know, I think we were known to a lot of our prescriber base, they knew the 
data on one of our other drugs, they knew how we’d gone about marketing to them, they have a 
view of what our company has to bring from our services and our product perspective and that helps 
I think, that helps when you launch a new product.  So we often use, we’d call it our heritage in CNS 
as being a strength for us in our marketplace, we’ve been around a long time, customers know us, 
you know we’ve got good science, you know we tend to have good products and good service 
offerings (CS2.2). 
 
I mean you know the people that are real advocates of our brand are generally people who’d had a 
bad experience, tried it again, and I think there are lots of examples there and I think it’s that we 
know that on average if you as a consumer goes into a restaurant and has a good experience, you will 
probably tell one person that you’ve had a good experience in a restaurant. If you have a bad 




you have had a bad experience and then somebody did something to resolve that for you, you will 
probably tell everybody what great service you’ve had, so, and that is quite a common thing in 
customer service, so actually there is a, not deliberately because we would have much rather got it 
right to start off with (CS2.3). 
 
Analysis revealed that a company’s culture can dictate a particular mindset of 
approach that while suitable for some disease areas, may not be transferable to all. 
Diffusion of healthcare technologies is a socially complex process and it was 
acknowledged by respondents that it is the role of the diffuser to understand the 
behaviours and the expectations of the people they are interacting with in order to 
influence that behaviour. Heritage was perceived as being important by some 
respondents in gaining an understanding of the social etiquette that exists in specific 
disease areas that can save time and resources in future ventures in that condition, but 
others felt that there was no guarantee of a favourable response. 
I think we made some mistakes at the start.  We culturally and historically have always been a strong 
cardiovascular house, and I think the mindset internally was ‘well everybody behaves like they treat 
cardiovascular disease’, well they don’t (CS1.3). 
 
Our heritage is, you know, back through the days of Prozac and even before that.  And so we knew 
who is who in the area of psychiatry. But at the end of the day if you haven’t got a medicine which 
offers true values it doesn’t matter who you know and what you’ve brought to the market in 
previous generations, you know, a product isn’t going to be sold and used just because you’ve got 
some presence and heritage. I think it can give you a head start in knowing who to talk to and, for 
example, who to involve in your trials and who to go to for an opinion. But these individuals aren’t 
going to give you an opinion which goes against their own personal experience and beliefs (CS2.2). 
 
So we knew how GPs worked and we knew; I guess you'd say organisationally our capability was in 
primary care (CS3.1). 
 
 
9.2. Culture Determining Company Priorities 
Analysis of respondents’ views suggested that cultural ethos can have a direct 
bearing on a company’s priorities. Whether that priority is market expansion or 




mindset is driven by maximising revenue or sales, which is dependent on the 
founding principles on which the company evolved.  
We’re a research based pharmaceutical company our goal is market expansion. We introduce drugs 
into areas where there’s under treatment or poor treatment available and go in and try and treat as 
many patients as we can so we’re improving health. So it's a very different mindset to companies 
driven by market share. So that’s a cultural thing, mindset (CS1.3). 
 
The pharmaceutical market differs from other consumer markets due to a relatively 
short period of patent protection. Yet some companies operate within this market 
with consumer-led priorities, which can result from the influence of other arms of the 
company if it has multiple business units spanning several markets. Respondents 
indicated how this feature can manifest itself in clinical trial programmes, as they 
may be designed to achieve outcome measures commensurate with a particular 
cultural mindset.  
What has changed is that the time horizon for products to actually be able to recoup their initial 
investment has proven and definitively become that much shorter. I think there used to be strategies 
that companies could have to develop and to create variants of molecules and new formulations that 
kept their patent protection in existence, but generics are now challenging drugs well before they 
come off patent. The problem with our philosophy at that time was it's a long time to wait for a 
market when the market can build slowly and can disappear quickly and I think one that we struggle 
with sometimes is that in the fast moving consumer goods world we’re used to building enduring 
and lasting brands, so in our portfolio we have 60 brands that have been on the market for more than 
50 years (CS1.1). 
 
The interesting facts are in different markets people behave very differently depending on their 
mindset of whether they’re a revenue maximiser or a sales maximiser, and they will design their 
trials probably to give them a predicted result which will fit with that position that they are, their 
behaviours. As I say, we will typically design everything to try and expand the market to try and get 
more patients treated (CS1.3). 
 
A company’s heritage impacts on the level of priority assigned to a new drug and the 
accompanying level of investment it receives. Respondents suggested that in 
companies with diverse portfolios of drugs, certain drugs will be afforded a lower 
priority, which impacts on its rate of uptake, compared with those drugs that form the 




People would recognise that within the key areas in which we specialise that we often have some of 
the leading brands, if not the leading brand.  And we tend to often invest in classes of drugs, rather 
than have just one in a particular class, so we become, if you like, a sort of specialist within that 
area. So quite a lot of say something like HIV for example, our representatives and our opinion 
leaders and our researchers are right at the forefront of those therapy areas. And so I think quite 
often we are involved in being at the cutting edge and people value that (G1.1). 
Lilly are a company that have had a lot of drugs and have a lot of heritage in psychiatry. AZ doesn’t, 
whether it’s Astra or Zeneca.  So if you think if we don’t have any other mental health drugs at all, 
you know, you go through you know Prozac is a Lilly drug, they have other things, it’s their area. 
They probably had existing relationships with the customers and to be honest, whereas you know 
olanzapine was probably a big priority for Lilly, if we go back to you know, ’99, 2000, 2001 was 
Seroquel such a bit priority for AstraZeneca?(CS2.3). 
 
When companies merge, partner or reassess priorities, respondents expressed the 
view that any increase in resources that means the message can be conveyed more 
efficiently to an audience will help to increase usage, but where to allocate the 
resources most effectively is dependent on what the message needs to focus on. 
Differentiating between products in a market is managed through sales force 
presence (see Theme 6: Communicating relative advantage; subtheme 6.2.3: Product 
justification (representative detailing)). If however, inadequate diagnosis is the 
barrier to diffusion, other strategies such as disease awareness programmes (see 
Theme 7: Market development; subtheme 7.2: Raising disease awareness) and 
thought leader consensus around guidelines (see Theme 8: Key opinion leaders; 
subtheme 8.3: Advancing the field through collegiate agreement) were thought by 
respondents to be of more value to increasing a drug’s diffusion. Mergers and 
partnerships may however, dilute the impact of any one culture dominating in the 
approach.  
 
Parke-Davis was a tiny company really, it was part of Warner-Lambert which was a medium sized 
company, but I mean the pharmaceutical arm was relatively small so much so that one of the things 
that was done pre-launch was the striking of the partnership with Pfizer to co-promote the product 
(CS4.1). 
Any culturally different approach from Bayer should have been balanced out by the GSK side of 





Respondents indicated that understanding the culture, and therefore, the likely 
approach of competitors was important in devising their own marketing strategies 
(see Theme 6: Communicating relative advantage; subtheme 6.2.3.1: Competitor 
objection handing). 
 
There's a bit of Goliath and David going on.  You know, they are much bigger.  They have far more 
people…it's one of those things, do you box clever and play to your strengths or, you know, stand 
behind your product, or do you try and play their game? And I guess where we've tried to play their 
game previously, it doesn't work. It's not something which you can win on 'cos, you know, they can 
change 5% of their field force and out-shout us tomorrow.  We'd have to change like 25% of our 
field force to be able to have that magnitude of change (CS3.2). 
 
There was an appreciation from respondents however that a heritage in a particular 
specialty does not necessarily equip them with sufficient knowledge for subsequent 
products. Even in a distinct specialty such as mental health, the potential diversity of 
conditions covered which can be managed both within the primary and secondary 
care settings means that each new drug requires subtly different approaches to 
convey messages effectively.  
  
Janssen have got a good track record in psychiatry.  Prozac was our heritage before Zyprexa but a 
lot of that was primary care, we had consultant psychiatrists, again it’s different, it’s very different 
launching SMI22 than it is with depression, so yes they knew us, whether we had I would say 
expertise within that area I don’t think so, I think it’s a different molecule and a different need, junior 
doctors treat a lot of depression for instance whereas consultant psych tends to deal with SMI. So yes 
and I guess we had presence and we were known. I’m not sure we had necessarily expertise in the 
schizophrenia marketplace (CS2.2). 
 
Ultimately, not having a heritage in a particular field was not perceived by 
respondents as posing a barrier to a new drug if it offered relative advantage. 
However, crossing over industries without having the basis of a pharmaceutical 
heritage can mean operational knowledge is lacking that may have a major impact on 
                                                 




diffusion (see Theme 3: Evidence; subtheme 3.2.4: Journal quality/publication 
control).  
 
I think yes, a history in psychiatry probably helps, Lilly and Janssen Cilag are both seen as having a 
long history in psychiatry, so I think yes, it probably helps but I don’t think it would stop a new 




10. PRICING   
Discussions on pricing strategies attracted an understandable reticence from 
respondents, exacerbated perhaps by the fact that the price of branded 
pharmaceuticals is set ultimately by the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme 
(PPRS)23. 
 
10.1. Price Setting 
Analysis of respondent views suggested that whilst a number of factors are at play in 
price setting (recouping costs of R&D, remaining period of patent protection, impact 
of parallel imports on profits), it is ultimately governed by what the market will bear. 
What the market will bear is a consequence of the value clinicians and patients 
assign to the relative advantage offered by the new drug. In this sense, even though 
these calculations are conducted within a scientific framework, respondents 
expressed that there is still a certain degree of skill required to predict what the 
market will bear if the drug is the first of a new class. 
I mean there is always this tension, because clearly we are for-profit companies, and for-profit 
within a health environment is quite…it immediately sets up some tension, particularly when you're 
working with public money. So all we can do really is make sure that we try to offer good value 
medicines. It doesn't mean cheap medicine it means medicines that are efficacious but are cost 
effective (G1.1). 
It's also very important to design those studies in a way where you capture data for socio-economic, 
health economic cases that you can build for to understand the pricing of the medicine. You know, 
that’s not just done by whim, it's done by a form of science. I mean it is an art, and it's also a 
measure of the competitiveness of that field, but if you’re first in the market with a brand new 
medicine, with a brand new class, how do you price it? You know, you’ve got to find some means of 
demonstrating value of the brand and the product to the people who are going to pay for it (CS1.3). 
 I think it’s something like 95% of drugs fail to make it to market, so there is always this tension 
between pricing, what the market can afford and what you need to be able to make a profit, and 
also then you have that across different markets, first world, second world, third world, and so on, 
and can you operate differential pricing, which is clearly what we try to do to make it fairer, without 
                                                 
23 The PPRS is a voluntary agreement between the Department of Health and the pharmaceutical 





it coming back to bite you?  So for example if you supply drugs at cost in the third world, do you find 
them pitching up in the first world?  You know, so things like that, and parallel imports and so on 
and so forth (G1.1). 
 
Interview data suggested that prior to the establishment of formalised cost 
effectiveness systems, cost was often secondary to clinical considerations when 
prescribing decisions were more heavily influenced by clinicians, although this 
seemed dependent on disease area. The AA case demonstrated how the confidence 
one company had in the value offered by its drug was such that they priced it at 
almost double that of the first entrant with the insight that price was not paramount in 
psychiatrists’ decision making.  
In the BP case a price premium on the second entrant was thought to have caused 
slow adoption (although there were other factors at play in this case), until the 
benefits of a once weekly formulation were judged worthy of the increased cost. The 
emergence of formal health technology assessment through NICE and the increasing 
importance of non-clinical decision makers was seen as an influence on pricing 
strategy. Respondents indicated how pricing is now determined several years before 
launch with the assistance of payer advisory boards who guide pricing strategy 
according to whether a drug will be considered cost effective on its clinical profile, 
and approved by bodies such as NICE.  
One of the reasons why olanzapine took off very quickly was that they actually came in and priced it 
at a higher price than Risperdal (risperidone) almost fifty percent as much. Now back then you 
could do that and it didn’t create too much of an issue, so they priced high, they invested heavily in 
marketing activities, and that drove some very strong growth for them. I think most of them would 
accept that Risperdal and olanzapine have a similar efficacy. Psychiatrists are really not driven by 
price, even now, too much, it’s the payers that have grown in influence, but back here they had…-
the payers just had less of an influence and there wasn’t as much cost pressure within the NHS, 
there wasn’t as much cost containment, and therefore, you know, that growth was possible with the 
higher price (CS2.1). 
They spent a lot of time trying to convince people that there was a significant benefit of the 
molecule, and they came at a price premium… and people did even understand that, even in the 




I think it’s up to three years you can talk about it, the purpose of advance notification is to notify 
payers if the new product is likely to have an impact upon their budget, so that they can in the NHS 
financial cycle, they can build into their budget planning the expectation of the new product coming. 
So you’re allowed to share some basic information about what the product is, and what you would 
expect it to be priced at (CS2.1).  
There are a number of payer advisory boards as well, as in, look at the clinical profile for this drug, 
look at the cost we’re thinking of charging, do you think that it will get approved for use?  (G1.1). 
 
Respondents indicated how sharing pricing decisions with policy makers in advance 
was seen as a way of enabling planned market entry to avoid potential cost barriers to 
adoption. In a rapidly changing healthcare landscape however, whilst pricing is 
influenced by payers, respondents indicated the difficulties in anticipating and 
accommodating the needs of payers, particularly when those needs vary locally. 
Then there’s the payers, the PCTs.  Now, I mean this has gone through so many evolutions in the 
last 15 years, you know, you wonder where you are. I mean it's becoming a very localised health 
economy around the country, which makes it quite difficult for us because it means we have to have 
multiple approaches depending on the locality and that’s down to the wrong distribution of 
resources, and that’s an accent of history, the post code prescribing, you know, we know all the 
stories.  But the PCTs, you do need to present to them the cogent case of why this drug should be 
used, and today there is generally joint formularies between the secondary care setting and the 
PCT, both agreed (CS1.3).   
 
I think the environment had changed, the NHS keeps evolving so there are again, if anything, by the 
time we launched that there were more checks and balances in place to slow down the acceptance 
of the drug, so you know, NICE had just been invented… before we launched the product we had to 
do a whole raft of work on what I guess would now be called access management to make sure that 
the non-prescribing elements of the healthcare system are at least aware, informed, understanding, 
and ideally from our point of view, accepting and positive about what we’re doing (CS1.2). 
 
Analysis of respondent views revealed that while first entrants face challenges in 
terms of price setting in the absence of a comparator, late entrants to a class are also 
confronted with difficult decisions regarding price due to the imminent risk of 
generics. Price was seen as a reflection of the competitiveness of a field. In a 
crowded market, for late entrants there become fewer points on which to differentiate 




For some diseases it's much less of a barrier than others. This [osteoporosis] there isn't a lot of 
choices, actually it's more important to me that the patient takes the drug. You know, so there’s a 
different motive that drives the prescribing behaviour, and price still, they will always think, well, 
yes, there’s not that many patients I treat, and actually it's quite a small field, yes, I’ll give these 
patients the best of, what I think is best for them.  When you get into a massive field the price 
becomes hugely important you know, like statins today is very different to what statins were 15 years 
ago (CS1.3). 
If you’ve got products on the market which are more meaty, some people will go for more of a 
pricing strategy, and so undercutting, and sort of commoditisation (G1.2). 
 
Later entrants have the additional challenge of still needing to recoup development 
costs and maintain the value perception of adopters, so aiming at an anticipated 
generic price can be counterproductive. Respondents highlighted how the prominent 
role cost effectiveness analysis now plays has in some way diminished the 
significance of value perception amongst adopters in favour of lower acquisition 
costs where sufficient efficacy can be demonstrated. 
You look at simvastatin now it's £1.59 for 40, as opposed to £18.05 or whatever ours is for ten.  So 
even if we'd grown massively over two years we'd have still been hit now because of simvastatin 40 
in the same way or to a lesser extent that atorvastatin has been hit (CS4.2). 
The impact of simvastatin generic on the market at first was relatively modest and the price 
differential at first was not that great… the Government was paying something like the original price 
of Zocor, so about £18 or £16. At that point, we still had a cost effectiveness value in terms of the 
number of people brought to cholesterol target per pound, so if people liked using atorvastatin they 
didn't immediately change their behaviour and say I can save a little bit of money by moving to 
generic simvastatin. The Government got wise to that in May 2005 when they applied their category 
M tariff. Category M was a new category where I think you could pin the price to just one or two 
generic suppliers and it meant that the price dropped dramatically (CS4.1).  
 
10.2. Price Perception   
A quote from one of the respondents that “price is perception” exemplifies the 
importance of the psychology around pricing. The perception of the price of a drug at 
launch was considered by respondents as having a lasting effect on diffusion. While 
the price is used to reflect the relative advantage offered by the new drug, adopters’ 




drug is diffusing. For example, respondents discussed how if the comparator is 
already generic, as in the AAs, the class may be seen as ‘expensive’, whilst in the 
PDE5 inhibitor case anxiety about demand led to the belief that erectile dysfunction 
was going to be too expensive a condition to treat. 
There was a massive price difference between Risperdal (risperidone) and the conventional drugs, 
because most of the conventional drugs…I think all of them would have been off patent, perhaps bar 
amisulpride, so there was a massive price difference, you know, probably talking a tenfold price 
difference, so I think that would have constrained the growth as well to a certain degree (CS2.1). 
It wasn’t like this some sort of vague you know, notion of efficacy, it was; worked in 70-80% of 
people on average, and it was safe, you know and to all intents and purposes and it wasn’t 
expensive, it was £5 a tablet, so that’s £20 a month and that was absolutely in the middle or the lower 
end of what most monthly medicine costs, so there was no reason to ban it, other than a fear about 
its uptake (CS3.1). 
 
Pricing is also a fluid concept, with respondents highlighting how there is an 
opportunity to negotiate agreements with the Department of Health. While price is a 
product differentiator, by not being an innate feature of the drug, it is unlike other 
elements of relative advantage that are subject to a single opportunity at launch to be 
effectively communicated (see Theme 6: Communicating relative advantage; 
subtheme 6.1: Differentiating relative advantage). Respondents indicated that price 
perception based on comparisons can often be misleading therefore as the actual 
price may not be easily established due to issues such as complexities of dosing 
regimes or pricing structures in the NHS.  
But price tends to be perception which is created at launch.  If they feel that it's expensive at launch 
it will always be expensive irrespective of whether it is or not (CS1.3).   
It's difficult to say what the price of etidronate really was, because of the cyclical nature of it.  So, 
it's kind of awkward to do price comparisons.  It wasn’t ‘here’s the daily price, here’s the daily price’ 
it was something like ‘oh god it's too complicated’ and price is very much is perception for GPs… for 
a drug which is primarily used in primary care they don’t see the real price anyway, they just see the 
list price which is the NHS price which if they then compare that with generics or whatever, you 
never know what the price of a generic is, so it's a highly flawed system, but you know, it's probably 





An interesting perspective discussed by respondents in the AA case was the concept 
that the setting of care in which a drug is prescribed may also impact on price 
perception. AAs limited to use in secondary care as a result of their route of 
administration, were considered to be under greater price scrutiny than those from 
the same class prescribed in primary care, despite being of equivalent or similar 
price. There was a belief that hospitals face greater price pressure on drugs than in 
primary care. 
We are finding that Risperdal Consta, although it’s actually no more expensive than olanzapine, is 
being scrutinised for cost very heavily because it’s paid for by the hospitals, whereas the other 
atypicals are paid for by the PCTs, they’re much more paid for by the PCTs, and with the pressure on 
hospital budgets, we’re finding that Risperdal Consta is coming under increasing scrutiny for cost, 
because hospitals have a much more constrained budget than PCTs (CS2.1). 
 
Further into the lifecycle of Risperdal Consta, the fact that the molecule in its oral 
form came off patent (thereby increasing the differential) may have influenced this 
perception. Inevitably, the possibility arises that the new formulation will be plagued 
by comparison with the generic version in the minds of clinicians, even though the 
mode of administration tailors the drug to a potentially different patient group. 
Respondents indicated that in this scenario, it becomes a value judgement for 
prescribers as to whether the relative advantage offered by the new mode of 
administration outweighs the price difference.  
I mean it really does mean that you’ve got to show, you know, advantages over the generic product, 
because the cost difference is so great (CS2.1). 
 
Analysis of respondents’ views around pricing suggested they felt this factor can 
play a significant role in dictating the utility of the innovation i.e. while a new drug 




advantage offered is not over and above current treatment, then a cheaper pricing 
strategy may be its only driver of diffusion. Aside from price issues, respondents had 
previously discussed how other factors were impacting on the way Risperdal Consta 
was being perceived by prescribers, particularly the negative associations of 
administering injections to patients with schizophrenia (see Theme 2: 
Clinician/patient experience; subtheme 2.2: Clinician-patient interaction). 
 
5.4. Chapter comment  
Thematic analysis of the interview data elucidated 10 major themes incorporating the 
factors respondents considered to be influential in the diffusion of pharmaceuticals, 
covering a range of social, economic and technological influences. These included: 
clinical need; clinician/patient experience; clinical evidence; health service/policy 
environments; adopter attitude; communicating relative advantage; market 
development; opinion leaders; company cultural heritage/perception and pricing. The 
validity of the findings and potential new insights contributed by the Industry 
respondents were revealed through triangulation with the other case specific data 





TRIANGULATION OF CASE STUDY DATA SOURCES 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Triangulation compares the results from two or more data sources in the study of the 
same phenomenon. Triangulation can serve different functions depending on your 
philosophical position (either as a test of internal validity by providing a means of 
looking for patterns of convergence to develop or corroborate an overall 
interpretation (Yin, 1994; Mays and Pope, 2000), or as a means of completing the 
data by creating a richer picture of the phenomenon being researched (Stake, 1995)). 
The purpose of triangulation in this research was to ensure the data was complete 
through gathering multiple perspectives from a variety of sources, commensurate 
with a constructivist approach. With this perspective, points of convergence are not 
claims of truth, but instead provide the context for discussion of differences, which 
enhances completeness. Exploration of the divergent understandings then generates 
an enriched picture of the phenomenon. 
 
6.2. Triangulation method 
The three case specific data sources (diffusion curve; timelines and drug-specific 
Industry accounts) were cross-referenced to detect points of convergence and 
divergence between sources. As stated previously in Chapter 4, for confidentiality 
reasons it was not possible to present the individual drug-specific accounts, but they 




of factors derived from the accounts provided by Industry respondents for each case 
study has been presented in Figures 6.1 to 6.4 as part of a composite triangulation of 
data sources for the class.  
 
6.3. Results  
Overall, there was a high degree of convergence between the data sources to explain 
the shape of the diffusion curves. The Industry accounts however, elicited several 
insights that had not been revealed through the literature or expert consultations that 
in some cases could be supported by the diffusion curve trajectories. The points of 





The composite triangulation of data sources for the bisphosphonate case is presented 
in Figure 6.1.  
Table 6.1: Bisphosphonates included in the triangulation analysis  





Alendronate Fosamax MSD 1 2nd Sep 1995 
Risedronate Actonel P&G 2 3rd May 2000 
Cyclical 
Etidronate 
Didronel PMO P&G 3 1st Nov 1991 
 
Points of Convergence – Why does the curve look the way it does? 
Based on agreement between sources, the main themes of importance for this 




• Disease perception – The Industry’s challenge was to represent osteoporosis as a 
preventable disease. This took a long period of time due to traditionally held 
beliefs that osteoporosis was a feature of ageing, which could have accounted for 
the slow rate of diffusion of etidronate, compared with the eventual size of the 
osteoporotic population. Etidronate entered a premature market where disease 
awareness was minimal.  
 
• Patient compliance with complex technologies – The various data sources 
support the concept that complicated administration protocols either due to 
irregular dosing, or to avoid tolerability issues led to patient discontent and non-
compliance, which was supported by the slow diffusion of both cyclical 
etidronate and the daily formulation of alendronate, the course of which changed 
dramatically after the launch of the once weekly formulation.  
 
• Adverse tolerability issues – Alendronate daily was plagued by adverse 
tolerability issues within the first year of launch, which was predominantly 
caused by a lack of adherence by patients to the complex administration protocol. 
The need for a ‘dear doctor’ letter in 1996 warning of potential safety concerns, 
was suggested as causing a marked slowing in alendronate’s rate of adoption that 
continued until the introduction of a new formulation of the drug in 2001.  
 
• Change in formulation – Demonstrating equivalent efficacy of a once weekly 
formulation of alendronate to its daily version was sufficient to revive its market 
potential. While it still required a complex administration protocol, the reduced 
frequency was considered by respondents to have been perceived by patients as 




making it a more acceptable therapy. This shift was clearly visible on the 
diffusion curve, occurring at the same time point when the new formulation was 
launched in 2001. 
 
• Evidence paradox – The Fracture Intervention Trial (FIT 124), was expected to 
have a major impact on the uptake of alendronate. The study was of high quality 
and published in a prestigious journal in 1996, involved several thousand 
patients, was designed to report relevant clinical endpoints, and resulted in a 
favourable outcome for alendronate. It is not however, reflected in alendronate’s 
diffusion curve post-publication in 1996, which coincides with the period when 
medical opinion had been potentially tainted by the emergence of safety 
concerns. Etidronate’s curve shows small dips in use following publication of 
both the FIT 1 and FIT 225 studies, but it recovered on both occasions. The study 
that was attributed as having a substantial positive impact upon BP diffusion was 
the pharmacokinetic comparison that demonstrated equivalence between once 
daily and the new once weekly formulation of alendronate (Schnitzer et al., 
2000). While it was published in a lesser known journal, the results could be 
translated to the FIT 1 trial. Efficacy could be considered without the detrimental 
impact of the safety concerns associated with the daily formulation, enabling the 
FIT 1 data to take on its intended significance. The synchronous change seen in 
risedronate’s diffusion curve following the launch of its once weekly formulation 
in 2003, exemplified the significance of ‘ease of use’ in the diffusion of 
pharmaceuticals, particularly for chronic diseases. 
                                                 
24 FIT 1: Alendronate vs placebo ‘megatrial’ to demonstrate secondary prevention in vertebral and 
non-vertebral fractures. Published in December 1996. 






• Guidelines/policy – Osteoporosis received significant attention between 1999 and 
2001 in terms of the production of policy and clinical guidelines by several UK 
and international bodies. Their significance with regard to the shift that occurred 
in alendronate’s curve in 2001 however is tenuous. As the guidelines did not 
distinguish between BPs, their effect would have been indiscriminate and a 
similar degree of positive impact would have been expected for risedronate at 
least, and this was not revealed by the curve data during that period. The 
timeliness of guideline publication defined the level of impact. Those produced 
early in the BP lifecycles, such as the WHO guidelines (1994) which helped to 
define osteoporosis, and the Royal College of Physician Guidelines on prevention 
and treatment (1999) were considered by respondents and the literature accounts 
as being instrumental in shaping clinical views, but this effect would have been 
gradual and therefore not identifiable through diffusion curves. When NICE 
guidance was published in 2005, at this late stage in the drug’s lifecycle, it is 
likely that clinical practice was already established.  
 
• Lack of competitor impact – The osteoporosis market was dominated by a 
relatively small number of players at the time of the interviews compared to some 
of the other case studies. The diffusion curves suggest that alendronate’s 
introduction did not cause a sudden depression in etidronate’s uptake and neither 
did the introduction of risedronate daily impact upon alendronate. Only when 
once weekly alendronate was launched did etidronate’s use start to decline. The 
extent of this decline was not further accelerated by risedronate’s weekly 
formulation however, potentially indicating preferential switching to alendronate 




(raloxifene and teriparatide) would result in market expansion for osteoporosis 
treatment and be detrimental to BPs is not supported by the curve data or the 
Industry accounts, which suggested raloxifene’s minimal impact was attributable 
to reduced effectiveness in preventing hip fractures, while teriparatide was 
potentially too expensive for the UK market.  
 
Points of Divergence – Industry specified factors 
The following explanations were proposed by Industry respondents as explanations 
for the inflexions in the diffusion curves. These aspects were not elucidated through 
the background literature, and may or may not have been supported by curve. 
• Expert consensus – Respondents explained how they felt there was a need to 
change attitudes towards disease perception before drugs for that condition could 
diffuse successfully, and that this was orchestrated through clinical opinion 
leader networks. Industry highlighted it was essential to gain an understanding of 
the hierarchy of influence in this field and establish the relationships necessary to 
reach a consensus view among clinicians on management strategies for the 
condition. The BP diffusion curves all show a slow rate of initial adoption that 
could reflect the culture of clinicians in this disease area. It could also reflect the 
impact of the postulated access barriers to specialists resulting from respondents’ 
belief that GPs were reluctant to manage the condition in primary care. 
 
• KOL loyalty – Evolution of opinion leadership from within one company as a 
result of the novelty that surrounded disease classification was believed to have 




leadership loyalty was perceived as a marker of allegiance to the company who 
had built and established the market, but as a barrier by competitors. The 
diffusion curves could support this view by showing 1) an unexpectedly slow 
period of adoption for alendronate post-launch in view of the evidence suite and 
marketing efforts, and 2) the fact that there was not a rapid decline in the use of 
etidronate considering the substantial difference in efficacy. P&G also stated that 
they had not mounted a response towards the market entry of alendronate in the 
knowledge that its second drug risedronate was due to enter the market soon 
after. KOL effect is however, impossible to dissociate from the impact of the 
safety issues or the increased cost of alendronate that would have affected the 
extent of relative advantage offered by its increased efficacy. With the advent of 
once weekly alendronate, respondents considered it would have been very 
difficult for opinion leadership loyalty to have continued for etidronate as it 
would have risked credibility to support a significantly less efficacious drug 
when tolerability was no longer a barrier. The diffusion curve could support this 
view as etidronate use only started to decline substantially when the once weekly 
formulation of alendronate entered the market, but this was also largely believed 
to have been driven by patient preference for the new formulation. 
 
• Culturally influenced approach to market entry – Respondents believed that 
adopting a mindset influenced by a heritage of successful practices in other 
disease areas did not translate well to osteoporosis. They believed it resulted in 
focusing attention on the wrong opinion leaders (primary as opposed to 
secondary care where they eventually believed the influence lay). The emerging 




leaders were closely associated with the first company to produce BPs may have 
created an environment where it was difficult for competitors to fully 
comprehend and foster the relationships necessary to achieve opinion leadership 
support. This view could be supported by the relatively slow rate of uptake 
experienced by alendronate, but there were many other confounding factors 
operating at that time.  
• Journal control – The restrictions imposed by a high impact factor journal in the 
way findings from a key study (McClung et al., 2001: risedronate vs placebo), 
were communicated (i.e. no pre-release of results and full explanations for 
inconsistencies in trial outcomes) was considered by respondents as a possible 
factor responsible for compromising the uptake of risedronate. The delay in 
publication was felt to reduce the impact of the data compared with gradual 
release that may have maintained interest, and secondly they felt the overall 
simplicity of the message became complicated by caveats. The trial appeared to 
make little positive impact on risedronate’s diffusion curve or a negative one on 
its main competitor alendronate. Its timing however, coincided with the launch of 
the once weekly formulation of alendronate, which could also account for its 
limited impact and alendronate had fortuitously proved several years earlier the 
outcome the risedronate trial was designed to demonstrate. 
 
• Obsolescence of daily preparations - Risedronate ‘daily’ – Despite not having the 
same degree of tolerability issues, risedronate daily was plagued by association 
with the problems experienced by daily alendronate. The favourable reception by 
patients and clinicians to ‘once weekly’ alendronate, introduced only a few 




limited any further growth in daily preparations. Respondents felt that 
expectations had moved on, making daily preparations obsolete. 
 
• Market leader activities – Respondents considered that market leadership 
activities that helped to increase diagnosis of osteoporosis were important in 
expanding the market for BPs. It is difficult to separate the effect of market 
expansion efforts to identifiable phases of the diffusion curve as the impact 
would have been cumulative over a long period. Alendronate overtook etidronate 
marginally around mid-1997, but the trajectories of the two drugs did not diverge 
significantly for a further three years. A slight increase in use of alendronate was 
evident at the time MSD introduced Fracture Liaison Clinics. The tolerability 
profile of alendonate however, was likely to be a limiting factor to a marked 
increase in alendronate prescribing despite possible increased rates of diagnosis. 
P&G however, also did not appear to gain market share from any of the potential 
activities MSD were involved in to expand the eligible patient population. It did 
perhaps set the foundations for alendronate’s rapid expansion in use when 
tolerability was no longer a barrier with release of the weekly preparation. 
Activities taking place outside of the pharmaceutical market, such as mergers 
between diagnostic companies with interests in osteoporosis were highlighted as 
potentially having provided additional resources to raise the profile of the 
condition. 
 
• Partnerships – Partnering with Hoechst Marion Roussel (a traditional 
pharmaceutical company) in the early stages of risedronate’s development was 
considered by respondents as being important to diffusion as a it provided 




as a consequence of its consumer-based heritage. The rate of uptake was greater 
for risedronate daily compared with etidronate, but the osteoporosis market had 
become established by this point and the arrival to the market of once weekly 
alendronate so soon after its launch would have been likely to hamper any 
additional marketing impact provided by Hoechst Marion Roussel for risedronate 
daily.  
 
• HRT withdrawal – Withdrawal of HRT towards the end of 2001 was not 
considered by respondents as a driver in the osteoporosis market, which disagrees 
with views expressed in the literature. As BPs were not licensed for this 
indication, respondents explained it was not something they could promote. The 
diffusion curve is supportive of the Industry perspective in that the curves for 
alendronate and risedronate continued on at the same angle of upward trajectory 
in the months that followed the withdrawal of HRT, as opposed to showing any 
dramatic increase in use. Alternatively, the slight plateau visible in alendronate’s 
curve at this point, while potentially a data artifact could have indicated the start 
of the saturation phase. HRT patients may then have opened up a new potential 










6.3.2. Atypical Antipsychotics 
 
The composite triangulation of data sources for the atypical antipsychotics case is 
presented in Figure 6.2.  
 










Olanzapine Zyprexa Eli Lilly (now 
Lilly) 
1 5th Oct 1996 
Risperidone Risperdal Janssen-Cilag, 
Organon 
2 3rd Jun 1993 
Quetiapine Seroquel AstraZeneca 4 6th Sep 1997 
 
 
Points of Convergence – Why does the curve look the way it does?  
Based on agreement between sources, the main themes of importance for this 
particular case study were: 
• Clinical need – Unprecedented latent unmet clinical need from clinicians in a 
field of medicine that had not seen any new drugs for several decades was 
recognised as creating the degree of anticipation for a new innovation. ‘Clinical 
need’ on its own however, was insufficient to ensure successful diffusion, 
otherwise risperidone would have benefitted maximally from the demand. The 
diffusion curve data demonstrated that the next entrant, olanzapine benefitted 
most from clinicians’ anticipation for a new treatment shown by a rapid rate of 
adoption.  
 
• Ease of use – Olanzapine was able to meet the additional clinical need in this 
disease area of ‘ease of use’. While risperidone had entered the market not 




obtain the optimal dose. Olanzapine however, offered a single dosing strategy that 
appealed to psychiatrists and enabled it to benefit maximally from the 
unprecedented level of clinical need.  
 
• Safety warnings/issues – On a simplistic level the AA curves can be divided into 
two sections; the acceleration phase and the plateau phase from 2004 onwards. 
The start of the plateau phase was attributed to the Committee for the Safety of 
Medicines letter warning against the use of risperidone and olanzapine for the 
unlicensed treatment of behavioural disturbances in elderly patients with dementia 
due to the risk of cerebrovascular adverse events. This had an immediate effect on 
the diffusion of these two drugs shown by the mirrored decline in the trajectories 
of their curves from March 2004. Concerns regarding metabolic issues did not 
appear to affect the diffusion curves initially, but contributed to the growing 
apprehension during the later phases when their effectiveness against 
conventional antipsychotics started to come under question. To lessen the impact 
of the latter stage decline, an Industry priority was to gain recognition that weight 
issues were a physiological symptom of schizophrenia so that services to manage 
physical health could be implemented.   
 
• Pricing barrier – Despite anticipation of a new drug, the relatively slow uptake 
rate of risperidone was attributed to the price differential compared with generic 
conventional antipsychotics. Olanzapine’s comparator however, was branded 
risperidone, which reduced the impact of price on uptake. In this case it was 





• Evidence – There were no obvious inflexions in the diffusion curves that could be 
attributed to the publication of the early pivotal studies in 1997 (Tollefson et al., 
1997: olanzapine vs haloperidol and Tran et al., 1997: olanzapine vs risperidone). 
Respondents were of the view that these trials effectively became redundant as 
psychiatrists had already formed their own opinions based on personal experience 
with the drugs. The studies were therefore felt to be confirmatory. The impact of 
the trial by Csernansky et al. (2002) on risperidone is difficult to determine as 
there was an increase in the curve trajectories of both risperidone and olanzapine 
during that period. At this point the environment was confounded by several other 
factors, such as the release of the long-acting formulation of risperidone, and 
olanzapine’s bipolar indication, which could have accounted for the increase and 
disguised the trial impact. In the later phases, the large-scale publicly funded trials 
(CATIE (2005) and CUtLASS (2006)) that indicated no significant differences 
between conventional and atypical antipsychotics, together with the mounting 
concerns of side effects appear to have slowed diffusion, although the Industry did 
present alternative explanations for diffusion barriers in this period (see following 
section). 
 
• Competitors – The entrance of competitor molecules could be seen to impact on 
the trajectories of those already available. The launch of olanzapine depressed the 
uptake rate of risperidone, and entry of quetiapine to the market did affect the 
trajectories of both risperidone and olanzapine, although not to a great extent.  
 
• Guidelines/policy – There were a series of guidelines and policy documents 
produced between 1999 and 2000 that correspond with the initial expansion 




Guidelines produced during 1999 were attributed to bringing attention to the 
disease area. Their importance was corroborated by respondents as they led to 
reconfiguration of services and standards, and corresponded with a marked 
change in the trajectory of olanzapine and risperidone (but only marginally for 
quetiapine), despite the presence of safety concerns that existed following the 
withdrawal of the AA sertindole. The impact of NICE guidance and guidelines in 
2002 however, whilst consistent with increases in the curves of all three AAs 
indicating a class effect, was not perceived by respondents to have had a major 
impact. They were produced at around the same time when several other events 
were occurring regarding new indications and off-label usage (see below), 
therefore their individual contributions are difficult to assess. A meta-analyses 
indicating no clear advantages of AAs over CAs ahead of the CATIE and 
CUtLASS trials produced in 2000 did not appear to have impacted on the AA 
curve trajectories suggesting evidence was not necessarily a key influential factor 
governing decisions in this disease area. 
 
Points of Divergence – Industry specified factors 
• Off-label usage – The upward trajectories mirrored in the diffusion curves of 
both risperdone and olanzapine during 2001 were attributed by respondents to 
switching of elderly patients with dementia from a drug (Melleril) that had 
received a Committee for the Safety of Medicines (CSM) warning in December 
2000, to AAs despite this class of drugs not being licensed for this indication.  
 
• Communication impacting on clinician experience – Clinician experience was not 




was considered as being instrumental in preventing the other two drugs from 
reaching their potential diffusion capabilities. Both risperidone and quetiapine 
were affected by confused dose messages at launch that were believed to have 
impacted upon clinicians’ perceptions of their efficacy. It was claimed that 
risperidone was used at too high a dose initially and did not achieve the desired 
separation from the conventional antipsychotics it was competing against. 
Similarly, quetiapine was believed to have been affected by use of too low a dose 
and so did not demonstrate equivalent efficacy to the other AAs (in attempts to 
change perceptions, respondents described how NICE guidance, which did not 
differentiate between AAs, was used to support a message of equivalence for 
quetiapine). It is not unusual for the UK to be conservative in its adoption of new 
medical technologies (Wanless, 2002), but the fact olanzapine was not affected by 
a slow rate of adoption could support the notion that inappropriate use leading to a 
lack of clear effect may explain why the UK was the slowest of the major 
economies to adopt some of the atypical antipsychotics despite the plethora of 
published data (Geddes, 2003). The dosing message was clarified for the launch 
of quetiapine’s bipolar indication, which corresponded to an increased trajectory 
in its diffusion curve from 2004. 
 
• Market positioning – Quetiapine was initially positioned against its competitors 
on the basis of an improved side effect profile rather than on efficacy grounds 
(i.e. equivalent efficacy to existing drugs, but with fewer side effects) based on 
market research that had indicated that side effects were the pertinent issue in 
psychiatrists’ prescribing decisions. Efficacy was however found to be important 




efficacy from a short to a longer-term concept. This achieved differentiation as 
patients tended to fare worse over time with the other AAs. The nature of the 
condition however, was such that respondents believed that management of acute 
manifestations is at the forefront of psychiatrists’ minds rather than focusing on 
the longer-term issues, as their strategies to change this perspective had little 
impact on accelerating diffusion. 
 
• Sales force presence – In conjunction with specific pricing and communication 
issues, the initial slow uptake rates of risperidone and quetiapine were attributed 
to limited sales force investment. In the periods where sales force presence was 
increased, either as a consequence of mergers, or through re-evaluation of market 
potential within the company’s portfolio, the trajectory of the curves increased 
steadily in the period between 1999 and 2003, but without any obvious inflexions 
in these time periods. 
 
• New formulations – The Industry believed that additional new formulations such 
as soluble, and short- and long-acting intramuscular preparations, were justified 
as they were responding to identified clinical needs. This was supported in their 
view by steeper gradients in the diffusion curves following the launch of these 
formulations. Respondent insights suggested however, that continued adoption of 
intramuscular Risperdal Consta was hampered by irrational perceptions held by 
prescribers towards injection preparations derived from association with 
injectable preparations for other management scenarios in schizophrenia (acute 




where clinical trials were also demonstrating little or no difference between 
conventional and atypical antipsychotics. 
 
• New indications – The increase in the gradient of olanzapine’s curve between 
2002 and 2003 was suggested by respondents to be due to the new bipolar 
indication. While olanzapine was the first AA to obtain this additional indication, 
similar rates of increase were not observed with the other AAs when they 
obtained their bipolar indications.  
 
• Limited role of advertising – Respondents considered the purpose of advertising 
is to create awareness, but in circumstances where awareness is already high 
ahead of launch, due to adopter interest or through early release of trial results, 
their view was that advertising was not influential in these circumstances.  
 
• Clinical setting – Prescribing of all AAs was limited by the professional barrier 












6.3.3. PDE5 Inhibitors  
The composite triangulation of data sources for the PDE5 inhibitor case is presented 
in Figure 6.3.  







UK launch  
Sildenafil citrate Viagra Pfizer 1 1st Sep 1998 
Tadalafil Cialis Lilly 2 2nd Feb 2003 
Vardenafil 
hydrochloride 
Levitra Bayer 3 3rd Mar 2003 
 
Points of Convergence – Why does the curve look the way it does?  
Based on agreement between sources, the main themes of importance for this 
particular case study were: 
• Unmet clinical need – Existing treatments for ED were of low patient 
acceptability mainly due to their modes of administration. This resulted in a 
significantly under-treated population and the need for a new type of therapy. 
This perspective was supported by the high level of interest in the subject just 
prior to the release of sildenafil.  
 
• Oral mode of administration – The offering of an oral formulation appealed to 
patients, such that the potential scale of the ED market started to become 
realised as interest grew not only amongst clinicians, but also from patients. This 
market anticipation was driven by extensive media coverage following the USA 
launch of sildenafil that took place a few months ahead of the UK launch.  
 
• Government policy – An unprecedented decision was taken by the Government 




prescription of the drug on the NHS based on fears of excessive demand (by 
implementing this government policy it was a clear acknowledgement of the 
need for NHS rationing). The steep gradient of sildenafil’s diffusion curve, 
however demonstrated that the drug continued to be prescribed, which was 
attributed to defiance of the ban initially by some clinicians following legal 
advice sought by the BMA indicated the guidance to be unlawful. The reduction 
in the rate of uptake by September 1999 reflects the period immediately 
following when the prescribing restrictions, while lessened to include certain 
patients groups, became law. The change in the angle of trajectory of sildenafil’s 
diffusion curve at this point suggests how the diffusion ceiling of the drug was 
significantly curtailed by the prescribing restrictions.   
 
• Media attention – The media attention brought a condition that was largely 
hidden from public discussion to the forefront of public interest. This was partly 
fuelled by misconceptions that sildenafil could be used as a drug of abuse to 
enhance rather than normalise function. The rapid uptake rate demonstrated in 
the initial phase of the diffusion curve could support the impact of the media in 
diffusion as it was key to raising awareness that encouraged patients to seek 
treatment.   
 
• Clinician autonomy – The belief that the autonomy of clinicians was being 
challenged by the Government’s ban was considered to be the reason that led the 
British Medical Association to encourage its members to continue prescribing 
sildenafil until the restrictions were given the rule of law. This allowed diffusion 
to take place in the period between launch and when the restrictions became 




which it was still possible to prescribe sildenafil on the NHS (men suffering 
severe distress on account of their ED) was considered by respondents and the 
literature to be broadly interpreted by clinicians, such that diffusion continued in 
this constrained prescribing environment, albeit to a reduced capacity to that 
originally anticipated. 
 
• Disease perception – Overcoming the embarrassment and stigma surrounding this 
condition was partly achieved through medicalisation (shift in terminology from 
impotence to ED). ED, which was a pre-existing term, changed the emphasis from 
it being perceived, particularly by patients, as a psychological condition to that of 
one with an organic cause. The impact was to alter clinician perception of ED 
from a lifestyle condition to that of a serious, yet treatable condition. The 
diffusion curve can only reflect the impact of this change through its increasing 
gradient in the post-launch period. 
 
• Competitor challenge – The almost simultaneous launch of two competitors 
within one month of each other caused an obvious reduction in the gradient of 
sildenafil’s diffusion curve. Tadalafil’s longer period of action however, was a 
clear point of differentiation that responded to patient need, reflected by the larger 
percentage of market share it was able to obtain compared with vardenfil, which 
was unable to achieve sufficient differentiation from sildenafil. A different 
approach to marketing was seen as being necessary to differentiate tadalafil from 
sildenafil. 
 
• Widening access – The peak in sildenafil’s diffusion curve seen at the beginning 




sildenafil through pharmacies, and caused a momentary reduction in tadalafil 
prescriptions.  
 
• Evidence – With the exception of the pivotal studies that heralded their 
introduction, trials did not appear to be a major driver in decision making in the 
diffusion of this class, despite the vast amounts of data generated by them. As 
efficacy of the drugs for this condition is tangible, preference is highly patient-
driven, according to the characteristics afforded by the different drugs in this 
class. The brief decline in the gradient of sildenafil’s curve and the slight increase 
in that of tadalafil’s at the beginning of 2006 may have reflected the impact of 
preference studies that favoured tadalafil. However, as the diffusion of sildenafil 
was not significantly affected in the period that followed, this could suggest that 




Points of Divergence – Industry specified factors 
As most points of divergence were based on social factors, it is difficult to attribute 
inflexions on the diffusion curves to them, and instead they are more likely to be 
represented as gradual positive and negative inclines. 
• Incompatibility of clinician/patient needs – The incompatibility between clinician 
priorities (restoration of function) and patient needs (restoration of intimacy) was 
perceived by respondents as having prevented clear communication during 
consultations of the relative advantage that a long-acting drug could provide. The 




characteristic afforded i.e. the potential for spontaneity was thought by 
respondents as not being adequately explored during consultations. The initial 
uptake rate of tadalafil was similar to sildenafil, but this lack of discussion could 
have contributed to the reduced rate of subsequent adoption witnessed after the 
first year. 
 
• Primary and secondary care boundaries – The intended shift of ED management 
from urology to primary care made possible by the oral mode of administration 
was curtailed by restrictive government prescribing policy. Respondents discussed 
how this transferred prescribing policy back to secondary care specialists as the 
conduit through which treatment could be obtained, but their limited numbers 
presented a barrier to access compared to what would have been possible through 
primary care.  
• Opinion leader involvement – Respondents believed that sensitive management of 
opinion leaders in secondary care was crucial in getting an oral drug that was 
going to be predominantly managed in primary care accepted by them, so as not 
to undermine the influence of specialists and get them on board. 
 
• Evidence barrier – Extensive clinical trial programmes were effectively used to 
block competition by raising the benchmark of the evidence suite necessary to 
compete on a level playing field. This was perceived by respondents as having 
presented a cost barrier for competitors. 
 
• Sales force dynamics – Withdrawal of a co-marketing partner in the case of 




immediately represented in the diffusion curve, the subsequent use of a contract 
sales force that did not possess the same level of established trust with clinicians 
as GSK representatives held, was thought by respondents to have contributed to 
limiting the rate of its adoption.  
 
• Influence of secondary care – One company’s strategy to scale back secondary 
care representatives to focus entirely on primary care was suggested by 
respondents as being the cause of a curve plateau. Despite the vast majority of 
prescriptions being maintained in primary care, respondents believed that 
specialists continued to retain prescribing influence. 
 
• Counterfeit impact – The view from respondents was that the presence of 
counterfeit versions of the molecule and the ability to purchase these drugs online 
has been responsible for severely compromising the potential ceiling of the 
diffusion curve for drugs in this class. 
 
• Policy impacting on compliance – The use of policy to ration availability of PDE5 
inhibitors to one tablet per week was believed by respondents to impose artificial 
conditions on what ideally is a spontaneous act. The impact, in their view, was 
that it often disengaged patients from wanting to continue with further treatment. 
Discontinuation rates of PDE5 inhibitors are relatively high, therefore the market 
research insights that respondents have on this matter could present this as a 
plausible explanation. 
 
• Clinician embarrassment – Embarrassment experienced by clinicians and patients 
was thought to be the cause of reticence to fully discuss alternative treatment 




there had been poor implementation of NSF policy objectives around ED. 
Sildenafil was thought to benefit from this issue as respondents perceived that 
patients requesting a particular brand were not generally dissuaded with a full 
discussion of the advantages and disadvantage of all other possible options.  
• Drug perception – The failure to adequately differentiate vardenafil from 
sildenafil was thought to be the reason why vardenafil became reserved as a 
second-line treatment. Vardenafil was also likely to fail in sildenafil resistant 
patients, which was believed by respondents to have reinforced clinicians’ 













The composite triangulation of data sources for the statin case is presented in Figure 
6.4.  
Table 6.3: Statins included in the triangulation analysis  
 






Atorvastatin Lipitor Pfizer 2 4th Mar 1997 
Rosuvastatin Crestor AstraZeneca 4 6th Mar  2000 
 
 
Points of Convergence – Why does the curve look the way it does?  
Based on agreement between sources, the main themes of importance for this 
particular case study were:  
• Evidence – The landmark 4S mega-trial in 1994 (simvastatin vs placebo) initiated 
the rapid uptake of statins (simvastatin had already been on the market for five 
years at the point of publication). The trial was sufficiently powered to prove that 
LDL-C reduction not only reduced cardiovascular mortality, but also total 
mortality through secondary prevention of cardiovascular events. It was this 
feature that was necessary to tip the balance in changing clinical practice. While 
the impact seems minimal on the scale of the eventual diffusion curve, there was 
a significant change in its trajectory following publication of the study (see 
Figure 4.7 for an expanded view of the initial diffusion period). WOSCOPS 
(pravastatin vs placebo), published in 1995, which quickly followed publication 
of 4S, opened up an additional market. It demonstrated effectiveness of statins in 
                                                 
26 Lovastatin was the first statin but it was not launched in the UK.  Interviewees often discussed 




primary prevention, which presented a significantly larger eligible patient 
population. 
 
The late 1990s, and into the mid-2000s was a trial active period (atorvastatin and 
simvastatin diffused in parallel27). The largest of these was the independently 
funded Heart Protection Study (2002) (simvastatin vs placebo), which was key to 
supporting continued use of simvastatin (on the grounds of proven clinical 
outcome efficacy and safety) in amongst a dominating series of atorvastatin 
mega-trials (see Appendix 16 for further details of trials).  
 
• Clinical scepticism – Before the 4S study, the views of respondents and the 
literature supported the belief that the medical community was unconvinced of the 
benefits of LDL-C lowering, despite evidence demonstrating a reduction in 
cardiovascular mortality. The barrier to statin adoption at that time was justified 
on the basis of questionable efficacy. Then despite demonstration of efficacy 
through the 4S trial, scepticism still persisted, but manifested in concerns over 
safety of the class (rhabdomyolysis and increased mortality associated with 
persistently low LDL-C levels). This contributed to the relatively low level of 
diffusion in the period post-4S compared with what was eventually achieved by 
this class. The lack of early opinion leader support for the LDL-lowering concept 
was a barrier to adoption for statins.  
 
• Relative advantage – Ease of use afforded by atorvastatin offered a relative 
advantage that appealed to prescribers. The lack of clinical outcome studies at its 
                                                 
27 Pravastatin was a viable competitor to the major statins, simvastatin and atorvastatin initially, but 
the null outcome of  the ALLHAT trial of pravastatin against usual care was responsible for its 




launch did not appear to present a barrier as confidence in the statin effect was 
such that extrapolations to clinical impact were being made on the basis of 
atorvastatin’s greater potency on surrogate markers. As a 4th entrant, atorvastatin 
gained almost equivalent market share to simvastatin within three years of launch 
and remained on a par with simvastatin for a period even after generic 
simvastatin became available. Rosuvastatin had greater potency, but safety 
concerns limited the impact of this benefit. 
 
• Policy – The identification of cholesterol lowering as a government priority in the 
National Service Framework for Coronary Heart Disease (CHD) in 2000 appears 
to have been a key factor in boosting statin usage. This was further enhanced by 
inclusion of cholesterol targets in the QOF in April 2004 that incentivised the 
prescribing of statins. This was supported by the continued steep upward 
trajectory across all statins (evident on rosuvastatin’s individual curve, but 
masked by scale on the group charts). 
 
• Safety – Despite launching into a cautious market tainted by the withdrawal of 
cerevastatin and the prospect of simvastatin becoming generic within a few 
months of launch, rosuvastatin experienced rapid adoption. However two safety 
warnings issued in quick succession for rosuvastatin in mid-2004 soon after its 
launch (due to incorrect use of starting doses higher than recommended) 
adversely affected the drug’s subsequent rate of uptake. The suggestion that this 
safety issue affected confidence in the other statins was supported by a plateau in 
the other statin curves for a short period around the same time. This period also 





• Generic challenge – Introduction of the category M tariff of the new Pharmacy 
Contract in April 2005, resulted in a significant reduction in the price reduction 
of generic simvastatin (genericisation of the market two years earlier had had 
little impact as prices had remained high). This coincided with an unprecedented 
NHS drive for restrictive prescribing policies and incentive schemes aimed at 
encouraging switching to generic simvastatin. The impact was observed as a 
virtually immediate plateau in the diffusion curves of atorvastatin and 
rosuvastatin.  
 
• Subgroup targeting – From 2005 onwards, generic simvastatin 40mg took the 
majority of the atorvastatin 10-20mg market, (although it had less impact on the 
rosuvastatin 10mg market due to its greater potency that could not be achieved 
with generic simvastatin). The flattening rather than decline in the diffusion 
curves of the more potent statins however, demonstrated their retention of niche 
high risk patient groups. 
 
Points of Divergence – Industry specified factors  
• Clinician experience – The initial delay in the uptake of low dose statins was 
thought to be a consequence of clinicians needing a period of trial with them 
before realising their convenience in terms of ease of use. While the uptake rates 
for both atorvastatin and rosuvastatin were quite rapid, this factor may have 
caused a degree of depression that would not be easily discernible due to the 





• Health service environment – Respondents were conscious of the impending 
challenge from generic simvastatin, but they described how the unprecedented 
scale of the NHS drive for restricted prescribing policies advocating the use of 
generic simvastatin was unforeseen, which respondents explained left them 
unprepared for its impact.  
 
• Impact of company mergers – The rapid uptake of atorvastatin was considered by 
respondents as reflecting the impact of a large field force of representatives that 
was required due to issues of scale for a drug that was predominantly prescribed 
in primary care. 
 
• Response to safety concerns – The handling of the safety warnings for 
rosuvastatin by deflecting concerns was viewed by respondents as having 
potentially limited the drug’s recovery. They believed a strategy using clinical 
evidence to align rosuvastatin with the rest of the class in terms of safety using the 
evidence to support their claims, would have been more effective in terms of 
converting clinical opinion. Wider pharmaceutical safety issues external to the 
class (e.g. withdrawal of COX II inhibitors in 2004) were considered to be a 
contributing factor in heightening an already cautious regulatory environment. 
 
• Guidelines – Despite an extensive array of guidelines, respondents considered that 
their effect appeared to be cumulative in that they informed policy outcomes such 
as the NSF for CHD in 2000. Only the Joint British Societies guideline (JBS2) 
produced in December 2005 was mentioned specifically as having thought to have 
had a tangible impact on diffusion. It was the first in the UK to lower targets 




potent branded statins (policy maintained its original position despite respondents 
indicating they believed clinical opinion was moving towards lower targets).  
 
6.4. Chapter comment  
Diffusion curves, representing usage (as in this research) or sales, have limitations in 
informing studies on technology diffusion. They require augmentation with 
additional sources of information to obtain a comprehensive picture of the reasons 
why a drug did or did not diffuse. The NHS is a dynamic environment, with events 
involving multiple stakeholder groups occurring simultaneously that may have some 
bearing on the diffusion of a new drug. Even with the sophistication of time series 
analysis, it would only be possible to attribute pin point discrete events. The effects 
of multiple simultaneous events or cumulative effects that arise from socially driven 
factors (based on experiences or perceptions) would not be discernible, particularly 
as the data is only accessible by quarter after the fact. The accounts of Industry 
respondents have overall closely aligned with the literature and clinical expert 
accounts for all case studies. Where there have been points of divergence, this has 














DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION. 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter i) outlines the novel contributions of the research, ii) summarises the 
key findings of the empirical research within the context of previous explicit Industry 
contributions to the academic literature iii) considers the implications of the findings 
and iv) discusses the potential for future research.  
 
7.2. Novel contributions 
 
7.2.1. Respondents 
This is the first empirical study to gather, analyse and present views on diffusion 
influences from personnel currently working within pharmaceutical companies. In 
doing so, it has contributed an absent voice from the biomedical literature on this 
issue, which can co-exist as an alternative stakeholder perspective amongst the views 
and opinions of prescribers whose perspective currently dominate the discussion on 
pharmaceutical diffusion. One of the reasons why Industry perspectives have been 
missing is that they are a difficult group to access. The commercial sensitivity 
surrounding the nature of the information the pharmaceutical industry possesses has 
potentially instilled a degree of reticence on behalf of both researchers to explore this 
issue and Industry personnel, who may be suspicious of the researcher’s intent, to 
participate. Rogers made the point in his book that “data gathering from the change 




innovations was not part of the prototypical diffusion study. Officials in such systems 
may be at least equally to blame for certain diffusion problems as are the potential 
adopters (who are the usual objects of diffusion). But it is not easy for diffusion 
scholars to study these officials”.  
Despite such an inherent challenge, it has been possible to gain access and obtain 
first-hand accounts from personnel actively operating within the Industry. This offers 
a more reliable insight into their beliefs compared with anecdotal commentary and 
critical assessments of their behaviour. A set of otherwise tacit views has been 
elicited that can contribute a valuable insight into the drivers and barriers to diffusion 
of pharmaceuticals according to this unique group, and how these can be interpreted. 
In exploring these explanations with Industry participants, the research has also made 
explicit aspects of the Industry’s own perception of what they do to actively 
influence diffusion. 
 
7.2.2. Methods  
The use of quantitative data (diffusion curves) to test the validity of qualitatively 
derived Industry claims about pharmaceutical diffusion influences has not been done 
before. This is most likely a consequence of the need for significant upfront 
investment to generate sufficiently large numbers of diffusion curves, coupled with a 
lengthy access process to ensure that four case studies were eventually possible. 
Taking a case study approach imposed additional levels of complexity considering 
the main aim of the research was to obtain general themes that the Industry felt were 
influential in the diffusion of pharmaceuticals. However, there was a risk that in 




not have yielded the same depth of response achieved through drawing upon the 
wealth of examples offered by case studies. This was demonstrated by the fact that 
most of the empirical studies identified in the literature review posed questions about 
general concepts and typically achieved official line responses, which suggested the 
need for a new approach. Importantly, a general approach would not have offered the 
opportunity to triangulate the respondents’ accounts with other data sources 
describing the same phenomena, which has enabled a richer picture to be generated.  
 
7.3. Key findings 
7.3.1. Industry themes affecting diffusion 
The Industry perspectives demonstrated how they perceive diffusion to be influenced 
by a combination of both tangible and intangible factors. Ten general themes 
encompassing these factors were elicited across the four case studies and are 
discussed below. Additionally, the specific Industry perceived drivers and barriers of 
diffusion for each of the four case studies are summarised in Table 7.1.  
Clinical need 
For an innovation to diffuse, Industry respondents felt there had to be a genuine need 
and that no amount of marketing could make prescribers use something that was not 
needed. They distinguished clinician-interpreted need including discontent with 
current therapies or poor innovation to date and patient need. These may not be in 
alignment. In the PDE5 inhibitor case, the Industry’s insight indicated that clinicians 
were more focussed on restoring function, whereas patients’ priority was intimacy 
and normality. The daily preparations of the bisphosphonates were also highlighted 





Clinician and patient experience with a drug was sometimes a strong feature of the 
Industry’s response (absent from the Industry literature review, although not from 
Rogers’ diffusion of innovations theory). Respondents highlighted several examples 
where changes to formulation were a significant driver of diffusion as they clearly 
improved the patient experience. Negative experience of the new drug was perceived 
as a major barrier to diffusion. The oesophageal irritation associated with the 
bisphosphonates (due to non-compliance with the complex dosing regimes, which is 
why this aspect had not been observed under the strict conditions of clinical trial 
settings) was perceived as a real limitation.  
 
Clinical evidence 
Evidence was cited as needing to fulfil various functions, from regulatory approval to 
marketing and had to offer novel, concise information that could be easily interpreted 
by specialists and generalists alike. Practical considerations, such as the return on 
investment on a limited patent life, may also dictate the nature of evidence provided 
and mean that studies that would be intuitively useful, for example head to head 
comparative trials, do not get funded. In these circumstances, surrogate endpoints 
were considered as relevant comparators. Evidence was also seen as having a 
temporal aspect. Publication of the Fracture Intervention Trials for example for daily 
alendronate made little impact on its diffusion curve at the time, but changes that 
occurred later in the lifecycle brought its relevance to the fore. The prestigious nature 
of the journal in which a study is published was also a matter for trade-off. 




set against the more rapid dissemination and, perhaps, simpler messaging from a 
study in a journal that can publish more quickly. 
 
Health service/policy environments 
The inherent tensions that exist between the pharmaceutical industry and 
government, in that government both regulates the Industry and through the NHS 
acts as its main market, was a feature highlighted by respondents that acts to both 
enhance and retard diffusion. Respondents described how companies seek out links 
to policy and national initiatives, even when they may be tenuous (e.g. 
bisphosphonates and falls in the NSF for Older People). The effect of guidelines was 
also described as having varying degrees of influence on diffusion, often being more 
positive if they coincided with general trends in clinical practice. Conflicts were 
identified, for example in the statins case where the Joint British Society guidelines 
seemed to support use of the most potent agents yet government policy was pushing 
towards generic simvastatin. Clinical setting also exhibited tensions for respondents. 
The Industry will almost always want to move prescribing from specialists to 
generalists to accelerate diffusion due to the greater number of prescribers in primary 
care, but respondents described how this shift can be compromised by policy barriers 
as in the case of sildenafil, or reluctance on behalf of non-specialists to want to 
manage certain conditions they perceive to be outside their expertise (schizophrenia 
and osteoporosis). However, as it is the specialist who is most likely to be interested 
in new technologies, respondents recognised that driving treatments to a primary care 







The view from respondents suggested they regarded UK clinicians as conservative in 
their practice, which can make them late adopters of new technologies, and 
encourages a sceptical view of information provided by Industry. Some respondents 
did acknowledge however, that challenging market access conditions could be a 
contributing factor rather than necessarily an ingrained culture. Attitudes that 
distinguish life-saving from life-enhancing treatments were perceived by respondents 
as having an impact on diffusion, as did clinician and patient perceptions of diseases. 
Diffusion of treatments for osteoporosis and erectile dysfunction was enhanced for 
example when clinicians were persuaded that the conditions were not an unavoidable 
part of ageing, or that the cause was physiological, and not psychological. 
 
Communicating relative advantage 
Respondents indicated that communicating relative advantage was a critical part of 
their remit, and the use of representatives was essential in this. Allowing two way 
exchange of information was supportive of the views on interpersonal relationships 
presented in the Industry literature and Rogers’ diffusion of innovations theory. 
Respondents referred to Rogers’ adopter categories to explain how they tailor their 
information materials, but did point out that the nature of information may change 
during the lifecycle of a drug. In the BP case advertising materials initially had a 
greater scientific focus to appeal to innovators, but then took a more compassionate 
approach towards the latter stages of the lifecycle to invoke the attention of the late 
majority. Failure to communicate relative advantage from the outset was seen as a 




other products can be. A host of factors are implicated here including complex or 
changing messages, difficult dosage regimens and market entry position. 
 
Market development 
Market development embodies actions that respondents highlighted the Industry is 
involved in to delay the diffusion curve reaching its plateau. This involves both 
identifying the market needs during drug development and removing barriers to 
diffusion post-launch. Examples included diagnostic service provision (Fracture 
Liaison Clinics in osteoporosis), and company sponsored physical health training 
programmes for NHS staff managing patients with schizophrenia justified on the 
basis that weight gain was legitimately associated with the condition. In this case this 
helped to focus what was initially a drug-specific issue to a disease-specific issue. 
Dissemination of information via patient groups, public figures and the media, is also 
a commonly used tactic of market development, which was regarded by respondents 
as principally the responsibility of the market leader. 
 
Key opinion leaders (KOLs) 
KOL influence was notably absent from the Industry literature and yet this factor 
featured highly in the interview material. Their influence ran from early stage 
development through to ensuring collegiate support post-launch. Respondents 
stressed the need for KOLs to ideally be seen as at arm’s-length from Industry, 
consistent with Rogers’ detailed discussion on opinion leader influence. It is seen as 
critical to have the right KOL, in the right setting at the right stage of diffusion. In 
the case of erectile dysfunction, a negative diffusion curve inflexion was attributed to 




specialist sector despite most prescribing decisions taking place in primary care. 
Interestingly, as in the case of osteoporosis, KOLs can originate from within the 
companies themselves, if the scientists who developed a class of drugs can be 
portrayed as the experts in that disease area. Competitors here saw that as 
compromising their own entry into a market ‘owned’ by another company. 
 
Company cultural heritage/perception 
Some of the cases highlighted the importance of how a company’s approach to a 
market needs to be sensitive to the norms operating within that area. Respondents 
described how their cultural mindset is formed as a result of a heritage in certain 
disease areas. Launching into different disease areas with different social norms and 
structures but using long-standing strategies was considered by respondents to be a 
cause for some of the negative inflexions in the diffusion curve. Being seen as either 
very aggressive or very conservative by adopters in their approach to marketing was 
also perceived as a potential drawback. A cardiovascular approach to the 
osteoporosis market for example was not well received by adopters as it was thought 
by respondents to have been perceived as being too aggressive. Equally a 
conservative approach in the erectile dysfunction market was believed to have 
resulted in a limited impact. The key message therefore was a company’s approach 
ideally needs to be responsive to the specific needs of the disease area into which the 
drug is diffusing. 
 
Pricing 
Pricing for first entrants was seen as relying on a skilful assessment of what a 




dictated by the others in its class, plus the threat of impending generic pressure, and 
yet the costs of R&D still need to be recouped. Price perception was highlighted as a 
potential barrier to the adoption of new drugs. Respondents believed that in 
circumstances where generics are involved as either the comparator (generic 
conventional antipsychotics vs branded atypical antipsychotics), or as a pre-existing 
formulation (generic risperidone vs Risperdal Consta), the branded drug will always 
be perceived as being expensive irrespective of any relative advantage it may afford. 
Perception can also be impacted on by the clinical setting. Respondents believed 
drugs limited to use in secondary care as a result of their administration (such as 
injectable risperidone) were under greater price scrutiny than those from the same 
class prescribed in primary care (e.g. oral olanzapine) despite being of equivalent or 





Table 7.1: Summary of Industry Perceived Case Study Diffusion Influences 
 Industry perceived drivers of diffusion  Industry perceived barriers to diffusion 
   
Bisphosphonates • New once weekly formulation alleviated the significant side 
effect issue 
• Safety warnings - oesophageal irritation  
• Apathy towards disease recognition – not being considered a real/credible disease 
 • Ease of administration - impact of complicated  regimen 
lessened by weekly formulation 
• Opinion leadership loyalty to one company  
• Co. approach to the osteoporosis market not commensurate with system norms 
 • Clinical need - lack of existing treatment options • Overly-complicated trial design (stemmed from lack of experience in pharmaceutical field) 
 • Under-treated population • Under-diagnosed population 
   
   
Atypical 
Antipsychotics 
• Ease of use: simplicity of olanzapine’s dosing regimen (single 
10mg daily dose vs risperidone’s need for titration) enabled it to 
benefit from unprecedented need 
• Complicated trial messages leading to confusion about starting dose – intended efficacy not 
witnessed by clinicians  
• Safety warnings - off-label use in inappropriate populations 
 • Unprecedented clinical need driven by innovation inertia  • Price perceptions associated with secondary care drug administration 
 • Side effects of AAs significantly less than current therapies • Negative associations with administering injection-based formulations 
 • Safety alert resulting in withdrawal of a drug, for which AAs 
were substituted (off-label indication) 
• Emergence of new side effects  
• Perception of need for specialist management by non-specialists 
• Price competition with genetic conventional antipsychotics 
   
   
PDE5 Inhibitors • New more acceptable mode of administration – encouraged men 
to seek treatment  
• Restrictive government policy for NHS availability  
• Stigma associated with ED prevented patients coming forward for treatment 
 • New formulation enabled non-specialist administration 
• Patient-driven need 
• Policy limited prescribing to specialists – fewer prescribers compared with intended non-
specialists 
 • Under-treated population • Media frenzy detracted attention from the seriousness of the condition. 
 • Unprecedented media attention and public interest in sexual 
topics  
• Recognition and acceptance that majority of ED cases have an 
organic and not a psychological cause – overcame stigma 
• Lack of clarity in terms of within class differentiation  
• Attitudes of apathy - ED considered as a lifestyle condition, or embarrassment from health 
professionals and patients to discuss condition 
• Misalignment between patient and clinician needs from a treatment perspective 
   
   
Statins • Growing acceptance that the lower the cholesterol level the 
better - emergence of an effective cholesterol lowering drug in 
statins  
• Enormous investment in clinical studies leading to 
transformation in prescribers’ viewpoint - improved outcome in 
all cause mortality demonstrated by 4S trial  
• Safety warnings re: rhabdomyolysis (cerevastatin and rosuvastatin, but had class effect)  
• Very underdeveloped market shrouded in controversy during early 1990s 
• Emergence of a new phase (genericisation of older molecules - required implementation of 
Schedule M generic pricing restrictions before generic impact was observed) – compromised 
diffusion potential of later entrants  
• NHS Switching policies with financial incentives  
 • Trial suite included supportive independent study (Heart 
Protection Study)  
• QOF has driven statin use with financial incentives 
• Government policy (NSF/NICE TA) boosting further usage  
• Conservatism of government guideline targets 
• NHS drive for generic use unprecedented – function of the size of the market and chronic 
nature (vs other disease areas) making it a financial priority. Class with the most spend. 





7.3.2. Divergence and convergence between Industry views and case study 
literature and expert views (results of triangulation) 
Clearly what Industry respondents said often overlapped with accounts about the case 
studies documented in the literature and supported by clinical experts. This suggests that 
respondents did not hold radically different perspectives on pharmaceutical diffusion 
from those elicited through other sources. But sometimes their views did diverge, which 
has provided some new insights into possible diffusion influences. The convergent 
findings were largely related to the more tangible factors that influence diffusion, such 
as pricing, changes to formulation that improve ease of use, safety warnings, 
government policies, clinical evidence, where it is easier to correlate the impact of an 
event with a time point on the diffusion curve (within the limitations of data 
interpretation, explained in previous sections). The divergent findings largely 
represented a combination of factors based on their insider knowledge (for example, 
impact of mergers on sales force dynamics; issues with journal restrictions; culturally 
influenced approach to market entry), and the more intangible factors they uncover from 
their efforts to understand adopter attitudes towards their products. Most of the barriers 
to diffusion that respondents highlighted had a social basis such as the detrimental 
impact of not fully appreciating the social dynamics of KOL influence in different 
disease areas; issues with communication that lead to unintended consequences; 
distorted adopter perceptions; and incompatibilities between patients’ and clinicians’ 
priorities. While these divergent findings are merely hypothetical in that they represent 
the world according to respondents, some of the more discrete events can be supported 





7.4. Comparison of the Industry themes with prior Industry contributions to the 
literature 
The literature review presented in Chapter 2 demonstrated that the only indication of 
pharmaceutical industry views on diffusion was from a relatively poor literature that 
only told part of the story (usually presented as counter-arguments to criticisms, rather 
than providing any depth of insight into their perspectives on wider diffusion issues), or 
inferences from critical commentaries on Industry practices. This was in spite of a wide 
search of the biomedical, marketing and economic literatures using a deliberately broad 
search strategy to try and capture their views. Relevant factors were drawn out by the 
literature review and presented under broad themes, but the only way to find out 
Industry perspectives was to research them directly.  
Comparison of the ten general Industry themes derived from respondents with those 
from the Industry literature (Table 7.2.) demonstrated that the degree of overlap was 
such that all of the literature review themes could be incorporated within those 
discussed by respondents. The literature review presented a limited picture of what 
respondents obviously had a much greater depth of knowledge and insight of. In these 
instances, the research has been able to support and augment topics that were not 
previously covered in depth, providing insights into how companies proactively respond 
to diffusion barriers and actively influence others.  
There were however, new themes not documented before in the Industry literature, 
which included the more tacit, socially driven aspects of diffusion, such as the influence 
of clinician and patient experiences with new drugs, the attitudes of clinicians and 
patients towards diseases and the social norms that exist with regards to disease 




commensurate with disease-specific norms, which requires an understanding of KOL 
influence i.e. needing to introduce the drug in the right way, to the right people that 
have the right influence. 
Table 7.2: Literature and empirically-derived Industry themes on key diffusion influences 
Empirically derived themes  
(order as presented in Chapter 5) 
Literature review themes 
Clinical need Research and development 
Clinician/patient experience - 
Clinical evidence Medical research 
Safety and regulation 
Health service/policy environments Government priority  
Adopter attitude: clinician/patient - 
Communicating relative advantage Marketing and promotion 
Competitors/generics 




Key opinion leaders - 
Company cultural heritage/perception - 
Pricing Cost impact/ HTA 
 
While some of these new themes are not essentially ‘new’ in that they have been 
acknowledged as being influential in the wider diffusion literature, they are novel 
contributions in that they are offering pharmaceutical industry perspectives on these 
factors that have not been elicited in the Industry literature before.  
 
7.5. Insights and contradictions  
Some of the more unexpected insights of the research included the suggestion that the 
practices of non-specialists created access barriers to pharmaceuticals through 
inappropriate referrals to secondary care; the potential incompatibilities between 
clinician and patient perspectives; the assertion that embarrassment is a major barrier 




(unlikely to be admitted by clinicians themselves in diffusion studies); that new 
formulations may be rejected on the basis of irrational negative associations; and that 
flawed communications were believed to have distorted clinician perceptions, such that 
new drugs were positioned inappropriately, or gave rise to safety issues. Safety issues 
were particularly interesting as in most examples they were conceptualised by 
respondents as not being a consequence of the drug itself, but more about the way the 
drug was being used, which is a perspective that absolves a degree of responsibility. 
There was an acceptance however, by respondents that communication issues around a 
lack of clarity in the messages they were conveying was a major part of the problem 
that led to inappropriate use.  
Certain perspectives that were presented could be viewed quite cynically such as 
changing the way diseases are perceived and the development of services to support 
diagnosis, in that the ultimate beneficiaries are the manufacturers of the drugs that are 
prescribed to manage the condition. However, if the drugs are demonstrated to be 
efficacious, there is a benefit to the patient and the health service from these Industry 
funded services as patients are being diagnosed that otherwise would not be. I also do 
not think it was necessarily detrimental to change attitudes towards marginalised 
conditions such as osteoporosis and erectile dysfunction, as the shift in the perception of 
clinicians and patients has resulted in many people benefitting from access to treatments 
for these conditions. 
I think some of the issues raised by respondents offer plausible explanations about 
pharmaceutical diffusion. However, when viewed critically there are tensions within 





7.5.1. Plausible arguments: 
Comparative trial design – The assumption that comparative trials are not conducted by 
Industry for fear of demonstrating inferiority was not confirmed by Industry 
respondents. They instead presented an alternative perspective around the commercial 
pressures they have to take into consideration. For instance, it is not always financially 
viable for them to conduct comparative trials if they are unlikely to report sufficiently 
ahead of patent expiry for them to benefit from the substantial investment. If this is 
indeed the barrier to conducting comparative trials, that are so very much needed by 
clinicians, then we are left with a scenario of either requiring more publicly funded 
trials to plug the gaps in research, or conditions have to change that make it more 
conducive for companies to want to do this type of trial design. Perhaps models could 
be considered where patent exclusivity is extended to give companies time to conduct 
head to head studies and recoup some of the costs involved. However, this would 
involve a trade-off between generating the evidence people want to make informed 
prescribing decisions, and delaying the emergence of a generic market. The risk of 
demonstrating inferiority is likely to be a concern, but equally there is a significant 
reward for superiority. If there is a genuine belief that the product is good enough and 
meets genuine need, as is often claimed, there is an incentive for these products to be 
assessed in this way. This may also reduce the incentive to produce me-too drugs if the 
relative advantage is not sufficiently substantial. If left to the Industry to conduct these 
trials, however issues will remain such as choice of appropriate comparators in a global 
market. 
Clinical need – While there is a lot of scepticism around whether new pharmaceuticals 




clinical need is an adopter-defined, and not a manufacturer-defined concept is 
something I think is plausible based on this research. There were several examples cited 
where new formulations of existing drugs developed in the belief they were answering a 
clinical need did not diffuse successfully because that need was perceived as either not 
there, or the drug did not align with the expectations of clinicians (exemplified by the 
intramuscular injection of long-acting risperidone). In addition, attempts described by 
respondents to change the meaning of clinical need for adopters (e.g. redefining efficacy 
in terms of long-term effects as opposed to immediate benefits) were unsuccessful as 
clinical need appears to be a factor that is conceptualised by the adopter.  
Unique insights and active involvement – I think the insights that respondents provided 
in relation to strategies that did not work as well as expected, such as communication 
issues and implications of misaligning company approaches to market entry with the 
social norms and systems of a disease area, do have some degree of plausibility on the 
very basis that there was nothing to be gained from their perspective by highlighting 
these issues and yet they provided some of the most fascinating insights. So did the 
discussions around the strategies companies use to accelerate adoption, such as subsidy 
of diagnostic or supportive services that coexist alongside the NHS, public policy 
engagement to engender favourable political and clinical environments and the impact 
of sales force dynamics on the diffusion curve. Company perception was a factor 
respondents were conscious of particularly as a result of attention levelled at the 
Industry in recent years pointing to unethical practices. Some critics of the 
pharmaceutical industry however, appear to miss a key point that would incentivise 
companies strongly against questionable activities. The most important statistic for 




indicates the confidence of the market in a particular company and ensures protection 
against hostile takeovers. Share prices are notoriously sensitive to reputational issues 
and scandals emanating from unethical behaviour, whether in research or commercial 
operations and almost always reflect negatively in the share price damaging the 
commercial viability of the company.  
These insights from respondents clearly demonstrate the active role of the 
pharmaceutical industry in dissemination, but the unintended consequences of diffusion, 
exemplified by some of the highlighted safety concerns, indicate that social influences 
(such as sharing of clinical experiences that may have resulted in use of incorrect doses) 
were also at work.  
 
7.5.2. Contradictions  
The tension that exists within some of the Industry arguments however, does lead me to 
challenge some of their perspectives: 
Experience –The insistence that clinical evidence is at the forefront of decisions about 
pharmaceutical diffusion did not align with the importance that respondents then placed 
on clinician and patient experience. The widely held view amongst respondents that 
clinicians need to observe the beneficial or harmful effects of a drug for themselves 
before they are convinced of its usefulness can be challenged by the fact that in many 
cases clinical outcome (e.g. prevention of fractures in osteoporosis or reduction of risk 
in cardiovascular disease) cannot be directly observed by the clinician. In the 
bisphosphonate case for example, it can take many years to see the effects of BPs on 




factors such as improved patient tolerability, or improved ease of use rather than a need 
to observe efficacy. Clinical evidence therefore is likely to hold greater importance in 
decision making when the effect of drugs cannot be observed directly by serving as a 
vicarious trial for individual prescribers. However, there are different kinds of 
clinicians, some who prefer evidence and some who do not. 
Key opinion leaders – Tensions exist between the suggestion that opinion leader loyalty 
hindered diffusion of competitor drugs in the bisphosphonate case study, when 
respondents then make the point that the only way KOLs retain their credibility is to 
maintain distance from any one company. It is difficult to find supporting or refuting 
evidence for this factor, but while criticisms remain that the Industry is ‘creating’ 
diseases, the scenario where expertise could originate from within a company is a 
potential competing explanation for competitor diffusion barriers. 
Conservatism – The view that conservatism is a cultural characteristic of UK adopters 
can be somewhat challenged by different rates of adoption in different disease areas. It 
is therefore unlikely to be an ingrained cultural response, but influenced more by the 
particular environmental conditions that prevail in different disease areas. With regard 
to international comparisons of adoption rates, the structural barriers to market entry in 
the UK are a more plausible explanation for the differences, which some respondents 
did acknowledge.  
 
7.6. Implications of the research  
This research has elucidated an implicit perspective on diffusion that has only 




understand Industry perspectives as this is the only way we can gain an insight into why 
pharmaceutical companies behave in the way that they do. Making assumptions about 
their motivations, as opposed to empirically gathering their views, just because they 
present a challenging sector to research has led to polarised and inaccurate accounts 
prevailing. The pharmaceutical industry has not helped its position by only minimally 
engaging with the academic literature. This research therefore has provided an 
opportunity to engage and understand their perspective, presented within the context of 
additional sources of information describing the same phenomena, such that it can be 
viewed critically.  
In addition to the academic contributions of this work, there are potentially some 
practical implications. There has been increasing emphasis in the UK on collaborative 
working between government funded agencies and the pharmaceutical industry to foster 
innovation and improve patient care (Department of Health/ABPI, 2010). While it is 
necessary to be mindful of the individual agendas each stakeholder group may bring to 
a discussion on diffusion there is value in exchanging and appreciating alternative 
perspectives. Some will remain sceptical as to the motivations of Industry as a partner in 
providing patient care as opposed to a supplier of it (Moynihan, 2012), but they 
certainly possess knowledge and resources that can be utilised by the health service. 
Through partnership, a dialogue can be established that recognises the needs of both 
sides, including understanding the realms of what is possible, what is not possible and 
the explanations for why certain things may not be possible, instead of assuming the 
stance that Industry is being uncooperative. While we have a good understanding of 




way to understanding the issues in diffusion the Industry consider to be important and 
some of the challenges they face as the diffusers.  
In addition to obtaining a greater understanding, this research has practical implication 
with regard to the methods used by the NIHR Horizon Scanning Centre (HSC).  The 
NIHR HSC provides timely information to policy makers about significant new and 
emerging health technologies. It is the largest of the horizon scanning agencies and as 
such has a strong research focus, leading on the development of methods in horizon 
scanning that are disseminated amongst the other agencies. To ensure that we are 
carrying out the work effectively, we constantly strive to improve on the methods used. 
The NIHR HSC’s current prioritisation criteria are based on previous diffusion work 
that has focussed on clinical, health service or policy-based opinion (Stevens et al., 
1997; Booth-Clibborn et al., 2000; Cook et al., 2004; Packer et al., 2004; Packer et al., 
2006), the premise being that to predict with a degree of accuracy which new 
technologies are likely to have a significant impact on the NHS, it is first necessary to 
gain a comprehensive understanding of the factors that have influenced uptake and 
diffusion in the past. Eliciting Industry insights on diffusion influences has provided an 
additional source of information to further refine the NIHR HSC’s prioritisation criteria 
for identifying new technologies. 
 
7.7. Further research  
The fact that a lot of the findings were confirmatory, coupled with the practical 
challenges this research presented, might dissuade me from recommending further 
research of this nature, particularly as access was most likely made possible through the 




pharmaceutical industry. However, I do think it was important to provide Industry 
respondents with an academic forum within which to discuss some of their challenges in 
relation to pharmaceutical diffusion, and make people aware of the environment in 
which they operate, which holds different pressures to the environment in which 
clinicians operate.  
The significance of the less tangible factors in pharmaceutical diffusion indicates more 
studies of a qualitative nature are justified to uncover these potential barriers and drivers 
that cannot be exposed through quantitative means. Further qualitative exploration that 
could emanate from these findings includes: 
i) Testing the Industry perspectives with clinicians to see if what they are saying 
rings true with them. As well as individual clinicians, the establishment of new 
stakeholder groups, such as the Clinical Commissioning Groups, whist heavily 
influenced by GPs, will be operating under a new dynamic. Additionally, the 
emerging architecture from Innovation, Health and Wealth, the white paper 
addressing improvements in the systematic introduction of innovations 
(Department of Health, 2011), will provide new stakeholders, such as the NICE 
Implementation Collaboratives and the Academic Health Science Networks 
(AHSNs) with alternative insights into diffusion against which the Industry 
perspective can be compared; 
ii) Exploring how the marketers’ insights on diffusion factors correlate with those 
of different employee groups within pharmaceutical companies, such as 





iii) As part of a much wider application, the findings could be compared against the 
various other models that exist on diffusion research to contribute to extending 
theories on diffusion. 
  
7.8. CONCLUSION 
Pharmaceutical industry views on diffusion were regarded as a ‘black hole’, but in fact 
many of the respondents’ views were consistent with what was already known on 
diffusion. While this could be considered a product of obtaining official line responses, 
the fact that respondents were prepared to discuss their own role in diffusion and not 
only talk about the successes but some of their disappointments, offered a far greater 
insight than what was initially anticipated from this research. Unsurprisingly, their 
perspectives cast the Industry and their practices in a good light, which will inevitably 
be contested by other stakeholders. However, in amongst the rhetoric there have been 
some fascinating insider insights that are useful contributions to the diffusion debate, 
particularly with regard to the significance of the less tangible social interactions that 








Appendix 1: Literature Review Search Strategy  
 
Literature review question:  
What literature exist describing pharmaceutical industry views on important factors in 
the diffusion of drugs (direct accounts from Industry personnel or empirical studies 
involving Industry personnel)? 
 
1. Databases searched: 
The following databases were selected on the basis of their relevance to the 
research disciplines covered by the literature review topic. 
 Database (Host) Relevant disciplines Date range  
1 MEDLINE (Ovid) Health and Biomedical 
Sciences, Social Science, 
Business and Law 
1946 to Sep wk 1 2012 
2 EmBASE: Excerpta Medica (Ovid) Health and Biomedical 
Sciences 
1974 to Sep 2012 
3 Health Management Information 
Consortium (HMIC)28 (Ovid) 
Health and Biomedical 
Sciences 
1979 to Jul 2012 
4 Web of Science (ISI) 
Science citation index 
Social science citation index 
Conference Proceedings 
Health and Biomedical 
Sciences, Social Science, 
Business and Law 
 
1899 – Sep 2012 
1898 – Sep 2012 
1990 – Sep 2012 
5 EconLit (EBSCO) Social Science, Business 
and Law 
1964 to 2012 
6 Business Source Premier (EBSCO) Social Science, Business 
and Law 
1907 - 2012 
7 ABI/INFORM Global (Proquest) Social Science, Business 
and Law 
1933 - 2012 
7 Applied Social Sciences Index and 
Abstracts (ASSIA) (Proquest) 
Social Science, Business 
and Law 
1987-2012 
8 Dissertations and Theses (Proquest) All 1861 to present day 
 
 
                                                 
28 Compilation of data from the Department of Health Library and Information Services and King's Fund 




2. Search strategy:  
According to the Cochrane Reviewers’ Handbook, when developing a search strategy: 
 It is always necessary to strike a balance between comprehensiveness and precision. Increasing the 
comprehensiveness of a search entails reducing its precision and retrieving more non-relevant 
articles.  
 
 Developing a search strategy is an iterative process in which the terms that are used are modified, 
based on what has already been achieved.  
 
 There are diminishing returns for search efforts; after a certain stage each additional unit of time 
invested in searching returns fewer references that are relevant to the review. Consequently there 
comes a point where the rewards of further searching may not be worth the effort required to 
identify the additional references.  
 
Rationale 
Several authors who have assessed the evidence in the field of diffusion of innovation 
research have indicated that formal protocol-driven search strategies may fail to identify 
important evidence (Greenhalgh et al., 2005; Greenhalgh and Peacock, 2005; Robert et 
al., 2010). The nature of this literature review topic required a combination of broad 
MeSH headings combined using Boolean operators with specific title searches in order 
to obtain the most relevant yield.  
The search strategy was tested for several variables to assess the impact on the yield. 
These included focussing and exploding MeSH headings and broadening title searches 
to include abstracts or text words. The ‘diffusion of innovation’ MeSH heading, or the 
use of truncated diffusion synonyms (diffuse* OR adopt* OR uptake OR sales OR 
market* OR disseminat* OR commerciali* OR penetrate*) when applied to the dataset 
limited the yield of relevant articles significantly. The iterative development of the 
search strategy is presented in section A. The final search strategy that obtained the 
most relevant yield and was subsequently applied across other databases is presented in 
section B. 
 
A. Iterative development of the Literature review search strategy  
Relevant MEDLINE MeSH Headings: 
MeSH Scope Used for  
DRUG INDUSTRY That segment of commercial enterprise 
devoted to the design, development, and 
manufacture of chemical products for use in 
the diagnosis and treatment of disease, 



















The broad dissemination of new ideas, 
procedures, techniques, materials, and 
devices and the degree to which these are 
accepted and used. 
innovation diffusion 





Database: Ovid MEDLINE(R) <1946 to September Week 1 2012> 
# Searches Results 
1 *Drug Industry/ 16137 
2 (Perspective* or View* or Overview* or Insight* or Perception* or Mindset* or 
Attitude* or Impression* or Thought* or Belief* or Realit* or Observation* or 
Angle*).ti. 
365129 
3 1 and 2 694 
4 limit 3 to English language 615 









Testing the Search strategy  
Apply consecutive terms filter to reduce hand searching requirement 
6 ([pharma*  industr*] or [pharma* compan*] or [pharma* manufactur*] or 
[pharma* sponsor*] or [drug* industr*] or [drug* compan*] or [drug* 
manufactur*] or [drug* sponsor*] ).ti.  
3389 
7 4 and 6 14929 
Assess impact of broadening title terms to include also abstract terms 
8 (Perspective* or View* or Overview* or Insight* or Perception* or Mindset* or 
Attitude* or Impression* or Thought* or Belief* or Realit* or Observation* or 
Angle*).ti,ab.  
1842381 
9 1 and 8  1528 
10  9 not 5  141330 
Apply ‘Diffusion of innovation’ MeSH heading and Diffusion Synonyms filters 
11 Diffusion of Innovation/  12567 
12 4 and 11 431 
13 1 and 11 9232 
                                                 
29  There was a degree of overlap with search 5, but many articles included views on the pharmaceutical 
industry from other stakeholder perspectives (clinicians/medical students/patients) and not Industry 
themselves. Several key studies were missing from search 5, therefore it was not a suitable filter. 
30  No more additional useful articles identified. No need to go any broader than perspective synonyms in 
title. 




14 (adopt* or uptake or diffus* or launch* or market* or disseminat* or 
commerciali* or penetrat*).ti,ab.  
808842 
15 11 or 14 808842 
16 4 and 15 (Drug industry MeSH + ‘perspective ‘synonyms  ti.+ ‘diffusion’ 
synonyms ti,ab.) 
13233 
17 9 and 15 ( Drug industry MeSH + ‘perspective ‘synonyms ti,ab. + ‘diffusion’ 
synonyms ti,ab.) 
45334 
18 5 and 16 2535 
19 16 not 5 10136 
Identifying empirical studies  
20 (questionnaire* or survey* or interview* or qualitative).ti,ab.  843202 
21 4 and 20  9737 
22 5 and 21 1338 
Broadening the empirical study search 
23 1 and 14 and 20 (Drug Industry MeSH + diffusion’ synonyms ti,ab. + interview  
synonyms ti,ab.) 
196 
24 limit 23 to english language 17439 
 
 
B. Final search strategy applied to other databases 
The MEDLINE search strategy (presented below) was adjusted as necessary (including 
equivalent MeSH terms) for the other electronic database searches.  
# Searches Results 
1 *Drug Industry/ 16137 
2 (Perspective* or View* or Overview* or Insight* or Perception* or Mindset* or 
Attitude* or Impression* or Thought* or Belief* or Realit* or Observation* or 
Angle*).ti. 
365129 
3 1 and 2 694 
4 limit 3 to english language 615 






                                                                                                                                               
32  Majority of the yield was not relevant. 
33  Limited number of Industry perspectives – mainly clinical views on Industry 
34  Broadening to include ‘perspective’ synonyms in ‘title’ and ‘abstract’ did not yield any further useful 
references. 
35  25 records were common to both sets. 
36  Additional yield containing diffusion references were not relevant. 
37  Empirical studies, but focus was too broad. 
38  Of the hand-selected studies, 13 were empirical studies involving the pharmaceutical industry. 







6 (questionnaire* or survey* or interview* or qualitative).ti,ab.  843202 
7 5 and 6 13 
 
 
3. Intuitive searches: Formal search strategies were accompanied by more intuitive 
approaches including:  
a. Pearl Growing: This search technique uses one relevant article as the 
basis for finding other relevant articles (either through the ‘find similar’ 
or electronic citation indexing functions), which identified a small 
number of additional articles.  
b. Serendipitous discovery: Browsing and being alert to serendipitous 
references (as advocated by Greenhalgh et al., 2005). 
 
4. Specific Journal Searches  
As an additional method, a limited number of journals that featured key 





o Journal of Medical Marketing: Device, Diagnostic and Pharmaceutical 
Marketing 
o Health Marketing Quarterly 
 
5. Grey literature  
a.   OpenGrey (formerly SIGLE) 
While some of the databases listed above (e.g. ABI/Inform, ASSIA) 
incorporated both peer-reviewed scholarly journals and grey literature, a 
search of the grey literature database OpenGrey 
(http://www.opengrey.eu/)  was conducted with the broad headings of the 
main search strategy, but yielded few results. 
 
b. Trade publications: Monthly trade magazines (PharmaTimes Magazine 
and Scrip Magazine) and online trade news sources (Pharmaceutical 




6. Internet searches 
Keyword and consecutive term searches (consistent with those tested in MEDLINE) 
were conducted in Google and Google Scholar. Search strings were refined 





A total of 153 articles that provided data on the subject question were retrieved, 90 of 
which were included in the review. While the search strategy was purposefully kept 
broad to capture relevant articles, there was no way of identifying Industry–authored 
papers that did not specifically state that it was an Industry response in the title or 
abstract. Searching for individual company names was considered too specific a 
limitation to incorporate into the search strategy. 
Twenty five empirical studies were identified that aimed to elucidate Industry views, 
usually on just one factor in the diffusion process. The remainder consisted of Industry 
opinion pieces, predominantly from the major pharmaceutical companies Merck, Lilly, 
GSK and Pfizer, reflecting similar niche focuses in the diffusion debate (most 
commonly from a USA perspective), or Industry evidence submissions to the HCHC 
Inquiry. Areas commonly discussed were in relation to research and development 
(R&D), regulation, pricing and HTA, clinical trial design and the perceived educational 
role of the pharmaceutical industry. One article provided a discussion of a range of 
diffusion influences across the lifecycle of a drug, but this was a rare insight provided 




Appendix 2: Industry Feasibility Study Response 
 
Pharmaceutical companies approached to determine the feasibility of Industry 
participation in the research.     
 





GlaxoSmithKline 1 Needed further clarification in order to know what they 
could supply, but willing to participate. 
 
Pfizer 2 Positive commitment to participate if possible. 
 
AstraZeneca 3 Positive commitment to participate if possible. 
 
Merck Sharp & 
Dohme 
4 Needed further clarification in order to know what they 
could supply, but willing to participate. 
 
Novartis 6 Positive commitment to participate if possible. 
 
Aventis 7 Positive commitment to participate if possible. 
 
Abbott 16 Needed further clarification in order to know what they 
could supply, but willing to participate. 
 
Lundbeck 20 Unable to agree to participate at this stage as individual 
brand managers would need to be contacted for case study 






Appendix 3: Approach email to case study experts - selection criteria  
 
Dear [Expert] 
My name is Luan Linden and I work with Dr Claire Packer at the National Horizon Scanning Centre. 
Claire has suggested that I contact you in the hope that I may be able to ask for your assistance.  
I have recently registered to do a Ph.D. investigating the views of the pharmaceutical industry on drug 
diffusion in the UK. The first step is to identify suitable case studies. Once identified, I will contact 
various data providers to construct a diffusion curve. I will then (a) explore the effect the pharmaceutical 
company had on diffusion through investigating marketing campaigns and talking to clinicians etc. and 
then (b) explain the shape of the curve through identifying key trials, guidelines, market competitors etc. 
In attempting to identify case studies, I have been overwhelmed by the vast number of possibilities. 
Although I have tried to apply selection criteria to narrow down the search, I am concerned that there is 
the potential to miss some interesting case studies and therefore I would like to tap into experts’ for some 
guidance in making a selection. 
If you are willing and able to assist me in this task, my only selection criteria are that the drugs should 
have been launched in the UK approximately between 1990 and 2000 and that they were intended for use 
in primary or secondary care (not over the counter preparations). Please do not feel that the selection has 
to only include ‘blockbuster’ drugs or those reviewed by NICE. The selection can include individual 
drugs or classes if you feel they would make a more interesting study. I have excluded proton pump 
inhibitors, COX II inhibitors and thrombolytics as other researchers have investigated these topics, but 
please consider any other specialties or patient groups of varying sizes.  
The hard part is to define what I mean by ‘interesting’. It encompasses a range of factors that could 
impact upon the diffusion of a new drug, including issues surrounding: 
 Cost (or cost-impact) of the new drug compared with current treatments (more expensive/ much 
cheaper) 
 Evidence base associated with the new drug (clinical reluctance due to limited faith in evidence/ 
rapid conversion in clinical practice as a result of several positive large scale trials) 
 Side effect profile of the new drug (better/ worse) 
 Administration (changes to mode or dose compared with existing treatments) causing 
increase/decrease in patient compliance 
 Disease profile (is the new drug intended for life threatening/ non-life threatening indications) 
 Need for patient monitoring with use of new drug (increase or decrease) 
 Were there any later additional indications that expanded the new drug’s market? 
 Significant journal/media attention surrounding the introduction of the new drug (positive/ 
negative) 
 Adverse drug reaction profile of the new drug (worse/ better) compared with existing treatments. 
 Marketing campaign (do you remember any drug where its launch was associated with a 




 What type of company was behind the new drug’s launch? (large/ small) 
 Patient group interest in the new drug 
 Did the introduction of the new drug result in service re-organisation issues (nurse prescribers as 
opposed to clinicians, home administration as opposed to medically assisted administration)? 
 Geographical availability (uneven/even) of the new drug as a result of local/ regional decisions 
(price discounting etc.)  
 Presence of official guidelines (NICE/NSF), independent assessments (UKMi), local/regional 
decisions (PCT committees) 
Examples of drugs that address some of the above issues include Viagra due to the significant media and 
patient interest it received at launch; statins and Glivec due to the significant cost impact their 
introduction was going to have on the NHS; ondansetron and granisitron’s uneven geographical 
availability due to cost and local discounting arrangements; and troglitazone due to its significant adverse 
effect profile. 
I would be very grateful if you could suggest up to 10 drugs (including any of the examples used above if 
appropriate), bearing some of the above issues in mind, with a brief explanation (1-2 lines) as to the 
reason for your choices, ideally before [1 month deadline]. 
In addition to yourself, I am also asking experts from national and local prescribing committees (National 
Prescribing Centre, UKMi), representatives from the pharmaceutical industry, the ABPI, independent 
medical journalists, academia and public health and pharmaceutical advisors to assist me with this task, 
with the aim of trying to identify themes from the suggestions provided. 
I appreciate that this is a very difficult exercise and I understand if you feel you simply do not have the 
time. Perhaps if you are unable to help on this occasion you can suggest a colleague who may be willing? 





Appendix 4: Approach email to NIHR Horizon Scanning Centre 
Pharmaceutical Industry Contact  
 
Dear [Industry contact name] 
My name is Luan Linden and I work with Dr Claire Packer at the NIHR Horizon Scanning Centre at the 
University of Birmingham. I am writing to you in my capacity as a Ph.D. student to request your help in 
identifying a contact within your company who would be willing to spare the time to talk to me about 
marketing strategies employed by the pharmaceutical industry, with particular reference to [drug name/ or 
multiple drug names], which has been chosen as one of my case study drugs from an earlier prioritisation 
exercise.  
In view of the detailed nature of the interviews, ideally I would need to speak to someone with knowledge 
of the brand history, therefore the marketing director may be my best place to start. So as to not provide 
unnecessary details to our horizon scanning contacts, I usually send a description of the research project 
to the marketing contact once identified, but in essence I am trying to obtain the pharmaceutical industry's 
perspective on what you think are the most important factors that impact upon the way a pharmaceutical 
is taken up into the market, using the case study as an example.  
I would be very grateful if you could provide me with the relevant contact details at your earliest 






Appendix 5: Approach email to potential pharmaceutical industry 
interviewee  
 
Dear [potential interviewee name] 
I am currently researching for a Ph.D. on the views of the pharmaceutical industry on the diffusion of 
drugs in the UK at the NIHR Horizon Scanning Centre, based at the University of Birmingham. We are a 
unit funded to provide the Department of Health with advance notice of new technologies that may 
impact upon the NHS in the next 2-3 years and part of our work feeds into the NICE programme. This 
‘early warning’ is our main activity, but in addition we engage in an active research programme. One of 
our particular areas of interest is the adoption and diffusion of healthcare technologies. 
I have been given your name as a contact by [name: industry contact/intermediary industry contact], 
[Business title] of [pharmaceutical company] as someone who may be willing to help with a brief, 
relatively informal one to one interview. Part of my research involves engaging directly with key industry 
personnel with the intention of gaining an objective insight into the process of drug uptake and 
subsequent diffusion from the perspective of the pharmaceutical industry. The key points of the research 
and the interview are summarised in the attached information sheet. 
If you are able to participate, I am more than happy to travel to you at a time that is convenient, and I will 
follow-up this letter with a phone call in the next week to discuss any issues you may have prior to 
arranging an appointment ideally before [date – within approximately two months of request].  
 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of the interview with me in the meantime, I have included my 












Appendix 6: Company Information Sheet  
(attached to email request in Appendix 5)  
INFORMATION SHEET - Industry Interviews 
 
What is the research about? 
The aim of the Ph.D. is to elicit the views of the pharmaceutical industry on the factors 
that influences the uptake and subsequent diffusion of drugs in the UK. The 
pharmaceutical industry is the single most important data source in understanding 
diffusion and yet it is significantly under-researched. This is a topical area in the academic 
literature with many publications discussing influences on physicians’ prescribing 
behaviour, but there is little documented from the industry’s perspective. From a research 
point of view this would be of great interest, as it would represent the position of the 
people primarily involved in initiating and driving diffusion, as opposed to relying on second-
hand accounts of the industry’s role. By using a case study approach with actual diffusion 
curves as a vehicle for capturing the industry’s viewpoint, the aim is to generate a 
comprehensive view of the factors that impact on a drug’s diffusion. 
 
What will be covered in the interview? 
Various topic areas may be covered, including: 
1. General issues such as:  
• what makes a successful marketing strategy and how marketing techniques used 
change throughout a drug’s lifecycle;  
• the relative importance of different information sources (e.g. clinical trials/ 
systematic reviews) and methods of communication  
• the most important influencing factors at launch compared to the time periods 
that follow and; 
• how changes in the NHS have impacted upon industry practice and targets. 
 
2.  In addition, I would like to talk about a case study drug manufactured by your 
company.  Some preliminary work has been done to construct a diffusion curve for 
[drug name] so it would be of interest to hear your experience/views of how the 
general issues can apply to an actual example. 
What are the advantages of participating in this research?  




• Express views and opinions from a perspective that is not currently well 
represented in the academic literature.  
• Further the understanding of individuals involved in healthcare with regards to the 
industry’s role in research and development processes, launch, and post-marketing 
activities. 
• Possibly help to redress the balance of criticism aimed at the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
 
How much time will be needed for the interview?  
Approximately 45-60 minutes. 
What format will the interview take?  
The interviews are intended to be relatively informal, on a one-to-one basis and follow a 
semi-structured question format. With your permission, the interviews will be recorded, as 
this enables complete and accurate capture of the interview material. The recordings and 
interview transcripts will be kept in locked storage and will be destroyed on completion of 
the Ph.D.  
I would like to emphasise that all interview data will be anonymised and therefore no 
comments will be attributed to particular individuals unless authorisation is provided. If 
you agree to discuss the case study drug, the interview data would be attributable to your 
company. If there are any issues with this they can be discussed beforehand. I will also 
feedback a précis of the interview themes so that you will have the opportunity to amend 
or append as you see fit.  
 
How was your company’s drug chosen as a case study? 
Through consultation with a group of 11 leading national health care experts, 
approximately 30 drugs launched in the UK between 1990-2000 were highlighted. Usage 
data was then obtained from IMS Health for these 30 drugs and converted into daily 
defined doses to produce diffusion curves. The final case study drugs were then chosen on 
the basis of them being the class market leader.  
 
What will the research be used for? 
The interview data in the first instance will contribute towards the completion of the 
Ph.D. The aim is to then disseminate the overall findings at conferences and internally 
within the university.  The intention is to also use segments of the Ph.D. to produce papers 




Appendix 7: Interviewee population: Elite Characteristics 
 
Elites are defined as a small group or class of persons, enjoying superior intellectual, 
social, or economic status. They possess disproportionately large amounts of influence 
over political decision making, money, social prestige and political power (Ostrander, 
1995; Duke, 2002). The basis of an elite’s power is believed to be their knowledge 
(Hunter, 1995). However, the resulting distortion of the power balance between the elite 
and the researcher can be advantageously used. According to Walford (1994), Ph.D. 
students often stand the greatest chance of interviewing elite subjects. Their vulnerable 
position within the academic research hierarchy, with low status and no significant 
academic credentials, can mean that access may be easier if the researcher is perceived 
to be ‘harmless’, non-threatening and without power.  
According to Duke (2002), researching those in positions of power presents a unique set 
of problems and difficulties, involving access, but also the distortion in the power 
balance between the researcher and interviewee, which has led to a paucity of research 
on elites. This lack of knowledge and research on the powerful contributes to 
mystifying their roles and therefore maintains their position of privilege in society. 
These sentiments have particular pertinence in the pharmaceutical industry that is 
commonly safeguarded by clauses of confidentiality. 
Gaining access to elites can be problematic as they have the power to create barriers and 
shield themselves from scrutiny. Access is easier for researchers who have existing 
links with those in power, and according to Fitz and Halpin (1994), is “contingent and 
conditional and researchers have to know how to ‘play the game’”. Elites are often very 
comfortable with the idea and methods of research and terminology being, in many 
cases, the holders of higher degrees themselves. This may encourage them however, to 
be more inclined to co-operate with the research.  
 
A unique situation that confronts researchers of elites is that they can often undergo a 
process of validation by the respondent. This determines whether the researcher is 
sufficiently knowledgeable to justify the use of their time and to determine the extent to 
which they know the field i.e. does the researcher know people they think they should 
know. Elites are also particularly interested in knowing who else the researcher has 
spoken to previously in the course of their research (Cookson, 1994; Ostrander, 1995). 
 
The use of the information provided can often cause concern for elites, particularly 
regarding the publication of the research and their lack of control over this process. 
Many are preoccupied with which outlets to use for dissemination and whether they 
would be able to see the results. Duke (2002) mentioned that it is not uncommon for 
elites to recommend other sources of publication in an attempt to exercise some control. 
However, the areas of interpretation, dissemination and publication are territories in 






Appendix 8: Timeline Construction - Literature Search 
Search terms and sources searched to identify relevant information in the published and 
‘grey’ literature for the purpose of constructing background chapters and timelines for 
each case study are documented below. The strategy required a broad focus to capture 
events that may have impacted on the diffusion curve and was adapted and modified 
from those developed for NIHR Horizon Scanning Centre projects (although the yield 
of hits was significantly larger as products had been licensed for several years). 
Electronic search strings were refined in response to emerging data, and pursuing 
references of references often enabled original documents and original dates of 
publication to be identified.  
 
1. Search terms from the two columns in Table A8.1 were combined in: 
• Internet search engines (Google/Google Scholar)  
• Medical and economic electronic databases (MEDLINE, EmBASE and EconLit) 
 
 
2. Searches of specific sources using drug code/name/class and indication included: 
• Drug development databases:  
- PharmaProjects (Informa Healthcare www.pharmaprojects.com)  
- Adis R&D Insight (Springer International Publishing AG 
www.adisinsight.com) 
• Manufacturer websites/annual reports and ABPI sales information/ trial 
information and company profiles. 
• Analyst reports 
• NICE  - guidelines/ technology appraisals (completed and in development)  and 
stakeholder comments 
• National and international clinical guidelines finder portals (work predated NHS 
Evidence) 
• Cochrane Library 
• Drug information sources: Regulatory agencies (MHRA/EMA/FDA): Electronic 
Medicines Compendium; National Prescribing Centre (NPC); UK Medicines 

















Table A8.1: Search terms for background case study literature  
Case Study Drugs Timeline Event Keywords  
 
• Drug class name e.g. PDE5 inhibitors 
 
Story OR Stories 
OR individual non-proprietary name e.g. sildenafil History 
OR proprietary (trade/brand) name e.g. Viagra 
OR clinical development code e.g. UK-92480 
Marketing [AND strategy] 
Review 
 Background 







 Launch [AND strategy] 
 Challenges OR Obstacles 








 Advertising AND phase III 
 Guidelines 
 Safety  




1. Historical guidelines were difficult to find and access once they have been 
superseded and replaced with current versions.  
2. Determining when guidelines were first available as reports, versus when they 
were published in journals, was often challenging, requiring extensive internet 
document searches. It was not uncommon for report authors to do spin off 
publications in specialist journals, in addition to the formal organisational report 
(e.g. the Erectile Dysfunction Association Guidelines were published in the BMJ 
by two report co-authors. It is not clear at which point the guidelines would have 
had the most impact).  
3. In the latter stages of the timelines, the impact of online publication of research 
articles, sometimes several months ahead of their print publication was difficult 
to assess. Due to the constraints of the timeline representations, dates of printed 
publication for primary research trials were recorded so as to be consistent with 
studies conducted before advance online publication became available. 
However, any conference abstracts/presentations of significance available ahead 




Appendix 9: Interview schedule for the semi-structured interviews 
Interview Schedule 
 
Introduction to the project/Recording consent 
General:  
• What do you think are the most important factors that affect the way a technology is taken up 
into the market (e.g. trials, guidance etc.)? 
• Some people think the emphasis of which factors are important has changed over the last 
decade (due to new barriers e.g. NICE etc). What are your views on this? 
• Can you think of a successful technology - What was key to its success?  
• Are there any technologies that performed below expectations – reasons for this? Actions 
taken to deal with this?  
• There is a perception that the larger the company, the more successful the technology (linked 
to marketing ability). What’s your view on this? 
 
Case study discussion (Lifecycle strategies): 
 
Pre-launch/launch 
• What was the environment like/types of activities that occurred before launch (e.g. disease 
awareness campaigns, trial design, government priorities)? 
• What was your level of awareness of competitors? – how did that influence your behaviour? 
• Talked a little about successful technologies earlier. At what point was the launch of this drug 
considered to be successful?  
• What initial barriers to adoption did you encounter, and how did you overcome them? 
Post–launch 
• In diffusion research we look for distinct phases.  How many distinct phases do you feel are 
represented in your product’s diffusion curve? 
• What factors do you feel were most influential in each of the phases you have identified? 
(marketing/guidance/systematic reviews/cost//trials/market entry timing)? 
• Was the shape of the diffusion curve what you had expected? What were the ambitions for the 
drug, and were they fulfilled? If not, how did you deal with it? 
• Were your competitors dealing with the same issues that you were facing? Did they do 
anything differently (based on company culture/size etc.)?  
• How responsive is marketing to sales? Did any one marketing technique stand out from your 
perspective? How do you ascertain which techniques are most effective? Monitor? 
 
End phase 
• Most innovations follow the classic S-shaped diffusion curve that eventually reaches a plateau. 
How do you know when you have reached that plateau? What did you do to change it? 
• If you had to choose one factor that has had the most impact on the uptake and diffusion of 
this particular drug, what would that be?  
• Were there any strategies that did not work as well you had anticipated? 
 
Final  








Appendix 10: Framework Analysis - Assignment of Interview Material for the ‘Clinical Evidence’ Theme to the 
Iteratively Developed Analytical Categories of the Thematic Framework 
 
Framework 1: Assignment of AA interview material (post-coding) 
Interview Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Legitimacy (authority) Quality Primary studies Warnings  - safety concerns  
 Timing Rejection/Acceptance Interpretation/ relevance clinical 
endpoint 
AA 1   it’s not really until you get a full blown 
publication, if you can in a prestigious 
journal, that would have the most 
impact, so, you know, if it was in like the 
Lancet, the BMJ, the data published in 
those journals would have more impact 
than data published in a lesser 
renowned journal. 
I think what we’ve seen is an increasing 
importance of things like the robustness of 
your clinical data, and therefore the 
strength of the clinical trial programme that 
you’ve run, so do you have for example 
head to head comparators with products 
already on the market that shows that you 
have the benefit in clinical effect or health 
economic value, and that has really 
increased in importance 
 efficacy that has to be proven with all 
drugs, so you have to have clinical data 
that shows you’re efficacious, and clinical 
data that shows that you’re well tolerated 
as well, but efficacy is probably the one 
driver across all brands 
 Risperdal was increasingly being used in elderly 
patients with psychosis, some of the prescribing 
was off licence, you know, that the clinicians had 
just decided to use that, but once Melleril was 
advised not to be used by the Committee for the 
Safety of Medicines, a lot of patients were actually 
switched over to Risperdal. 
 The most powerful data is sort of, you 
know, the early clinical data, so the 
phase IIIb, particularly if you have 
randomised head to head, you know, 
double blinded type data, I mean that’s 
regarded as the most powerful data. 
The systematic reviews are generally 
regarded as not quite as robust 
sometimes, although they can be very 
useful in terms of gathering lots of 
different opinions together and forming 
and overall consensus 
The data possibly helped to drive some of 
it, but I think more of that increase you can 
see was actually driven by the use in 
elderly patients, I mean the Csernansky 
data was very very good data. You 
probably could have argued that we didn’t 
do enough with it, you know, in terms of 
promoting the data, because it’s very good 
data. Just limits in terms of marketing 
spend, you know, Jansen-Cilag would 
generally have a much lower marketing 
budget than Lilly for example 
 we had good effective marketing, that was 
key in driving the success of the brand. We 
had to have the clinical data as well, but the 
marketing activity I think really had more of 
an emphasis on driving the brand’s 
success. Now I think you can - you still 
have to invest in the marketing, but unless 
you have the clinical data to back up the 
marketing, it’s far less effective. 
 probably the biggest impact on Risperdal 
negatively was this - the CVAE (cerebrovascular 
adverse event) warning from the MHRA, that, you 
know, Risperdal shouldn’t really be used in elderly 
patients, that had quite an immediate impact upon 
sales. I’ve not seen anything like it before or since 
then I don’t think, but in terms of like the letter 
went out from the CSM, and it was literally 
patients were switched, which, you know, is 
unusual but it happened very fast. 
      What happened here was that there was some 
studies done with Risperdal and some of the other 
atypical antipsychotics, which actually suggested 
that Risperdal probably had some risks as well in 
elderly patients, it was an  independent study. And 
then what happened was that patients - some of 
the elderly psychosis patients were switched off 
Risperdal onto other drugs, so we gained there 
and then began to lose business here. 
AA 2+3  It will depend on the quality of the 
study and where it’s published as 
to whether we would react to it . 
You’ve always got to look….you 
know we have to present lots of 
evidence for our products and so 
we tend to….if we get an 
individual study that comes out 
and look at what is the body of 
evidence that either backs that 
study up or disagrees with that 
quality of the data is absolutely 
paramount to us for a successful 
product launch. we have to do placebo 
for regulatory reasons.   Physicians 
want head to head, how do you 
compare with other products on the 
marketplace?  If you’re lucky enough not 
to be, you know you’re first in class then 
it’s slightly different but quality data is 
critical 
At that time we  had no head to head data 
versus risperidone.  The differentiation was 
against the typical antipsychotics, notably 
haloperidol which did present some 
problems in the UK because haloperidol, 
although the standard of care in the US, is 
less commonly used in the UK and indeed 
across much of Europe.  So haloperidol 
was really seen as a proxy for typical 
antipsychotics and people were left to draw 
their own conclusions about what that 
People go to 
conferences to get the 
latest stuff so they 
definitely take note of 
what’s presented at 
meetings and you can’t 
beat peer review journal 
publications. 
We take them [weight gain side effects] 
very seriously because I think they’re 
serious issues and I think again it goes 
back to the body of evidence, you look at 
the body of evidence and what does it tell 
you and it tells you that there are issues 
with all antipsychotics, atypical 
antipsychotics, so therefore that’s why 
physical health is a very important debate 
for us and something we take very, very 
seriously 
I think in the last eighteen months people do 
have real concerns about the metabolic 
effects. It is causing people to switch away 
from olanzapine gradually in schizophrenia, 
but they’ve not moved away rapidly because 
again I think the efficacy is still seen as the 
most important thing, and the company have 
done quite a good job in trying to minimise, 





Interview Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Legitimacy (authority) Quality Primary studies Warnings  - safety concerns  
 Timing Rejection/Acceptance Interpretation/ relevance clinical 
endpoint 
study, if it’s a one off and there’s 
loads disagreeing with it I 
probably wouldn’t bother with it. If 
it’s one of a series and I think 
longer term it’s going to hurt the 
brand if we don’t respond to it, 
then we’ll go proactive and 
respond to it 
meant against their own personal standard 
of care.  Be that another typical, such as 
chlorpromazine or against risperidone.  But 
I remember one of the great needs and the 
great pleas from our sales forces at the 
time was we need head to head data 
versus risperidone which we simply didn’t 
have 
 The KOLs tend to be on the advisory 
boards, they would do more high level, 
look at the quality of your science, look 
at the quality of your studies, tell you 
which ones you should use and how it 
supports your message and your 
marketing strategy and then you know 
the individual psychiatrist, what we 
would call the more jobbing side, who 
do the day job, they tend to come to 
focus groups. (MOVED INTO 
SEPARATE KOL THEME ONCE THIS 
BECAME A MAJOR THEME) 
we only actually used two or three studies 
at the time of that launch.  The most pivotal 
of which was the Tollenson data. I recall at 
the time it was the biggest ever study 
undertaken on a psychiatric population.   
  I tell you what happened here, it was safety 
concerns, we had dear doctor letters, and so 
did Risperdal. Issues with dementia 
 
AA 4       I think in psychiatry, I think you would struggle 
to identify a really ground breaking study that 
kind of meant people used atypicals  instead of 
typicals, one, because of the nature of the 
illness and the nature of how clinical trials are 
done.  So when you measure, do a trial for a 
statin and you are measuring cholesterol, you 
have your primary outcome measures for that 
trial will be things that doctors that are 
prescribing them, totally understand. If I talk 
about a PANSS scale or a Weinmeres scale or 
any of those scales they are kind of, not 
artificial but they are a thing that is done in 
order to get clinical trial results and not just by 
the industry but that’s how you measure the 
effectiveness of the drugs.  Your jobbing day to 
day psychiatrist may not really understand 
exactly what a reduction in PAN score means 









Framework 2: Assignment of AA interview material (post-analysis) 
Interview Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety   Clinical data Evidence translation Policy and guidelines (MOVED INTO EVIDENCE FROM POLICY & 
GOVERNMENT) 
Unlicensed use Regulatory issues Adverse effects Primary Secondary Relevance of outcomes Mandatory nature Differentiation Timing 
AA 1  Risperdal was increasingly 
being used in elderly patients 
with psychosis, some of the 
prescribing was off licence, you 
know, that the clinicians had 
just decided to use that, but 
once Melleril was advised not 
to be used by the Committee 
for the Safety of Medicines, a 
lot of patients were actually 
switched over to Risperdal. 
What happened here was 
that there was some studies 
done with Risperdal and 
some of the other atypical 
antipsychotics, which actually 
suggested that Risperdal 
probably had some risks as 
well in elderly patients, it was 
an  independent study. And 
then what happened was that 
patients - some of the elderly 
psychosis patients were 
switched off Risperdal onto 
other drugs, so we gained 
there and then began to lose 
business here 
 The data possibly helped to drive some 
of it, but I think more of that increase 
you can see was actually driven by the 
use in elderly patients, I mean the 
Csernansky data was very very good 
data. You probably could have argued 
that we didn’t do enough with it, you 
know, in terms of promoting the data, 
because it’s very good data. Just limits 
in terms of marketing spend, you know, 
Jansen-Cilag would generally have a 
much lower marketing budget than Lilly 
for example. 
The most powerful data is sort 
of, you know, the early clinical 
data, so the phase IIIb, 
particularly if you have 
randomised head to head, you 
know, double blinded type 
data, I mean that’s regarded 
as the most powerful data. 
The systematic reviews are 
generally regarded as not 
quite as robust sometimes, 
although they can be very 
useful in terms of gathering 
lots of different opinions 
together and forming and 
overall consensus 
 very strong recommendations 
from NICE I think, but it 
depends on the wording and 
how strong it is, so I think the 
fact that they were positive 
about atypicals did have an 
impact. 
  
I mean if people have used it in 
a certain area and found it 
works very well, then, you 
know, once it’s licensed they 
would be inclined to use more 
of it. 
  we had good effective marketing, that 
was key in driving the success of the 
brand. We had to have the clinical data 
as well, but the marketing activity I think 
really had more of an emphasis on 
driving the brand’s success. Now I think 
you can - you still have to invest in the 
marketing, but unless you have the 
clinical data to back up the marketing, 
it’s far less effective. 
     
probably the biggest impact on 
Risperdal negatively was this - 
the CVAE (cerebrovascular 
adverse event) warning from 
the MHRA, that, you know, 
Risperdal shouldn’t really be 
used in elderly patients, that 
had quite an immediate impact 
upon sales. I’ve not seen 
anything like it before or since 
then I don’t think, but in terms 
of like the letter went out from 
the CSM, and it was literally 
patients were switched, which, 
you know, is unusual but it 
happened very fast. 
  efficacy that has to be proven with all 
drugs, so you have to have clinical data 
that shows you’re efficacious, and 
clinical data that shows that you’re well 
tolerated as well, but efficacy is probably 
the one driver across all brands 
     
   I think what we’ve seen is an increasing 
importance of things like the robustness 
of your clinical data, and therefore the 
strength of the clinical trial programme 
that you’ve run, so do you have for 
example head to head comparators with 
products already on the market that 
shows that you have the benefit in 
clinical effect or health economic value, 
and that has really increased in 




Interview Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety   Clinical data Evidence translation Policy and guidelines (MOVED INTO EVIDENCE FROM POLICY & 
GOVERNMENT) 
Unlicensed use Regulatory issues Adverse effects Primary Secondary Relevance of outcomes Mandatory nature Differentiation Timing 
importance 
   it’s not really until you get a full blown 
publication, if you can in a prestigious 
journal, that would have the most 
impact, so, you know, if it was in like the 
Lancet, the BMJ, the data published in 
those journals would have more impact 
than data published in a lesser 
renowned journal. 
     
   There’s been two big - quite big 
government studies recently, CATIE and 
CUTLASS, one in the states and one 
here, that actually is questioning the 
value of atypicals, that some people -
particularly payers I think - are taking 
notice of. Psychiatrists I think are more 
sceptical of the data because they’ve 
had the clinical experience and they see 
a difference. I think most psychiatrists, 
you know, would say no, I think 
atypicals are better (MOVED FROM 
EXPERIENCE THEME INTO 
EVIDENCE POST-AA ANALYSIS. ON 
LATER MERGING AAs WITH OTHER 
CASES IT WAS MOVED BACK TO 
EXPERIENCE THEME). 
     
AA 2+3   I tell you what happened 
here, it was safety concerns, 
we had dear doctor letters, 
and so did Risperdal. Issues 
with dementia 
I think in the last 
eighteen months people 
do have real concerns 
about the metabolic 
effects. It is causing 




they’ve not moved away 
rapidly because again I 
think the efficacy is still 
seen as the most 
important thing, and the 
company have done 
quite a good job in trying 
to minimise, you know, 
how the side effects are 
viewed. 
  At that time we had no head to 
head data versus risperidone.  
The differentiation was against 
the typical antipsychotics, notably 
haloperidol which did present 
some problems in the UK 
because haloperidol, although the 
standard of care in the US, is less 
commonly used in the UK and 
indeed across much of Europe.  
So haloperidol was really seen as 
a proxy for typical antipsychotics 
and people were left to draw their 
own conclusions about what that 
meant against their own personal 
standard of care.  Be that another 
typical, such as chlorpromazine 
or against risperidone.  But I 
remember one of the great needs 
and the great pleas from our 
sales forces at the time was we 
need head to head data versus 
risperidone which we simply 
didn’t have.   
what’s the environment like, 
what are the key priorities in 
the UK environment, are there 
government policies and 
pressures that we can 
leverage from the 
communication perspective 
that says you should…..this is 
really important to you 
because the government are 
asking you to do this and our 
product will help you do that. 
What NICE did do though was 
say there was a need for 
atypicals and that from our 
perspective is a good message.  
You still have a lot of typical use 
going on here…they are an 
advance, atypical antipsychotics, 
we should be thinking of using 
them ‘cos the older typicals had 
and still do have very serious side 
effects, so that message helps 
us. NICE guidelines that followed 
the guidance they did differentiate 
on drugs and olanzapine for 
instance….was pulled out for 
crisis in the wards, rapid 
tranquilisation.  And then that way 
that does help us because you 
can then actually use that to say 
like olanzapine has been the drug 
of choice in this situation 
the fact that NICE 
Guidance was 
produced relatively late 
in the lifecycle of 
Zyprexa meant that 
impact on people’s 
prescribing habits was 
probably fairly limited. 
Had they come along 
three or four years 
earlier than they did 
then it might be a 
different answer, but 
they came along so 
late. 
  We take them [weight 
gain side effects] very 
seriously because I think 
they’re serious issues 
and I think again it goes 
back to the body of 
There was such a pent up demand for 
this drug.  And I remember being at 
some of the congresses where the 
Phase III data were presented on 
Zyprexa prior to its launch.  And it was 
standing room only in some of the 
  NSF not very useful. Lots of 
best practice and that’s what 
we should do but not a lot to 
really help the NHS make 
those changes. Interesting 





Interview Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety   Clinical data Evidence translation Policy and guidelines (MOVED INTO EVIDENCE FROM POLICY & 
GOVERNMENT) 
Unlicensed use Regulatory issues Adverse effects Primary Secondary Relevance of outcomes Mandatory nature Differentiation Timing 
evidence, you look at the 
body of evidence and 
what does it tell you and 
it tells you that there are 
issues with all 
antipsychotics, atypical 
antipsychotics, so 
therefore that’s why 
physical health is a very 
important debate for us 
and something we take 




auditoria where the data were 
presented.  People really were excited 
about this.  That it did represent a 
breakthrough (MOVED FROM 
CLINICAL NEED TO EVIDENCE) 
good visions for where they 
need to be but then you’ve got 
to make it happen on the 
ground haven’t you. 
   People go to conferences to get the 
latest stuff so they definitely take note of 
what’s presented at meetings and you 
can’t beat peer review journal 
publications. 
     
   It will depend on the quality of the study 
and where it’s published as to whether 
we would react to it . You’ve always got 
to look….you know we have to present 
lots of evidence for our products and so 
we tend to….if we get an individual 
study that comes out and look at what is 
the body of evidence that either backs 
that study up or disagrees with that 
study, if it’s a one off and there’s loads 
disagreeing with it I probably wouldn’t 
bother with it. If it’s one of a series and I 
think longer term it’s going to hurt the 
brand if we don’t respond to it, then we’ll 
go proactive and respond to it 
     
   quality of the data is absolutely 
paramount to us for a successful 
product launch. we have to do placebo 
for regulatory reasons.   Physicians 
want head to head, how do you 
compare with other products on the 
marketplace?  If you’re lucky enough not 
to be, you know you’re first in class then 
it’s slightly different but quality data is 
critical 
     
   There was such a pent up demand for 
this drug.  And I remember being at 
some of the congresses where the 
Phase III data were presented on 
Zyprexa prior to its launch.  And it was 
standing room only in some of the 
auditoria where the data were 
presented.  People really were excited 
about this.  That it did represent a 
breakthrough (MOVED FROM 
CLINICAL NEED TO EVIDENCE) 




Interview Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety   Clinical data Evidence translation Policy and guidelines (MOVED INTO EVIDENCE FROM POLICY & 
GOVERNMENT) 
Unlicensed use Regulatory issues Adverse effects Primary Secondary Relevance of outcomes Mandatory nature Differentiation Timing 
   we only actually used two or three 
studies at the time of that launch.  The 
most pivotal of which was the Tollenson 
data. I recall at the time it was the 
biggest ever study undertaken on a 
psychiatric population.   
     
   Evidence will convince somebody or 
otherwise to give something a go.  But 
at the end of the day there’s no 
substitute for good old fashioned 
personal clinical experience. By the time 
it gets to Guidelines people have formed 
an opinion through their own clinical 
experience anyway (MOVED FROM 
EXPERIENCE THEME INTO 
EVIDENCE POST-AA ANALYSIS. ON 
LATER MERGING AAs WITH OTHER 
CASES IT GOT MOVED BACK TO 
EXPERIENCE THEME) 
     
AA 4     Regardless of what your clinical data 
says, doctors don’t perceive Seroquel to 
be as effective as either olanzapine or 
risperidone. NICE guidance says it is, 
but our doctors don’t believe it, because 
their experience is Seroquel doesn’t 
work as well.  So unless you get them to 
kind of re-evaluate and use it at the right 
dose…their perception won't change 
(MOVED FROM EXPERIENCE THEME 
INTO EVIDENCE POST AA 
ANALYSIS. ON LATER MERGING 
AAs WITH OTHER CASES IT GOT 
MOVED BACK TO EXPERIENCE 
THEME) 
 I think in psychiatry, I think you 
would struggle to identify a really 
ground breaking study that kind of 
meant people used atypicals  
instead of typicals, one, because 
of the nature of the illness and the 
nature of how clinical trials are 
done.  So when you measure, do 
a trial for a statin and you are 
measuring cholesterol, you have 
your primary outcome measures 
for that trial will be things that 
doctors that are prescribing them, 
totally understand. If I talk about a 
PANSS scale or a Weinmeres 
scale or any of those scales they 
are kind of, not artificial but they 
are a thing that is done in order to 
get clinical trial results and not 
just by the industry but that’s how 
you measure the effectiveness of 
the drugs.  Your jobbing day to 
day psychiatrist may not really 
understand exactly what a 
reduction in PAN score means to 
a patient unless they are involved 
in clinical trial work. 







Framework 3: Assignment of BP interview material (post-coding) 
Interviews Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety Clinical effectiveness (Primary level data) Evidence translation 
Unlicensed use Regulatory issues Adverse effects  Trial design Journal  
quality/publication 
control 
Trial outcomes: planned vs 
serendipitous 
Tailored to adopter category (clinical 
relevance of outcomes) (MOVED  
EVENTUALLY TO COMMUNICATION THEME ) 
BP1   There is genuinely a concern that 
etidronate as a first generation 
bisphosphonate, that if you give it in 
too a higher dose then it causes 
osteomalacia which is basically 
malformed bone, so that the bone 
that it's making is not of a sufficient 
quality.  And we know that, it came 
out from the sciences, and the 
solution from a scientific point of view 
was to give it in cyclical regiment, so 
that’s why it became Didronel PMO 
[etidronate] and had a cyclical 
regimen of 14 days of Didronel 
followed by the calcium, vitamin 
D…that’s all done to stop 
osteomalacia occurring because in 
that dosing cycle it doesn’t happen.  
The US have higher concerns about 
that than the European regulators, 
so, it's not unusual that different 
regulators have different concerns. 
You could, as a company, submit 
new data to shift the opinion of the 
regulators, but you reach a point 
relatively quickly when you get 
regulatory delay, that because of the 
intellectual property rights that you 
have on the product it becomes 
unviable to bring it to market within 
the time space you have back to 
actually recoup your additional costs 
and your base costs. It went on and 
got a licence in Europe, but it never 
managed to get a licence in the US. 
it went on and got a licence in 
Europe, but it never managed 
to get a licence in US,  it had a 
licence in Canada, the UK and 
12 other markets, but not in 
the US which also means that 
as an overall opportunity for 
any company it's lower down 
the list than something like 
Actonel [risedronate] which 
has now got a licence in 83. 
I think really the key innovators 
who are really running the basic 
science involved in the big clinical 
trials as lead investigators, they 
want the next thing, they want to 
know something new, something 
that’s not been tried with the 
products, something that’s a new 
indication, a new area, a new 
formulation, a new piece in the 
lifecycle management (MOVED 
EVENTUALLY TO 
COMMUNICATION THEME) 
   the innovators and the early adopters might have actually 
quite low usage but they drive a huge amount of 
influence to drive acceptance of these as established 
treatments for the people that follow, so you usually only 
start to see the pickup when you’ve got the early 
adopters and you’re into the early majority that’s when 
you see the pick up.  So they tend to follow those curves 
so I think each bit of material has a role to play in how 
you educate those different groups, because they want 
to hear something different.   
       By the time you’ve got a peer review publication,  or 
you’ve got a full systematic review or meta analysis, it's a 
little bit too late to be taking that information to the people 
that are your innovators and early adopters. Those are 
wonderful tools that can actually help address the 
concerns of the middle majority which tends to be then 
more in, I would say not highly specialised secondary 
care or in primary care, in the case of osteoporosis 
primary care, because that’s what they want, and 
everyone wants something different. 
BP2    I think the adverse effect issue 
for alendronate slowed down 
the adoption curve, I think you 
should have seen it rise above 
that.  So I think the fact that 
Large scale trials do carry weight 
but I think the problem is that as 
soon as they carry some weight 
they also become the next 
benchmark. 
And at that point we needed to 
shoot above where MSD were in 
terms of their studies so they had 
done BMD, they had done 
vertebral fracture, they hadn’t 
We were very heavily 
focussed on securing a 
very credible 
publication for our hip 
fracture trial published 
I think what disappointed us, and I 
think there’s two things, one is 
fortuitous, I think that the 
bisphosphonates are a very good 
class of drugs, so I will be honest 
When you’re into the early adopters this is where I think it 
gets really interesting where you’re getting into a slightly 
broader number of again specialists that are shaping and 
leading the way that the product will be used, and those 




Interviews Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety Clinical effectiveness (Primary level data) Evidence translation 
Unlicensed use Regulatory issues Adverse effects  Trial design Journal  
quality/publication 
control 
Trial outcomes: planned vs 
serendipitous 
Tailored to adopter category (clinical 
relevance of outcomes) (MOVED  
EVENTUALLY TO COMMUNICATION THEME ) 
there was some scepticism in 
the marketplace about that. 
really had hip fracture as a 
primary end point, but they key 
element was that we had a hip 
fracture drug at the primary end 
point where hip fracture was 
prospectively planned, and then 
obviously the study was sizably 
geared to show that, so you’re 
looking at 10,000 patient plus.  
But we had 330 investigators, 
16,000 patients, 18 countries.  
 
in NEJM and NEJM is 
still regarded as the 
highest impact factor 
publication, out of all 
the publications you 
can have.  The 
downside is that 
they’revery fastidious 
about how things work, 
so the first thing is that 
you can't do the gradual 
release it has to be 
brand new to the world, 
otherwise it never gets 
into NEJM, and so it 
puts a lot of blocks on 
what you can do, 
because from a 
marketing point of view, 
we want to be able to 
build up to it, but they 
won't do that, and that’s 
why they're so 
prestigious.   
with you I think they all work, and 
they’re all substantially above what 
you’re basic calcium vitamin D does, 
so that’s the great news for the class 
yes?  The bad news, because they 
all work, that when you try and plan 
in 1993 what you’re expecting 
breakthrough to do, which was that 
we were planning to show a 
significant reduction in hip fracture 
that no one else would have, we 
actually got trumped by Fosamax 
(alendronate) because they showed 
fortuitously because it was never 
powered to show it, they showed 
fortuitously that they did reduce 
significantly reduce hip fracture in 
their trials, because they had a good 
drug, and we had a good drug, you 
know, so the reality is that had they 
not shown hip fracture, had they only 
ever shown vertebral fracture, which 
is what we were predicting at the 
time, then ours, because it was 
powered to show hip fracture, should 
have been able to do the bit where it 
became the market leader. 
at congress level activity, abstracts are an indicator of 
what to watch out for, there may be a couple of things 
they take home as little gems from that, but they’re 
looking for oral presentations that are interrogating the 
next level up of influences, and they obviously are 
interested in making sure that as soon as a peer review 
publication comes out they’ve got it, 
    Our cost of entry is becoming 
increasingly higher and the next 
one is that there’s not going to be 
a head-to-head trial on hip 
fracture between any drugs, 
because when they all work as 
well as all of these do you’re 
talking about 50,000 patients, five 
years before you even stand a 
chance of seeing any difference, 
and when you see the difference 
it's unlikely to be clinically that 
significantly and meaningful to 
actually knock one out of the 
market and favour the other. 
The other element is 
that they shape the 
publication, so actually 
it's from a technical 
point of view it's not the 
best written publication, 
it doesn’t do justice to 
the dataset that 
supports the 
publication, but we 
again don’t have a lot of 
say in that because it's 
NEJM and they have a 
lot of say in what they 
want and how they 
want it written 
  
BP 3  There was obviously an 
opportunity for us to say 
treat with Alendronate when 
HRT was no longer 
recommended in 
osteoporosis, but our licence 
was really for treatment, not 
prevention. And there might 
be some spill over into 
doctors that said ‘well this 
patient I can see is going to 
Bisphosphonates are not a very nice 
class of drugs to take.  Didronel was 
a cyclical bisphosphonate so you 
took the active ingredient for a 
certain period of time, and then you 
took calcium for a certain period of 
time.  It was not a very easy thing to 
take but people were used to doing 
it.  Our once daily came in, we had a 
fracture intervention trial which came 
through  in publication ’96, the FIT 
But when you come in and 
you have an issue of adverse 
tolerability like this which is 
causing oesophageal irritation.  
They’re caustic drugs, they’re 
designed in a way, it's a nasty 
acid but it diffuses once it gets 
in the gut, but you know, with 
an elderly population you often 
get reflux and that can push 
the acid back into the 
Clearly the trial designs that are 
done for regulatory purposes 
need to also meet the needs of 
being able to communicate the 
benefits of the medicine to the 
wider community, because you 
won't have typically in market 
studies for some years until after 
the medicine is launched.  So you 
need to have robust data which is 
going to be able to present to 
it's also very important to design 
those studies in a way where you 
capture data for socio-economic, 
health economic cases that you 
can build for to understand the 
pricing of the medicine.  You 
know, that’s not just done by 
whim, it's done by a form of 
science.  I mean it is an art, and 
it's also a measure of the 
competitiveness of that field, but if 




Interviews Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety Clinical effectiveness (Primary level data) Evidence translation 
Unlicensed use Regulatory issues Adverse effects  Trial design Journal  
quality/publication 
control 
Trial outcomes: planned vs 
serendipitous 
Tailored to adopter category (clinical 
relevance of outcomes) (MOVED  
EVENTUALLY TO COMMUNICATION THEME ) 
be osteoporotic so I will treat 
now, and treat early’, so our 
message was only about 
treat osteoporosis for 
confirmed osteoporosis 
cases and not to go after 
people who were being 
treated with HRT for 
menopausal issues.  There 
are other alternatives 
available for that. 
trial, so that gave you the evidence 
base, it was very quick after launch, 
and every expectation would have 
been then that this drug would have 
flowed because a big population 
which is under treated, existing 
therapy not particularly attractive for 
anybody to take, patient, doctor.  
But, at the same time as we had this, 
we did have incidence of adverse 
tolerability particularly in the United 
States which lead to a world-wide 
need for us to write a ‘dear doctor’ 
letter.  You know, an awareness 
letter to the doctor saying ‘watch out 
for tolerability’.  Well then you see 
your competition, some will walk 
away from that, and say ‘that’s going 
to be really bad news for growing this 
market’ and some will say ‘that’s 
great news, I’ll keep my market 
share’, so it depends on whether the 
motivation of the competitor is 
market share or market expansion.   
oesophagus. And the 
competition made hay with 
that.  And consequently we 
got a relatively slow uptake 
curve, even though we were 
promoting quite extensively 
doing a lot of education and 
advertising, calling on doctors, 
we couldn’t change behaviour 
because this was the 
message that they’d got in 
their head from the 
competition, and, to be fair, 
patients were referring…you 
know, we did have instances 
where patients were actually 
reporting this to the doctor 
people, regulators, to payers, to 
physicians, to everybody that 
actually gives a compelling story 
of why we would use the drug. So 
marketing gets involved before 
launch is what I'm saying. 
you’re first in the market with a 
brand new medicine, with a brand 
new class, how do you price it?  
You know, you’ve got to find 
some means of demonstrating 
value of the brand and the 
product to the people who are 
going to pay for it 
we were very clear and 
ethical about this, that if 
you’d got somebody on HRT 
who is osteoporotic you’ve 
been treating with HRT to 
treat osteoporosis, then, yes 
use Alendronate, that’s a 
very good alternative for you. 
But if you’ve got somebody 
on HRT and they’re 50 and 
they’re doing this for 
menopause management it 
is not appropriate to use 
Alendronate at that stage.  
Some doctors would out of 
their own choice, but it's not 
what we were saying.  And 
you will see on that chart of 
adoption of HRT when it 
does come down there is 
some change to our growth 
curve but it's not that 
dramatic, it's not the driver. 
regulators around the world all have 
different, slightly different nuances 
on what data they want to see, which 
makes it expensive to bring a 
medicine to market, because you 
can't necessarily use the same file 
around the world, and that is a 
frustration through the industry, and 
it slows access to medicine down.  
And it costs us money.  So that’s a 
frustration, but that’s the world that 
we live in. 
 Trials get you your position in 
guidelines.  And there are 
different quality of trials of course.  
You’ve got your Phase III 
regulatory filing, which is against 
placebo, which just shows the 
thing works. If it's a highly 
competitive field, people like to 
have head-to-head studies versus 
the leading comparators, or use 
drugs in the field at the right dose 
so that they can make a valid 
judgement call saying ‘well this 
one is better than that one’ and 
they can say they’re efficaciously 
the same but one does this with 
less side affects and therefore is 
better pay off for the doctor and 
the patient.  And that will then 
influence the positioning in the 
guidelines, so you have to have 
the trials, the best form of course, 
which really prove outcomes. 
So, you know in the Alendronate 
case for us it was very important 
that we had the fracture 
intervention trial which was 
published in about 1996.  For a 
big outcomes trial, three year 
outcomes trial on fracture which 
really no fracture data of that 
scale existed in this field before 
that trial, and to bring that to 
market less than a year after the 
launch of the drug was a hugely 
important thing to do in getting 
the diffusion of the drug in a very 
under treated disease.  So, that 
was a good example of a huge 
…of this designing the trials 
correctly for Phase III to be 
extended to produce the 
outcomes which gives you every 
argument.   
   
   you’ve got to look at the lifecycle 
of drug development really and 
say where do certain events 
come into play?  Typically from 
molecule patenting, registering 
the molecule which then gives us 
sort of 20 years of commercial 
The interesting facts are in 
different markets people behave 
very differently depending on their 
mindset of whether they’re a 
revenue maximiser or a sales 
maximiser, and they will design 
their trials probably to give them a 




Interviews Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety Clinical effectiveness (Primary level data) Evidence translation 
Unlicensed use Regulatory issues Adverse effects  Trial design Journal  
quality/publication 
control 
Trial outcomes: planned vs 
serendipitous 
Tailored to adopter category (clinical 
relevance of outcomes) (MOVED  
EVENTUALLY TO COMMUNICATION THEME ) 
life, but in the first 10 years of that 
typically that is just governed by 
regulatory trials, and safety and 
efficacy trials.  So you’re really 
just trying to find what’s the right 
dose? Does it work and is it safe?  
And so you’re identifying the 
population in which it will be 
efficacious in.  And that will give 
you your licence.  So typically 
we've only got 10 years of 
marketing of the drug when it is 
actually available for use within 
whatever population (MOVED TO 
MARKET PREPARPEDNESS 
THEME) 
predicted result which will fit with 
that position that they are, their 
behaviours. As I say, we will 
typically design everything to try 
and expand the market to try and 
get more patients treated 
(MOVED TO HERITAGE 
THEME) 
   Fracture discharge, as we would 
describe it became….that was 
well-published in all leading 
journals and has become one of 
the great case studies in this field.  
And they’re very evidence-based 
and it was all very evidence-
based and so that’s why they 
were preferring to use 
Alendronate maybe than the 
competition because they’ve got 
the fracture intervention trial plus 
other evidence, plus the 70 
milligram formulation. 
    
   trials and guidance do influence , 
well, trials do.  Mega trials are 
very important in terms of getting 
the opinion leaders to buy into the 
science quite frankly. 







Framework 4: Assignment of BP interview material (post-analysis) 
Interview Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety Clinical effectiveness (primary data) 
Unlicensed use Regulatory issues Trial design  Temporal impact of 
evidence 
Relevance/limitation of 
trial outcomes  
Journal quality/publication control 
Variation in regulatory standards Adverse effects (official warnings) 
BP1   There is genuinely a concern that 
etidronate as a first generation 
bisphosphonate, that if you give it in too a 
higher dose then it causes osteomalacia 
which is basically malformed bone, so that 
the bone that it's making is not of a 
sufficient quality.  And we know that, it 
came out from the sciences, and the 
solution from a scientific point of view was 
to give it in cyclical regiment, so that’s why 
it became Didronel PMO [etidronate] and 
had a cyclical regimen of 14 days of 
Didronel followed by the calcium, vitamin 
D…that’s all done to stop osteomalacia 
occurring because in that dosing cycle it 
doesn’t happen.  The US have higher 
concerns about that than the European 
regulators, so, it's not unusual that different 
regulators have different concerns. You 
could, as a company, submit new data to 
shift the opinion of the regulators, but you 
reach a point relatively quickly when you 
get regulatory delay, that because of the 
intellectual property rights that you have on 
the product it becomes unviable to bring it 
to market within the time space you have 
back to actually recoup your additional 
costs and your base costs. It went on and 
got a licence in Europe, but it never 
managed to get a licence in the US. 
 
     
 it went on and got a licence in Europe, but it 
never managed to get a licence in US,  it 
had a licence in Canada, the UK and 12 
other markets, but not in the US which also 
means that as an overall opportunity for 
any company it's lower down the list than 
something like Actonel [risedronate] which 
has now got a licence in 83. 
     
BP2    I think the adverse effect issue for alendronate 
slowed down the adoption curve, I think you 
should have seen it rise above that.  So I think 
the fact that there was some scepticism in the 
marketplace about that. 
I think what disappointed us, and I think there’s 
two things, one is fortuitous, I think that the 
bisphosphonates are a very good class of 
drugs, so I will be honest with you I think they 
all work, and they’re all substantially above 
what you’re basic calcium vitamin D does, so 
that’s the great news for the class yes?  The 
bad news, because they all work, that when 
you try and plan in 1993 what you’re expecting 
breakthrough to do, which was that we were 
planning to show a significant reduction in hip 
fracture that no one else would have, we 
actually got trumped by Fosamax 
 Our cost of entry is becoming 
increasingly higher and the 
next one is that there’s not 
going to be a head-to-head 
trial on hip fracture between 
any drugs, because when they 
all work as well as all of these 
do you’re talking about 50,000 
patients, five years before you 
even stand a chance of seeing 
any difference, and when you 
see the difference it's unlikely 
to be clinically that significantly 
We were very heavily focussed on securing a 
very credible publication for our hip fracture 
trial published in NEJM and NEJM is still 
regarded as the highest impact factor 
publication, out of all the publications you can 
have.  The downside is that they’re very 
fastidious about how things work, so the first 
thing is that you can't do the gradual release it 
has to be brand new to the world, otherwise it 
never gets into NEJM, and so it puts a lot of 
blocks on what you can do, because from a 
marketing point of view, we want to be able to 




Interview Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety Clinical effectiveness (primary data) 
Unlicensed use Regulatory issues Trial design  Temporal impact of 
evidence 
Relevance/limitation of 
trial outcomes  
Journal quality/publication control 
Variation in regulatory standards Adverse effects (official warnings) 
(alendronate) because they showed 
fortuitously because it was never powered to 
show it, they showed fortuitously that they did 
reduce significantly reduce hip fracture in their 
trials, because they had a good drug, and we 
had a good drug, you know, so the reality is 
that had they not shown hip fracture, had they 
only ever shown vertebral fracture, which is 
what we were predicting at the time, then ours, 
because it was powered to show hip fracture, 
should have been able to do the bit where it 
became the market leader. 
and meaningful to actually 
knock one out of the market 
and favour the other. 
why they're so prestigious.   
   And at that point we needed to shoot above 
where MSD were in terms of their studies so 
they had done BMD, they had done vertebral 
fracture, they hadn’t really had hip fracture as 
a primary end point, but they key element was 
that we had a hip fracture drug at the primary 
end point where hip fracture was prospectively 
planned, and then obviously the study was 
sizably geared to show that, so you’re looking 
at 10,000 patient plus.  But we had 330 
investigators, 16,000 patients, 18 countries. 
  The other element is that they shape the 
publication, so actually it's from a technical 
point of view it's not the best written 
publication, it doesn’t do justice to the dataset 
that supports the publication, but we again 
don’t have a lot of say in that because it's 
NEJM and they have a lot of say in what they 
want and how they want it written 
   Large scale trials do carry weight but I think 
the problem is that as soon as they carry some 
weight they also become the next benchmark. 
  I think we do make mistakes and I think we 
probably, as a company, we have often maybe 
jumped a step in terms of dose ranging so we 
have an issue in the sense that it's not a 
problem from a clinical point of view, but I have 
an issue from a trial point of view that our 2.5 
milligram arm disappeared out of the trials and 
so that’s not good because you have to explain 
it, so we should maybe have dealt with that in 
a different way. We also had an issue that we 
wanted to do too much in one trial, so what we 
chose to do was we chose to have an over 80s 
group, and again a potentially big market, a 
potentially big unmet need, but we complicated 
it. So instead of one nice clean crisp message 
we ended up with sort of ‘well I have to explain 
a few things about my trial before I can now 
give you my clean crisp message’ so it's not so 
clean and it's not so crisp. And so I think that’s 
maybe our inexperience in…I think a more 
experienced pharmaceutical company that is 
doing this day in and day out and has a cookie 
cutter of ‘this is how we launch a drug’ they 
have the experience, you know, and that is a 
genuine challenge for a company of our size, 
which is actually how do we keep up the 
capability in tasks that are infrequent but 
important? (MOVED FROM 








Interview Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety Clinical effectiveness (primary data) 
Unlicensed use Regulatory issues Trial design  Temporal impact of 
evidence 
Relevance/limitation of 
trial outcomes  
Journal quality/publication control 
Variation in regulatory standards Adverse effects (official warnings) 
opportunity for us to say treat 
with Alendronate when HRT was 
no longer recommended in 
osteoporosis, but our licence 
was really for treatment, not 
prevention. And there might be 
some spill over into doctors that 
said ‘well this patient I can see is 
going to be osteoporotic so I will 
treat now, and treat early’, so our 
message was only about treat 
osteoporosis for confirmed 
osteoporosis cases and not to go 
after people who were being 
treated with HRT for menopausal 
issues.  There are other 
alternatives available for that. 
different, slightly different nuances on what 
data they want to see, which makes it 
expensive to bring a medicine to market, 
because you can't necessarily use the 
same file around the world, and that is a 
frustration through the industry, and it slows 
access to medicine down.  And it costs us 
money.  So that’s a frustration, but that’s 
the world that we live in. 
drugs to take.  Didronel was a cyclical 
bisphosphonate so you took the active 
ingredient for a certain period of time, and then 
you took calcium for a certain period of time.  It 
was not a very easy thing to take but people 
were used to doing it.  Our once daily came in, 
we had a fracture intervention trial which came 
through  in publication ’96, the FIT trial, so that 
gave you the evidence base, it was very quick 
after launch, and every expectation would 
have been then that this drug would have 
flowed because a big population which is 
under treated, existing therapy not particularly 
attractive for anybody to take, patient, doctor.  
But, at the same time as we had this, we did 
have incidence of adverse tolerability 
particularly in the United States which lead to a 
world-wide need for us to write a ‘dear doctor’ 
letter.  You know, an awareness letter to the 
doctor saying ‘watch out for tolerability’.  Well 
then you see your competition, some will walk 
away from that, and say ‘that’s going to be 
really bad news for growing this market’ and 
some will say ‘that’s great news, I’ll keep my 
market share’, so it depends on whether the 
motivation of the competitor is market share or 
market expansion.   
was very important that we had the fracture 
intervention trial which was published in about 
1996.  For a big outcomes trial, three year 
outcomes trial on fracture which really no 
fracture data of that scale existed in this field 
before that trial, and to bring that to market 
less than a year after the launch of the drug 
was a hugely important thing to do in getting 
the diffusion of the drug in a very under treated 
disease.  So, that was a good example of a 
huge …of this designing the trials correctly for 
Phase III to be extended to produce the 
outcomes which gives you every argument.   
would describe it 
became….that was well-
published in all leading 
journals and has become 
one of the great case 
studies in this field.  And 
they’re very evidence-
based and it was all very 
evidence-based and so 
that’s why they were 
preferring to use 
Alendronate maybe than 
the competition because 
they’ve got the fracture 
intervention trial plus other 
evidence, plus the 70 
milligram formulation. 
head trials to prove clinical 
difference versus an existing 
field in a drug which you need 
to do a three to six year study, 
in a massive population to be 
powered statistically to prove 
anything.  It's extremely 
difficult.  So you’ve got to find 
other markers.  In this case 
that’s typically done through 
bone mineral density which 
you can actually measure at a 
relatively short phase and see 
change, and that would be 
typically what people will do to 
try and get an edge over each 
other. 
we were very clear and ethical 
about this, that if you’d got 
somebody on HRT who is 
osteoporotic you’ve been 
treating with HRT to treat 
osteoporosis, then, yes use 
Alendronate, that’s a very good 
alternative for you. But if you’ve 
got somebody on HRT and 
they’re 50 and they’re doing this 
for menopause management it is 
not appropriate to use 
Alendronate at that stage.  Some 
doctors would out of their own 
choice, but it's not what we were 
saying.  And you will see on that 
chart of adoption of HRT when it 
does come down there is some 
change to our growth curve but 
it's not that dramatic, it's not the 
driver. 
 But when you come in and you have an issue 
of adverse tolerability like this which is causing 
oesophageal irritation.  They’re caustic drugs, 
they’re designed in a way, it's a nasty acid but 
it diffuses once it gets in the gut, but you know, 
with an elderly population you often get reflux 
and that can push the acid back into the 
oesophagus. And the competition made hay 
with that.  And consequently we got a relatively 
slow uptake curve, even though we were 
promoting quite extensively doing a lot of 
education and advertising, calling on doctors, 
we couldn’t change behaviour because this 
was the message that they’d got in their head 
from the competition, and, to be fair, patients 
were referring…you know, we did have 
instances where patients were actually 
reporting this to the doctor 
it's also very important to design those studies 
in a way where you capture data for socio-
economic, health economic cases that you can 
build for to understand the pricing of the 
medicine.  You know, that’s not just done by 
whim, it's done by a form of science.  I mean it 
is an art, and it's also a measure of the 
competitiveness of that field, but if you’re first 
in the market with a brand new medicine, with 
a brand new class, how do you price it?  You 
know, you’ve got to find some means of 
demonstrating value of the brand and the 
product to the people who are going to pay for 
it 
   
   trials and guidance do influence , well, trials 
do.  Mega trials are very important in terms of 
getting the opinion leaders to buy into the 
science quite frankly. 
   
   Clearly the trial designs that are done for 
regulatory purposes need to also meet the 
needs of being able to communicate the 
benefits of the medicine to the wider 




Interview Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety Clinical effectiveness (primary data) 
Unlicensed use Regulatory issues Trial design  Temporal impact of 
evidence 
Relevance/limitation of 
trial outcomes  
Journal quality/publication control 
Variation in regulatory standards Adverse effects (official warnings) 
community, because you won't have typically 
in market studies for some years until after the 
medicine is launched.  So you need to have 
robust data which is going to be able to 
present to people, regulators, to payers, to 
physicians, to everybody that actually gives a 
compelling story of why we would use the 
drug. So marketing gets involved before 
launch is what I'm saying. 
   Trials get you your position in guidelines.  And 
there are different quality of trials of course.  
You’ve got your Phase III regulatory filing, 
which is against placebo, which just shows the 
thing works.  If it's a highly competitive field, 
people like to have head-to-head studies 
versus the leading comparators, or use drugs 
in the field at the right dose so that they can 
make a valid judgement call saying ‘well this 
one is better than that one’ and they can say 
they’re efficaciously the same but one does 
this with less side effects and therefore is 
better pay off for the doctor and the patient.  
And that will then influence the positioning in 
the guidelines, so you have to have the trials, 
the best form of course, which really prove 
outcomes.   









Framework 5: Assignment of PDE5 interview material to the amalgamated BP and AA Frameworks (post-coding) 
Interview Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety Clinical effectiveness (primary data) Marketing  - market 




trial outcomes  
Journal quality/publication 
control Variation in regulatory standards Adverse effects (official 
warnings)/contraindications 
BP1   There is genuinely a concern that 
etidronate as a first generation 
bisphosphonate, that if you give it in too a 
higher dose then it causes osteomalacia 
which is basically malformed bone, so that 
the bone that it's making is not of a 
sufficient quality.  And we know that, it 
came out from the sciences, and the 
solution from a scientific point of view was 
to give it in cyclical regiment, so that’s why 
it became Didronel PMO [etidronate] and 
had a cyclical regimen of 14 days of 
Didronel followed by the calcium, vitamin 
D…that’s all done to stop osteomalacia 
occurring because in that dosing cycle it 
doesn’t happen.  The US have higher 
concerns about that than the European 
regulators, so, it's not unusual that different 
regulators have different concerns. You 
could, as a company, submit new data to 
shift the opinion of the regulators, but you 
reach a point relatively quickly when you 
get regulatory delay, that because of the 
intellectual property rights that you have on 
the product it becomes unviable to bring it 
to market within the time space you have 
back to actually recoup your additional 
costs and your base costs. It went on and 
got a licence in Europe, but it never 
managed to get a licence in the US. 
      
 it went on and got a licence in Europe, but it 
never managed to get a licence in US,  it 
had a licence in Canada, the UK and 12 
other markets, but not in the US which also 
means that as an overall opportunity for 
any company it's lower down the list than 
something like Actonel [risedronate] which 
has now got a licence in 83. 
      
BP2    I think the adverse effect issue for 
alendronate slowed down the 
adoption curve, I think you should 
have seen it rise above that.  So I 
think the fact that there was some 
scepticism in the marketplace about 
that. 
I think what disappointed us, and I think 
there’s two things, one is fortuitous, I think 
that the bisphosphonates are a very good 
class of drugs, so I will be honest with you I 
think they all work, and they’re all 
substantially above what you’re basic 
calcium vitamin D does, so that’s the great 
news for the class yes?  The bad news, 
because they all work, that when you try 
and plan in 1993 what you’re expecting 
breakthrough to do, which was that we 
were planning to show a significant 
 Our cost of entry is becoming 
increasingly higher and the next 
one is that there’s not going to be 
a head-to-head trial on hip 
fracture between any drugs, 
because when they all work as 
well as all of these do you’re 
talking about 50,000 patients, five 
years before you even stand a 
chance of seeing any difference, 
and when you see the difference 
it's unlikely to be clinically that 
We were very heavily focussed 
on securing a very credible 
publication for our hip fracture 
trial published in NEJM and 
NEJM is still regarded as the 
highest impact factor publication, 
out of all the publications you can 
have.  The downside is that 
they’re very fastidious about how 
things work, so the first thing is 
that you can't do the gradual 





Interview Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Safety Clinical effectiveness (primary data) Marketing  - market 




trial outcomes  
Journal quality/publication 
control Variation in regulatory standards Adverse effects (official 
warnings)/contraindications 
reduction in hip fracture that no one else 
would have, we actually got trumped by 
Fosamax (alendronate) because they 
showed fortuitously because it was never 
powered to show it, they showed 
fortuitously that they did reduce significantly 
reduce hip fracture in their trials, because 
they had a good drug, and we had a good 
drug, you know, so the reality is that had 
they not shown hip fracture, had they only 
ever shown vertebral fracture, which is 
what we were predicting at the time, then 
ours, because it was powered to show hip 
fracture, should have been able to do the 
bit where it became the market leader.   
 
significantly and meaningful to 
actually knock one out of the 
market and favour the other. 
the world, otherwise it never gets 
into NEJM, and so it puts a lot of 
blocks on what you can do, 
because from a marketing point 
of view, we want to be able to 
build up to it, but they won't do 
that, and that’s why they're so 
prestigious.   
   And at that point we needed to shoot above 
where MSD were in terms of their studies 
so they had done BMD, they had done 
vertebral fracture, they hadn’t really had hip 
fracture as a primary end point, but they 
key element was that we had a hip fracture 
drug at the primary end point where hip 
fracture was prospectively planned, and 
then obviously the study was sizably 
geared to show that, so you’re looking at 
10,000 patient plus.  But we had 330 
investigators, 16,000 patients, 18 countries. 
 
  The other element is that they 
shape the publication, so actually 
it's from a technical point of view 
it's not the best written 
publication, it doesn’t do justice to 
the dataset that supports the 
publication, but we again don’t 
have a lot of say in that because 
it's NEJM and they have a lot of 
say in what they want and how 
they want it written 
 
   Large scale trials do carry weight but I think 
the problem is that as soon as they carry 
some weight they also become the next 
benchmark. 
  I think we do make mistakes and I 
think we probably, as a company, 
we have often maybe jumped a 
step in terms of dose ranging so 
we have an issue in the sense 
that it's not a problem from a 
clinical point of view, but I have 
an issue from a trial point of view 
that our 2.5 milligram arm 
disappeared out of the trials and 
so that’s not good because you 
have to explain it, so we should 
maybe have dealt with that in a 
different way. We also had an 
issue that we wanted to do too 
much in one trial, so what we 
chose to do was we chose to 
have an over 80s group, and 
again a potentially big market, a 
potentially big unmet need, but 
we complicated it. So instead of 
one nice clean crisp message we 
ended up with sort of ‘well I have 
to explain a few things about my 
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clean crisp message’ so it's not 
so clean and it's not so crisp. And 
so I think that’s maybe our 
inexperience in…I think a more 
experienced pharmaceutical 
company that is doing this day in 
and day out and has a cookie 
cutter of ‘this is how we launch a 
drug’ they have the experience, 
you know, and that is a genuine 
challenge for a company of our 
size, which is actually how do we 
keep up the capability in tasks 
that are infrequent but important? 
(MOVED FROM 
COMMUNICATION THEME TO 
EVIDENCE THEME) 
 
BP3  There was obviously 
an opportunity for us to 
say treat with 
Alendronate when 
HRT was no longer 
recommended in 
osteoporosis, but our 
licence was really for 
treatment, not 
prevention. And there 
might be some spill 
over into doctors that 
said ‘well this patient I 
can see is going to be 
osteoporotic so I will 
treat now, and treat 
early’, so our message 
was only about treat 
osteoporosis for 
confirmed osteoporosis 
cases and not to go 
after people who were 
being treated with HRT 
for menopausal issues.  
There are other 
alternatives available 
for that. 
regulators around the world all have 
different, slightly different nuances on what 
data they want to see, which makes it 
expensive to bring a medicine to market, 
because you can't necessarily use the 
same file around the world, and that is a 
frustration through the industry, and it slows 
access to medicine down.  And it costs us 
money.  So that’s a frustration, but that’s 
the world that we live in. 
Bisphosphonates are not a very nice 
class of drugs to take.  Didronel was 
a cyclical bisphosphonate so you 
took the active ingredient for a 
certain period of time, and then you 
took calcium for a certain period of 
time.  It was not a very easy thing to 
take but people were used to doing 
it.  Our once daily came in, we had a 
fracture intervention trial which came 
through  in publication ’96, the FIT 
trial, so that gave you the evidence 
base, it was very quick after launch, 
and every expectation would have 
been then that this drug would have 
flowed because a big population 
which is under treated, existing 
therapy not particularly attractive for 
anybody to take, patient, doctor.  
But, at the same time as we had this, 
we did have incidence of adverse 
tolerability particularly in the United 
States which lead to a world-wide 
need for us to write a ‘dear doctor’ 
letter.  You know, an awareness 
letter to the doctor saying ‘watch out 
for tolerability’.  Well then you see 
your competition, some will walk 
away from that, and say ‘that’s going 
to be really bad news for growing this 
market’ and some will say ‘that’s 
great news, I’ll keep my market 
share’, so it depends on whether the 
motivation of the competitor is 
market share or market expansion.   
So, you know in the Alendronate case for 
us it was very important that we had the 
fracture intervention trial which was 
published in about 1996.  For a big 
outcomes trial, three year outcomes trial on 
fracture which really no fracture data of that 
scale existed in this field before that trial, 
and to bring that to market less than a year 
after the launch of the drug was a hugely 
important thing to do in getting the diffusion 
of the drug in a very under treated disease.  
So, that was a good example of a huge 
…of this designing the trials correctly for 
Phase III to be extended to produce the 
outcomes which gives you every argument.   
Fracture discharge, as 
we would describe it 
became….that was 
well-published in all 
leading journals and 
has become one of the 
great case studies in 
this field.  And they’re 
very evidence-based 
and it was all very 
evidence-based and so 
that’s why they were 
preferring to use 
Alendronate maybe 
than the competition 
because they’ve got the 
fracture intervention trial 
plus other evidence, 
plus the 70 milligram 
formulation. 
it's very difficult to do head-to-
head trials to prove clinical 
difference versus an existing field 
in a drug which you need to do a 
three to six year study, in a 
massive population to be 
powered statistically to prove 
anything.  It's extremely difficult.  
So you’ve got to find other 
markers.  In this case that’s 
typically done through bone 
mineral density which you can 
actually measure at a relatively 
short phase and see change, and 
that would be typically what 
people will do to try and get an 
edge over each other. 
 Clearly the trial designs that 
are done for regulatory 
purposes need to also meet 
the needs of being able to 
communicate the benefits of 
the medicine to the wider 
community, because you won't 
have typically in market 
studies for some years until 
after the medicine is launched.  
So you need to have robust 
data which is going to be able 
to present to people, 
regulators, to payers, to 
physicians, to everybody that 
actually gives a compelling 
story of why we would use the 
drug. So marketing gets 
involved before launch is what 
I'm saying (MOVED FROM 
TRIAL DESIGN WITH 
EMERGENCE OF THIS NEW 
EVIDENCE SUBTHEME) 
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ethical about this, that 
if you’d got somebody 
on HRT who is 
osteoporotic you’ve 
been treating with HRT 
to treat osteoporosis, 
then, yes use 
Alendronate, that’s a 
very good alternative 
for you. But if you’ve 
got somebody on HRT 
and they’re 50 and 
they’re doing this for 
menopause 
management it is not 
appropriate to use 
Alendronate at that 
stage.  Some doctors 
would out of their own 
choice, but it's not what 
we were saying.  And 
you will see on that 
chart of adoption of 
HRT when it does 
come down there is 
some change to our 
growth curve but it's 
not that dramatic, it's 
not the driver. 
an issue of adverse tolerability like 
this which is causing oesophageal 
irritation.  They’re caustic drugs, 
they’re designed in a way, it's a 
nasty acid but it diffuses once it gets 
in the gut, but you know, with an 
elderly population you often get 
reflux and that can push the acid 
back into the oesophagus. And the 
competition made hay with that.  And 
consequently we got a relatively slow 
uptake curve, even though we were 
promoting quite extensively doing a 
lot of education and advertising, 
calling on doctors, we couldn’t 
change behaviour because this was 
the message that they’d got in their 
head from the competition, and, to 
be fair, patients were referring…you 
know, we did have instances where 
patients were actually reporting this 
to the doctor 
studies in a way where you capture data for 
socio-economic, health economic cases 
that you can build for to understand the 
pricing of the medicine.  You know, that’s 
not just done by whim, it's done by a form 
of science.  I mean it is an art, and it's also 
a measure of the competitiveness of that 
field, but if you’re first in the market with a 
brand new medicine, with a brand new 
class, how do you price it?  You know, 
you’ve got to find some means of 
demonstrating value of the brand and the 
product to the people who are going to pay 
for it 
   trials and guidance do influence , well, trials 
do.  Mega trials are very important in terms 
of getting the opinion leaders to buy into the 
science quite frankly. 
 
    
   Clearly the trial designs that are done for 
regulatory purposes need to also meet the 
needs of being able to communicate the 
benefits of the medicine to the wider 
community, because you won't have 
typically in market studies for some years 
until after the medicine is launched.  So you 
need to have robust data which is going to 
be able to present to people, regulators, to 
payers, to physicians, to everybody thaat 
actually gives a compelling story of why we 
would use the drug. So marketing gets 
involved before launch is what I'm saying. 
 
    
   Trials get you your position in guidelines.  
And there are different quality of trials of 
course.  You’ve got your Phase III 
regulatory filing, which is against placebo, 
which just shows the thing works.  If it's a 
highly competitive field, people like to have 
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head-to-head studies versus the leading 
comparators, or use drugs in the field at the 
right dose so that they can make a valid 
judgement call saying ‘well this one is 
better than that one’ and they can say 
they’re efficaciously the same but one does 
this with less side affects and therefore is 
better pay off for the doctor and the patient.  
And that will then influence the positioning 
in the guidelines, so you have to have the 
trials, the best form of course, which really 
prove outcomes. 
 
PDE1    We also wanted to get the message 
right about how the drug worked 
because I mean, the fact is it was 
very, very effective, but there were a 
couple of very important aspects.  
One that it was contraindicated with 
the use of nitrates which are quite 
common medicines and you know, 
contraindicated to the point where it 
was a safety issue if people used 
them together, that was one thing 
that we just had to make sure that 
was clear…and that was a 
reasonably commonly used medicine 
for the target group for 
Viagra..middle aged men basically. 
   
The thing that Pfizer did very well I think 
was, we studied Viagra in everyone. This is 
the point, this is where the evidence I think 
became increasingly important because we 
could say, here's our data on diabetes, 
here's our data in spinal cord injury and you 
know, psychological cases, and no 
competitor during that period was ever 
going to have anything like that. It showed 
its effectiveness, but it also forces people to 
compete across loads of different areas, 
which is very difficult for them to do and 
raises the cost of entry so we were always 
going to have a very high market share, 
you know, very early on. 
    
  I think it was very helpful that it had a 
nitrate contraindication in some 
respects, because I think people 
knew that we'd checked.  I mean 
obviously we are always going to 
check what the side effect profile is, 
but you know, as somebody put it to 
me; somebody pointing out where 
the iceberg was, meant that you 
knew how to sail the ship. So think 
that was very important 
If you actually look at the wealth of 
information out there I think Viagra's got 
something like, I don't know, five, ten times 
more clinical papers than we have on the 
sheer numbers of it.  But if you look at our 
numbers of head-to-head studies versus 
them and if you looked at, say, preference, 
although each of the drugs have got some 
studies or abstracts which show a 
preference for one of the other, there's 
probably more out there, both sponsored 
and independent, which would show a 
preference for tadalafil.  But that hasn't 
swayed things.  
  
    
PDE2     Ever since this point, end of '05, '06, you've 
then got a whole load of clinical papers 
that... ever since launch, physicians have 
been screaming out for comparative 
evidence.  Show us head-to-head.  Tell you 
what, go and look at the evidence base for 
head-to-heads now.  All the companies 
have done them to one degree or another.  
And there's only pretty much one company 
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who are absolutely driving head-to-head 
studies and that's us.  And I think that 
speaks volumes for where we stand on the 
medication. You don't have those at launch 
you have pretty much registration studies 
which are...we work and here's the reason 
to care, unique selling point of it. 
 
   There are a whole load of different 
preference studies which were being used 
at the time but they all had methodological 
problems. So different doses comparing 
each other and different instructions and all 
sorts of weird things going on. 
 
    
   A [KOL] turned around and said 'Look, if 
you're going to do a study head-to-head, 
this is how you would do it for the PDE5s 
and it should be open label, crossover 
randomised', you know, on the right doses, 
comparing relative doses, given the 
package  instructions and not going beyond 
that. He designed the trial and we went and 
did it. 
 
    
PDE3    It's really, are they on nitrates, yes, 
well then they can't have a PD5 
inhibitor; nope, then they can have a 
PDE5 inhibitor and any one of them.   
No we kind of had our global colleagues 
trying to make you know, a big new study 
and we've got to do a whole load of PR 
about this, I think the initial regulatory 
submissions, the studies that we used 
there, they're the best quality evidence, and 
I think they still really work for us. 
  I understand you know, the need 
for peer-review and everything, 
but then maybe you leave the 
review of the data until there's a 
bit more published data on the 
other two treatments or you know, 
I don't know, but it was kind of 
like, yeah, as much as we tried to 
discuss it with them, because 
they give you the opportunity to 
discuss; it kept coming back to 
the same thing, that's a poster, 
that's an abstract, it's not peer-
reviewed.  Essentially they have 
to be peer-reviewed to make the 
meeting, but my understanding is 
that it's not as critical a review 
process as maybe a preliminary 
published paper would go 
through. 
I think possibly one of the 
reasons why we stay down 
this end of the market is 
because we don't do as many 
studies or trials as the other 
two products, and we all know; 
it's almost like a self fulfilling 
thing, we don't do as many 
because we're not making as 
much money, but you know 
we might make more money if 
we do more studies, so I think 
it definitely; from a marketing 
point of view, it really helps, 
because you can keep saying 
the same things but bring new 
data to the package which 
then makes it sound new and 
interesting, whereas if you've 
got old data that you're just 
sort of re-hashing all the time, 
you struggle to make 
something sound new or 
interesting, so I think clinical 
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increasingly being 
used in elderly patients 
with psychosis, some 
of the prescribing was 
off licence, you know, 
that the clinicians had 
just decided to use 
that, but once Melleril 
was advised not to be 
used by the Committee 
for the Safety of 
Medicines, a lot of 
patients were actually 
switched over to 
Risperdal. 
Risperdal negatively was this - the 
CVAE (cerebrovascular adverse 
event) warning from the MHRA, that, 
you know, Risperdal shouldn’t really 
be used in elderly patients, that had 
quite an immediate impact upon 
sales. I’ve not seen anything like it 
before or since then I don’t think, but 
in terms of like the letter went out 
from the CSM, and it was literally 
patients were switched, which, you 
know, is unusual but it happened 
very fast. 
drugs, so you have to have clinical data 
that shows you’re efficacious, and clinical 
data that shows that you’re well tolerated 
as well, but efficacy is probably the one 
driver across all brands 
blown publication, if you can in a 
prestigious journal, that would 
have the most impact, so, you 
know, if it was in like the Lancet, 
the BMJ, the data published in 
those journals would have more 
impact than data published in a 
lesser renowned journal. 
drive some of it, but I think 
more of that increase you can 
see was actually driven by the 
use in elderly patients, I mean 
the Csernansky data was very 
very good data. You probably 
could have argued that we 
didn’t do enough with it, you 
know, in terms of promoting 
the data, because it’s very 
good data. Just limits in terms 
of marketing spend, you know, 
Jansen-Cilag would generally 
have a much lower marketing 
budget than Lilly for example. 
(MOVED FROM CLINICAL 
DATA - PRIMARY  WITH 
EMERGENCE OF THIS NEW 
EVIDENCE SUBTHEME) 
 
I mean if people have 
used it in a certain 
area and found it 
works very well, then, 
you know, once it’s 
licensed they would be 
inclined to use more of 
it. 
 What happened here was that there 
was some studies done with 
Risperdal and some of the other 
atypical antipsychotics, which 
actually suggested that Risperdal 
probably had some risks as well in 
elderly patients, it was an 
independent study. And then what 
happened was that patients - some 
of the elderly psychosis patients 
were switched off Risperdal onto 
other drugs, so we gained there and 
then began to lose business here 
(MOVED FROM REGULATORY 
WARNING ONCE CATEGORY 
WAS MERGED WITH ADVERSE 
EFFECTS) 
I think what we’ve seen is an increasing 
importance of things like the robustness of 
your clinical data, and therefore the 
strength of the clinical trial programme that 
you’ve run, so do you have for example 
head to head comparators with products 
already on the market that shows that you 
have the benefit in clinical effect or health 
economic value, and that has really 
increased in importance 
   we had good effective 
marketing, that was key in 
driving the success of the 
brand. We had to have the 
clinical data as well, but the 
marketing activity I think really 
had more of an emphasis on 
driving the brand’s success. 
Now I think you can - you still 
have to invest in the 
marketing, but unless you 
have the clinical data to back 
up the marketing, it’s far less 
effective.  (MOVED FROM 
CLINICAL DATA - PRIMARY  




   The most powerful data is sort of, you 
know, the early clinical data, so the phase 
IIIb, particularly if you have randomised 
head to head, you know, double blinded 
type data, I mean that’s regarded as the 
most powerful data. The systematic reviews 
are generally regarded as not quite as 
robust sometimes, although they can be 
very useful in terms of gathering lots of 
different opinions together and forming and 
overall consensus (MOVED FROM 
SECONDARY DATA TO TRIAL DESIGN) 
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here, it was safety 
concerns, we had dear 
doctor letters, and so 







people do have real concerns about 
the metabolic effects. It is causing 
people to switch away from 
olanzapine gradually in 
schizophrenia, but they’ve not moved 
away rapidly because again I think 
the efficacy is still seen as the most 
important thing, and the company 
have done quite a good job in trying 
to minimise, you know, how the side 
effects are viewed. 
at the time of that launch.  The most pivotal 
of which was the Tollenson data. I recall at 
the time it was the biggest ever study 
undertaken on a psychiatric population.   
conferences to get the 
latest stuff so they 
definitely take note of 
what’s presented at 
meetings and you can’t 
beat peer review journal 
publications. (MOVED 
FROM TRIAL DESIGN) 
study and where it’s published as 
to whether we would react to it . 
You’ve always got to look….you 
know we have to present lots of 
evidence for our products and so 
we tend to….if we get an 
individual study that comes out 
and look at what is the body of 
evidence that either backs that 
study up or disagrees with that 
study, if it’s a one off and there’s 
loads disagreeing with it I 
probably wouldn’t bother with it. If 
it’s one of a series and I think 
longer term it’s going to hurt the 
brand if we don’t respond to it, 
then we’ll go proactive and 
respond to it (MOVED FROM  
CLINICAL DATA - PRIMARY TO 
JOURNAL QUALITY 
FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENT 
OF THIS SUBTHEME) 
 
  We take [weight gain side effects] 
very seriously because I think they’re 
serious issues and I think again it 
goes back to the body of evidence, 
you look at the body of evidence and 
what does it tell you and it tells you 
that there are issues with all 
antipsychotics, atypical 
antipsychotics, so therefore that’s 
why physical health is a very 
important debate for us and 
something we take very, very 
(EVENTUALLY MOVED TO 
ENVIRONMENT - GUIDELINE TO 
DEFLECT DRUG ISSUES) 
At that time we  had no head to head data 
versus risperidone.  The differentiation was 
against the typical antipsychotics, notably 
haloperidol which did present some 
problems in the UK because haloperidol, 
although the standard of care in the US, is 
less commonly used in the UK and indeed 
across much of Europe.  So haloperidol 
was really seen as a proxy for typical 
antipsychotics and people were left to draw 
their own conclusions about what that 
meant against their own personal standard 
of care.  Be that another typical, such as 
chlorpromazine or against risperidone.  But 
I remember one of the great needs and the 
great pleas from our sales forces at the 
time was we need head to head data 
versus risperidone which we simply didn’t 
have (MOVED TO TRIAL DESIGN FROM 
CLINICAL DATA - PRIMARY) 
 
There was such a pent 
up demand for this 
drug.  And I remember 
being at some of the 
congresses where the 
Phase III data were 
presented on Zyprexa 
prior to its launch.  And 
it was standing room 
only in some of the 
auditoria where the data 
were presented.  
People really were 
excited about this.  That 
it did represent a 
breakthrough (MOVED 
FROM CLINICAL 
DATA - PRIMARY TO 
TEMPORAL IMPACT) 
 quality of the data is absolutely 
paramount to us for a successful 
product launch. we have to do 
placebo for regulatory reasons.   
Physicians want head to head, 
how do you compare with other 
products on the marketplace?  If 
you’re lucky enough not to be, 
you know you’re first in class then 
it’s slightly different but quality 
data is critical (MOVED FROM  
CLINICAL DATA - PRIMARY TO 
JOURNAL QUALITY 
FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENT 
OF THIS SUBTHEME) 
 
AA4      I think in psychiatry, I think you 
would struggle to identify a really 
ground breaking study that kind of 
meant people used atypicals  
instead of typicals, one, because 
of the nature of the illness and the 
nature of how clinical trials are 
done.  So when you measure, do 
a trial for a statin and you are 
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your primary outcome measures 
for that trial will be things that 
doctors that are prescribing them, 
totally understand. If I talk about a 
PANSS scale or a Weinmeres 
scale or any of those scales they 
are kind of, not artificial but they 
are a thing that is done in order to 
get clinical trial results and not 
just by the industry but that’s how 
you measure the effectiveness of 
the drugs.  Your jobbing day to 
day psychiatrist may not really 
understand exactly what a 
reduction in PAN score means to 
a patient unless they are involved 
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Unlicensed use Adverse effects 
/contraindications 
Head to head comparisons Surrogate markers 
BP1    There is genuinely a concern that 
etidronate as a first generation 
bisphosphonate, that if you give it 
in too a higher dose then it 
causes osteomalacia which is 
basically malformed bone, so that 
the bone that it's making is not of 
a sufficient quality.  And we know 
that, it came out from the 
sciences, and the solution from a 
scientific point of view was to give 
it in cyclical regiment, so that’s 
why it became Didronel PMO 
[etidronate] and had a cyclical 
regimen of 14 days of Didronel 
followed by the calcium, vitamin D 
…that’s all done to stop 
osteomalacia occurring because 
in that dosing cycle it doesn’t 
happen.  The US have higher 
concerns about that than the 
European regulators, so, it's not 
unusual that different regulators 
have different concerns. You 
could, as a company, submit new 
data to shift the opinion of the 
regulators, but you reach a point 
relatively quickly when you get 
regulatory delay, that because of 
the intellectual property rights that 
you have on the product it 
becomes unviable to bring it to 
market within the time space you 
have back to actually recoup your 
additional costs and your base 
costs. It went on and got a licence 
in Europe, but it never managed 
to get a licence in the US. 
 
      
  it went on and got a licence in 
Europe, but it never managed to 
get a licence in US,  it had a 
licence in Canada, the UK and 12 
other markets, but not in the US 
which also means that as an 
overall opportunity for any 
company it's lower down the list 
than something like Actonel 
[risedronate] which has now got a 
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licence in 83. 
 
BP2  I think the adverse effect issue 
for alendronate slowed down 
the adoption curve, I think you 
should have seen it rise above 
that.  So I think the fact that 
there was some scepticism in 
the marketplace about that. 
  I think what disappointed us, 
and I think there’s two things, 
one is fortuitous, I think that 
the bisphosphonates are a 
very good class of drugs, so I 
will be honest with you I think 
they all work, and they’re all 
substantially above what 
you’re basic calcium vitamin 
D does, so that’s the great 
news for the class yes?  The 
bad news, because they all 
work, that when you try and 
plan in 1993 what you’re 
expecting breakthrough to do, 
which was that we were 
planning to show a significant 
reduction in hip fracture that 
no one else would have, we 
actually got trumped by 
Fosamax (alendronate) 
because they showed 
fortuitously because it was 
never powered to show it, 
they showed fortuitously that 
they did reduce significantly 
reduce hip fracture in their 
trials, because they had a 
good drug, and we had a 
good drug, you know, so the 
reality is that had they not 
shown hip fracture, had they 
only ever shown vertebral 
fracture, which is what we 
were predicting at the time, 
then ours, because it was 
powered to show hip fracture, 
should have been able to do 
the bit where it became the 
market leader.   
 
Our cost of entry is becoming 
increasingly higher and the next 
one is that there’s not going to be 
a head-to-head trial on hip 
fracture between any drugs, 
because when they all work as 
well as all of these do you’re 
talking about 50,000 patients, five 
years before you even stand a 
chance of seeing any difference, 
and when you see the difference 
it's unlikely to be clinically that 
significantly and meaningful to 
actually knock one out of the 
market and favour the other. 
  I think we do make mistakes and 
I think we probably, as a 
company, we have often maybe 
jumped a step in terms of dose 
ranging so we have an issue in 
the sense that it's not a problem 
from a clinical point of view, but I 
have an issue from a trial point of 
view that our 2.5 milligram arm 
disappeared out of the trials and 
so that’s not good because you 
have to explain it, so we should 
maybe have dealt with that in a 
different way. We also had an 
issue that we wanted to do too 
much in one trial, so what we 
chose to do was we chose to 
have an over 80s group, and 
again a potentially big market, a 
potentially big unmet need, but 
we complicated it. So instead of 
one nice clean crisp message we 
ended up with sort of ‘well I have 
to explain a few things about my 
trial before I can now give you 
my clean crisp message’ so it's 
not so clean and it's not so crisp. 
And so I think that’s maybe our 
inexperience in…I think a more 
experienced pharmaceutical 
company that is doing this day in 
and day out and has a cookie 
cutter of ‘this is how we launch a 
drug’ they have the experience, 
you know, and that is a genuine 
challenge for a company of our 
size, which is actually how do we 
keep up the capab 
    And at that point we needed 
to shoot above where MSD 
were in terms of their studies 
so they had done BMD, they 
had done vertebral fracture, 
they hadn’t really had hip 
fracture as a primary end 
point, but they key element 
was that we had a hip 
fracture drug at the primary 
   The other element is that they 
shape the publication, so actually 
it's from a technical point of view 
it's not the best written 
publication, it doesn’t do justice 
to the dataset that supports the 
publication, but we again don’t 
have a lot of say in that because 
it's NEJM and they have a lot of 
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end point where hip fracture 
was prospectively planned, 
and then obviously the study 
was sizably geared to show 
that, so you’re looking at 
10,000 patient plus.  But we 
had 330 investigators, 16,000 
patients, 18 countries. 
 
they want it written 
    Large scale trials do carry 
weight but I think the problem 
is that as soon as they carry 
some weight they also 
become the next benchmark. 
   We were very heavily focussed 
on securing a very credible 
publication for our hip fracture 
trial published in NEJM and 
NEJM is still regarded as the 
highest impact factor publication, 
out of all the publications you 
can have.  The downside is that 
they’revery fastidious about how 
things work, so the first thing is 
that you can't do the gradual 
release it has to be brand new to 
the world, otherwise it never gets 
into NEJM, and so it puts a lot of 
blocks on what you can do, 
because from a marketing point 
of view, we want to be able to 
build up to it, but they won't do 
that, and that’s why they're so 
prestigious.   
 
BP3  There was obviously an 
opportunity for us to say 
treat with Alendronate 
when HRT was no longer 
recommended in 
osteoporosis, but our 
licence was really for 
treatment, not prevention. 
And there might be some 
spill over into doctors that 
said ‘well this patient I can 
see is going to be 
osteoporotic so I will treat 
now, and treat early’, so 
our message was only 
about treat osteoporosis 
for confirmed osteoporosis 
cases and not to go after 
people who were being 
treated with HRT for 
menopausal issues.  There 
are other alternatives 
available for that 
Bisphosphonates are not a 
very nice class of drugs to 
take.  Didronel was a cyclical 
bisphosphonate so you took 
the active ingredient for a 
certain period of time, and 
then you took calcium for a 
certain period of time.  It was 
not a very easy thing to take 
but people were used to doing 
it.  Our once daily came in, we 
had a fracture intervention trial 
which came through  in 
publication ’96, the FIT trial, so 
that gave you the evidence 
base, it was very quick after 
launch, and every expectation 
would have been then that this 
drug would have flowed 
because a big population 
which is under treated, 
existing therapy not 
particularly attractive for 
regulators around the world all 
have different, slightly different 
nuances on what data they want 
to see, which makes it expensive 
to bring a medicine to market, 
because you can't necessarily 
use the same file around the 
world, and that is a frustration 
through the industry, and it slows 
access to medicine down.  And it 
costs us money.  So that’s a 
frustration, but that’s the world 
that we live in. 
Clearly the trial designs that 
are done for regulatory 
purposes need to also meet 
the needs of being able to 
communicate the benefits of 
the medicine to the wider 
community, because you won't 
have typically in market 
studies for some years until 
after the medicine is launched.  
So you need to have robust 
data which is going to be able 
to present to people, 
regulators, to payers, to 
physicians, to everybody that 
actually gives a compelling 
story of why we would use the 
drug. So marketing gets 
involved before launch is what 
I'm saying 
So, you know in the 
Alendronate case for us it 
was very important that we 
had the fracture intervention 
trial which was published in 
about 1996.  For a big 
outcomes trial, three year 
outcomes trial on fracture 
which really no fracture data 
of that scale existed in this 
field before that trial, and to 
bring that to market less than 
a year after the launch of the 
drug was a hugely important 
thing to do in getting the 
diffusion of the drug in a very 
under treated disease.  So, 
that was a good example of a 
huge …of this designing the 
trials correctly for Phase III to 
be extended to produce the 
outcomes which gives you 
every argument.   
 it's very difficult to do head-to-
head trials to prove clinical 
difference versus an existing 
field in a drug which you need 
to do a three to six year study, 
in a massive population to be 
powered statistically to prove 
anything.  It's extremely 
difficult.  So you’ve got to find 
other markers.  In this case 
that’s typically done through 
bone mineral density which you 
can actually measure at a 
relatively short phase and see 
change, and that would be 
typically what people will do to 
try and get an edge over each 
other (REFINED 
SUBCATEGORY) 
Fracture discharge, as 
we would describe it 
became….that was 
well-published in all 
leading journals and 
has become one of the 
great case studies in 
this field.  And they’re 
very evidence-based 
and it was all very 
evidence-based and so 
that’s why they were 
preferring to use 
Alendronate maybe 
than the competition 
because they’ve got the 
fracture intervention trial 
plus other evidence, 
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anybody to take, patient, 
doctor.  But, at the same time 
as we had this, we did have 
incidence of adverse 
tolerability particularly in the 
United States which lead to a 
world-wide need for us to write 
a ‘dear doctor’ letter.  You 
know, an awareness letter to 
the doctor saying ‘watch out 
for tolerability’.  Well then you 
see your competition, some 
will walk away from that, and 
say ‘that’s going to be really 
bad news for growing this 
market’ and some will say 
‘that’s great news, I’ll keep my 
market share’, so it depends 
on whether the motivation of 
the competitor is market share 
or market expansion.  
  
we were very clear and 
ethical about this, that if 
you’d got somebody on 
HRT who is osteoporotic 
you’ve been treating with 
HRT to treat osteoporosis, 
then, yes use Alendronate, 
that’s a very good 
alternative for you. But if 
you’ve got somebody on 
HRT and they’re 50 and 
they’re doing this for 
menopause management it 
is not appropriate to use 
Alendronate at that stage.  
Some doctors would out of 
their own choice, but it's 
not what we were saying.  
And you will see on that 
chart of adoption of HRT 
when it does come down 
there is some change to 
our growth curve but it's 
not that dramatic, it's not 
the driver. 
But when you come in and 
you have an issue of adverse 
tolerability like this which is 
causing oesophageal irritation.  
They’re caustic drugs, they’re 
designed in a way, it's a nasty 
acid but it diffuses once it gets 
in the gut, but you know, with 
an elderly population you often 
get reflux and that can push 
the acid back into the 
oesophagus. And the 
competition made hay with 
that.  And consequently we 
got a relatively slow uptake 
curve, even though we were 
promoting quite extensively 
doing a lot of education and 
advertising, calling on doctors, 
we couldn’t change behaviour 
because this was the 
message that they’d got in 
their head from the 
competition, and, to be fair, 
patients were referring…you 
know, we did have instances 
where patients were actually 
reporting this to the doctor 
 
 
  it's also very important to 
design those studies in a way 
where you capture data for 
socio-economic, health 
economic cases that you can 
build for to understand the 
pricing of the medicine.  You 
know, that’s not just done by 
whim, it's done by a form of 
science.  I mean it is an art, 
and it's also a measure of the 
competitiveness of that field, 
but if you’re first in the market 
with a brand new medicine, 
with a brand new class, how 
do you price it?  You know, 
you’ve got to find some 
means of demonstrating 
value of the brand and the 
product to the people who are 
going to pay for it 
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influence , well, trials do.  
Mega trials are very important 
in terms of getting the opinion 
leaders to buy into the 
science quite frankly. 
 
    Trials get you your position in 
guidelines.  And there are 
different quality of trials of 
course.  You’ve got your 
Phase III regulatory filing, 
which is against placebo, 
which just shows the thing 
works.  If it's a highly 
competitive field, people like 
to have head-to-head studies 
versus the leading 
comparators, or use drugs in 
the field at the right dose so 
that they can make a valid 
judgement call saying ‘well 
this one is better than that 
one’ and they can say they’re 
efficaciously the same but 
one does this with less side 
affects and therefore is better 
pay off for the doctor and the 
patient.  And that will then 
influence the positioning in 
the guidelines, so you have to 
have the trials, the best form 
of course, which really prove 
outcomes. 
 
    
PDE1   We also wanted to get the 
message right about how the 
drug worked because I mean, 
the fact is it was very, very 
effective, but there were a 
couple of very important 
aspects.  One that it was 
contraindicated with the use of 
nitrates which are quite 
common medicines and you 
know, contraindicated to the 
point where it was a safety 
issue if people used them 
together, that was one thing 
that we just had to make sure 
that was clear…and that was 
a reasonably commonly used 
medicine for the target group 
for Viagra..middle aged men 
  The thing that Pfizer did very 
well I think was, we studied 
Viagra in everyone. This is 
the point, this is where the 
evidence I think became 
increasingly important 
because we could say, here's 
our data on diabetes, here's 
our data in spinal cord injury 
and you know, psychological 
cases, and no competitor 
during that period was ever 
going to have anything like 
that. It showed its 
effectiveness, but it also 
forces people to compete 
across loads of different 
areas, which is very difficult 
for them to do and raises the 
If you actually look at the wealth 
of information out there I think 
Viagra's got something like, I 
don't know, five, ten times more 
clinical papers than we have on 
the sheer numbers of it.  But if 
you look at our numbers of head-
to-head studies versus them and 
if you looked at, say, preference, 
although each of the drugs have 
got some studies or abstracts 
which show a preference for one 
of the other, there's probably 
more out there, both sponsored 
and independent, which would 
show a preference for tadalafil.  
But that hasn't swayed things 
(MOVED FROM TRIAL DESIGN 
INTO NEW HEAD TO HEAD 
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basically. cost of entry so we were 
always going to have a very 
high market share, you know, 




 I think it was very helpful that it 
had a nitrate contraindication 
in some respects, because I 
think people knew that we'd 
checked.  I mean obviously we 
are always going to check 
what the side effect profile is, 
but you know, as somebody 
put it to me; somebody 
pointing out where the iceberg 
was, meant that you knew 
how to sail the ship. So think 
that was very important 
 
       
PDE2      A [KOL] turned around and 
said 'Look, if you're going to 
do a study head-to-head, this 
is how you would do it for the 
PDE5s and it should be open 
label, crossover randomised', 
you know, on the right doses, 
comparing relative doses, 
given the package  
instructions and not going 
beyond that. He designed the 
trial and we went and did it. 
There are a whole load of 
different preference studies which 
were being used at the time but 
they all had methodological 
problems. So different doses 
comparing each other and 
different instructions and all sorts 
of weird things going on  
(MOVED FROM TRIAL DESIGN 




   
     Ever since this point, end of '05, 
'06, you've then got a whole load 
of clinical papers that... ever since 
launch, physicians have been 
screaming out for comparative 
evidence.  Show us head-to-
head.  Tell you what, go and look 
at the evidence base for head-to-
heads now.  All the companies 
have done them to one degree or 
another.  And there's only pretty 
much one company who are 
absolutely driving head-to-head 
studies and that's us.  And I think 
that speaks volumes for where 
we stand on the medication. You 
don't have those at launch you 
have pretty much registration 
studies which are...we work and 
here's the reason to care, unique 
selling point of it  (MOVED FROM 
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TRIAL DESIGN INTO NEW 
HEAD TO HEAD COMPARISON 
SUBCATEGORY) 
 
PDE3   It's really, are they on nitrates, 
yes, well then they can't have 
a PD5 inhibitor; nope, then 
they can have a PDE5 
inhibitor and any one of them.   
 I think possibly one of the 
reasons why we stay down 
this end of the market is 
because we don't do as many 
studies or trials as the other 
two products, and we all know; 
it's almost like a self fulfilling 
thing, we don't do as many 
because we're not making as 
much money, but you know 
we might make more money if 
we do more studies, so I think 
it definitely; from a marketing 
point of view, it really helps, 
because you can keep saying 
the same things but bring new 
data to the package which 
then makes it sound new and 
interesting, whereas if you've 
got old data that you're just 
sort of re-hashing all the time, 
you struggle to make 
something sound new or 
interesting, so I think clinical 
data does have a significant 
affect. (MOVED FROM 
MARKETING SUBTHEME 
INTO THIS BROADER 
CATEGORY) 
 
No we kind of had our global 
colleagues trying to make you 
know, a big new study and 
we've got to do a whole load 
of PR about this, I think the 
initial regulatory submissions, 
the studies that we used 
there, they're the best quality 
evidence, and I think they still 
really work for us 
   I understand you know, the need 
for peer-review and everything, 
but then maybe you leave the 
review of the data until there's a 
bit more published data on the 
other two treatments or you 
know, I don't know, but it was 
kind of like, yeah, as much as we 
tried to discuss it with them, 
because they give you the 
opportunity to discuss; it kept 
coming back to the same thing, 
that's a poster, that's an abstract, 
it's not peer-reviewed.  
Essentially they have to be peer-
reviewed to make the meeting, 
but my understanding is that it's 
not as critical a review process 
as maybe a preliminary 
published paper would go 
through. 
AA1  Risperdal was increasingly 
being used in elderly 
patients with psychosis, 
some of the prescribing 
was off licence, you know, 
that the clinicians had just 
decided to use that, but 
once Melleril was advised 
not to be used by the 
Committee for the Safety 
of Medicines, a lot of 
patients were actually 
switched over to Risperdal. 
  The data possibly helped to 
drive some of it, but I think 
more of that increase you can 
see was actually driven by the 
use in elderly patients, I mean 
the Csernansky data was very 
very good data. You probably 
could have argued that we 
didn’t do enough with it, you 
know, in terms of promoting 
the data, because it’s very 
good data. Just limits in terms 
of marketing spend, you know, 
Jansen-Cilag would generally 
have a much lower marketing 
budget than Lilly for example. 
 
 
efficacy that has to be proven 
with all drugs, so you have to 
have clinical data that shows 
you’re efficacious, and clinical 
data that shows that you’re 
well tolerated as well, but 
efficacy is probably the one 
driver across all brands 
   it’s not really until you get a full 
blown publication, if you can in a 
prestigious journal, that would 
have the most impact, so, you 
know, if it was in like the Lancet, 
the BMJ, the data published in 
those journals would have more 
impact than data published in a 
lesser renowned journal. 
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that there was some 
studies done with 
Risperdal and some of the 
other atypical 
antipsychotics, which 
actually suggested that 
Risperdal probably had 
some risks as well in 
elderly patients, it was an 
independent study. And 
then what happened was 
that patients - some of the 
elderly psychosis patients 
were switched off 
Risperdal onto other drugs, 
so we gained there and 
then began to lose 





marketing, that was key in 
driving the success of the 
brand. We had to have the 
clinical data as well, but the 
marketing activity I think really 
had more of an emphasis on 
driving the brand’s success. 
Now I think you can - you still 
have to invest in the 
marketing, but unless you 
have the clinical data to back 
up the marketing, it’s far less 
effective 
sort of, you know, the early 
clinical data, so the phase 
IIIb, particularly if you have 
randomised head to head, 
you know, double blinded 
type data, I mean that’s 
regarded as the most 
powerful data. The systematic 
reviews are generally 
regarded as not quite as 
robust sometimes, although 
they can be very useful in 
terms of gathering lots of 
different opinions together 
and forming and overall 
consensus 
probably the biggest 
impact on Risperdal 
negatively was this - the 
CVAE (cerebrovascular 
adverse event) warning 
from the MHRA, that, you 
know, Risperdal shouldn’t 
really be used in elderly 
patients, that had quite an 
immediate impact upon 
sales. I’ve not seen 
anything like it before or 
since then I don’t think, but 
in terms of like the letter 
went out from the CSM, 
and it was literally patients 
were switched, which, you 
know, is unusual but it 
happened very fast 
(MOVED FROM 
ADVERSE EVENTS TO 
UNLICENSED USE) 
 
  I think what we’ve seen is an 
increasing importance of 
things like the robustness of 
your clinical data, and 
therefore the strength of the 
clinical trial programme that 
you’ve run, so do you have for 
example head to head 
comparators with products 
already on the market that 
shows that you have the 
benefit in clinical effect or 
health economic value, and 
that has really increased in 
importance (MOVED FROM 
TRIAL DESIGN) 
     
I mean if people have used 
it in a certain area and 
found it works very well, 
then, you know, once it’s 
licensed they would be 
inclined to use more of it. 
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here, it was safety 
concerns, we had dear 
doctor letters, and so did 
Risperdal. Issues with 




months people do have real 
concerns about the metabolic 
effects. It is causing people to 
switch away from olanzapine 
gradually in schizophrenia, but 
they’ve not moved away 
rapidly because again I think 
the efficacy is still seen as the 
most important thing, and the 
company have done quite a 
good job in trying to minimise, 
you know, how the side effects 
are viewed. 
three studies at the time of 
that launch.  The most pivotal 
of which was the Tollenson 
data. I recall at the time it was 
the biggest ever study 
undertaken on a psychiatric 
population 
absolutely paramount to us 
for a successful product 
launch. we have to do 
placebo for regulatory 
reasons.   Physicians want 
head to head, how do you 
compare with other products 
on the marketplace?  If you’re 
lucky enough not to be, you 
know you’re first in class then 
it’s slightly different but quality 
data is critical (MOVED 
FROM JOURNAL QUALITY 
TO TRIAL DESIGN) 
head data versus risperidone.  
The differentiation was against 
the typical antipsychotics, notably 
haloperidol which did present 
some problems in the UK 
because haloperidol, although the 
standard of care in the US, is less 
commonly used in the UK and 
indeed across much of Europe.  
So haloperidol was really seen as 
a proxy for typical antipsychotics 
and people were left to draw their 
own conclusions about what that 
meant against their own personal 
standard of care.  Be that another 
typical, such as chlorpromazine 
or against risperidone.  But I 
remember one of the great needs 
and the great pleas from our 
sales forces at the time was we 
need head to head data versus 
risperidone which we simply 
didn’t have (MOVED FROM 
TRIAL DESIGN INTO NEW 
HEAD TO HEAD COMPARISON 
SUBCATEGORY) 
 
conferences to get the 
latest stuff so they 
definitely take note of 
what’s presented at 
meetings and you can’t 
beat peer review journal 
publications. 
the study and where it’s 
published as to whether we 
would react to it . You’ve always 
got to look….you know we have 
to present lots of evidence for 
our products and so we tend 
to….if we get an individual study 
that comes out and look at what 
is the body of evidence that 
either backs that study up or 
disagrees with that study, if it’s a 
one off and there’s loads 
disagreeing with it I probably 
wouldn’t bother with it. If it’s one 
of a series and I think longer 
term it’s going to hurt the brand if 
we don’t respond to it, then we’ll 
go proactive and respond to it. 
 We take [weight gain side 
effects] very seriously 
because I think they’re serious 
issues and I think again it 
goes back to the body of 
evidence, you look at the body 
of evidence and what does it 
tell you and it tells you that 
there are issues with all 
antipsychotics, atypical 
antipsychotics, so therefore 
that’s why physical health is a 
very important debate for us 
and something we take very, 
very (EVENTUALLY MOVED 
TO ENVIRONMENT - 
GUIDELINE ) 
 
     There was such a pent 
up demand for this 
drug.  And I remember 
being at some of the 
congresses where the 
Phase III data were 
presented on Zyprexa 
prior to its launch.  And 
it was standing room 
only in some of the 
auditoria where the data 
were presented.  
People really were 
excited about this.  That 
it did represent a 
breakthrough 
 
 We’ve got a service that we’re 
now training NHS personnel 
on how to manage physical 
health in schizophrenic 
patients, that’s endorsed by all 
the advocacy groups 
endorsed by the government 
and that’s taken us a lot of 
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time and a lot of money but we 
think that’s really important 
and as we are the market 
leader we should be leading 
the way on the other issues 
that need to be addressed 
(MOVED TO EVIDENCE -
ADVERSE EVENTS FROM 




AA4        I think in psychiatry, I think you 
would struggle to identify a 
really ground breaking study 
that kind of meant people used 
atypicals  instead of typicals, 
one, because of the nature of 
the illness and the nature of 
how clinical trials are done.  So 
when you measure, do a trial 
for a statin and you are 
measuring cholesterol, you 
have your primary outcome 
measures for that trial will be 
things that doctors that are 
prescribing them, totally 
understand. If I talk about a 
PANSS scale or a Weinmeres 
scale or any of those scales 
they are kind of, not artificial 
but they are a thing that is 
done in order to get clinical trial 
results and not just by the 
industry but that’s how you 
measure the effectiveness of 
the drugs.  Your jobbing day to 
day psychiatrist may not really 
understand exactly what a 
reduction in PAN score means 
to a patient unless they are 
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BP1    There is genuinely a concern that 
etidronate as a first generation 
bisphosphonate, that if you give it 
in too a higher dose then it 
causes osteomalacia which is 
basically malformed bone, so that 
the bone that it's making is not of 
a sufficient quality.  And we know 
that, it came out from the 
sciences, and the solution from a 
scientific point of view was to give 
it in cyclical regiment, so that’s 
why it became Didronel PMO 
[etidronate] and had a cyclical 
regimen of 14 days of Didronel 
followed by the calcium, vitamin 
D…that’s all done to stop 
osteomalacia occurring because 
in that dosing cycle it doesn’t 
happen.  The US have higher 
concerns about that than the 
European regulators, so, it's not 
unusual that different regulators 
have different concerns. You 
could, as a company, submit new 
data to shift the opinion of the 
regulators, but you reach a point 
relatively quickly when you get 
regulatory delay, that because of 
the intellectual property rights that 
you have on the product it 
becomes unviable to bring it to 
market within the time space you 
have back to actually recoup your 
additional costs and your base 
costs. It went on and got a licence 
in Europe, but it never managed 
to get a licence in the US. 
 
      
  it went on and got a licence in 
Europe, but it never managed to 
get a licence in US,  it had a 
licence in Canada, the UK and 12 
other markets, but not in the US 
which also means that as an 
overall opportunity for any 
company it's lower down the list 
than something like Actonel 
[risedronate] which has now got a 
licence in 83. 
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BP2   I think the adverse effect 
issue for alendronate 
slowed down the adoption 
curve, I think you should 
have seen it rise above 
that.  So I think the fact that 
there was some scepticism 
in the marketplace about 
that. 
  I think what disappointed us, 
and I think there’s two things, 
one is fortuitous, I think that 
the bisphosphonates are a 
very good class of drugs, so I 
will be honest with you I think 
they all work, and they’re all 
substantially above what 
you’re basic calcium vitamin D 
does, so that’s the great news 
for the class yes?  The bad 
news, because they all work, 
that when you try and plan in 
1993 what you’re expecting 
breakthrough to do, which was 
that we were planning to show 
a significant reduction in hip 
fracture that no one else 
would have, we actually got 
trumped by Fosamax 
(alendronate) because they 
showed fortuitously because it 
was never powered to show it, 
they showed fortuitously that 
they did reduce significantly 
reduce hip fracture in their 
trials, because they had a 
good drug, and we had a good 
drug, you know, so the reality 
is that had they not shown hip 
fracture, had they only ever 
shown vertebral fracture, 
which is what we were 
predicting at the time, then 
ours, because it was powered 
to show hip fracture, should 
have been able to do the bit 
where it became the market 
leader.   
Our cost of entry is becoming 
increasingly higher and the next one is 
that there’s not going to be a head-to-
head trial on hip fracture between any 
drugs, because when they all work as 
well as all of these do you’re talking 
about 50,000 patients, five years before 
you even stand a chance of seeing any 
difference, and when you see the 
difference it's unlikely to be clinically that 
significantly and meaningful to actually 
knock one out of the market and favour 
the other. 
  I think we do make mistakes 
and I think we probably, as a 
company, we have often 
maybe jumped a step in terms 
of dose ranging so we have an 
issue in the sense that it's not 
a problem from a clinical point 
of view, but I have an issue 
from a trial point of view that 
our 2.5 milligram arm 
disappeared out of the trials 
and so that’s not good 
because you have to explain 
it, so we should maybe have 
dealt with that in a different 
way. We also had an issue 
that we wanted to do too much 
in one trial, so what we chose 
to do was we chose to have 
an over 80s group, and again 
a potentially big market, a 
potentially big unmet need, but 
we complicated it. So instead 
of one nice clean crisp 
message we ended up with 
sort of ‘well I have to explain a 
few things about my trial 
before I can now give you my 
clean crisp message’ so it's 
not so clean and it's not so 
crisp. And so I think that’s 
maybe our inexperience in…I 
think a more experienced 
pharmaceutical company that 
is doing this day in and day 
out and has a cookie cutter of 
‘this is how we launch a drug’ 
they have the experience, you 
know, and that is a genuine 
challenge for a company of 
our size, which is actually how 
do we keep up the capab 
 
    And at that point we needed to 
shoot above where MSD were 
in terms of their studies so 
they had done BMD, they had 
done vertebral fracture, they 
hadn’t really had hip fracture 
as a primary end point, but 
they key element was that we 
had a hip fracture drug at the 
primary end point where hip 
fracture was prospectively 
   The other element is that they 
shape the publication, so 
actually it's from a technical 
point of view it's not the best 
written publication, it doesn’t 
do justice to the dataset that 
supports the publication, but 
we again don’t have a lot of 
say in that because it's NEJM 
and they have a lot of say in 
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planned, and then obviously 
the study was sizably geared 
to show that, so you’re looking 
at 10,000 patient plus.  But we 
had 330 investigators, 16,000 
patients, 18 countries. 
 
want it written 
    Large scale trials do carry 
weight but I think the problem 
is that as soon as they carry 
some weight they also 
become the next benchmark. 
   We were very heavily 
focussed on securing a very 
credible publication for our hip 
fracture trial published in 
NEJM and NEJM is still 
regarded as the highest 
impact factor publication, out 
of all the publications you can 
have.  The downside is that 
they’revery fastidious about 
how things work, so the first 
thing is that you can't do the 
gradual release it has to be 
brand new to the world, 
otherwise it never gets into 
NEJM, and so it puts a lot of 
blocks on what you can do, 
because from a marketing 
point of view, we want to be 
able to build up to it, but they 
won't do that, and that’s why 
they're so prestigious.   
 
BP3  There was obviously an 
opportunity for us to say 
treat with Alendronate 
when HRT was no longer 
recommended in 
osteoporosis, but our 
licence was really for 
treatment, not prevention. 
And there might be some 
spill over into doctors that 
said ‘well this patient I can 
see is going to be 
osteoporotic so I will treat 
now, and treat early’, so 
our message was only 
about treat osteoporosis 
for confirmed osteoporosis 
cases and not to go after 
people who were being 
treated with HRT for 
menopausal issues.  There 
are other alternatives 
available for that 
Bisphosphonates are not a 
very nice class of drugs to 
take.  Didronel was a 
cyclical bisphosphonate so 
you took the active 
ingredient for a certain 
period of time, and then 
you took calcium for a 
certain period of time.  It 
was not a very easy thing 
to take but people were 
used to doing it.  Our once 
daily came in, we had a 
fracture intervention trial 
which came through  in 
publication ’96, the FIT 
trial, so that gave you the 
evidence base, it was very 
quick after launch, and 
every expectation would 
have been then that this 
drug would have flowed 
because a big population 
which is under treated, 
regulators around the world all 
have different, slightly different 
nuances on what data they want 
to see, which makes it expensive 
to bring a medicine to market, 
because you can't necessarily 
use the same file around the 
world, and that is a frustration 
through the industry, and it slows 
access to medicine down.  And it 
costs us money.  So that’s a 
frustration, but that’s the world 
that we live in. 
Clearly the trial designs that 
are done for regulatory 
purposes need to also meet 
the needs of being able to 
communicate the benefits of 
the medicine to the wider 
community, because you won't 
have typically in market 
studies for some years until 
after the medicine is launched.  
So you need to have robust 
data which is going to be able 
to present to people, 
regulators, to payers, to 
physicians, to everybody that 
actually gives a compelling 
story of why we would use the 
drug. So marketing gets 
involved before launch is what 
I'm saying 
So, you know in the 
Alendronate case for us it was 
very important that we had the 
fracture intervention trial which 
was published in about 1996.  
For a big outcomes trial, three 
year outcomes trial on fracture 
which really no fracture data of 
that scale existed in this field 
before that trial, and to bring 
that to market less than a year 
after the launch of the drug 
was a hugely important thing 
to do in getting the diffusion of 
the drug in a very under 
treated disease.  So, that was 
a good example of a huge 
…of this designing the trials 
correctly for Phase III to be 
extended to produce the 
outcomes which gives you 
every argument.   
 it's very difficult to do head-to-
head trials to prove clinical 
difference versus an existing 
field in a drug which you need 
to do a three to six year study, 
in a massive population to be 
powered statistically to prove 
anything.  It's extremely 
difficult.  So you’ve got to find 
other markers.  In this case 
that’s typically done through 
bone mineral density which 
you can actually measure at a 
relatively short phase and see 
change, and that would be 
typically what people will do to 
try and get an edge over each 
other. 
Fracture discharge, as 
we would describe it 
became….that was 
well-published in all 
leading journals and 
has become one of the 
great case studies in 
this field.  And they’re 
very evidence-based 
and it was all very 
evidence-based and so 
that’s why they were 
preferring to use 
Alendronate maybe 
than the competition 
because they’ve got the 
fracture intervention trial 
plus other evidence, 
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existing therapy not 
particularly attractive for 
anybody to take, patient, 
doctor.  But, at the same 
time as we had this, we did 
have incidence of adverse 
tolerability particularly in 
the United States which 
lead to a world-wide need 
for us to write a ‘dear 
doctor’ letter.  You know, 
an awareness letter to the 
doctor saying ‘watch out for 
tolerability’.  Well then you 
see your competition, 
some will walk away from 
that, and say ‘that’s going 
to be really bad news for 
growing this market’ and 
some will say ‘that’s great 
news, I’ll keep my market 
share’, so it depends on 
whether the motivation of 
the competitor is market 
share or market expansion. 
   
we were very clear and 
ethical about this, that if 
you’d got somebody on 
HRT who is osteoporotic 
you’ve been treating with 
HRT to treat osteoporosis, 
then, yes use Alendronate, 
that’s a very good 
alternative for you. But if 
you’ve got somebody on 
HRT and they’re 50 and 
they’re doing this for 
menopause management it 
is not appropriate to use 
Alendronate at that stage.  
Some doctors would out of 
their own choice, but it's 
not what we were saying.  
And you will see on that 
chart of adoption of HRT 
when it does come down 
there is some change to 
our growth curve but it's 
not that dramatic, it's not 
the driver. 
But when you come in and 
you have an issue of 
adverse tolerability like this 
which is causing 
oesophageal irritation.  
They’re caustic drugs, 
they’re designed in a way, 
it's a nasty acid but it 
diffuses once it gets in the 
gut, but you know, with an 
elderly population you 
often get reflux and that 
can push the acid back into 
the oesophagus. And the 
competition made hay with 
that.  And consequently we 
got a relatively slow uptake 
curve, even though we 
were promoting quite 
extensively doing a lot of 
education and advertising, 
calling on doctors, we 
couldn’t change behaviour 
because this was the 
message that they’d got in 
their head from the 
competition, and, to be fair, 
patients were 
  it's also very important to 
design those studies in a way 
where you capture data for 
socio-economic, health 
economic cases that you can 
build for to understand the 
pricing of the medicine.  You 
know, that’s not just done by 
whim, it's done by a form of 
science.  I mean it is an art, 
and it's also a measure of the 
competitiveness of that field, 
but if you’re first in the market 
with a brand new medicine, 
with a brand new class, how 
do you price it?  You know, 
you’ve got to find some means 
of demonstrating value of the 
brand and the product to the 
people who are going to pay 
for it 
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referring…you know, we 
did have instances where 
patients were actually 
reporting this to the doctor 
 
    trials and guidance do 
influence , well, trials do.  
Mega trials are very important 
in terms of getting the opinion 
leaders to buy into the science 
quite frankly. 
 
    
    Trials get you your position in 
guidelines.  And there are 
different quality of trials of 
course.  You’ve got your 
Phase III regulatory filing, 
which is against placebo, 
which just shows the thing 
works.  If it's a highly 
competitive field, people like to 
have head-to-head studies 
versus the leading 
comparators, or use drugs in 
the field at the right dose so 
that they can make a valid 
judgement call saying ‘well 
this one is better than that 
one’ and they can say they’re 
efficaciously the same but one 
does this with less side affects 
and therefore is better pay off 
for the doctor and the patient.  
And that will then influence the 
positioning in the guidelines, 
so you have to have the trials, 
the best form of course, which 
really prove outcomes. 
 
    
PDE1   We also wanted to get the 
message right about how 
the drug worked because I 
mean, the fact is it was 
very, very effective, but 
there were a couple of very 
important aspects.  One 
that it was contraindicated 
with the use of nitrates 
which are quite common 
medicines and you know, 
contraindicated to the point 
where it was a safety issue 
if people used them 
together, that was one 
  The thing that Pfizer did very 
well I think was, we studied 
Viagra in everyone. This is the 
point, this is where the 
evidence I think became 
increasingly important 
because we could say, here's 
our data on diabetes, here's 
our data in spinal cord injury 
and you know, psychological 
cases, and no competitor 
during that period was ever 
going to have anything like 
that. It showed its 
effectiveness, but it also 
If you actually look at the wealth of 
information out there I think Viagra's got 
something like, I don't know, five, ten 
times more clinical papers than we have 
on the sheer numbers of it.  But if you 
look at our numbers of head-to-head 
studies versus them and if you looked 
at, say, preference, although each of the 
drugs have got some studies or 
abstracts which show a preference for 
one of the other, there's probably more 
out there, both sponsored and 
independent, which would show a 
preference for tadalafil.  But that hasn't 
swayed things. 
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thing that we just had to 
make sure that was 
clear…and that was a 
reasonably commonly used 
medicine for the target 
group for Viagra..middle 
aged men basically. 
forces people to compete 
across loads of different 
areas, which is very difficult for 
them to do and raises the cost 
of entry so we were always 
going to have a very high 
market share, you know, very 
early on. 
 
 I think it was very helpful 
that it had a nitrate 
contraindication in some 
respects, because I think 
people knew that we'd 
checked.  I mean obviously 
we are always going to 
check what the side effect 
profile is, but you know, as 
somebody put it to me; 
somebody pointing out 
where the iceberg was, 
meant that you knew how 
to sail the ship. So think 
that was very important 
 
       
PDE2      A [KOL] turned around and 
said 'Look, if you're going to 
do a study head-to-head, this 
is how you would do it for the 
PDE5s and it should be open 
label, crossover randomised', 
you know, on the right doses, 
comparing relative doses, 
given the package  
instructions and not going 
beyond that. He designed the 
trial and we went and did it. 
 
There are a whole load of different 
preference studies which were being 
used at the time but they all had 
methodological problems. So different 
doses comparing each other and 
different instructions and all sorts of 
weird things going on. 
   
     Ever since this point, end of '05, '06, 
you've then got a whole load of clinical 
papers that... ever since launch, 
physicians have been screaming out for 
comparative evidence.  Show us head-
to-head.  Tell you what, go and look at 
the evidence base for head-to-heads 
now.  All the companies have done 
them to one degree or another.  And 
there's only pretty much one company 
who are absolutely driving head-to-head 
studies and that's us.  And I think that 
speaks volumes for where we stand on 
the medication. You don't have those at 
launch you have pretty much 
registration studies which are...we work 
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and here's the reason to care, unique 
selling point of it. 
 
PDE3   It's really, are they on 
nitrates, yes, well then they 
can't have a PD5 inhibitor; 
nope, then they can have a 
PDE5 inhibitor and any one 
of them.   
 I think possibly one of the 
reasons why we stay down 
this end of the market is 
because we don't do as many 
studies or trials as the other 
two products, and we all know; 
it's almost like a self fulfilling 
thing, we don't do as many 
because we're not making as 
much money, but you know 
we might make more money if 
we do more studies, so I think 
it definitely; from a marketing 
point of view, it really helps, 
because you can keep saying 
the same things but bring new 
data to the package which 
then makes it sound new and 
interesting, whereas if you've 
got old data that you're just 
sort of re-hashing all the time, 
you struggle to make 
something sound new or 
interesting, so I think clinical 
data does have a significant 
affect. 
 
No we kind of had our global 
colleagues trying to make you 
know, a big new study and 
we've got to do a whole load 
of PR about this, I think the 
initial regulatory submissions, 
the studies that we used there, 
they're the best quality 
evidence, and I think they still 
really work for us 
   I understand you know, the 
need for peer-review and 
everything, but then maybe 
you leave the review of the 
data until there's a bit more 
published data on the other 
two treatments or you know, I 
don't know, but it was kind of 
like, yeah, as much as we 
tried to discuss it with them, 
because they give you the 
opportunity to discuss; it kept 
coming back to the same 
thing, that's a poster, that's an 
abstract, it's not peer-
reviewed.  Essentially they 
have to be peer-reviewed to 
make the meeting, but my 
understanding is that it's not 
as critical a review process as 
maybe a preliminary published 
paper would go through. 
AA1  Risperdal was increasingly 
being used in elderly 
patients with psychosis, 
some of the prescribing 
was off licence, you know, 
that the clinicians had just 
decided to use that, but 
once Melleril was advised 
not to be used by the 
Committee for the Safety 
of Medicines, a lot of 
patients were actually 
switched over to Risperdal. 
  The data possibly helped to 
drive some of it, but I think 
more of that increase you can 
see was actually driven by the 
use in elderly patients, I mean 
the Csernansky data was very 
very good data. You probably 
could have argued that we 
didn’t do enough with it, you 
know, in terms of promoting 
the data, because it’s very 
good data. Just limits in terms 
of marketing spend, you know, 
Jansen-Cilag would generally 
have a much lower marketing 
budget than Lilly for example. 
 
efficacy that has to be proven 
with all drugs, so you have to 
have clinical data that shows 
you’re efficacious, and clinical 
data that shows that you’re 
well tolerated as well, but 
efficacy is probably the one 
driver across all brands 
   it’s not really until you get a full 
blown publication, if you can in 
a prestigious journal, that 
would have the most impact, 
so, you know, if it was in like 
the Lancet, the BMJ, the data 
published in those journals 
would have more impact than 
data published in a lesser 
renowned journal. 
What happened here was 
that there was some 
studies done with 
Risperdal and some of the 
other atypical 
antipsychotics, which 
actually suggested that 
  we had good effective 
marketing, that was key in 
driving the success of the 
brand. We had to have the 
clinical data as well, but the 
marketing activity I think really 
had more of an emphasis on 
The most powerful data is sort 
of, you know, the early clinical 
data, so the phase IIIb, 
particularly if you have 
randomised head to head, you 
know, double blinded type 
data, I mean that’s regarded 
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Risperdal probably had 
some risks as well in 
elderly patients, it was an 
independent study. And 
then what happened was 
that patients - some of the 
elderly psychosis patients 
were switched off 
Risperdal onto other drugs, 
so we gained there and 
then began to lose 
business here. 
 
driving the brand’s success. 
Now I think you can - you still 
have to invest in the 
marketing, but unless you 
have the clinical data to back 
up the marketing, it’s far less 
effective 
as the most powerful data. 
The systematic reviews are 
generally regarded as not 
quite as robust sometimes, 
although they can be very 
useful in terms of gathering 
lots of different opinions 
together and forming and 
overall consensus 
probably the biggest 
impact on Risperdal 
negatively was this - the 
CVAE (cerebrovascular 
adverse event) warning 
from the MHRA, that, you 
know, Risperdal shouldn’t 
really be used in elderly 
patients, that had quite an 
immediate impact upon 
sales. I’ve not seen 
anything like it before or 
since then I don’t think, but 
in terms of like the letter 
went out from the CSM, 
and it was literally patients 
were switched, which, you 
know, is unusual but it 
happened very fast. 
 
  I think what we’ve seen is an 
increasing importance of 
things like the robustness of 
your clinical data, and 
therefore the strength of the 
clinical trial programme that 
you’ve run, so do you have for 
example head to head 
comparators with products 
already on the market that 
shows that you have the 
benefit in clinical effect or 
health economic value, and 
that has really increased in 
importance. 
     
 I mean if people have used 
it in a certain area and 
found it works very well, 
then, you know, once it’s 
licensed they would be 
inclined to use more of it. 
 
        
AA2 +3  I tell you what happened 
here, it was safety 
concerns, we had dear 
doctor letters, and so did 
Risperdal. Issues with 
dementia. 
I think in the last eighteen 
months people do have 
real concerns about the 
metabolic effects. It is 
causing people to switch 
away from olanzapine 
gradually in schizophrenia, 
but they’ve not moved 
away rapidly because 
again I think the efficacy is 
still seen as the most 
important thing, and the 
company have done quite 
a good job in trying to 
 we only actually used two or 
three studies at the time of 
that launch.  The most pivotal 
of which was the Tollenson 
data. I recall at the time it was 
the biggest ever study 
undertaken on a psychiatric 
population 
quality of the data is 
absolutely paramount to us for 
a successful product launch. 
we have to do placebo for 
regulatory reasons.   
Physicians want head to head, 
how do you compare with 
other products on the 
marketplace?  If you’re lucky 
enough not to be, you know 
you’re first in class then it’s 
slightly different but quality 
data is critical. 
At that time we  had no head to head 
data versus risperidone.  The 
differentiation was against the typical 
antipsychotics, notably haloperidol 
which did present some problems in the 
UK because haloperidol, although the 
standard of care in the US, is less 
commonly used in the UK and indeed 
across much of Europe.  So haloperidol 
was really seen as a proxy for typical 
antipsychotics and people were left to 
draw their own conclusions about what 
that meant against their own personal 
standard of care.  Be that another 
 People go to 
conferences to get the 
latest stuff so they 
definitely take note of 
what’s presented at 
meetings and you can’t 
beat peer review journal 
publications. 
It will depend on the quality of 
the study and where it’s 
published as to whether we 
would react to it . You’ve 
always got to look….you know 
we have to present lots of 
evidence for our products and 
so we tend to….if we get an 
individual study that comes 
out and look at what is the 
body of evidence that either 
backs that study up or 
disagrees with that study, if it’s 
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minimise, you know, how 
the side effects are viewed. 
typical, such as chlorpromazine or 
against risperidone.  But I remember 
one of the great needs and the great 
pleas from our sales forces at the time 
was we need head to head data versus 
risperidone which we simply didn’t have. 
disagreeing with it I probably 
wouldn’t bother with it. If it’s 
one of a series and I think 
longer term it’s going to hurt 
the brand if we don’t respond 
to it, then we’ll go proactive 
and respond to it. 
 
 We take them [weight gain 
side effects] very seriously 
because I think they’re 
serious issues and I think 
again it goes back to the 
body of evidence, you look 
at the body of evidence 
and what does it tell you 
and it tells you that there 
are issues with all 
antipsychotics, atypical 
antipsychotics, so therefore 
that’s why physical health 
is a very important debate 
for us and something we 
take very, very seriously. 
 
     There was such a pent 
up demand for this 
drug.  And I remember 
being at some of the 
congresses where the 
Phase III data were 
presented on Zyprexa 
prior to its launch.  And 
it was standing room 
only in some of the 
auditoria where the data 
were presented.  
People really were 
excited about this.  That 
it did represent a 
breakthrough 
 
 We’ve got a service that 
we’re now training NHS 
personnel on how to 
manage physical health in 
schizophrenic patients, 
that’s endorsed by all the 
advocacy groups endorsed 
by the government and 
that’s taken us a lot of time 
and a lot of money but we 
think that’s really important 
and as we are the market 
leader we should be 
leading the way on the 
other issues that need to 
be addressed 
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AA4        I think in psychiatry, I think you 
would struggle to identify a 
really ground breaking study 
that kind of meant people 
used atypicals  instead of 
typicals, one, because of the 
nature of the illness and the 
nature of how clinical trials are 
done.  So when you measure, 
do a trial for a statin and you 
are measuring cholesterol, 
you have your primary 
outcome measures for that 
trial will be things that doctors 
that are prescribing them, 
totally understand. If I talk 
about a PANSS scale or a 
Weinmeres scale or any of 
those scales they are kind of, 
not artificial but they are a 
thing that is done in order to 
get clinical trial results and not 
just by the industry but that’s 
how you measure the 
effectiveness of the drugs.  
Your jobbing day to day 
psychiatrist may not really 
understand exactly what a 
reduction in PAN score means 
to a patient unless they are 
involved in clinical trial work. 
 
  
Statin1     What was going to change the 
cholesterol lowering market 
was big trials. If ever there 
was an area that is 
characterised by there having 
been an impact of big 
randomised controlled trials, 
it's this area, so I think it was 
1994 that the first sort of big 
landmark study came out, the 
4S study, and there for the 
first time was a demonstrated 
impact on total mortality, not 
cardiovascular mortality, but 
total mortality in a population 
of middle aged men with 
existing heart disease and I 
think that was the turning point 
at which erm people started to 
really kind of, sit up and take 
notice.  I mean there had been 
pretty good evidence 
MSD staked their place as market 
leader for many years really with the 4S 
trial; they had what was probably of the 
available statins, the most effective lipid 
lowerer and they had the evidence to 
say this drug saves lives and I think , 
that's reflected in their usage relative to 
the others. The other drugs were either 
later or less convincing with their trials, 
so there was actually very good 
evidence for Pravastatin, but Pravastatin 
probably published more landmark 
trials, through the nineties than Merck 
did behind Simvastatin, but the drug 
was less effective at lowering 
cholesterol and it was the most effective 
drug in the market place that benefitted. 
 We've almost got to the 
point of there being just 
sheer overkill on the 
amount of data, I mean 
how much more 
evidence do you need 
that lowering 
cholesterol saves lives, 
and there's not much, 
not many questions left 
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beforehand, but not in such a 
simple, elegantly designed, 
big trial as happened then and 
I think you really start to see 
from the back end of '94 that 
things really start to take off 
Statin2  Pre-launch there's the 
withdrawal of Cerevastatin 
which affects the whole 
statin market in terms of 
safety profile.  The first 
dynamic phase, was 
expected because the 
drugs available weren't 
controlling the lipids so well 
I guess.  And we had a low 
dose statin that was able to 
control lipids easily.  These 
two phases here are 
caused by Dear Doctor 
letters which wrote out 
saying that the dose of 
rosuvastatin needs to be 
watched in certain groups 
of patients.  So that was 
unexpected.  And then you 
look at this phase where 
obviously you'd expect it to 
go exponential, it's tapered 
off a little bit but it has 




To have two [Dear Doctor 
letters] was unprecedented 
to be honest with you, and 
to recover from two has 
been a massive success. 
You've got to add in 
competitors and how they 
use it and so obviously 
they'll use it negatively 
against you and positively 
against them.  So you have 
to really get your positive 
message out into the 
market one way or another.  
Whether that's through 
sales force or it's through 
meetings, through a 
combination of both really.   
  It's a very highly regulated 
industry in terms of what you 
can and what you can't 
present to clinicians.  We can 
convey the results of clinical 
studies and you can say that 
that's marketing, you can say 
that that's science.  But I think 
there's a case to say that 
it's…certainly in the UK it's, it's 
pretty difficult to over market a 
drug just because of the level 
of regulation.  It's that 
relationship between 
regulation and marketing and 
some of the sign off 
procedures that we have to go 
through internally such that 
the representatives can 
actually share the material 
with a physician are kind of 
ludicrous but it's there to 
protect the industry and the 
clinicians. 
  There's not much more 
evidence you can 
collect really because 
most of it's been done 
in terms of placebo 
controlled trials, most of 
it's been done now.  It's 
mostly unethical to do 
the trials anymore.  So 
we're stuck.  So doing 
more and more trials is 
probably not the 
answer, 
pharmacoeconomics is 
the answer I think.  
Make sure that your 
product is 
pharmacoeconomically 
positioned to take 
advantage of the health 
system as it is now 
 
 I think if we hadn't had 
these Dear Doctor letters 
this gap here shows you 
the evidence is not that 
important.  It is now 
because this happened 
and people want to see 
evidence, so if you start it 
again here, you'd say yes 
some of the trials have 
been important but during 
that first dynamic phase 
evidence wasn't important 
to us.  Everyone had 
bought into the fact that 
lowering LDL is good for 
you.   
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 Well, I think there wouldn't 
have been much different 
at all if the Dear Doctor 
letters, it would have been 
straight up until probably 
Simvastatin came off 
patent and then we'd be in 
a similar position to Pfizer, 
losing a lot of market share 
 
       
 When the Dear Doc letters 
came out in some ways 
there was a programme of 
meetings to sort of say, 
you know, don't worry 
about it.  I often do wonder 
if the fact that you say to 
someone don't worry, they 
worry more. Like don't 
worry about flying, the first 
thing you do is like it's 
going to crash.  I think that 
maybe was a mistake to go 
so passionately across the 
country saying don't worry, 
it's alright.  It might have 
just been better just to say 
carry on almost as normal 
and say yeah, we're a 
statin, we do have side 
effects, but they're in line 
with all the rest of those in 
the class. 
 
       
Statin3  When rosuvastatin was 
first being used, it perhaps 
wasn't being used 
appropriately by clinicians. 
They'd been used to using 
simvastatin and 
atorvastatin for however 
many years at kind of 
reasonably high doses, 
20s and 40s, and they 
were using rosuvastatin in 
the same way despite the 
starting dose being 10mg.  
And they were actually four 
cases of rhabdomyolysis 
associated with starting 
patients on higher doses of 
rosuva than there should 
have been which prompted 
a letter from the regulatory 
Following the launch of 
Ceriva there was less 
willingness to treat the 
statins as a class.  There 
was more of a requirement, 
much more need in the 
marketplace to 
demonstrate long-term 
safety and that's still 
something that we're 
having discussions with 
clinicians around now it's 
been on the market for five 
years in the UK, six years 
in some markets, has 
rosuva kind of got that 
wealth of experience and 
patient experience required 
for the physicians to feel 
comfortable enough to use 
   I guess the main one, the one that is 
mostly used within the marketing is the 
STELLAR trial where the endpoints are 
cholesterol markers and mainly because 
it's comparative data across the statins, 
it's head to head data. A lot of the trials 
are not head to head but it's possible to 
do that on cholesterol… when we get 
our outcomes data then the focus would 
switch a bit, it's true what we've been 
telling you, a reduction in cholesterol 
and it has an event and outcomes 
benefit.   
You have to really ask the 
question do you believe that 
it's an LDL story or not?  So 
from 4S onwards every single 
statin trial that's come out has 
shown that lowering LDL 
cholesterol is beneficial.  So 
are you saying that one statin 
is a miracle drug, or are you 
saying it's really largely its 
ability to lower LDL 
cholesterol?  Now if you look 
at all them together and say 
okay, then you have the ileal 
bypass trial, POSCH, which 
saved lives without any 
statins, by lowering LDL 
cholesterol.  You have the 
Cholestepol trials which saved 
lives by lowering cholesterol.  
There was awareness 
of the clinical data 
before launch and that it 
looked fairly strong.  
Other things that were 
in place like the QOF 
which physicians were 
starting to get wind of 
which directly 
incentivises them to go 
and find patients who 
were eligible for statin 
therapy and to treat 
them to a certain level, 
those two things 
together, that's some of 
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authorities to remind 
prescribers that the starting 
dose was 10mg.  And so 
once you send a letter from 
regulators and with what 
looks to be a safety 
concern then that's going 
to have an impact…looking 
at what's happened since I 
think probably statistically it 
was quite unlucky to have 
had four in that time frame. 
it?  And it harks back to 
things like cerivastatin 
where people got their 
fingers burnt.  And at the 
same time, kind of 2004, 
you had the withdrawal of 
Vioxx and various other 
kinds of scares, so for 
rosuvastatin being a new 
entrant into a market where 
there'd already been 
scares that definitely has 
an impact on diffusion. 
 
And so if you draw a line from 
the top to the bottom, you can 
plot all these trials on a line 
that basically shows you the 
lower the LDL cholesterol the 
better your outcome is.  So 
that's your surrogate market 
argument.  We can lower LDL 
cholesterol, we can prove it 
does things to atherosclerosis. 
 I think cerivastatin came to 
the market claiming 
superior efficacy and gets 
withdrawn. Effectively 
rosuvastatin had to kind of 
try and do something 
similar, new statin to the 
market, proven superior 
efficacy in order to get 
usage, definitely had an 
impact.  What you have to 
do is to show the safety 
data and say look here's 
the adverse event reporting 
data, you can see 
rosuvastatin is in line with 
the other statins and 
cerivastatin is on here as 
well and it's off the scale. 
Other than that, it's actually 
quite difficult because it's 
quite an emotive response 
you're dealing with 
amongst physicians in 
terms of their level of 
comfort around prescribing 
something new.  
   Atorvastatin, because it's so large 
relative to rosuvastatin, that's where the 
impact of the switching has been felt the 
most but there have been instances of 
rosuvastatin low dose being switched as 
well.  It's perhaps a bit more difficult for 
a prescribing advisor to push a 
rosuvastatin switch programme because 
of the clinical data.  There's a fairly good 
argument to say that Atorvastatin 10mg 
is the best equivalent to simvastatin 40, 
whereas it's been more difficult to argue 
that for rosuvastatin 
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 It's just a case of 
reassurance, to present the 
safety data in context 
against the other statins.  
To try and demonstrate to 
physicians that look, it's 
exactly in line with the 
other available statins. 
Perhaps we did have a bit 
of a problem in terms of the 
way that the product was 
being used, that's now 
been addressed and the 
initiation rates at the start 
dose are actually very 
good and actually much 
better than what you'd get 
from the SPCs of the other 
statins 
       
 I think that the regulators 
were also a bit more 
cautious and were keen to 
issue a letter because of 
what had happened with 
cerivastatin.  Because it 
was rhabdomyolysis which, 
they had fatal cases of 
rhabdomyolysis; I think 
there were 50 odd cases of 
fatal  rhabdomyolysis so 
the regulators are now in a 
more cautious place and 
keen to act  quickly.  So 
once you kind of send a 
letter, a prescribing 
reminder that's citing a risk 
of rhabdomyolysis in a 
market where there's 
already been a product 
withdrawal because of 
rhabdomylisis then that 
spooks physicians and 
that's responsible for some 
of that uptake.  This is also 
kind of the time frame 
when there was a real 
gearing up behind 
simvastatin as well.  So put 
those two things together 
and that's the kind of 
flattening of, the less steep 
trajectory of that line 
around kind of late 2004 
onwards.   
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Gen1   We did a lot of work in 
terms of understanding 
what it was that was the 
misconceptions, what 
needed to be 
communicated more 
clearly, and also what 
materials we could provide 
that may support the 
customer.  So what could 
support the GP or the 
specialist to make it easier 
for them to work with the 
patient, so if they had 
some uncertainty around 
what they needed to do, 
they would have some 
support items that were 
purely educational and 
they'd be able to sort of 
say, okay, if they gave the 
drug, or any drug, to the 
patient 'here's the leaflet to 
say this is what you should 
do and how you should 
take it' 
   Until evidence came of mortality benefits 
which came with the 4S study, there 
was very little treatment even though we 
were saying, you know ‘you need to 
treat, you need to treat’, but nobody 
believed until you got the evidence.  You 
eventually got the evidence and the 
treatment paradigm changed overnight, 
from flat to whoosh like this, and then 
just powered on to be the biggest 
market in the world. Well, you know, 
there’s still massive under-treatment of 
that, even though it's the biggest selling 
drug. 
   
Gen2      For registration you have to 
have two placebo controlled 
studies for licence.  So that's 
why people produce placebo, 
because we have to, the 
regulations to actually get the 
drug licensed.  What the 
regulators want versus what 
the market access side want, 
are completely different things. 
It's sometimes quite difficult to work out 
what your comparators need to be. In 
some therapy areas, standard care in 
other countries is now not the same 
standard of care in the UK, so that in 
itself is proving quite problematic. What 
we're starting to see in the UK is 
divergence of clinical practice from the 
rest of Europe so from some therapy 
areas potentially oncology, the drugs 
that are now standard in the rest of 
Europe are not standard in the UK 
so…it becomes incredibly expensive, I 
mean the clinical trials are tremendously 
expensive to run and it can be quite 
difficult if  you were having to run them 
for individual countries, and they cost 
£30 million, £40 million a trial, and 
you're never going to make the money 
back. 
   
    One of our key things is who 
do we need to talk to?  Where 
is the funding?  Because 
sometimes its not that obvious 
where the funding is, because 
actually unless we talk to 
people who hold the funds, 
then we have no chance at all 
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of having a reasonable 
conversation about prescribing 
or being able to know who 
needs taking into account 







Framework 8: Final Framework for the Evidence Theme Incorporating Data from All Case Studies (post-analysis) 
Interview Evidence Theme/Subthemes 
Marketing Evidence  
(REVISED THEME 
TITLE) 
Impact of clinical evidence 
Impact of evidence  Trial design  Evidence translation: Relevance/ limitation of trial 
outcomes (RENAMED) 
Temporal impact of 
evidence 
Journal quality/  
publication control 
Trials design Functional versatility of evidence 
(NEW SUB-CATEGORY) 
Novel trial perspective  
(NEW SUB-CATEGORY) 
Head to head 
comparisons 
Surrogate markers vs 
clinically relevant outcomes 
(MODIFIED SUBTHEME) 
BP1     There is genuinely a concern that 
etidronate as a first generation 
bisphosphonate, that if you give it in too a 
higher dose then it causes osteomalacia 
which is basically malformed bone, so that 
the bone that it's making is not of a 
sufficient quality.  And we know that, it 
came out from the sciences, and the 
solution from a scientific point of view was 
to give it in cyclical regiment, so that’s why 
it became Didronel PMO [etidronate] and 
had a cyclical regimen of 14 days of 
Didronel followed by the calcium, vitamin 
D…that’s all done to stop osteomalacia 
occurring because in that dosing cycle it 
doesn’t happen.  The US have higher 
concerns about that than the European 
regulators, so, it's not unusual that different 
regulators have different concerns. You 
could, as a company, submit new data to 
shift the opinion of the regulators, but you 
reach a point relatively quickly when you 
get regulatory delay, that because of the 
intellectual property rights that you have on 
the product it becomes unviable to bring it 
to market within the time space you have 
back to actually recoup your additional 
costs and your base costs. It went on and 
got a licence in Europe, but it never 
managed to get a licence in the US. 
(MOVED FROM SAFETY/REGULATION 
THEME BACK INTO EVIDENCE WITH 
THIS NEW SUBCATEGORY) 
 
     
BP2    I think what disappointed us, and 
I think there’s two things, one is 
fortuitous, I think that the 
bisphosphonates are a very good 
class of drugs, so I will be honest 
with you I think they all work, and 
they’re all substantially above 
what you’re basic calcium vitamin 
D does, so that’s the great news 
for the class yes?  The bad news, 
because they all work, that when 
you try and plan in 1993 what 
you’re expecting breakthrough to 
do, which was that we were 
And at that point we needed to shoot above 
where MSD were in terms of their studies 
so they had done BMD, they had done 
vertebral fracture, they hadn’t really had hip 
fracture as a primary end point, but they 
key element was that we had a hip fracture 
drug at the primary end point where hip 
fracture was prospectively planned, and 
then obviously the study was sizably 
geared to show that, so you’re looking at 
10,000 patient plus.  But we had 330 
investigators, 16,000 patients, 18 countries. 
Large scale trials do carry 
weight but I think the problem 
is that as soon as they carry 
some weight they also 
become the next benchmark. 
Our cost of entry is becoming 
increasingly higher and the 
next one is that there’s not 
going to be a head-to-head 
trial on hip fracture between 
any drugs, because when they 
all work as well as all of these 
do you’re talking about 50,000 
patients, five years before you 
even stand a chance of seeing 
any difference, and when you 
see the difference it's unlikely 
to be clinically that significantly 
and meaningful to actually 
  We were very heavily focussed 
on securing a very credible 
publication for our hip fracture 
trial published in NEJM and 
NEJM is still regarded as the 
highest impact factor publication, 
out of all the publications you can 
have.  The downside is that 
they’re very fastidious about how 
things work, so the first thing is 
that you can't do the gradual 
release it has to be brand new to 
the world, otherwise it never gets 
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planning to show a significant 
reduction in hip fracture that no 
one else would have, we actually 
got trumped by Fosamax 
(alendronate) because they 
showed fortuitously because it 
was never powered to show it, 
they showed fortuitously that they 
did reduce significantly reduce hip 
fracture in their trials, because 
they had a good drug, and we 
had a good drug, you know, so 
the reality is that had they not 
shown hip fracture, had they only 
ever shown vertebral fracture, 
which is what we were predicting 
at the time, then ours, because it 
was powered to show hip 
fracture, should have been able 
to do the bit where it became the 
market leader.   
 
knock one out of the market 
and favour the other. 
blocks on what you can do, 
because from a marketing point 
of view, we want to be able to 
build up to it, but they won't do 
that, and that’s why they're so 
prestigious.   
        The other element is that they 
shape the publication, so actually 
it's from a technical point of view 
it's not the best written 
publication, it doesn’t do justice to 
the dataset that supports the 
publication, but we again don’t 
have a lot of say in that because 
it's NEJM and they have a lot of 
say in what they want and how 
they want it written 
         I think we do make mistakes and 
I think we probably, as a 
company, we have often maybe 
jumped a step in terms of dose 
ranging so we have an issue in 
the sense that it's not a problem 
from a clinical point of view, but I 
have an issue from a trial point of 
view that our 2.5 milligram arm 
disappeared out of the trials and 
so that’s not good because you 
have to explain it, so we should 
maybe have dealt with that in a 
different way. We also had an 
issue that we wanted to do too 
much in one trial, so what we 
chose to do was we chose to 
have an over 80s group, and 
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potentially big unmet need, but 
we complicated it. So instead of 
one nice clean crisp message we 
ended up with sort of ‘well I have 
to explain a few things about my 
trial before I can now give you my 
clean crisp message’ so it's not 
so clean and it's not so crisp. And 
so I think that’s maybe our 
inexperience in…I think a more 
experienced pharmaceutical 
company that is doing this day in 
and day out and has a cookie 
cutter of ‘this is how we launch a 
drug’ they have the experience, 
you know, and that is a genuine 
challenge for a company of our 
size, which is actually how do we 
keep up the capability in tasks 
that are infrequent but important? 
 
BP3  Clearly the trial designs 
that are done for regulatory 
purposes need to also 
meet the needs of being 
able to communicate the 
benefits of the medicine to 
the wider community, 
because you won't have 
typically in market studies 
for some years until after 
the medicine is launched.  
So you need to have 
robust data which is going 
to be able to present to 
people, regulators, to 
payers, to physicians, to 
everybody that actually 
gives a compelling story of 
why we would use the 
drug. So marketing gets 
involved before launch is 
what I'm saying 
Trials get you your position 
in guidelines.  And there 
are different quality of trials 
of course.  You’ve got your 
Phase III regulatory filing, 
which is against placebo, 
which just shows the thing 
works.  If it's a highly 
competitive field, people 
like to have head-to-head 
studies versus the leading 
comparators, or use drugs 
in the field at the right dose 
so that they can make a 
valid judgement call saying 
‘well this one is better than 
that one’ and they can say 
they’re efficaciously the 
same but one does this 
with less side affects and 
therefore is better pay off 
for the doctor and the 
patient.  And that will then 
influence the positioning in 
the guidelines, so you have 
to have the trials, the best 
form of course, which really 
prove outcomes (MOVED 
FROM TRIAL DESIGN) 
 
 regulators around the world all have 
different, slightly different nuances on what 
data they want to see, which makes it 
expensive to bring a medicine to market, 
because you can't necessarily use the 
same file around the world, and that is a 
frustration through the industry, and it slows 
access to medicine down.  And it costs us 
money.  So that’s a frustration, but that’s 
the world that we live in (MOVED FROM 
SAFETY/REGULATION THEME BACK 
INTO EVIDENCE WITH THIS NEW 
SUBCATEGORY) 
trials and guidance do 
influence , well, trials do.  
Mega trials are very important 
in terms of getting the opinion 
leaders to buy into the science 
quite frankly. 
 it's very difficult to do head-to-head 
trials to prove clinical difference 
versus an existing field in a drug 
which you need to do a three to six 
year study, in a massive population 
to be powered statistically to prove 
anything.  It's extremely difficult.  So 
you’ve got to find other markers.  In 
this case that’s typically done 
through bone mineral density which 
you can actually measure at a 
relatively short phase and see 
change, and that would be typically 
what people will do to try and get an 
edge over each other 
Fracture discharge, as 
we would describe it 
became….that was 
well-published in all 
leading journals and 
has become one of the 
great case studies in 
this field.  And they’re 
very evidence-based 
and it was all very 
evidence-based and so 
that’s why they were 
preferring to use 
Alendronate maybe 
than the competition 
because they’ve got the 
fracture intervention trial 
plus other evidence, 
plus the 70 milligram 
formulation. 
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us it was very important that we had the 
fracture intervention trial which was 
published in about 1996.  For a big 
outcomes trial, three year outcomes trial on 
fracture which really no fracture data of that 
scale existed in this field before that trial, 
and to bring that to market less than a year 
after the launch of the drug was a hugely 
important thing to do in getting the diffusion 
of the drug in a very under treated disease.  
So, that was a good example of a huge 
…of this designing the trials correctly for 
Phase III to be extended to produce the 
outcomes which gives you every argument.  
  
   it's also very important to design those 
studies in a way where you capture data for 
socio-economic, health economic cases 
that you can build for to understand the 
pricing of the medicine.  You know, that’s 
not just done by whim, it's done by a form 
of science.  I mean it is an art, and it's also 
a measure of the competitiveness of that 
field, but if you’re first in the market with a 
brand new medicine, with a brand new 
class, how do you price it?  You know, 
you’ve got to find some means of 
demonstrating value of the brand and the 
product to the people who are going to pay 
for it 
 
     
PDE1     The thing that Pfizer did very 
well I think was, we studied 
Viagra in everyone. This is the 
point, this is where the 
evidence I think became 
increasingly important 
because we could say, here's 
our data on diabetes, here's 
our data in spinal cord injury 
and you know, psychological 
cases, and no competitor 
during that period was ever 
going to have anything like 
that. It showed its 
effectiveness, but it also 
forces people to compete 
across loads of different 
areas, which is very difficult for 
them to do and raises the cost 
of entry so we were always 
going to have a very high 
If you actually look at the 
wealth of information out there 
I think Viagra's got something 
like, I don't know, five, ten 
times more clinical papers 
than we have on the sheer 
numbers of it.  But if you look 
at our numbers of head-to-
head studies versus them and 
if you looked at, say, 
preference, although each of 
the drugs have got some 
studies or abstracts which 
show a preference for one of 
the other, there's probably 
more out there, both 
sponsored and independent, 
which would show a 
preference for tadalafil.  But 
that hasn't swayed things 
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market share, you know, very 
early on. 
PDE2    A [KOL] turned around and said 
'Look, if you're going to do a 
study head-to-head, this is how 
you would do it for the PDE5s 
and it should be open label, 
crossover randomised', you know, 
on the right doses, comparing 
relative doses, given the package  
instructions and not going beyond 
that. He designed the trial and we 
went and did it. 
 
  There are a whole load of 
different preference studies 
which were being used at the 
time but they all had 
methodological problems. So 
different doses comparing 
each other and different 
instructions and all sorts of 
weird things going on 
   
     Ever since this point, end of 
'05, '06, you've then got a 
whole load of clinical papers 
that... ever since launch, 
physicians have been 
screaming out for comparative 
evidence.  Show us head-to-
head.  Tell you what, go and 
look at the evidence base for 
head-to-heads now.  All the 
companies have done them to 
one degree or another.  And 
there's only pretty much one 
company who are absolutely 
driving head-to-head studies 
and that's us.  And I think that 
speaks volumes for where we 
stand on the medication. You 
don't have those at launch you 
have pretty much registration 
studies which are...we work 
and here's the reason to care, 
unique selling point of it  
(MOVED FROM TRIAL 
DESIGN INTO NEW HEAD 
TO HEAD COMPARISON 
SUBCATEGORY) 
   
PDE3  I think possibly one of the 
reasons why we stay 
down this end of the 
market is because we 
don't do as many studies 
or trials as the other two 
products, and we all know; 
it's almost like a self 
fulfilling thing, we don't do 
as many because we're 
not making as much 
       understand you know, the need 
for peer-review and everything, 
but then maybe you leave the 
review of the data until there's a 
bit more published data on the 
other two treatments or you know, 
I don't know, but it was kind of 
like, yeah, as much as we tried to 
discuss it with them, because 
they give you the opportunity to 
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money, but you know we 
might make more money if 
we do more studies, so I 
think it definitely; from a 
marketing point of view, it 
really helps, because you 
can keep saying the same 
things but bring new data 
to the package which then 
makes it sound new and 
interesting, whereas if 
you've got old data that 
you're just sort of re-
hashing all the time, you 
struggle to make 
something sound new or 
interesting, so I think 
clinical data does have a 
significant affect.(MOVED 
FROM MARKETING 
SUBTHEME INTO THIS 
BROADER CATEGORY) 
 
the same thing, that's a poster, 
that's an abstract, it's not peer-
reviewed.  Essentially they have 
to be peer-reviewed to make the 
meeting, but my understanding is 
that it's not as critical a review 
process as maybe a preliminary 
published paper would go 
through. 
 No we kind of had our 
global colleagues trying to 
make you know, a big new 
study and we've got to do 
a whole load of PR about 
this, I think the initial 
regulatory submissions, 
the studies that we used 
there, they're the best 
quality evidence, and I 
think they still really work 
for us. 
 
        
AA1  The data possibly helped 
to drive some of it, but I 
think more of that increase 
you can see was actually 
driven by the use in elderly 
patients, I mean the 
Csernansky data was very 
very good data. You 
probably could have 
argued that we didn’t do 
enough with it, you know, 
in terms of promoting the 
data, because it’s very 
good data. Just limits in 
terms of marketing spend, 
you know, Jansen-Cilag 
efficacy, that has to be 
proven with all drugs, so 
you have to have clinical 
data that shows you’re 
efficacious, and clinical 
data that shows that you’re 
well tolerated as well, but 
efficacy is probably the one 
driver across all brands 
(MOVED FROM TRIAL 
DESIGN TO IMPACT OF 
EVIDENCE) 
      it’s not really until you get a full 
blown publication, if you can in a 
prestigious journal, that would 
have the most impact, so, you 
know, if it was in like the Lancet, 
the BMJ, the data published in 
those journals would have more 
impact than data published in a 
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would generally have a 
much lower marketing 
budget than Lilly for 
example. 
we had good effective 
marketing, that was key in 
driving the success of the 
brand. We had to have the 
clinical data as well, but the 
marketing activity I think 
really had more of an 
emphasis on driving the 
brand’s success. Now I 
think you can - you still 
have to invest in the 
marketing, but unless you 
have the clinical data to 
back up the marketing, it’s 
far less effective 
The most powerful data is 
sort of, you know, the early 
clinical data, so the phase 
IIIb, particularly if you have 
randomised head to head, 
you know, double blinded 
type data, I mean that’s 
regarded as the most 
powerful data. The 
systematic reviews are 
generally regarded as not 
quite as robust sometimes, 
although they can be very 
useful in terms of gathering 
lots of different opinions 
together and forming and 
overall consensus 
(MOVED FROM TRIAL 
DESIGN TO IMPACT OF 
EVIDENCE) 
       
I think what we’ve seen is 
an increasing importance 
of things like the 
robustness of your clinical 
data, and therefore the 
strength of the clinical trial 
programme that you’ve 
run, so do you have for 
example head to head 
comparators with products 
already on the market that 
shows that you have the 
benefit in clinical effect or 
health economic value, and 
that has really increased in 
importance (MOVED 
FROM TRIAL DESIGN) 
 
        
AA2 + 3   quality of the data is 
absolutely paramount to us 
for a successful product 
launch. we have to do 
placebo for regulatory 
reasons.   Physicians want 
head to head, how do you 
compare with other 
products on the 
marketplace?  If you’re 
  we only actually used two or 
three studies at the time of 
that launch.  The most pivotal 
of which was the Tollenson 
data. I recall at the time it was 
the biggest ever study 
undertaken on a psychiatric 
population 
At that time we had no head to 
head data versus risperidone.  
The differentiation was against 
the typical antipsychotics, 
notably haloperidol which did 
present some problems in the 
UK because haloperidol, 
although the standard of care 
in the US, is less commonly 
used in the UK and indeed 
 People go to 
conferences to get the 
latest stuff so they 
definitely take note of 
what’s presented at 
meetings and you can’t 
beat peer review journal 
publications. 
It will depend on the quality of the 
study and where it’s published as 
to whether we would react to it . 
You’ve always got to look….you 
know we have to present lots of 
evidence for our products and so 
we tend to….if we get an 
individual study that comes out 
and look at what is the body of 
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lucky enough not to be, 
you know you’re first in 
class then it’s slightly 
different but quality data is 
critical (MOVED FROM 
TRIAL DESIGN TO 
IMPACT OF EVIDENCE) 
across much of Europe.  So 
haloperidol was really seen as 
a proxy for typical 
antipsychotics and people 
were left to draw their own 
conclusions about what that 
meant against their own 
personal standard of care.  Be 
that another typical, such as 
chlorpromazine or against 
risperidone.  But I remember 
one of the great needs and the 
great pleas from our sales 
forces at the time was we 
need head to head data 
versus risperidone which we 
simply didn’t have. 
study up or disagrees with that 
study, if it’s a one off and there’s 
loads disagreeing with it I 
probably wouldn’t bother with it. If 
it’s one of a series and I think 
longer term it’s going to hurt the 
brand if we don’t respond to it, 
then we’ll go proactive and 
respond to it. 
        There was such a pent 
up demand for this 
drug.  And I remember 
being at some of the 
congresses where the 
Phase III data were 
presented on Zyprexa 
prior to its launch.  And 
it was standing room 
only in some of the 
auditoria where the data 
were presented.  
People really were 
excited about this.  That 
it did represent a 
breakthrough 
 
AA4    Our objective is to become 
the number one oral 
atypical, and actually, if all 
these drugs work exactly 
the same, you know, so in 
terms of their level of effect 
is the same, and that’s 
what NICE says, why is it 
that the drug that actually 
causes patients the least 
problem is only 3rd not 1st 
in the market?...it should 
be a lot higher up than it is 
(MOVED FROM HEALTH 
SERVICE AND POLICY 
ENVIRONMENT TO 
EVIDENCE). 
    I think you would struggle to identify 
a really ground breaking study that 
kind of meant people used atypicals 
instead of typicals, one, because of 
the nature of the illness and the 
nature of how clinical trials are done.  
So when you measure, do a trial for 
a statin and you are measuring 
cholesterol, you have your primary 
outcome measures for that trial will 
be things that doctors that are 
prescribing them, totally understand. 
If I talk about a PANSS scale or a 
Weinmeres scale or any of those 
scales they are kind of, not artificial 
but they are a thing that is done in 
order to get clinical trial results and 
not just by the industry but that’s how 
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drugs.  Your jobbing day to day 
psychiatrist may not really 
understand exactly what a reduction 
in PAN score means to a patient 
unless they are involved in clinical 
trial work. 
 
Statin1      What was going to change the 
cholesterol lowering market 
was big trials. If ever there 
was an area that is 
characterised by there having 
been an impact of big 
randomised controlled trials, 
it's this area, so I think it was 
1994 that the first sort of big 
landmark study came out, the 
4S study, and there for the 
first time was a demonstrated 
impact on total mortality, not 
cardiovascular mortality, but 
total mortality in a population 
of middle aged men with 
existing heart disease and I 
think that was the turning point 
at which erm people started to 
really kind of, sit up and take 
notice.  I mean there had been 
pretty good evidence 
beforehand, but not in such a 
simple, elegantly designed, 
big trial as happened then and 
I think you really start to see 
from the back end of '94 that 
things really start to take off 
MSD staked their place as 
market leader for many years 
really with the 4S trial; they 
had what was probably of the 
available statins, the most 
effective lipid lowerer and they 
had the evidence to say this 
drug saves lives and I think , 
that's reflected in their usage 
relative to the others. The 
other drugs were either later 
or less convincing with their 
trials, so there was actually 
very good evidence for 
Pravastatin, but Pravastatin 
probably published more 
landmark trials, through the 
nineties than Merck did behind 
Simvastatin, but the drug was 
less effective at lowering 
cholesterol and it was the 
most effective drug in the 
market place that benefitted. 
Then along came Lipitor, 
atorvastatin; more effective still and 
by the time we launched, in the late 
nineties…the kind of medical world 
had made its' mine up, that 
cholesterol lowering was a good 
thing, that there was probably a class 
effect at work here, so probably all of 
the statins worked, and so which one 
were you going to use, well you were 
going to use the ones which lowered 
the cholesterol the most, and that's 
what led to the early uptake of 
Lipitor.  As our clinical trial 
programme progressed, we began to 
publish trials that indeed 
demonstrated that Lipitor shared the 
benefits and in fact may have a 
greater effect on mortality than 
Simvastatin did, and that's when you 
saw the real kind of take off , through 
the early 2000's when there was the 
confirmation that that additional 
cholesterol lowering did translate to 
real benefit and of course , the 
period of sort of 2001 through to 
2004 was enormous for us. (MOVED 
FROM COMMUNICATION OF 
RELATIVE ADVANTAGE THEME 
TO EVIDENCE) 
 
We've almost got to the 
point of there being just 
sheer overkill on the 
amount of data, I mean 
how much more 
evidence do you need 
that lowering 
cholesterol saves lives, 
and there's not much, 
not many questions left 
to ask now really. 
 
Statin2   I think if we hadn't had 
these Dear Doctor letters 
this gap here shows you 
the evidence is not that 
important.  It is now 
because this happened 
and people want to see 
evidence, so if you start it 
again here, you'd say yes 
some of the trials have 
been important but during 
that first dynamic phase 
evidence wasn't important 
to us.  Everyone had 
    You have to really ask the question 
do you believe that it's an LDL story 
or not?  So from 4S onwards every 
single statin trial that's come out has 
shown that lowering LDL cholesterol 
is beneficial.  So are you saying that 
one statin is a miracle drug, or are 
you saying it's really largely its ability 
to lower LDL cholesterol?  Now if you 
look at all them together and say 
okay, then you have the ileal bypass 
trial, POSCH, which saved lives 
without any statins, by lowering LDL 
cholesterol.  You have the 
There's not much more 
evidence you can 
collect really because 
most of it's been done 
in terms of placebo 
controlled trials, most of 
it's been done now.  It's 
mostly unethical to do 
the trials anymore.  So 
we're stuck.  So doing 
more and more trials is 
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bought into the fact that 
lowering LDL is good for 
you (MOVED FROM 
ADVERSE EVENTS TO 
NEW SUBTHEME) 
Cholestepol trials which saved lives 
by lowering cholesterol.  And so if 
you draw a line from the top to the 
bottom, you can plot all these trials 
on a line that basically shows you the 
lower the LDL cholesterol the better 
your outcome is.  So that's your 
surrogate market argument.  We can 
lower LDL cholesterol, we can prove 
it does things to atherosclerosis.    
the answer I think.  
Make sure that your 
product is 
pharmacoeconomically 
positioned to take 
advantage of the health 
system as it is now 
Statin3  It's a very highly regulated 
industry in terms of what 
you can and what you can't 
present to clinicians.  We 
can convey the results of 
clinical studies and you can 
say that that's marketing, 
you can say that that's 
science.  But I think there's 
a case to say that 
it's…certainly in the UK it's, 
it's pretty difficult to over 
market a drug just because 
of the level of regulation.  
It's that relationship 
between regulation and 
marketing and some of the 
sign off procedures that we 
have to go through 
internally such that the 
representatives can 
actually share the material 
with a physician are kind of 
ludicrous but it's there to 
protect the industry and the 
clinicians. 
    I guess the main one, the one 
that is mostly used within the 
marketing is the STELLAR 
trial where the endpoints are 
cholesterol markers and 
mainly because it's 
comparative data across the 
statins, it's head to head data. 
A lot of the trials are not head 
to head but it's possible to do 
that on cholesterol… when we 
get our outcomes data then 
the focus would switch a bit, 
it's true what we've been 
telling you, a reduction in 
cholesterol and it has an event 
and outcomes benefit.   
Some physicians will be completely 
closed off in terms of if there's no 
clinical outcomes data I'm not 
touching it, and that's fair enough.  
Others are willing to accept that 
there's a relationship demonstrated 
in other studies in the past between 
reducing cholesterol and reducing 
CV events. We have to be very 
careful in our marketing because 
we're only licensed for cholesterol.  
We cannot imply in out marketing 
that Crestor reduces CV events 
because that data has not been 
demonstrated.  We can show 
evidence from other studies, but we 
have to clearly associate them with 
the drugs that were in those studies 
and say Crestor lowers cholesterol 
then it's up to them to make the link if 
they want to (MOVED FROM 
COMMUNICATION OF RELATIVE 
ADVANTAGE THEME TO 
EVIDENCE) 
There was awareness 
of the clinical data 
before launch and that it 
looked fairly strong.  
Other things that were 
in place like the QOF 
which physicians were 
starting to get wind of 
which directly 
incentivises them to go 
and find patients who 
were eligible for statin 
therapy and to treat 
them to a certain level, 
those two things 
together, that's some of 
the reason behind that. 
 
      Atorvastatin, because it's so large 
relative to rosuvastatin, that's where 
the impact of the switching has been 
felt the most but there have been 
instances of rosuvastatin low dose 
being switched as well.  It's perhaps 
a bit more difficult for a prescribing 
advisor to push a rosuvastatin switch 
programme because of the clinical 
data.  There's a fairly good argument 
to say that Atorvastatin 10mg is the 
best equivalent to simvastatin 40, 
whereas it's been more difficult to 
argue that for rosuvastatin.   
  
Gen1        Until evidence came of mortality 
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study, there was very little treatment 
even though we were saying, you 
know ‘you need to treat, you need to 
treat’, but nobody believed until you 
got the evidence.  You eventually got 
the evidence and the treatment 
paradigm changed overnight, from 
flat to whoosh like this, and then just 
powered on to be the biggest market 
in the world. Well, you know, there’s 
still massive under-treatment of that, 
even though it's the biggest selling 
drug. 
Gen2     For registration you have to have two 
placebo controlled studies for licence.  So 
that's why people produce placebo, 
because we have to, the regulations to 
actually get the drug licensed.  What the 
regulators want versus what the market 
access side want, are completely different 
things. 
 It's sometimes quite difficult to 
work out what your 
comparators need to be. In 
some therapy areas, standard 
care in other countries is now 
not the same standard of care 
in the UK, so that in itself is 
proving quite problematic. 
What we're starting to see in 
the UK is divergence of clinical 
practice from the rest of 
Europe so from some therapy 
areas potentially oncology, the 
drugs that are now standard in 
the rest of Europe are not 
standard in the UK so…it 
becomes incredibly expensive, 
I mean the clinical trials are 
tremendously expensive to run 
and it can be quite difficult if  
you were having to run them 
for individual countries, and 
they cost £30 million, £40 
million a trial, and you're never 
going to make the money 
back. 
   
   One of our key things is who do we need to 
talk to?  Where is the funding?  Because 
sometimes its not that obvious where the 
funding is, because actually unless we talk 
to people who hold the funds, then we have 
no chance at all of having a reasonable 
conversation about prescribing or being 
able to know who needs taking into account 
when you're generating your evidence.   
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4.1. Clinical priorities 
4.2. Patient perspective 
 
5. Drug characteristics  
5.1. Real benefits 
5.2. Perceived benefits 
5.3. Ease of use 
5.4. Differentiation 









6. Market expansion 
6.1. Education 
6.2. Identifying leakage points (where patients are lost) 
6.3. New indications 
6.4. Heritage 
6.5. Growth Limiters 
 
7. Market preparedness/access 
7.1. Market research 
7.2. Competitors 
 
8. Communication channels 
8.1. Advertising 
8.2. Clarity of message 
8.3. Message reinforcement (reps) 
8.4. Endorsement 
 
9. Market leadership 
9.1. Company perception 
9.2. Responsibilities 
 
10. Policy and Government 
10.1. Priority areas 






Framework 2: AAs - Post-analysis 
1. Clinical Need 
1.1. Degree of anticipation 
1.2. Severity of condition 
1.3. Ease of use 
 
2. Relative Advantage – innovation – may become wider heading of innate 
characteristic. 
 




4.1.1. Unlicensed use 
4.1.2. Regulatory warning 
4.1.3. Adverse effects 
4.2. Clinical Data 
4.2.1. Primary 
4.2.2. Secondary 
4.3. Evidence Translation 
4.3.1. Relevance of outcomes 
4.4. Policy and guidelines 




5. Disease Perception 
5.1. Risk mitigation 
5.2. Infrastructure – Institutional barriers 
 
6. Innate characteristics 
6.1. Real vs perceived benefits 





7. Market Preparedness – may include education in here? 
7.1. Market entry position  
7.2. Market research – linked clinical need 
7.3. Supply logistics 
 
8. Communication  
8.1. Clarity of message 
8.2. Managing expectations 
8.3. Message Reinforcement 




9. Market Leadership 
9.1. Market expansion 
9.2. Education 
9.3. Research – new formulation/indications 
 
10. Maintaining Perception of Brand/Co. credibility 
10.1. Rescue strategies 
10.1.1. Redefining meaning/ change messaging 
10.1.2. Switching focus 
10.1.3. Proactive responses 
10.2. Competitor - objection handling 
10.3. Heritage 
 






Framework 3: BPs - Post-coding 
 
1. Clinical need/demand (Clinician/patient experience) 
1.1. Interdependence of diffusion factors 
1.2. Patient experience, expectations and compliance 
 




3.1.1. Unlicensed use  
3.1.2. Regulatory Issues  
3.1.3. Adverse effects 
3.2. Clinical effectiveness (Primary level data) 
3.2.1. Trial design  
3.2.2. Journal quality/Publication control 
3.3. Evidence translation 
3.3.1. Trial outcomes: planned vs serendipitous 
3.3.2. Tailored to adopter category (Clinical relevance of outcomes)  
 
4. Health Service Environment 
4.1.1. Policy and Guidelines (Secondary level data) 
 4.1.1.1. Political priority 
 4.1.1.2. Conversion of policy/guidelines stance to industry aim 
 4.1.1.3. Clinical setting of disease management – specialist/non-
specialist. 
4.1.1.4. Mandatory nature 
4.1.1.5. Strength of message/ competitor differentiation 
4.1.1.6. Timing 
4.1.2. UK Constraints 
4.1.2.1. Clinician conservatism  
4.1.2.2. Infrastructure/institutional barriers 
 
5. Disease Perception 
5.1. Risk mitigation (inexperience leading to lack of confidence) 
5.2. Reduced health service priority  
 
5.3. Clinician indifference/dismissiveness 
5.4. Alteration of perception through disease awareness 
 
6. Innovation’s innate characteristics  
6.1. Relative advantage (was initially separate category) 
6.2. Real vs perceived benefits 
6.3. Idiosyncratic responses 
 
7. Market Preparedness 
7.1. Market entry position 
7.2. Market research 
7.2.1. Industry dependence 
7.3. Access management (non-prescribers) 
7.4. Supply logistics 
7.5. Managing expectations (should go into communication?) 
 
8. Communication 
8.1. Clarity of message 
8.2. Message reinforcement 
8.2.1. Priority/ resource allocation linked to Co size 
8.2.2. Representative (detailing) – heterophily – was under broader 
heading of endorsement that also incorporated KOLs which 
been moved to separate category. 
8.2.3. Advertising 




9.1. Collaborative involvement with industry 
9.1.1. Loyalty to one company causing institutional inertia 
9.2. Peer credibility/acceptance 
9.2.1. Hierarchical 
9.2.2. Esteem based on access to exclusive information 
9.3. Collegiate agreement  




10. Market Leadership 
10.1. Entitlement – company resolve 
10.2. Market expansion responsibility 
10.2.1. Education 
10.2.2. Overcoming Infrastructure barriers (Funding of NHS services 
‘corporate philanthropy’) 
10.2.3. Research new formulations/indications 
 
11. Maintaining perception of brand integrity/ Co. credibility 
11.1. Rescue strategies 
11.1.1. Redefining meaning/change messaging 
11.1.2. Switching focus 
11.1.3. Proactive responses 
11.1.3.1. Implementing/supporting services under-funded by 
NHS 
11.2. Competitor/objection handling 
 
12. Corporate Heritage 
12.1. Inexperience  
12.2. Mergers and acquisitions 
12.3. Corporate identity 
 
13. Lifecycle strategies 





Framework 4: BPs - Post-analysis 
 
1. Clinical need/demand (Clinician/patient) 
1.1. Technology void 
1.2. Discontent 
1.3. Innovator pursuit -‘be first mentality’ 
 




3.1.1. Unlicensed use (formerly off-label) 
3.1.2. Regulatory issues 
3.1.2.1. Variation in regulatory standards 
3.1.2.2. Adverse effects (official warnings) 
3.2. Clinical effectiveness (primary data) 
3.2.1. Trial design  
3.2.2. Temporal impact of evidence 
3.2.3. Relevance/limitation of trial outcomes 
3.2.4. Journal quality/Publication control 
 
4. Health Service [policy] Environment 
4.1. Policy and Guidelines (Secondary data) 
4.1.1. Political priority 
4.1.2. Strength of message/Differentiation/Conversion to industry aim 
4.1.3. Hierarchy of perceived importance - mandatory nature 
4.1.4. Timing 
4.1.5. Clinical setting of disease management – specialist/non-
specialist. 
 
5. Clinician/Patient Attitude  
5.1. Clinician conservatism 
5.2. Disease Perception (indifference/nonchalance) 





6. Innate characteristics of the Innovation 
6.1. Relative advantage  
6.2. Real vs perceived benefits 
6.3. Idiosyncratic responses 
 
7. Market Preparedness (or Market Access Preparation/Management?) 
7.1. Market entry position 
7.1.1. Premature curtailment of the market 
7.2. Market research 
7.2.1. Industry dependence 
7.3. Non-prescriber argument 
7.4. Supply logistics 
7.5. Managing expectations  
 
8. Communication 
8.1. Clarity (Simplicity) of message 
8.1.1. Tailoring to adopter characteristics 
8.2. Message reinforcement 
8.2.1. Priority and resource allocation (Partnering, mergers and 
acquisitions) 
8.2.2. Targeting of the message 





9.1. Hierarchical cascade of influence 
9.2. Early engagement/collaboration 
9.3. Loyalty causing institutional inertia 
9.4. Peer credibility and esteem 
9.5. Collegiate agreement – management consensus 
 
10. Market Leadership 




10.1.1. Disease awareness 
10.1.2. Education – aid decision making 
10.1.3. Subsidy of health services (corporate philanthropy) 
10.1.4. Research - new formulations/new indications 
 
11. Image - Maintaining brand perception/ Company integrity  
11.1. Rescue strategies 
11.1.1. Redefining meaning/change messaging 
11.1.2. Switching focus 
11.1.3. Proactive responses 
11.2. Response to competitors (objection handling) 
 
12. Heritage (corporate identity) 
 





Framework 5: Combined AAs + BPs + PDE5s - Post-coding 
 
1. Clinical need/demand (Clinician/patient) 
1.1 Technology void 
1.2. Discontent 
1.3. Innovator pursuit -‘be first mentality’ 
 
2. Clinician/Patient Experience 
2.1. Real life experience 
2.2. Use of samples  




3.1.1. Unlicensed use  
3.1.2. Regulation 
3.1.2.1. Variation in regulatory standards 
3.1.2.2. Adverse effects (official warnings)/ contraindications 
3.2. Clinical effectiveness (primary data) 
3.2.1. Trial design  
3.2.2. Temporal impact of evidence 
3.2.3. Translation: Relevance/limitation of trial outcomes 
3.2.4. Journal quality/Publication control 
3.3 Marketing – market revival with new data 
 
4. Environment  
4.1. Health Policy environment (central government outputs - white 
papers/NSFs)  
4.1.1. Political priority 
4.1.2. Policy constraints – discrimination/ impacts on compliance 
4.1.3. Conversion to industry aim 
4.2. Guidelines (secondary data – produced by non-government bodies: 
NICE/Royal Colleges) 
4.2.1. Hierarchy of perceived importance - mandatory nature 




4.2.4. Conversion to policy aim  
4.3. Health Care Environment  
4.3.1. Clinical setting of disease management (specialist/non-specialist) 
4.3.2. Clinical priority 
 
5. Attitude: Clinician/ Patient  
5.1. Clinician conservatism 
5.2. Disease Perception 
(indifference/nonchalance/reticence/embarrassment) 
5.3. Risk mitigation 
 
6. Market Expansion/development  
6.1. Disease awareness 
6.1.1. Counteract attitudes to disease perception through education/de-
stigmatisation (by medicalisation/celebrity endorsement) 
6.1.2. Patient group role – credible conduit of information 
6.2. Market leadership responsibility 
6.2.1. Subsidy of health services (corporate philanthropy overcome 
infrastructure barriers) 
6.2.2. Research - new formulations/new indications 
 
7. Innate characteristics of the Innovation 
7.1. Relative advantage  
7.2. Real vs perceived benefits 
7.3. Change of mode of administration on clinical setting  
7.4. Idiosyncratic responses 
 
8. Market Preparedness (or Market Access Preparation/Management?) 
8.1. Market entry position 
8.1.1. Premature curtailment of the market (early generic competition/ 
counterfeit challenges) 
8.2. Market research 
8.2.1. Industry dependence 




8.4. Supply barriers 
8.4.1. Supply logistics 
8.4.2. Dispensing issues 
8.5. Managing expectations 
  
9. Communication 
9.1. Clarity (simplicity) of message  
9.1.1. Tailoring to adopter characteristics 
9.2. Message reinforcement 
9.2.1. Company priority and resource allocation (Partnering, mergers 
and acquisitions) 
9.2.2. Targeting of the message 
9.2.3. Representative (detailing) – translation process of trust to aid 
decision making/correct usage of product. 
9.2.4. Dissemination 
9.2.4.1. Controlled – advertising 
9.2.4.2. Uncontrolled – media 
 
10. KOLs 
10.1. Hierarchical cascade of influence 
10.2. Early engagement/collaboration/interest/enthusiasm 
10.3. Loyalty based institutional inertia 
10.4. Peer credibility and esteem 
10.5. Collegiate agreement – management consensus 
 
11. Image - Maintaining brand perception/ Company integrity  
11.1. Brand identity/recognition 
11.2. Rescue strategies – response to adverse market conditions 
11.2.1. Redefining meaning/change messaging 
11.2.2. Switching focus 
11.2.3. Proactive responses 
11.3. Response to competitors (objection handling) 
 
12. Cultural/scientific heritage (corporate identity) 
 
13. Circumstantial Events 
 





Framework 6: AAs + BPs + PDE5s - Post-analysis  
 
1. Clinical need 
1.1. Discontent with current therapies 
1.2. Desire for something new in a stagnating field 
1.3. Need to alleviate distress 
1.4. Patients’ need to restore normality 
1.5. Need to satisfy innovator pursuit 
 
2. Clinician/Patient Experience 
2.1. Subjective evaluation based on personal clinical experience 
2.2. Clinician-patient interaction 
2.3. Distorted experience 
2.4. Patient experience - customer feedback  
 
3. Evidence  
3.1. Safety /Regulation 
3.1.1. Warnings 
3.1.1.1. Unlicensed use  
3.1.1.2. Adverse effects/contraindications 
3.1.2. Variation in regulatory standards 
3.2. Evidence as marketing 
3.2.1. Trial design  
3.2.2. Evidence translation: Relevance/limitation of trial outcomes 
3.2.2.1. Head to head comparisons 
3.2.2.2. Surrogate markers 
3.2.3. Temporal impact of evidence 
3.2.4. Journal quality/Publication control 
 
4. Health Service/policy Environments  
4.1. Health Policy Environment  
4.1.1. Political priority 
4.1.1.1. Restrictive policy  
4.2. Independent guidance/guidelines 
4.2.1. Differentiation 




4.3. Health Care Environment  
4.3.1. Clinical priority 
4.3.2. Clinical setting of disease management (specialist/non-
specialist) 
 
5. Attitude: Clinician/ Patient  
5.1. Clinician conservatism 
5.2. Disease Perception  
5.3. Risk mitigation 
 
6. Communication of relative advantage 
6.1. Differentiation 
6.1.1. Real versus perceived benefits 
6.1.2. Brand identity/perception 
6.1.3. Market entry position 
6.2. Message clarity/simplicity  
6.3. Tailoring to adopter characteristics 
6.4. Product awareness (advertising) – targeting the message 
6.4.1. Managing expectations 
6.5. Message reinforcement (representatives) 
6.6. Competitor objection handling 
 
7. Market development  
7.1. Market research 
7.2. Disease awareness 
7.2.1. Patient group role  
7.2.2. Public figure/celebrity endorsement 
7.2.3. Media role 
7.3. Market leadership responsibility 
7.3.1. Subsidy of health services (corporate philanthropy) 
7.4. Research - new formulations/new indications 






8.1. Early engagement/collaboration 
8.2. Hierarchical cascade of influence/peer credibility 
8.3. Advancing the field through collegiate agreement 
 
9. Cultural heritage/Company perception  
9.1. Cultural mindset influence on company perception 
9.2. Determining company priorities 
 
10. Pricing 
10.1. Price setting 





















Framework 7: (AAs + BPs + PDE5s) + statins + general – 
Post-coding  
 
The framework categories did not change from the previous 






Framework 8: Final Thematic Framework: All cases - Post-
analysis 
 
1. CLINICAL NEED 
1.1. Discontent with current therapies 
1.2. Innovation inertia: Desire for something new in a stagnating field 
1.3. Vocational need to alleviate distress 
1.4. Disparity between clinician and patient–driven needs 
1.5. Need to satisfy innovator pursuit 
1.6. Industry response to unmet clinical need 
 
2. CLINICIAN/PATIENT EXPERIENCE (EFFECTIVENESS) 
2.1. Subjective evaluation based on personal clinical experience 
2.2. Clinician-patient interaction 
2.3. Inappropriate drug use 
2.3.1. Distorted experience 
2.3.2. Safety warnings/concerns 
2.4. Patient insight 
2.5. Industry response to experiential barriers 
 
3. CLINICAL EVIDENCE (EFFICACY) 
3.1. Marketing evidence 
3.2. Impact of clinical evidence 
3.2.1. Trial design  
3.2.1.1. Functional versatility of evidence 
3.2.1.2. Novel trial perspective 
3.2.2. Evidence translation: Relevance/limitation of trial outcomes 
3.2.2.1. Head to head comparisons 
3.2.2.2. Surrogate markers versus clinically relevant outcomes 
3.2.3. Temporal impact of evidence 
3.2.4. Journal quality/Publication control 
 
4. HEALTH SERVICE/POLICY ENVIRONMENTS  
4.1. Health policy environment  
4.1.1. Political priorities 




4.1.1.2. Adverse policy environment 
4.2. Independent guidance/guidelines 
4.2.1. Differentiation 
4.2.2. Perceived importance/ strength of message 
4.2.3. Timeliness 
4.3. Health service environment  
4.3.1. Clinical priorities 
4.3.2. Clinical setting of disease management (specialist/non-
specialist) 
4.4. Industry response to environmental barriers 
 
5. ATTITUDE: CLINICIAN/ PATIENT  
5.1. Clinician conservatism 
5.2. Perception of Industry 
5.3. Disease perception  
5.4. Non-specialist risk mitigation 
5.5. Industry response to attitude barriers 
 
6. COMMUNICATING RELATIVE ADVANTAGE 
6.1. Differentiating relative advantage 
6.1.1 Real versus perceived benefits 
6.1.2. Market entry position 
6.1.3. Perception of brand identity 
6.2. Conveying relative advantage 
6.2.1. Simplicity/ clarity of message 
6.2.1.1. Tailoring the message to adopter needs 
6.2.1.2. Targeting the message 
6.2.2. Product awareness (advertising) 
6.2.2.1. Managing expectations 
6.2.3. Product justification (representative detailing) 






7. MARKET DEVELOPMENT  
7.1. Market research 
7.2. Raising disease awareness 
7.2.1. Patient group role  
7.2.2. Public figure/celebrity endorsement 
7.2.3. Media role 
7.3. Market leadership  
7.3.1. Corporate philanthropy: Subsidy of health services  
7.4. Research: New formulations/new indications 
7.5. Dispensing/supply issues 
 
8. KEY OPINION LEADERS (KOLS) 
8.1. Early engagement/collaboration 
8.2. Hierarchical cascade of influence/peer credibility 
8.3. Advancing the field through collegiate agreement 
 
9. CULTURAL HERITAGE/COMPANY PERCEPTION  
9.1. Cultural influence on company perception 
9.2. Culture determining company priorities 
 
10. PRICING 
10.1. Price setting 








Appendix 12: Qualitative study assessment criteria (Mays and Pope, 1995)  
 
Qualitative Study Assessment Criteria 
 
1. Did the researcher make explicit in the account the theoretical framework and 
methods used at every stage of the research? 
 
2. Was the context clearly described? 
 
3. Was the sampling strategy clearly described and justified? 
 
4. Was the sampling strategy theoretically comprehensive to ensure the 
generalisability of the conceptual analyses (diverse range of individuals and 
settings, for example)? 
 
5. How was the fieldwork undertaken? Was it described in detail? 
 
6. Could the evidence (fieldwork notes, interview transcripts, recording, 
documentary analysis, etc.) be inspected independently by others; if relevant, 
could the process of transcription be independently inspected? 
 
7. Were the procedures for data analysis clearly described and theoretically 
justified? Did they relate to the original research question? How were themes 
and concepts identified from the data? 
 
8. Was the analysis repeated by more than one researcher to ensure reliability? 
 
9. Did the investigator make use of quantitative evidence to test qualitative 
conclusions where appropriate? 
 
10. Did the investigator give evidence of seeking out observations that might have 
contradicted or modified the analysis? 
 
11. Was sufficient of the original evidence presented systematically in the written 
account to satisfy the sceptical reader of the relation between the interpretation 







Appendix 13: Background literature on bisphosphonates for 
postmenopausal osteoporosis 
 
1. Osteoporosis  
Osteoporosis can affect the whole skeleton and most commonly results in fractures to 
bones in the wrist, spine and hip, causing a substantial burden of disability and chronic 
pain. Once perceived as a natural consequence of ageing, it is now acknowledged as a 
major public health concern that is potentially preventable.  
Bones are living organs that undergo constant remodelling. Specialist cells called 
osteoclasts remove old bone, leaving pit like depressions that are filled with new bone 
deposited by cells called osteoblasts over a period of about 90 days. Cortical bone on 
the outside is dense and compact, while trabecular bone on the inside has a honeycomb 
structure to maximise strength whilst minimising weight. In osteoporosis, it is the 
trabecular bone loss which occurs first with serious implications to bone strength. 
While osteoporosis can occur in all populations at all ages, it is most prevalent in 
postmenopausal women, with symptoms usually developing between ages 51 and 75 
years. In addition to age, bone loss may be influenced by several other factors including 
low body weight, smoking, excess alcohol consumption, physical inactivity, genetic 
factors poor dietary calcium intake, reduced production and impaired metabolism of 
vitamin D and declining calcium absorption. 
Osteoporosis is sometimes referred to as a silent disease as only around one third of 
radiographically diagnosed vertebral fractures cause symptoms (Cooper and Melton, 
1992). The condition may go unnoticed for several years, until it causes a loss in height 
or the characteristic marked curvature of the upper back (referred to as a dowager’s 
hump) as the bones in the spinal column become crushed or wedged. Clinically 
apparent vertebral fractures however, can cause pain, breathing difficulties and 
gastrointestinal problems, while hip fractures are associated with significant morbidity 
and mortality.  
 
2. Diagnosis  
 
2.1. Defining Osteoporosis – Bone Mineral Density (BMD) 
Despite the production of numerous guidelines, diagnosis of osteoporosis is still 
controversial, mainly as it is a condition which involves many medical disciplines, all 
with differing perspectives. Osteoporosis received little attention until the advent of 
dual-energy X-ray absorptiometry scanning techniques (DEXA) in the late 1980’s, 
which made it possible to accurately measure bone mineral density (BMD). Coupled 
with the therapeutic possibility of preventing bone loss, osteoporosis was transformed 
from a fracture syndrome resulting from reduced bone density detected only once a 





Table A13.1: WHO definition of osteoporosis 
Stages of Osteoporosis Bone Mineral Density 
Osteopaenia T-score between -1.0 and -2.5. 
Osteoporosis T-score  below -2.5  
Established osteoporosis T-score <-2.5, with presence of one or more fragility fractures 
 
BMD T-scores can vary by site and method of measurement so the gold standard for 
diagnostic purposes is total hip BMD measured by DEXA (Kanis, 2002). Changes to 
BMD (preferably at the spine) may be used to monitor responses to treatment (Royal 
College of Physicians (RCP), 1999). About 50% of women with symptomatic vertebral 
fractures have evidence of osteoporosis (T score <-2.5) on spine bone densiometry, and 
a further 40% have osteopaenia (T-score -1 to -2.5) (Francis et al., 2004). 
Population-based BMD screening has never been advocated for the prevention of 
osteoporotic fractures due to the high cost of DEXA scanning. Instead a selective case-
finding approach was recommended, based on other risk factors, such as the presence of 
previous fracture. There are still relatively few DEXA scanners (bone densitometers) 
per million of the population in the UK compared with other European countries.  
 
2.2. Issues with BMD 
The correlation between low bone mineral density and increased risk of fracture is 
contentious. Low bone density is an important component of fracture risk, but it cannot 
be used alone. Other skeletal (bone turnover) and non-skeletal parameters (advanced 
age and propensity to fall) contribute to fracture risk and need to be considered to 
predict in absolute terms whether or not an individual will sustain a fracture. For a given 
BMD T-score of -2.5, a 50 year old woman has a much lower fracture risk than an 80 
year old woman (Cheung and Detsky, 2008). It has been proposed that falls are a 
stronger predictor of fractures than BMD. Falls increase in frequency with advancing 
age due to an increasing number of cognitive issues and account for at least 95% of hip 
fractures in the elderly (Wilkins, 1999). 
Controversy has surrounded the WHO definition of osteoporosis. Some believe it is 
inappropriate to use a surrogate marker as by raising it to the status of a diagnostic 
criterion, it conceptualises a risk factor as a disease (Eastell, 1998). This is however, not 
an issue restricted just to osteoporosis, but a concern with surrogate markers in general 
(other examples include cholesterol and heart attacks, or blood pressure and stroke) and 
ultimately their ability to translate into clinically relevant endpoints. 
The fact that the WHO definition set the bone density of young white women as normal, 
and to judge the bones of older women against this standard was viewed contentiously 
by some in the medical profession, who have indicated a Z-score measure (BMD is 
compared with the mean value in normal subjects of the same age and sex) may have 
been more appropriate (Eastell, 1998; Moynihan et al., 2002). Some have implied that 
the Industry were heavily involved in influencing the WHO definition, through 
sponsorship of key meetings of the WHO study group, and developing extensive 





2.3. Fracture reduction 
Alternatively osteoporosis can be inferred from the presence of pre-existing 
osteoporosis-related fractures at the spine or hip detected symptomatically, or defined 
radiographically.   
Previous fracture is an important determinant of predicting future risk: 
• In osteoporotic patients without pre-existing fracture, the 3-4 year incidence of 
new vertebral fracture ranges from 2-4% (Cummings et al., 1998; Liberman et 
al., 1995; Ettinger et al., 1999), and from 1.1%-5.1% for hip fracture 
(Cummings et al., 1998; McClung et al., 2001).  
• In contrast, these rates in those with pre-existing fracture increase to 15-29% for 
new vertebral fractures (Liberman et al., 1995; Ettinger et al., 1999; Lindsay et 
al., 2001; Klotzbuecher et al., 2000; Black et al., 1996; Harris et al., 1999; 
Reginster et al., 2000), and 2.2-5.7% for new hip fractures (McClung et al., 
2001; Black et al., 1996; Harris et al., 1999; Reginster et al., 2000). 
 
2.4. Markers of Bone turnover 
An increased rate of bone turnover has been suggested by some as a better measure of 
risk than low BMD, (Wilkin, 1999). The extent to which changes in BMD and 
biochemical markers account for changes in fracture risk remains an area of much 
debate (Rosen et al., 2005). It has been suggested that the small increases in BMD (5-
8%) seen with BPs could not account entirely for the reductions in fracture risk of the 
order of 50%, and that it is more likely a combination of both increased BMD and 
reduced bone turnover.  
Bone turnover markers may be a better measure of response to treatment. Urinary 
markers have a maximum suppression in the order of 50% within three months of 
starting therapy, compared with a two year time frame before a lack of response is noted 
using BMD, and are also easier and less costly to measure. 
 
3. Prognosis 
Osteoporosis affects 1 in 3 women and 1 in 12 men aged over the age of 50. It is 
estimated to cause over 200,000 fractures in the UK each year (over 40,000 spinal 
fractures, 70,000 hip fractures and 50,000 wrist fractures). High-risk groups include the 
elderly, those who have taken long-term corticosteroids, women who have had an early 
menopause or have had their ovaries removed, those who smoke or have a low body 
mass index, and those with a family history of osteoporosis.  
 
In the UK, estimates of the annual cost of osteoporosis to the NHS vary from £940 




a profound detrimental effect on quality of life account for more than 20% of 
orthopaedic bed occupancy, with the cost of surgical replacement estimated to be 
around £4,800 per patient. One in five people experiencing a hip fracture require long-
term residential care (costing £19,000 per year), and one tenth to one fifth of women die 
within the following year (Soloman, 2002), which equates to approximately 14,000 
people in the UK annually (NSF, 2001a).  
More than one-third of adult women will sustain at least one osteoporotic fracture 
during their life. A 50 year old white woman has a risk of hip fracture during her 
remaining lifetime of about 16%, and of vertebral fracture of 32% (Cummings et al., 
1989). Most women over 70 have osteopaenia. Over 80, most have osteoporosis and 
90% will have suffered a fracture. The most common fractures include vertebral 
compression fractures and fractures of the distal radius (wrist) and proximal femur 
(hip). 
 
4. Setting of care  
Osteoporosis is a condition that can in theory be managed in primary care, but is 
plagued by an inappropriate number of referrals to secondary care services. A survey 
conducted in 1986 found that 20% of general practitioners claimed they had never seen 
a case of osteoporosis among their patients (Edwards and Fraser, 1997), while research 
from the few specialists in osteoporosis at that time indicated to the contrary that 
osteoporosis was a major problem. Disease awareness campaigns aimed at educating 
primary care have been only moderately successful, as many GPs continue to refer 
patients to secondary care specialist clinics.  
Case-finding exercises do take place in primary care. Specialist nurses search through 
patient records to identify people at particular risk of osteoporosis and then offer them a 
consultation. Had clinical indicators for osteoporosis been included in the Quality 
Outcomes Framework section of the General Medical Services Contract introduced in 
2004, it may have gone some way to recognising the importance of the primary care 
setting in the prevention of osteoporotic fractures.  
 
5. Disease Management 
Management of osteoporosis is divided into treatment and prevention: 
• Treatment involves increasing bone mass in patients with osteoporosis to 
prevent further fractures. Can also be referred to as: 
o ‘secondary prevention’ if a patient has already sustained a clinically 
apparent (i.e. symptomatic) osteoporotic fracture; or 
o ‘primary prevention’ in patients with osteoporosis based on a T-score of 
-2.5, but with no clinically apparent osteoporotic fractures. 
 
•  Prevention involves increasing bone mass in patients without osteoporosis (but 




as ‘primary prevention’ but of osteoporosis, as opposed to primary prevention of 
fracture in patients with diagnosed osteoporosis.  
 
In clinical practice this distinction is less appropriate, since all BPs act through 
inhibition of bone resorption. 
Fractures can be prevented both through pharmacological intervention and lifestyle 
modification. In addition to BPs, other pharmacological therapies shown to increase 
bone mass include: 
• Hormone Replacement Therapy (HRT)40 – oestrogen replacement to prevent 
bone loss in to women entering menopause/men with low testosterone  
• Calcitonin (thyroid hormone) - inhibits bone resorption and reduces pain 
associated with fractures 
• Dietary supplements (calcium and vitamin D) – vitamin D is essential to absorb 
calcium from food and regulates bone resorption. Calcitrol is the active form of 
vitamin D 
• Anabolic steroids - increase bone and muscle mass. Reserved for the very 
elderly due to side effects 
• Sodium Fluoride – increases vertebral bone density but concerns that bone was 
structurally flawed and weaker limited its use. 
• Selective Oestrogen Receptor Modulators (SERMS) – mimic effects of 
oestrogen (raloxifene) 
• Parathyroid hormone (Teriparatide) - stimulates production of new bone. 
 
 
At the time the interviews with the Industry took place, NICE had produced guidance 
on the main pharmacological therapies for the secondary prevention of fractures in 
osteoporosis (NICE, 2005). NICE guidance (2005) states: 
 
“BPs are recommended as treatment options for the secondary prevention of 
osteoporotic fragility fractures: 
• In women aged 75 years and older, without the need for DEXA scanning 
• In women aged between 65-74 if presence of osteoporosis confirmed by DEXA 
scanning (treatment can be commenced prior to scanning provided a scan is 
booked) 
• In postmenopausal women younger than 65 if they have: 
o low BMD (T-score ≤-3 SD) 
o confirmed osteoporosis plus ≥1 additional age-independent risk factor: 
- low body mass index 
- family history of maternal hip fracture before the age of 75 years 
- untreated premature menopause 
- medical disorders independently associated with bone loss 
- conditions associated with prolonged immobility. 
                                                 




• In their choice of BP, clinicians and patients need to balance the drug’s overall 
proven effectiveness profile against tolerability and adverse effects in individual 
patients. 
• Raloxifene and teriparatide are recommended as second-line therapies to BPs”. 
 
NICE have since published guidance on interventions for the primary prevention of 
fragility fractures (NICE, 2008a), which recommends alendronate as first-line therapy, 
with risedronate and etidronate reserved as alternative treatment options. At that time, 
the guidance stated that recommendations for the primary prevention of osteoporosis in 
women with osteopaenia or normal BMD would be made in future guidance produced 
by NICE.  NICE guidelines on osteoporosis were finally published in August 2012, nine 
years after publication of the scope. 
 
6. Pharmacological Mechanism  
BPs are effective antiresorptive agents. They are stable synthetic analogues of naturally 
occurring inorganic pyrophosphate (an endogenous regulator of bone turnover), but 
unlike pyrophosphate, BPs are resistant to breakdown by enzymatic hydrolysis. BPs 
have a high binding affinity for hydroxyapatite (HA), a calcium-phosphate complex that 
is the primary mineral component of bone, due to the presence of a P-C-P bond. The 
different drugs within this class have different side chains attached to the P-C-P bond 
which determine the different potencies and degrees of absorption from the bowel. 
Despite poor absorption from the bowel, BPs localise preferentially in bone and persist 
for several months to provide a prolonged period of action. 
BPs adsorb to the surface of bones and are internalised by the osteoclast cell during the 
resorption process. The osteoclasts adhere normally to the bone surface but do not show 
the ruffled surface that indicates active resorption. The non-nitrogen containing BP 
(etidronate) effectively poisons the osteoclast by becoming substituted into ATP and 
disabling ATP dependent-enzymes. The more potent nitrogen containing BPs 
(alendronate and risedronate) disable enzymes of the mevalonate pathway. By inhibiting 
osteoclast activity, shallow pits are left allowing osteoblasts to increase bone mass.  
 
7. Licensed Osteoporosis Indications41 
Etidronate  
Cyclical etidronate (Didronel PMO) is an oral BP licensed for: 
• treatment of osteoporosis and the prevention of bone loss in postmenopausal 
women.  
• prevention and treatment of corticosteroid-induced osteoporosis. 
 
Didronel PMO therapy is a long-term cyclical regime administered in 90-day cycles to 
correspond with the osteoclast-osteoblast cycle. Each cycle consists of etidronate 
400mg for the first 14 days, followed by calcium 500mg for the remaining 76 days. Due 
                                                 




to poor gastrointestinal absorption, etidronate has to be taken on an empty stomach an 
hour before, or two hours after meals.  
Etidronate was initially licensed for Paget’s disease in the UK  in 1987 , but it soon 
became apparent that if given continuously at high doses, etidronate could result in 
impaired mineralisation (osteomalacia – see section on long-term effects).  This 
problem was avoided when etidronate was launched for osteoporosis by using low dose 
intermittent therapy incorporated into a calcium-containing cyclical regimen. In 
2003/2004, 23% of prescriptions for BPs in England were for etidronate (NICE, 2005). 
It still has a reasonable market share as it was the first of the BPs to become generically 





Alendronate is an oral aminobisphosphonate licensed for the: 
• treatment of postmenopausal osteoporosis (10mg daily or 70mg once weekly), 
and osteoporosis in men (10mg daily). 
• prevention of postmenopausal osteoporosis (5mg daily) 
• prevention and treatment of corticosteroid-induced osteoporosis (5mg daily) 
 






Risedronate is an oral pyridinyl bisphosphonate licensed for: 
• treatment of postmenopausal osteoporosis to reduce risk of vertebral and hip 
fracture: 5mg daily, or 35mg once weekly.  
• prevention of osteoporosis (including corticosteroid-induced osteoporosis) in 
postmenopausal women: 5mg daily. 
 
The once weekly formulation was launched two years after alendronate’s weekly 
formulation. In 2003/2004, 16% of prescriptions for BP in England were for risedronate 
(NICE, 2005) 
 
8. Safety and Regulation 
8.1. Acute upper gastrointestinal side effects 
The major safety issues that have plagued the BP class are upper gastrointestinal (GI) 
side effects that present as oesophageal ulceration. The problem mainly affects 
alendronate, but the other BPs may have also been implicated through class association. 
The presence of the nitrogen-containing side arm in the aminobisphosphonates 
(alendronate and risedronate) can irritate the upper GI mucosa if there is prolonged local 




study that prompted the release of a ‘Dr Doctor’ letter from MSD (de Groen et al., 
1996) did highlight that the findings of the post-marketing surveillance study were not 
consistent with those reported in clinical trials, where no significant differences were 
observed between alendronate and placebo. They stated that the difference was most 
likely due to the controlled environment of clinical trials, where close monitoring and 
reinforcement of correct administration can take place (de Groen et al., 1996). This was 
supported by a re-examination of the data in the Fracture Intervention Trial (FIT 1) 
using the same criteria of oesophageal irritation as used by de Groen et al. (1996), 
which showed no evidence of an increased incidence of serious or severe adverse 
effects compared with placebo (Liberman and Hirsch, 1996). Soon after the MSD letter, 
P&G released a statement stressing that in 18 years of post-marketing surveillance, only 
one case of oesophageal ulceration and five cases of oesophagitis had been associated 
with Didronel PMO (Procter & Gamble, 1996).  
 
 8.2. Long-term effects 
Bone age: 
There is a concern with all BPs that long-term suppression of bone remodelling may 
alter the material properties of bone. The bone age effectively increases, which may 
affect its mechanical integrity over time and potentially contribute to the risk of 
developing atypical fractures.  
 
Osteomalacia: 
Etidronate was the only BP that was associated with osteomalacia. Osteomalacia, which 
means ‘soft bones’, occurs when newly formed bone does not mineralise. It was more 
of a concern for etidronate’s initial indication of Paget’s disease as the dose required to 
inhibit resorption was very close to that which could inhibit normal skeletal 
mineralisation. The dose was reduced for the osteoporosis indication, but perceptions of 
the drug may still have been affected. Other BPs were not associated with this condition 
as they could be used at much lower doses due to their higher potency. 
Osteonecrosis of the jaw 
This safety issue only became apparent after the interviews had taken place. 
Bisphosphonate-related osteonecrosis of the jaw is defined as exposed, necrotic bone in 
the maxillofacial region that persists for more than eight weeks in current or past 
recipients of BP therapy. The condition can occur spontaneously or after invasive dental 
procedures. In September 2009, the European Medicines Agency completed a review 
and concluded that there was an increased risk of osteonecrosis of the jaw in patients 
using these medicines. 
 
8.3. HRT withdrawal 
Following the publication of two major studies assessing the long-term effects of HRT; 
The Women's Health Initiative (WHI) trial of oestrogen plus progestin (2002) and the 
Million Women Study (2003), the UK Committee on Safety of Medicines concluded in 




risks and benefits was such that HRT should no longer be considered as a first-line 
therapy due to the increased risk of breast, endometrial and ovarian cancers in a 
duration-dependent manner. 
 
9. Efficacy  
All three BPs are effective in preventing vertebral fractures, but alendronate and 
risedronate are also effective in reducing hip fracture. In lieu of interventional studies of 
etidronate’s effect on hip fracture, NICE guidance (2005) acknowledged that although 
an effect was likely, it would be less pronounced than with alendronate and risedronate. 
Previous vertebral fracture and low BMD (T-Score <-2.5) at the femoral neck (even in 
the absence of previous fracture (Cummings et al., 1998)) identified those osteoporotic 
women who benefitted from treatment. 
 
Table A13.2: Summary of fracture risk reduction and BMD increases for bisphosphonates in 
pivotal clinical trials  
Bisphosphonate Relative Risk Reduction (RRR) of 
Fracture42 
Increase in BMD 
Vertebral Non-vertebral Vertebral Non-vertebral 
Etidronate - - 4-8% 2-4% 
Alendronate 44-48% 55% 6-8% 4-8% 
Risedronate 41-49% 33-40% 4-6% 3-6% 
 
Table A13.3: Evidence for the efficacy of therapies in osteoporosis (WHO Technical Report Series 
921) 
Intervention BMD Vertebral fracture Non-vertebral fracture Hip fracture 
Etidronate A B D D 
Alendronate A A A A 
Risedronate A A A A 
Calcium A B B D 
Calcium + vitamin D A - A A 
Raloxifene A A - - 
Oestrogens A A A A 
Calcitonin A C C D 
Fluoride A C - - 
Anabolic steroids A - - D 
Evidence A: positive evidence from one or more adequately powered, randomised controlled trial; B: positive evidence from 
smaller non-definitive randomised controlled trials; C: inconsistent results from randomised controlled trials; D: positive results 
from observational studies; -: efficacy not tested. 
 
                                                 
42Calculated from relative risk (RR). RR=1: no difference; >1: increased risk in group exposed to treatment; <1: reduced risk in 






9.1 Trial design - clinical outcomes 
 
Ideally trials in this disease area would only look at fracture rates and not surrogate 
markers, but it is often a case of pragmatism.  A trial involving up to 30,000 patients 
would be required to provide sufficient power to demonstrate a comparative difference 
between different BPs in terms of fracture reduction.  
 
Fracture reduction:  
 
• Trial results were frequently presented as relative risk reductions (RRR), which can 
appear substantial, but when considered as an absolute risk reduction (ARR) the 
numbers are small (e.g. in FIT 1 (Black et al., 1996) a RRR of 51%, corresponded to 
an ARR of  just 1.1%). 
 
• Vertebral fractures are important because they predict subsequent non-vertebral 
fractures independently of BMD (see section on diagnosis). Some studies used 
clinical (i.e. symptomatic) fractures as their endpoint, while others used fractures 
that were identified radiographically (sometimes called morphometric), which 
include symptomatic and asymptomatic fractures.  
 
• If facture is used as an endpoint, then trials tend to recruit women with multiple 
vertebral fractures at base line and are therefore at very high risk of developing 
subsequent fractures. However, the applicability of the results of these trials to the 
general population with osteoporosis may then be limited. In the FIT 1 trial (Black 
et al., 1996), the primary endpoint was numbers of women with fractures rather than 
the total number of fractures to attempt to avoid these statistical issues. 
 
• In treatment studies, the higher risk of fragility fracture occurring in study 
populations enables the assessment of anti-fracture efficacy. Prevention studies 
however are performed in early postmenopausal women with osteopaenia or normal 
BMD, in whom the absolute risk of fragility fracture is low within the 1-2 year 




In clinical trials, BMD was measured at various vertebral and non-vertebral sites which 
made direct comparisons difficult. Vertebral sites included the lumbar spine and lateral 
spine. Non-vertebral sites often included several hip locations (femoral neck, femoral 
trochanter (upper part of the femur), total hip), wrist (distal radius), forearm (mid-shaft 
radius), pelvis, total body, leg and clavicle, but occasionally non-vertebral results would 







9.2. Volume of evidence 
Searches of the biomedical literature databases (Table A13.4) indicated substantially 
more clinical studies produced for alendronate compared with etidronate that had been 
on the market for a longer period of time. In the three years following launch when a 
technology can still be considered to be new (Linden et al., 2007), the relevance of 
clinical trials assumed more importance than for the first BP etidronate, potentially to 
support claims of differentiation.   
Table A13.4:Bisphosphonates: volume of evidence: MEDLINE and EmBASE 
searches 
BPs No. of studies included on MEDLINE/EmBASE Databases 
(restricted to clinically sound43 studies) 
From launch to terminal curve 
date (year ending 2004) 
3 years before 
launch 
3 years post-launch 
Etidronate 25 2 3 
Alendronate 54 2 9 





The need for guidelines was realised in the mid 1990’s, following a change in the 
definition of osteoporosis by the WHO in 1994. Changes to policy were then necessary 




The WHO redefinition was in response to a consensus development conference that had 
convened in Rome in 1992 following recognition by the WHO that views on the 
assessment and treatment of osteoporosis were not consistent amongst experts. At the 
meeting, experts proposed expanding the definition of osteoporosis, from that of an 
elderly person with a fracture, to anyone who had a BMD T-Score of ≤ - 2.5, and in 
doing so, also created the term osteopaenia to describe a pre-osteoporotic state (Sandor 
et al., 1998). The WHO has been involved in many initiatives to raise awareness of 
osteoporosis, promote preventative and management strategies and increase its priority 
on the worldwide political agenda.  
 
 Department of Health Advisory Group on Osteoporosis 
 
Following pressure from patient organisations, most notably the National Osteoporosis 
Society, the then Health Minister, Baroness Cumberlege established an Advisory Group 
on Osteoporosis in 1993 chaired by Professor David Barlow. Their remit was to 
ascertain what information about osteoporosis was available, what research was being 
conducted, and what further work needed to be done. Such attention from Government 
                                                 
43Definition of ‘clinically sound’ in accordance with the Health Information Research Unit (HIRU) 




was important in raising awareness of the condition. The group reported in November 
1994 (Barlow, 1994) and recommended the establishment of local bone scanning 
facilities for at risk women, consideration of the role of diet as a preventative strategy, 
and the preparation of prevention and treatment guidelines, which led to the production 
of the Royal College of Physicians guidelines published in 1999.  
 
Royal College of Physicians Guidelines: 
When the authoritative Royal College of Physicians Guidelines on the prevention and 
treatment of osteoporosis were produced in 1999, etidronate, alendronate and raloxifene 
were licensed, so they were able to provide guidance on the basis of cost effectiveness 
and there was a clear template as to how osteoporosis services and intervention should 
be approached based on the WHO definition.  
 
Several other major policy documents and guidelines followed, but their impact is 
questionable as osteoporosis was often only included as a subclause of the wider issue 
of falls in older people, they were produced late on in the lifecycles of the 
bisphosphonates, and any reference to pharmacological interventions were generally 
limited, and/or did not differentiate between drugs within a class (notable examples are 
listed in the BP timeline commentary for secondary level evidence and guidelines). 
 
 
11. Policy issues - Fracture Service Provision 
  
Access to bone densiometry services in the UK was slow to develop, despite 
osteoporosis being acknowledged as a major public health problem. In a national survey 
conducted by the National Osteoporosis Society in 1995, only 13 health authorities were 
providing services that met DH recommendations. The vast majority provided no 
funding for bone densiometry. A further survey conducted in 2000 (Rowe and Cooper, 
2000) showed a 60% increase in the number of health authorities contracting for DEXA 
scans. There continued to be wide variation in service provision, attributed by the 
authors to the disorganised way in which fracture services developed, with variable 
levels of funding for osteoporosis diagnostic services that resulted in inequitable access. 
 
Industry needed patients to be diagnosed in order that they can be treated and saw an 
opportunity to become involved through the development of Fracture Liaison Services 
(FLS), which was synchronous with the release of the once weekly formulation of 
alendronate. FLS optimise selective case-finding of patients who have already 
experienced a fragility fractures. Specialist nurses liaise between secondary care bone 
metabolism services and the orthopaedic and A&E departments to ensure all patients 
over 50 with fracture are identified. The first FLS was established in Glasgow in 1999, 
and by 2003, the British Orthopaedic Association advocated the implementation of the 
FLS model on a national basis (Merck Sharp & Dohme, 2005). In 2005, the DH 
announced investment of £20 million to improve access to DEXA scanning, but the 
funding was not ring-fenced for this purpose and there has continued to be wide 
variation in service provision. 
 
Osteoporosis clinical indicators were not included in the original Quality and Outcomes 




from April 2012 to ensure patients over the age of 50 who sustain a fracture are 




At the time of alendronate’s introduction, it cost double that of cyclical etidronate and it 
was not clear if its effectiveness was greater than etidronate due to the lack of head to 
head data. The cost of risedronate on entry to the marker was similar to alendronate. 
When NICE assessed cost effectiveness, the average cost per QALY for each treatment 
at age 65 in women at the threshold of osteoporosis with a previous fracture was 
£24,777 for alendronate, £29,127 for risedronate and £58,916 for etidronate (or £34,018 




Appendix 14: Background literature on atypical antipsychotics for 
schizophrenia   
 
1. Schizophrenia  
Despite its relatively low incidence (15.2/100,000), the prevalence of schizophrenia is 
relatively high, with nearly one in 100 people in Britain affected. This is because the 
disorder often presents in late adolescence or early adult life and becomes chronic (Saha 
et al., 2005). In Britain, around 35,000 people enter hospital with this illness each year. 
Mean length of stay is around 130 days with a median duration of 30 days (NICE, 
2002b). It is estimated that the cumulative cost of care of individuals with schizophrenia 
accounts for 1.6% of the total national health care budget and 5.4% of NHS inpatient 
cost (Davies and Drummond, 1990; Knapp et al., 2002). 
 
Schizophrenia is a multifactorial, spectrum disorder. The aetiology remains poorly 
understood, but the greatest risk factor is a positive family history.  Schizophrenia can 
follow a relapsing and remitting course, or it can be chronic and progressive. The 
condition manifests as positive and negative symptoms; positive symptoms relate to an 
exaggeration of normal functions which are a consequence of malfunctioning of the 
dopamine system; negative symptoms relate to the loss of normal functions (Picchioni 
and Murray, 2007).  
 
Symptoms of Schizophrenia 
 
Positive symptoms: 
• Lack of insight – failure to appreciate symptoms are not real or caused by illness 
• Hallucinations – auditory most common, but can include touch, smell taste or vision 
• Agitation 
• Delusions 
o Persecution: believe being victimised or central to a conspiracy 
o Passivity: thoughts/actions controlled by an external force 
o Other: grandiose, sexual or religious 
• Thought disorder – distorted or illogical speech 
 
Negative symptoms: 
• Social withdrawal; self neglect; loss of motivation and initiative; emotional blunting; 














Patients can present with a range of complex symptoms including anxiety and 
depression, difficulties in concentrating etc. that can be initially confused with other 
conditions. However, a diagnosis of schizophrenia is based on the following ICD-10 
diagnostic criteria: 
At least one present most of the time for a month: 
• Thought echo, insertion or withdrawal, or thought broadcast 
• Delusions of control referred to body parts, actions or sensations 
• Delusional perception  
• Hallucinatory voices 
• Persistent bizarre or culturally inappropriate delusions 
 
Or at least two present most of the time for a month: 
• Persistent daily hallucinations accompanied by delusions 
• Incoherent or irrelevant speech 
• Catatonic behaviour 
• Negative symptoms such as marked apathy or incongruous mood 
 
3. Prognosis 
Some individuals with schizophrenia have predominantly acute episodes associated 
with little long-term impairment. Studies suggest that about 20% recover, 70% have 
relapsing disease and about 19% are seriously disabled by the disease (Robinson et al., 
1999).  
 
4. Setting of care 
If the onset of psychosis is suspected, the patient is rapidly referred to secondary care 
for diagnosis and initiation of treatment. The vast majority of people with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia in the care of the NHS (about 85-90%) are treated by secondary care 
mental health services, which in the UK consists of local early intervention or home 
treatment teams, or the community mental health team. The need for hospital admission 
and the use of the Mental Health Act is dependent on the patient’s presentation, the risk 
assessment and availability of good community support.  Only 10-15% of service users 
are managed solely in primary care (NICE, 2002b). However, GPs are increasingly 
being asked through the QOF to have a role in monitoring, as the association between 







5. Disease management 
Despite the fact schizophrenia is not curable, there are treatment options that help to 
suppress the symptoms. Following a diagnosis, first-line treatment is with an oral 
antipsychotic, unless the patient is non-compliant and experiencing an acute manic 
episode, in which case a depot intramuscular formulation may be more appropriate due 
to its rapid onset of action.  
NICE guidance (2002a) recommends that: 
• AAs for new patients should be considered within the choice of first-line 
treatments for patients with newly diagnosed schizophrenia.  
• In patients on conventional antipsychotics (CAs) with adequate symptom 
control, but with unacceptable side effects, or for those in relapse who have 
previously experienced unsatisfactory management with CAs, then AAs should 
be considered. 
• Patients on CAs with good control of their condition, without unacceptable side 
effect control should not be switched to AAs.  
 
Most side effects of antipsychotics are dose related and therefore the lowest efficacious 
dose for the individual patient should be used. Following recovery from an acute 
episode of schizophrenia, prophylactic doses of antipsychotic for one to two years is 
recommended, whilst continuing to be supervised by specialist services (NICE, 2002a). 
If the patient is well and symptom free, the dose is gradually reduced with careful 
monitoring achieved by collaboration between primary and secondary care to detect any 
signs of relapse. Concurrent use of two or more antipsychotics is however limited to 
specialist services.  
Several health professionals other than psychiatrists are involved in making treatment 
decisions in patients with schizophrenia e.g. community psychiatric nurses, but the 
rising importance of drugs and therapeutic committees, and the role of payers has 
restricted access to the selection of drugs that can be prescribed. In addition to 
pharmacological therapy, several psychological treatments are used to help ameliorate 
symptoms. 
 
6. Pharmacological mechanism  
The AAs differ pharmacologically from previous antipsychotic agents in their lower 
affinity for dopamine D2 receptors and greater affinities for other neuroreceptors, 
notably those for serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine (5HT) 1A, 2A, 2C, 3, 6 and 7) and 
norepinephrine (α1 and α2) (Miyamoto et al., 2005).  
It has been suggested that both activity, and absence or presence of EPS side effects is 
related to the delicate balance required in binding affinity for dopamine receptors. 
Molecularly, CAs bind to dopamine receptors more tightly than even dopamine itself 
and so are released slowly. The AAs however, bind loosely and so can rapidly 




if it is too loose the antischizophrenic activity is lost.  CAs block up to 80% of D2 
receptors, while clozapine and quetiapine block around 30%, which may explain their 
lower propensity to cause EPS. Leaving the D2 receptors unoccupied for periods of 
time, allows the natural dopamine system to operate more effectively and so negative 
symptoms are less likely to occur with AAs. The role of serotonin is less clear as 5HT 
binding is not a prerequisite for clinical efficacy of atypicals. 
 
7. Historical context 
7.1 Conventional Antipsychotics (first generation) 
The conventional or typical antipsychotics (CAs) such as chlorpromazine and 
haloperidol have been essential in treating schizophrenia since they were first 
introduced in the 1950s. These drugs target the dopamine D2 receptors in the brain and 
their effectiveness in reducing the intensity of patients’ delusions and hallucinations not 
only suggested for the first time that schizophrenia had a biochemical basis, but 
permitted outpatient treatment instead of lifelong institutionalisation (Freedman, 2005).  
CAs are associated with significant side effect issues. Extrapyramidal effects, of which 
tardive dyskinesia (TD) which is the development of involuntary movements initially of 
the face, lips and tongue, but eventually affecting other parts of the body, is a particular 
concern and persists even after treatment discontinuation. It occurs in around 20% of 
people receiving CAs after chronic use (>6 months) (Kane et al., 1985). Other side 
effects include sedation, hyperprolactinaemia, reduced seizure threshold, postural 
hypotension, anticholinergic effects (blurred vision, dry mouth), neuroleptic malignant 
syndrome, weight gain, sexual dysfunction and cardiotoxicity (prolongation of QTc 
interval). 
A particular issue with schizophrenia is that if patients experience such severe adverse 
effects on the first-line approach to treatment, then their insight compliance is so 
marginal they may give up on treatment altogether. The side effects of CAs contribute 
to rates of non-compliance amongst patients approaching 50% (Tollefson et al., 1997), 
which is a major cause of relapse and rehospitalisation.  
 
Around one third of patients with schizophrenia are also unresponsive to CAs (Conley 
and Buchanan, 1997), so the early promise of these drugs was only partially fulfilled. 
They were highly effective but not very well tolerated in most cases. Effects on modest 
doses were limited and there was a reluctance to switch onto other CAs, for although 
they were not a class, they were perceived by clinicians as all acting in the same way. 
The only option therefore was to increase the dose further in lieu of not being able to 
offer anything else. By the early 1980s, megadoses several orders of magnitude greater 
than BNF limits were being tested as a means of controlling symptoms in people who 
would otherwise be considered treatment-resistant (Aubree and Lader, 1980). 
From a patient perspective, these drugs were also becoming very unpopular.  The very 
high doses being administered were resulting in significant adverse effects that were not 
being outweighed by the benefits, particularly when some of these patients were 




translated into a significant clinical need for something new that psychiatrists could 
offer to patients, and this need continued to build for several decades until the AAs were 
introduced. CAs are still available, but are now limited to specialised uses. 
 
7.2 Atypical Antipsychotics (second generation) 
The term ‘atypical’ was first applied to clozapine (Clozaril, Novartis) in 1988 following 
a pivotal study that demonstrated its unusual behaviour in patients resistant to 
chlorpromazine (Kane et al., 1988). It has since been applied broadly and uncritically to 
antipsychotic drugs marketed since then despite their chemical, pharmacological and 
clinical heterogeneity (Gardner et al., 2005). The essence of ‘atypicality’ remains 
unknown and so the parameters for the separation of atypicals from typicals is still not 
clearly defined or agreed. 
Clozapine is the most efficacious of all antipsychotics, but is restricted to treatment-
resistant schizophrenia because of its adverse effect profile. Therapeutic difference 
between the other AAs and CAs is less certain, with differentiation based on their side 
effect profiles. AAs have a lower propensity to cause EPS, and with minimal 
stimulation of prolactin release (Jones et al., 2006). 
 
Clozapine – the first atypical antipsychotic 
By the early 1970s, experience with clozapine suggested that it might be significantly 
more effective than CAs. It appeared to improve the negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia in addition to the positive symptoms and was almost devoid of EPS. 
However, problems soon emerged as it became associated with a high risk of 
agranulocytosis (a potentially fatal reduction in white blood cells), seizure and 
orthostatic hypotension and was voluntarily withdrawn in 1975 for a period of time.   
Even at that time, there were indications that clozapine acted differently to CAs and 
seemed to improve symptoms in patients who were severely ill or refractory to 
treatment. Following pressure from psychiatrists to reintroduce clozapine, its undisputed 
efficacy in refractory patients was demonstrated in a landmark trial by Kane et al. 
(1988). The trial, which showed a 30% response rate to clozapine, compared to a 3% 
response to chlorpromazine in patients who were refractory to haloperidol, led to 
clozapine’s reintroduction on a limited second-line basis in the early 1990s. This was on 
the proviso patients were subject to regular haematological monitoring through the 
nationally coordinated Clozaril Patient Monitoring Service (provided by Novartis) 
under control of a specialist consultant psychiatrist.  
Clozapine was only ever licensed in the UK as a second-line therapy, initially for people 
with resistance to CAs, but also now in those refractory to other AAs, which accounts 
for around 10% of patients (Freedman, 2005). Clozapine was regarded as a good 
molecule, but for schizophrenia where there is a correlation between response to 
treatment and insight and adherence, the perception of risk which far outweighed the 
actual risk, and its limitations in terms of monitoring were a disincentive for many 





Clozapine was not an option for the vast majority of people with schizophrenia and 
coupled with clinicians’ dislike for the CAs, this presented an opportunity for the 
pharmaceutical industry to develop new variants that attempted to capture the enhanced 
therapeutic effect of clozapine without its toxicity. The perception of risk associated 
with the use of clozapine however, potentially made for a sceptical market in which to 
launch a new AA. The first of these was risperidone, followed closely by olanzapine, 
quetiapine and several others. 
 
Risperidone 
Risperidone (Risperdal, Janssen-Cilag) was the first AA to be released after clozapine in 
1993. It is a benzisoxazole derivative, chemically unrelated to any other antipsychotic 
currently available. It was first introduced as an oral tablet, but has since been launched 
in various other formulations. It is licensed for schizophrenia and moderate to severe 
manic episodes associated with bipolar disorder. In schizophrenia, the initial dose is 
1mg daily which can be titrated slowly to 2mg twice daily over a 1 week period. The 
usual dose range is 4-6mg/day, up to a maximum of 16mg daily. At launch there was 
some confusion over what the optimal dose was, as several of the early trials on 
risperidone were using doses of 16-20mg/day (Claus et al., 1992; Ceskova and Svestka, 
1993), which was relatively high compared to those now recommended. At higher 
doses, risperidone showed similar effects to CAs and the degree of differentiation 




Olanzapine (Zyprexa, Lilly) was launched 3 years after risperidone in 1996. It is a 
thienobenzodiazepine derivative structurally related to clozapine, so the 
pharmacological profile was similar but side effects were significantly improved 
compared with CAs. It is licensed for schizophrenia, and the treatment of moderate to 
severe manic episodes, and prevention of recurrence of mania in bipolar disorder. In 
schizophrenia the dose is 10mg daily adjusted to a usual range of 5-20mg daily. There is 




Quetiapine (Seroquel, AstraZeneca) is a dibenzothiazepine antipsychotic, structurally 
related to clozapine and olanzapine. It is licensed for use in schizophrenia and in the 
treatment of manic episodes and major depressive episodes associated with bipolar 
disorder. Doses range from 150mg-750mg/day, titrated upwards from 25mg twice daily 
from day 1 to 300 mg/day on day 4.  The average dose is around 300-450mg/day.  
  
 
8. Safety and regulation  
Experience of market withdrawals with clozapine, remoxipride and sertindole in this 







8.1. Long-term effects 
The AAs fulfilled their promise of causing less movement disorder, but new 
problematic side effects including severe weight gain, often accompanied by type 2 
diabetes mellitus (Sernyak et al., 2002) and hypercholesterolemia (Lindenmayer et al., 
2003), started to emerge during the early part of 2000. There is an argument that 
schizophrenia itself, irrespective of pharmacological intervention, is associated with 
increased risk of diabetes (Schimmelbusch et al., 1971; Dixon et al., 2000) and weight 
gain (Brown et al., 1999), and that these side effects also occurred with the first 
generation drugs, but not to the same degree. 
However, the body of evidence attributing these effects to AAs has been gathering pace 
over the last few years and there has been a definite shift in the risk perception in 
schizophrenia treatment away from movement disorders to metabolic issues. Regulators 
never distinguished between olanzapine, but data showed it was the one most people 
were concerned about (Allison et al., 1999; Kinon et al., 2001; Casey and Zorn, 2001). 
The AAs have also been subject to safety warnings as a result of off-label usage. 
(Table A14.1) Benefits and risk of conventional and atypical antipsychotics 
(adapted from Gardner et al., 2005)44 
 AA CA (by potency45) 
Property Clozapine Olanzapine Quetiapine Risperidone High Low  
Efficacy in 
terms of 
Positive symptoms ++++ +++ ++ +++ +++ +++ 
Negative symptoms ++ + + + + + 
Adverse 
effects 
EPS 0 + 0 ++ ++++ ++ 
Hyperprolactinaemia 0 + 0 ++ ++ ++ 
Weight gain +++ +++ ++ + 0 ++ 
Type 2 diabetes ++ ++ + + + + 
Anticholinergic +++ + 0 0 0 +++ 
Sexual dysfunction ++ ++ + ++ ++ +++ 
Hypotension +++ ++ ++ +++ + +++ 
 
9. Efficacy 
This class of drugs is assessed to a greater extent on their side effect profiles rather than 
efficacy which are all closely aligned in terms of effectiveness.  
Table A14.2 summarises the quantity of evidence produced for each drug from launch 
up until 2007 and for the initial periods pre- and post-launch. Of the four case studies, 
this class has generated the most studies, which could be related to the fact that more 
evidence may be necessary to justify differentiation based primarily on side effect 
claims as opposed to efficacy 
 
 
                                                 
44 Benefit or risk: ++++ = very high, +++ = high, ++ = moderate, + = low, 0 = negligible. 




Table A14.2: Atypical antipsychotics: volume of evidence: MEDLINE and 
EmBASE searches  
AA No. of studies included on MEDLINE/EmBASE Databases 
(restricted to clinically sound studies) 
From launch to terminal curve 
date (year ending 2007) 
3 years before 
launch 
3 years post-launch 
Risperidone 214 3 21 
Olanzapine 210 0 19 
Quetiapine 67 4 6 
 
The majority of trials are Industry sponsored, which is unsurprising as psychiatry is 
often referred to as a ‘Cinderella specialty’ due to relatively few funding charities. This 
results in a greater need for Industry to fund activities such as trials and continuing 
professional development than in other larger specialties such as cardiology. 
 
10. Policy and Guidelines 
AAs are usually grouped as a class in clinical guidelines despite their heterogeneity, and 
as such, there has been no attempt to distinguish between them. Several guidelines 
indicated that AAs should be the first choice in treatment, particularly those produced in 
the USA which can influence practice in the UK. NICE guidance, which is mandatory 
in England and Wales, would not distinguish between the atypicals, but stated they 
should be considered within first-line treatment, not considered as first-line treatment as 
some marketing has suggested. In April 2002, just prior to publication of the technology 
appraisal, Janssen-Cilag attempted to use the data from their long-term study 
(Csernansky et al., 2002) to appeal NICE guidance (2002a), so as to place risperidone 
as the first choice amongst the AAs. NICE however rejected the appeal on the grounds 
that they regarded the AAs as a class and not individual technologies (NICE, 2002a). 
Several other major policy documents that relate to mental health have been produced, 
including the National Service Framework for Mental Health (Department of Health, 
1999b) and the Government White paper: Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation 
(Department of Health ,1999a). Their impact however was limited as they mainly dealt 
with service issues in mental health, setting out national standards; national service 
models; local action and national underpinning programmes for implementation, and 
little if anything about pharmacological intervention.  
 
11. Cost 
The emphasis on cost pressures is far more apparent now than when these drugs were 
first introduced. At that time, it was more a case of safety at any cost if it meant that 
patients were spared from the risk of TD. Now that there is some doubt over their 
effectiveness compared with CAs, this has led people to question their value through 
extensive large scale comparator trials (CATIE/CUtLASS1). The higher acquisition 
cost of olanzapine relative to risperidone is unlikely to be offset by clinically significant 
differences in efficacy or safety, which has been represented in a slowing in the uptake 




Appendix 15: Background literature on phosphodiesterase type 5 
(PDE5) inhibitors for erectile dysfunction  
 
1. Erectile dysfunction (ED)  
The term ‘erectile dysfunction’ (ED) was first recorded in MEDLINE in 1980 
(Tordjman et al., 1980), several years in advance of the development of PDE5 
inhibitors, but the wider recognition of this term used in the marketing of sildenafil was 
instrumental in changing the perception of the disease. Risk factors include advancing 
age, with the condition becoming increasingly common in men over 40 years; the 
presence of chronic illness (heart disease, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, depression); 
smoking; stress; alcohol; drug abuse and a sedentary lifestyle. While sometimes 
considered pejoratively as a ‘life-style’ disorder, ED significantly impacts on patients’ 
quality of life, psychological health and relationships. 
The World Health Organization (WHO), and British, European and American 
guidelines on ED recommend that oral therapies, predominantly PDE5 inhibitors should 
be used as first-line treatment for ED (Jardin et al., 2000; Ralph and McNicholas, 2000; 
Hackett et al., 2008; Wespes et al., 2002 and 2006; Montague et al., 2005). Prior to 
their introduction, therapies included transurethral delivery, intracavernosal or 
intraurethral injections of vasoactive substances such as alprostadil; penile implants or 
vacuum constriction devices as mechanical aids; or venous or arterial surgery 




ED is believed to be highly prevalent and often undertreated due to the stigma 
associated with the condition. Studies in men between the ages of 16-78 in the UK 
indicate a prevalence of around 19%, which equates to over 4 million men (Goldmeier 
et al., 1997). This figure is supported by the Men’s Attitudes to Life Events and 
Sexuality (MALES) study that assessed the prevalence of ED in nearly 28,000 men 
aged between 20-75 years across 8 countries, indicating a UK prevalence of 13% 
(Rosen et al., 2004). The prevalence in adult diabetic men is 35%, rising to >60% in 
men over 60 years of age, with smoking doubling the prevalence of ED in men with 
diabetes or heart disease (Feldman et al. 1994). The introduction of sildenafil, the first 
oral therapy for ED, significantly helped to overcome the taboo associated with ED that 
had prevented men coming forward for treatment (Wright, 2006). In a UK ‘before and 
after’ study, the diagnosis of ED more than doubled following the launch of sildenafil 
onto the UK market in 1998 (Kaye and Jick, 2003).  
ED is notoriously difficult to diagnose as it is a self-reported condition. In the year 
before sildenafil was launched, Rosen et al. (1997) developed a new diagnostic tool to 
assess ED called the International Index of Erectile Function (IIEF). The 15 point 
questionnaire based on subjective measures categorised into five domains: erectile 
function, orgasmic function, sexual desire, intercourse satisfaction and overall 




is believed to have impacted upon increasing the prevalence estimates of ED. In 
addition, all three companies were involved in non-branded education campaigns about 
ED, designed to educate men about the condition. This helped them become more 
comfortable discussing the topic and to seek treatment for their ED. Current UK 
guidelines base a diagnosis of ED on a combination of a detailed case history, genital 
and physical health examination, investigations including serum lipids, plasma glucose, 
and serum testosterone (to check for hypogonadism) together with serum prostate 
specific antigen levels if clinically indicated. Specialist investigations, such as 
ultrasound of penile arteries or intracavernous injection tests, are generally only 
indicated in patients with a history of trauma, abnormality of the testes or penis, or those 
that have never had normal erectile function (Hackett et al., 2008).  
 
3. Prognosis 
PDE5 inhibitors are effective and well tolerated drugs that not only provide an 
opportunity to improve the quality of life of the patient, but also that of their partner. 
With the many similarities in the effectiveness and tolerability of the PDE5 inhibitors, 
treatment decisions are heavily influenced by patient preference for the other features 
they offer (Wright, 2006).  
The initial success rate with PDE5 inhibitors is high, but only around half of patients are 
still taking these drugs after one year (Althof, 2002). Several explanations have been 
proposed for why a disproportionately high number of individuals fail to continue using 
medical interventions compared to those for whom treatment is efficacious, a major one 
being the potential development of tachyphylaxis with continued use. In patients still 
taking the drugs after 2 years, around 40% required an increase in dosage to maintain 
efficacy (El-Galley et al., 2001). Alternatively, while the drugs can improve the 
physical issues, they may not be sufficient to resolve the co-existing psychological 
problems in a relationship (Althof, 2002).  
Some patients fail to respond to, or are dissatisfied with, their initial choice of treatment, 
in which case others within the class may still be suitable. Often cases of non-response 
can be attributed to incorrect administration and so education and counselling can 
increase response rates in previous non-responders. The need for adequate testosterone 
levels was also highlighted by Shabsigh et al. (2004) when they demonstrated improved 
erectile function in men who had previously been unresponsive to sildenafil alone once 
their testosterone levels were supplemented. Guidelines recommend that patients should 
not be regarded as true treatment failures until they have failed to respond to a 
maximum dose on at least eight occasions with at least two drugs taken sequentially 
(Hackett et al., 2008).  
 
4. Setting of care 
Before the widespread use of oral drugs, ED was managed predominantly in secondary 
care in view of the specialist administration usually required. With orally administered 




was intended only for patients unresponsive to first-line therapy or with anatomical 
abnormalities. However, government restrictions on prescribing of PDE5 inhibitors that 
followed the introduction of sildenafil inadvertently transferred a large proportion of ED 
patients back into secondary care for specialist determination of eligibility (see policy 
and guidelines sections).  These regulations presented a physical barrier to access based 
on the sheer disparity between the numbers of specialists compared with GPs (Hackett, 
2002).  
 
5. Pharmacological mechanism 
PDE5 inhibitors act to increase blood flow to the penis in response to sexual 
stimulation. Erections result from the local release of nitric oxide (NO) into the corpus 
cavernosum of the penis following sexual stimulation. NO activates the enzyme 
guanylate cyclase, which catalyses the formation of cyclic guanosine monophosphate 
(cGMP). cGMP triggers smooth muscle relaxation, allowing increased blood flow to the 
penile tissue. 
As part of the natural feedback process, the enzyme phosphodiesterase type 5 (PDE5) 
then catalyses the degradation of cGMP, causing the erection to dissipate. In men with 
erectile dysfunction, blocking the binding site on the PDE5 enzyme with a competitive 
PDE5 inhibitor prevents the degradation of cGMP, enabling the erection to be 
maintained (Hood and Kirby, 2004).  
As competitive inhibitors of the PDE5 enzyme, the structure of this class of drugs is 
based on cGMP. Sildenafil and vardenafil are molecularly very similar. Tadalafil, while 
retaining those elements required for inhibition of PDE5, is structurally different, which 
is reflected in its differing pharmacokinetic profile. 
 
6. Licensed indications 
• Sildenafil, tadalafil and vardenafil are all licensed for the treatment of men with 
ED of various etiologies (generalised and specific subpopulations). 
•  Sildenafil and tadalafil have been subsequently licensed for the treatment of 
adult patients with pulmonary arterial hypertension under the brand names 




Sildenafil was initially investigated as a treatment for hypertension and angina in 1991, 
but the serendipitous observation that patients were reporting increases in erectile 
function led to a refocusing of the clinical programme towards the end of 1993 and 
approval of sildenafil for the treatment of ED in 1998. It quickly reached blockbuster 
status, expanded the ED market 10-fold, capturing nearly 95% market share (Neumeyer 
and Kirkpatrick, 2004). Sildenafil has become a societal phenomenon, with Viagra one 
of the world’s most successful brands; a combination of Pfizer’s marketing presence 




unchallenged by class competitors for five years, during which time clinicians become 




Tadalafil, whist maintaining a similar level of effectiveness as sildenafil, has a much 
longer mode of action, which addressed an element of unmet need in the ED market.  
This allowed the marketing angle to focus on the relationship aspect of ED, rather than 
just addressing the physical aspects. In doing so, Lilly avoided a head on marketing 




Vardenafil was the only PDE5 inhibitor developed specifically for the treatment of ED 
(Neumeyer and Kirkpatrick, 2004). Despite the similarities in molecular structure, 
vardenafil has greater selectivity for PDE5 than sildenafil, resulting in greater potency, 
a faster onset of action and fewer adverse effects (particularly in relation to visual 
disturbances – see safety and regulation section). Efficacy however, is similar to that of 
sildenafil in a broad ED population, which led Bayer to target their development 
programme early on to demonstrate vardenafil’s efficacy in difficult to treat subgroups 
(Neumeyer and Kirkpatrick, 2004).  
A legal challenge from Pfizer against the manufacturers of tadalafil and vardenafil for 
exploitation of their patented research was lost in the EU, which resulted in these two 
drugs launching in the UK several months ahead of the USA.     
 
7. Safety and regulation  
Safety issues related to this class of drugs have been predominantly related to cardiac 
and sensory disturbances (visual and hearing).  
Cardiovascular 
Clinical trials and post-marketing data of sildenafil, tadalafil, and vardenafil have 
demonstrated no increase in myocardial infarction rates in patients who received these 
agents as part of either double-blind, placebo-controlled trials or open-label studies, or 
compared to expected rates in aged-matched populations of men (Kloner, 2004). 
Visual and Hearing 
In addition to the risk of non-arteritic anterior ischaemic optic neuropathy (NAION), 
other transient visual disturbances, notably a blue discolouration in colour vision have 
been reported, albeit rarely for sildenafil and vardenafil at high doses (Hood and Kirby, 
2004). This has been attributed to their interaction with PDE6 found in the retina. 
Sildenafil and vardenafil are seven and three times more selective for PDE5 than PDE6, 
respectively, while tadalafil is over 750 times more selective (Wright, 2006). Tadalafil 




found amongst other places in the smooth muscles of the internal organs, cardiac and 
skeletal muscles (Hood and Kirby, 2004), which may be related to the back and muscle 
pain occasionally reported with tadalafil (Padma-Nathan et al., 2001). PDE5 inhibitor 
product labels also had to be updated with regard to the potential risk for sudden hearing 
loss although no causal relationship could be established. 
Common adverse effects 
Common side effects of PDE5 inhibitors include headache, facial flushing, nasal 
congestion, and dyspepsia, which are transient and mild to moderate in nature (see 
Table A15.1). Tadalafil has been associated with back pain and myalgia at doses of 10-
20mg.  
Table A15.1: Common adverse events of PDE5 inhibitors - based on EMEA statements on product 
characteristics (Wespes et al., 2006). 
Adverse event Sildenafil Tadalafil Vardenafil 
Headache  12.8% 14.5% 16% 
Flushing  10.4% 4.1% 12% 
Dyspepsia  4.6% 12.3% 4% 
Nasal congestion  1.1% 4.3% 10% 
Dizziness  1.2% 2.3% 2% 
Abnormal vision  1.9%  - <2% 
Back pain  – 6.5%  – 




All PDE5 inhibitors are contraindicated in patients taking nitrates and those with 
hypotension as they potentiate the hypotensive effect. They are also contraindicated in 
patients with severe hepatic impairment, hereditary degenerative retinal disorders and in 
men whom sexual activity is inadvisable e.g. recent stroke or myocardial infarction 
(within the previous 6 months), unstable angina or severe cardiac failure. They can be 
used in men with cardiovascular disease provided they have been properly assessed and 
are not taking nitrates.  
 
8. Efficacy 
When the differences in efficacy and toxicity are so marginal and the outcome measures 
so immediately tangible (in contrast to surrogate markers), the trials likely to have an 
impact on diffusion are those that directly compare them. The recognisable differing 
pharmacological characteristics of the three PDE5 inhibitors however, has made it 
difficult to conduct randomised, double-blind, comparative studies, so head to head 
comparisons have been based on preference studies, many of which have been criticised 
for poor design introducing bias (Mulhall and Montorsi, 2006). One study highlighted 
in the British Society of Sexual Medicine guidelines (Hackett et al., 2008) that 
compared all three PDE5 inhibitors, demonstrated a preference for tadalafil based on its 




The EU licensing application for sildenafil included 31 phase II/III clinical studies in 
more than 3,000 patients. The four main studies evaluated ED in a broad spectrum 
population, but the comprehensively designed trial programme resulted in studies 
assessing the safety and efficacy of sildenafil in most of the subgroups permitted under 
government prescribing restrictions reporting in advance of tadalafil and vardenafil’s 
launch: diabetes (Rendell et al., 1999); spinal cord injury (Giuliano et al., 1999); 
prostate cancer treated with radiotherapy (Zalefsky et al., 1999); spina bifida (Palmer et 
al., 2000); radical prostatectomy (Zagaja et al., 2000); depression (Seidman et al., 
2001); Parkinson’s disease (Hussain et al., 2001) and renal transplant (Prieto Castro et 
al., 2001). This then set an evidence precedent for the competing entrants. 
Table A15.2 summarises the quantity of evidence produced for each drug from launch 
up until 2007 and for the initial periods pre- and post-launch. With the publication of 
nine major studies before launch, Lilly appreciated the likely need for evidence to 
impact on the dominance that sildenafil had on the ED market in order to change 
prescribing practice. 
 




No. of studies included on MEDLINE/EmBASE Databases 
(restricted to clinically sound studies) 
From launch to terminal curve 
date (year ending 2007) 
3 years before 
launch 
3 years post-launch 
Sildenafil 160 2 33 
Tadalafil 59 9 33 
Vardenafil  43 5 29 
 
Outcome measures 
Most studies used specific elements of the International Index of Erectile Function 
(IIEF) questionnaire as a primary outcome, predominantly change from baseline scores 
to Q1-5 and 15 of the Erectile Function domain (Rosen et al., 1997).  Some use the 
entire IIEF, while early studies often used just Q3 and Q4 that specifically addressed the 
key aspects of ED as defined by the NIH. Other primary and sometimes secondary 
outcomes were responses to Q2 and Q3 of the Sexual Encounter Profile (SEP) and a 
Global Assessment Question (GAQ) highlighted below:  
IIEF  Q3: When you attempted sexual intercourse, how often were you able to penetrate your partner? 
           Q4: During sexual intercourse, how often were you able to maintain your erection after you had 
penetrated your partner? 
SEP   Q2: Were you able to penetrate your partner (intercourse attempt)? 
          Q3: Did your erection last long enough for you to complete intercourse? 





IIEF questions utilise a 1-5 grading scale to quantify the magnitude of response, but 
responses are subjective, as is data from the GAQ, and therefore the most relevant 
measure in an ED study is whether the drug has enabled the patient to complete 
intercourse successfully (SEP Q3).  
 
9. Policy  
The diffusion of the PDE5 inhibitors has been considerably impacted upon by 
government policy. Sildenafil presented an unprecedented challenge for policy makers, 
forcing acknowledgement of the need for rationing in the NHS. Following fears that 
excessive demand and inappropriate recreational use could cost the health service more 
than £1 billion a year, the then Secretary of State for Health issued interim guidance 
through a Health Service Circular (HSC) the day before sildenafil was licensed in 
Europe, advising that doctors should not prescribe the drug until further notice. The 
temporary moratorium on sildenafil was intended as a holding position while the 
Department of Health considered its longer-term view, with a decision on the final 
status anticipated at the end of that year after seeking further expert advice. In the 
interim, GPs could issue prescriptions privately, but not to their own patients or those of 
their practice partners. 
On 21st January 1999, draft guidelines were issued following public consultation, 
placing drug treatment of ED into Schedule 11 of the 1992 General Medical Services 
Regulations (subsequently became Schedule 2), which lists drugs, medicines and other 
substances that qualify for prescription at NHS expense only in certain circumstances. It 
included six conditions and two qualifier groups that would be eligible to receive 
sildenafil on the NHS. While acknowledging ED could cause psychological distress, the 
Government’s position was that ED was not life-threatening, or causes physical pain. 
The intention of the guidelines was to limit the cost of the drug to around £10-12 
million per year (Department of Health, 1999c) and distinguish between patients with 
real physical need from those who wanted to improve performance, a misconception 
that persisted despite Pfizer emphasising sildenafil was not a performance enhancer in a 
normal healthy male (Brooks, 1998).  
The increased role of specialists in the DH proposals to determine ‘severe distress’ was 
met with mixed opinions from both primary and secondary care. GPs felt that their 
position was being undervalued and that it was inappropriate for specialists to assess 
distress when they were often in a better position to do so.  Equally, urologists did not 
want prescribing confined to specialists for fear of overburdening their already stretched 
outpatient clinics and ultimately restricting access to what they believed was a genuine 
innovation (Berger, 1998). Other GPs however, were not as keen on it becoming a 
primary care concern due to difficulties in making a true diagnosis of ED, coupled with 
the cost implications to fixed prescribing budgets. 
In May 1999, following public pressure six further conditions were added to the 
exceptions to prescribing. Additionally, the frequency of treatment was recommended 




to unlicensed use of the drug (Department of Health 1999d). In a change to the initial 
situation, anyone not eligible, could receive a private prescription from their own GP, 
and not be charged for the consultation. The changes came into effect on 1st July 1999 
and were intended to provide a balance between treating men with impotence whilst 
protecting NHS resources for other priorities. This landmark decision was not based on 
clinical effectiveness grounds, and so was considered conclusive proof of the first 
acknowledgement of rationing in the NHS, whilst also raising the issue of priority given 
to the treatment of a ‘lifestyle’ condition such as ED under the NHS in contrast to life 
threatening conditions. 
Other policy challenges 
There still remains little or no central funding allocated to ED (Wright, 2006), but in 
November 2007, recommendations were submitted that routine enquiries about erectile 
function should be included as specific indicators in the diabetes and cardiovascular 
disease domains of the QOF, and in doing so help to reduce GPs reluctance to broach 
the subject. As a condition that affects the vasculature, ED is considered an early 
marker of underlying chronic illness, notably atherosclerosis and diabetes (Thompson et 
al., 2005). In 2011, pilots using indicators developed from NICE guidelines to 
incentivise practices to case-find and prescribe treatment for ED in men with diabetes 
were ongoing before consideration for inclusion in the 2013/2014 QOF review (NICE, 
2010).  
Earlier proposals to include non-diabetic cardiovascular disorders within the conditions 
permitted under Schedule 11 were rejected on the basis it would increase NHS 
eligibility beyond what could be sustained.  
10. Guidelines 
There have been numerous national and international guidelines published on the 
management of ED. While NICE has not produced guidance specifically on the 
management of ED, the condition has been recognised within its diabetes guidelines 
(see PDE5 inhibitor timeline commentary). Following the launch of sildenafil, all 
guidelines reflected the same message of the importance of the use of oral PDE5 
inhibitors as first-line therapy. There was also significant activity to update 
recommendations following the launch of tadalafil and vardenafil, although insufficient 
evidence was available to advise the use of one PDE5 inhibitor above any other. 
Therefore the impact of guidelines was likely to have been limited. Inclusion of ED 
within the NICE diabetes clinical guidelines provided an opportunity to assess and 
educate men on the organic causes of ED, and be offered treatment with a PDE5 
inhibitor when they may have otherwise been reticent to seek help for the condition 
(NICE, 2004a). 
11. Cost 
In retrospect, the cost projections were excessively high which reflected the uncertainty 
about the prevalence of the condition. The BMA’s projections were £1.25 billion a year 




drugs budget for the NHS. NHS projections were around £100 million, while Pfizer’s 
projections were that the market would stabilise at around £50 million a year after 5 
years (Brooks, 1998). The restrictions were a necessary means of keeping spending in 
line with the modest priority for NHS funding afforded to this condition. Despite these 
measures, by 2001 NHS expenditure for impotence was double that initially intended at 
around £25 million a year (Department of Health, 2001).  
The NHS price of all three PDE5 inhibitors for the recommended starting dose was 
£4.86 per tablet (private cost: £12 each), which compared to sublingual apomorphine 
(£5.34 per tablet) and intraurethral aloprostadil with its associated side effects 
(Caverject £6.74 per dose), are both clinically and cost effective. A cost-utility analysis 
conducted by Stolk and colleagues (2000), demonstrated that sildenafil was cost 
effective compared with conventional treatment46 with an incremental cost effectiveness 
ratio in the first year of £3,639.  However, in the absence of a substantial transfer in 
responsibility for the management of ED to primary care due to Schedule 11 




Despite restrictions on direct to consumer advertising in the UK, a unique level of 
patient awareness of sildenafil resulted from an unprecedented media interest in this 
subject in the months intervening between its US and UK launches. The unanticipated 
response of the Government to the drug also ensured the topic remained in the headlines 
for several months after. Pfizer’s main challenge was to move the discussion away from 
a sexual context, which the media were keen to perpetuate, towards a medical issue to 
help men overcome the embarrassment that accompanies the condition. Their marketing 
approach, sometimes described as ‘aggressive’ by commentators, focussed heavily on 
the physical aspects of the condition (Neumeyer and Kirkpatrick, 2004). Their 
campaigns tended to feature just men, often using sports stars to convey a concept of 
performance, or famous spokesmen with the condition capable of empathising with 
patients.  
With its differing pharmacokinetic profile, Lilly was able to take a more couples 
focussed approach by offering renewed intimacy from tadalafil. Bayer initially followed 
a similar approach to Pfizer, but they later pursued the relationship angle and difficult to 
treat subpopulations with vardenafil (Neumeyer and Kirkpatrick, 2004). Sectioning 
patients into niche groups by subgroup based on the cause of ED, or according to time 
of onset of action, was crucial for the other two companies involved as it made the 
market more accessible when confronted with such a powerful brand as Viagra. It 
reduced competition and enabled advertising campaigns to be tailored to the needs of 
the individual groups. 
                                                 
46 Conventional treatment included papaverine/phentolamine injections which were not licensed in the 




Appendix 16: Background literature on the statins for the prevention 
of first and recurrent cardiovascular events through 
lipid lowering  
 
1. Cardiovascular disease (CVD) 
 
In addition to cholesterol, there are many other factors that influence a person’s risk of 
developing coronary heart disease (CHD), including age, sex, ethnicity, a family history 
of premature heart attack or heart disease indicating a genetic predisposition, socio-
economic status, smoking, obesity, hypertension and type 1 and 2 diabetes mellitus 
(NICE, 2006). The risk of a future cardiovascular event can be calculated from these 
risk factors and people at highest risk can be identified.  
 
As cholesterol levels are a modifiable risk factor, cholesterol management i.e. reducing 
overall total cholesterol (TC) by reducing low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) 
and triglycerides (TG) and increasing high-density lipoprotein cholesterol (HDL-C) 
sometimes referred to as ‘good’ cholesterol either through diet, exercise and/or drugs, is 
a key strategy in reducing morbidity and mortality from CVD. Around 20% of 
cholesterol in the body comes directly from food, but the remaining 80% is synthesised 
endogenously in the liver by an enzyme called HMG-CoA reductase, the target of the 




The magnitude of statin derived benefit is related to the individual’s baseline risk of 
CHD events and to the degree of cholesterol lowering, but not to the initial cholesterol 
concentration. The decision to initiate statin therapy therefore is not based on lipid 
levels alone (fasting TC, LDL-C, HDL-C and TG), but takes into account an 
individual’s overall CVD risk assessment (Gotto and LaRosa, 2005).  
 
In primary CVD prevention, patients with one or more risk factors can benefit from 
statins even if they do not have substantially elevated cholesterol levels. An appropriate 
risk calculator designed to estimate a person’s 10 year cardiovascular event risk is used 
as an aid to making clinical decisions about how intensively to intervene with lifestyle 
measures and drug treatments (NICE, 2006). Before a statin is offered in primary 
prevention, all other modifiable risk factors should be managed. This is opposed to 
secondary prevention where lipid therapy is initiated immediately. 
 
3. Prognosis 
CHD was responsible for 160,000 deaths in the UK in the 1960’s. This figure has now 
more than halved, a reduction of which a significant proportion has been due to the use 
of statins (British Heart Foundation, 2011). The effect of statin therapy is rapid, with 
results evident within one week and maximal lipid lowering effect achieved after four to 




Cholesterol Treatment Trialists found that for every mmol/L reduction in LDL-C, there 
is an overall 12% reduction in all-cause mortality; largely reflecting significant 
reductions in deaths due to CHD and other cardiac causes (Baigent et al., 2005) 
 
Compliance 
After 3-4 years of treatment, continuation rates in secondary and primary prevention 
trials remained high at 75% and 87%, respectively (NICE, 2006). However, after 10 
years only around 40% of patients are still taking statins (Benner et al., 2002), which 
although is characteristic of chronic asymptomatic conditions, may also be attributable 
to adverse effects. 
 
 
4. Setting of care  
 
While secondary care influences statin prescribing practice, these drugs are 
predominantly prescribed within primary care, accounting for approximately a million 
prescriptions a week in the UK (Trusler, 2011). Most patients are managed within 
primary care specialist lipid, diabetic or cardiac clinics often run by practice nurses who 
are also responsible for setting up monitoring systems to identify new patients at high 
risk of CHD. These types of initiatives are often supported by statin manufacturers, such 




5. Pharmacological mechanism  
 
Statins block the endogenous synthesis of cholesterol in the liver by selectively 
inhibiting the enzyme HMG-CoA reductase. A reduction in intracellular cholesterol has 
a secondary effect of stimulating the production of LDL receptors on the surface of liver 
cells, which increase the removal of circulating LDL-C from the blood. Statins have 
also been shown to raise HDL-C levels and reduce triglycerides, although to a lesser 
extent than fibrates. 
 
Statins are divided into two groups; the early statins such as simvastatin and pravastatin 
are fermentation-derived, while atorvastatin and rosuvastatin are synthetically produced. 
They are differentiated predominantly according to their potency profiles, cerevastatin 
being the most potent, followed by rosuvastatin, atorvastatin, simvastatin, pravastatin 
and fluvastatin.  
 
In addition to their cholesterol lowering ability, several other mechanisms have been 
proposed to explain the beneficial effects of statins. The improvement in reducing 
stroke seen with statins, but not with other LDL-C lowering drugs such as fibrates, 
indicates that statins may stabilise plaques. Stabilisation of coronary lesions is most 
likely the main reason for survival, but improvement of endothelial function, prevention 







6. Licensed indications 
 
The impact of statins in reducing cardiovascular events and mortality is predominantly 
due to their LDL-C lowering efficacy, but as they also increase HDL-C and reduce 
levels of TGs to varying degrees, their licensed indications reflect multiple types of 
lipid disorders (NICE, 2006). 
 
Table A16.1: Licenced indications of statins 
 
Indication Licensed as an adjunct to diet in 
people with: 
Simvastatin Atorvastatin Rosuvastatin 
Primary 
hypercholesterolaemia  
High cholesterol levels in the blood due 
to an underlying genetic cause 
(indication can be inclusive of 
heterozygous familial 
hypercholesterolaemia). 
   
Homozygous familial 
hypercholesterolaemia 
Rare genetic disorder causing extreme 
elevations of LDL-C due to defective 
LDL receptor genes.  Leads to premature 
CHD in the absence of any other risk 
factor or coronary disease. 
   
Heterozygous familial 
hypercholesterolaemia 
Only one of the pair of LDL receptor 
genes is defective or mutated. 
-  - 
Mixed 
hyperlipidaemia  
Increase in lipids (TC; LDL-C, TG). 
Does not include reduced HDL-C. Often 
associated with metabolic syndrome, 
non-alcoholic fatty liver disease, and risk 
of developing type 2 diabetes. 
-  - 
Mixed dyslipidaemia Abnormal levels of more than one lipid 
fraction (elevated TC, LDL-C or 
triglycerides, or low HDL-C). 
 -  
Reduction of CVD 
mortality/morbidity  
General indication in people with 
atherosclerotic CVD or diabetes mellitus 
(with normal or increased cholesterol 
levels). 
 - - 
Starting doses 20mg (40mg 




(40mg  if 
>45% LDL-C 
reduction) 






The development of atorvastatin was nearly abandoned by Warner-Lambert in the early 
stages on the premise that it was bringing nothing new to an already crowded market. 
However, a trial in 24 employee-volunteers found that at its lowest dose (10mg) it was 
more effective than simvastatin at its highest, causing a 38% reduction in LDL-C. A 
lack of pipeline development, combined with the potentially huge statin market meant 
that even with a 10% market share, it would become Warner-Lambert’s biggest selling 
drug convincing them to continue with development, which they co-marketed with 
Pfizer. 
 
As a later entrant to the statin market, Pfizer and Warner-Lambert were able to leverage 
the efforts of other companies to raise consumer awareness and clinicians’ confidence 
in the use of statins.  They were however, at a disadvantage at launch in that they could 
only present surrogate data for atorvastatin compared with the clinically relevant 




C reduction argument. Their strategy was to invest in a substantial clinical trial 
programme that reported over the next six years, firstly to evaluate statin use in specific 
subpopulations, and secondly to determine the impact of atorvastatin’s enhanced 
potency on clinical outcomes.  In doing so, they addressed some of the concerns raised 






AstraZeneca believed there was a compelling medical need for another statin in what 
was already a crowded market, as millions of people were still at risk of CVD, either 
through remaining untreated or not being effectively treated with other lipid lowering 
therapies (McKillop, 2003). Differentiation was based on its ease of use, as more than 
80% of patients reached their LDL-C goals on the starting dose of 10mg, and unlike 
other statins it also significantly increased HDL-C (atorvastatin demonstrated a negative 
dose response curve in relation to HDL-C, with higher doses becoming progressively 
worse). The 40mg dose was reserved for people with severe hypercholesterolaemia at 
high cardiovascular risk and required specialist supervision and routine follow up. 
Rosuvastatin’s greater potency enabled 17% of patients with familial 
hypercholesterolaemia to reach acceptable levels at a dose of 40mg compared with 
4.5% with atorvastatin 80mg (Stein et al., 2003). 
 
The development programme was the largest and most comprehensive in the statin class 
containing four times the number of patients of that for any other previously approved 
statin. More than 63,000 patients were recruited worldwide to participate in the Galaxy 
trial portfolio (consortium of 16 clinical trials), a strategy which enabled clinicians to 
become familiar with the new statin ahead of launch, and so contributed to raising 
confidence. AstraZeneca also invested heavily in the marketing campaign (reported cost 
of around $1 billion), featuring an unprecedented sampling programme of 500,000 30 
day samples (most used 7 day supplies) to raise awareness and encourage clinicians to 
try the drug. 
 
As with all other statins, at launch rosuvastatin could only compete on surrogate 
evidence (LDL-C lowering efficacy or atherolsclerosis progression) in a market that 
was now heavily dominated by clinical endpoint data. A Lancet editorial in 2003 urged 
clinicians to inform patients that compared with its competitors, rosuvastatin had an 
inferior evidence base (Horton, 2003). While this was true in terms of clinical endpoints 
and long-term safety data (the first study to evaluate the impact of rosuvastatin on 
mortality and morbidity outcomes (CORONA) was not published until late 2007 
(Kjekshus et al., 2007)), AstraZeneca responded by highlighting this was the case for 
any new drug entering a market, and that safety had been rigorously assessed by 
regulatory authorities.  At this late stage in the diffusion of statins, the class safety 
profile and the correlation between lipid lowering and clinical benefit were well 
established, such that surrogate endpoints were widely accepted in clinical decision 






7. Safety and regulation 
 
Statins are the most extensively studied drugs available and while being considered 
relatively safe at moderate doses, some have been affected by serious safety issues at 
high doses. Common adverse reactions of statins include myalgia (muscle pain), mild 
transient gastrointestinal symptoms (diarrhoea, constipation), elevated hepatic 
transaminases, headache, insomnia, joint pain and/or dizziness. Serious adverse events 
including myopathy (muscle weakness) and rhabdomyolysis (an extreme form of 
myopathy causing the breakdown of skeletal muscle proteins into the blood, potentially 
leading to acute renal failure), are relatively rare (1 in 1,000 and 1 in 10,000, 
respectively) (Jacobson, 2006). While this appeared to be the case in randomised 
controlled trials, in observational studies and clinical experience rates were higher, 
which reduced confidence in lipid lowering therapy contributing to its underuse 
(Fernandez, 2011). Cerevastatin was withdrawn, and rosuvastatin was adversely 





With the eventual reduction in price of generic simvastatin, it replaced the lower doses 
of atorvastatin, which accounts for the vast majority of prescriptions. Over time, statin 
doses had been increasing and targets had become more aggressive, limiting the impact 
that generic simvastatin could achieve, but there is a threshold where lipid lowering 
effect reaches a plateau and side effects increase. However, people who fail to reach 
target, or have very high initial base-line levels, or progressive disease despite lipid 
lowering therapy, or following recent acute coronary syndrome require more intensive 
lipid lowering therapy to reduce LDL-C by around 55%. This can be achieved through 
atorvastatin and rosuvastatin monotherapy, or with the addition of ezetimibe (Zetia) to 
simvastatin 40mg (the additional cost of ezetimibe however, made this combination 
more expensive than monotherapy, even after the significant price drop of generic 
simvastatin). High dose simvastatin (80mg) has been associated with higher rates of 
myopathy than high dose atorvastatin and is therefore not generally recommended for 





Marketed statins lower TC by 13-46%, LDL-C by 17-61%, triglycerides by 7-37% and 
raise HDL-C by 5-15%. In the major primary and secondary prevention studies, the 
percentage change in TC ranged from 18-25%47. A meta-analysis of these studies 
(NICE, 2006) indicates that therapy with a statin (providing a mean reduction in TC of 




                                                 
47The ALLHAT-LLT pravastatin study produced only a 10% reduction in TC (the small reduction was 
attributed to many in the placebo arm also receiving lipid lowering drugs by the end of the study). The 




Table A16.2: Clinical impact of statin therapy (NICE, 2006) 
 
 Relative Risk Reduction48  









All cause mortality 17% 21% ns 17% 
Cardiovascular mortality 21% 25% ns ns 
CHD mortality 23% 28% ns ns 
Fatal MI 46% 43% 59% 59% 
Stroke ns ns ns ns 
Non-fatal outcomes 
Stroke 25% 25% ns ns 
MI 32% 31% 40% 42% 
Unstable angina 12% 18% ns ns 
Revascularisation  25% 23% ns ns 
ns= non significant 
 
At the time of the NICE technology appraisal on statins, there was no data on clinical 
events to suggest the superiority of any one statin over all the others in reducing 
cardiovascular events.  
 
 
8.1. Statin Trials 
 
The key trials relevant to the case study drugs are outlined in the statin timeline. 
However, throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s a whole series of large scale 
clinical trials were conducted that confirmed the cardiovascular benefits of the statin 
class in: 
• Secondary prevention: 4S; CARE; LIPID; HPS; GREACE49; LIPS50;  
o Intensive lipid lowering (Stable CHD): TNT51; IDEAL; AVERT; 
ALLIANCE 
o Intensive lipid lowering (acute coronary syndrome): PROVE-IT TIMI 
22; MIRACL52; A to Z53 
• Primary prevention: WOSCOPS; AFCAPS/TEXCAPS54; ASCOT-LLA; 
CARDS55; ASPEN56; 4D57; HPS (contained people with and without CHD) 
                                                 
48 While the relative risk reductions (RRRs) appear substantial, the absolute risk reductions (ARRs) are 
conservative (e.g. all cause mortality in 4S study: placebo 11.2% vs simvastatin 8.2%:  RRR=30%, 
ARR=3.3%; CHD mortality in LIPID study: placebo 8.3% vs pravastatin 6.4%: RRR 24%, ARR 1.9%). 
49 GREACE: GREek Atorvastatin and Coronary heart disease Evaluation (Athyros et al., 2002) 
50 LIPS: Lescol Intervention Prevention Study (Serruys et al., 2002) - fluvastatin 
51 TNT: Treating to New Targets (LaRosa et al., 2005) - atorvastatin 
52 MIRACL: Myocardial Ischaemia Reduction with Aggressive Cholesterol Lowering (Schwartz et al., 
2001) – atorvastatin 
53 A to Z: Phase Z of the Aggrastat to Zocor study (de Lemos et al., 2004) – simvastatin 
54 AFCAPS/TexCAPS: Air Force/Texas Coronary Atherosclerosis Prevention Study (Downs et al., 
1998) - lovastatin 
55 CARDS: Collaborative AtoRvastatin Diabetes Study (Colhoun et al., 2004) 
56 ASPEN: Atorvastatin Study for Prevention of coronary heart disease Endpoints in Non-insulin-
dependent diabetes mellitus (Knopp et al., 2006) - atorvastatin 




• Across a wide age range: CARE; HPS; LIPID; ALLIANCE; PROSPER58; 
ASCOT-LLA 
• People with lower than average total cholesterol levels: CARE; HPS; LIPID 
• Diabetes: HPS; CARDS; ASPEN; 4D 
• Hypertension: ALLHAT; ASCOT-LLA 
• Stroke: SPARCL 
 
The footnoted studies were not included in the timeline on the basis of subpopulation 
analysis or earlier studies addressing the same or similar concepts. The most influential 
statin trial was the 4S study published in 1994 (Scandinavian Simvastatin Survival 
Study Group, 1994), which was the first to demonstrate the link between lowering LDL-
C and reducing overall mortality in an era when evidence-based medicine was 
increasing in importance.  
 
By the time atorvastatin entered the market in 1997, there had been a shift in attitude 
towards the statins. At launch, the surrogate endpoint study CURVES (Jones et al., 
1998) was able to demonstrate atorvastatin’s greater LDL-C lowering efficacy, but 
clinical endpoint data did not emerge until around two years later from the AVERT trial 
(Pitt et al., 1999), and it was not until 2003 that the first trial demonstrating a reduction 
in cardiovascular mortality (ASCOT-LLA) was published (Sever et al., 2003). 
Atorvastatin was competing with statins with proven clinical endpoints, but this did not 
affect its uptake. The fact that within approximately two years of launch, atorvastatin 
had reached an adoption rate on a par with simvastatin, which had been on the market 
for 10 years, could support the argument for aggressive marketing as opposed to 
evidence-based medicine (Walley et al., 2005), but confidence in the statin effect was 
such that extrapolations were being made on the basis of atorvastatin’s greater lipid 
lowering efficacy. While the Heart Protection Study (Heart Protection Study 
Collaborative Group, 2002) provided a strong argument for using simvastatin, 
atorvastatin did benefit from an overall boost in statin use as the price differential 
between them at that time was small. 
 
Pravastatin’s diffusion was negatively impacted upon by the ALLHAT-LLT trial 
(ALLHAT Officers and Coordinators for the ALLHAT Collaborative Research Group, 
2002) and fluvastatin was not widely prescribed in the UK as it was expensive for the 
extent of lipid lowering obtained (even at maximal dose it was less effective than either 
simvastatin 40mg or atorvastatin 10 and 20mg). This left the statin market dominated by 
simvastatin and atorvastatin. Rosuvastatin launched with the surrogate endpoint 
STELLAR trial (Jones et al., 2003), demonstrating its superiority in terms of lipid 
lowering efficacy and raising HDL-C, even at very low doses, but clinical endpoint 





                                                 





8.2. Intensive lipid lowering 
 
The ‘fire and forget’ approach to lipid lowering proposed in 2002 (Shepherd, 2002), 
involved prescribing a standard dose of statins without further testing or dose 
adjustment. However, the prospect of greater potency altered the focus of trials towards 
more aggressive lipid lowering and an alternative approach of ‘treating to target’, which 
aims to achieve target concentration of LDL-C through titration. The argument for 
intensive lowering has been controversial as the vast majority of people do not need to 
reduce their cholesterol levels to this degree. Studies such as CARE (Sacks et al., 1996) 
had suggested that there might be a LDL-C threshold of around 3·2mmol/L, however 
the Heart Protection Study (Heart Protection Study Collaborative Group, 2002) and 
PROVE IT-TIMI 22 trial (Cannon et al., 2004) demonstrated that lowering LDL-C 
from below 3mmol/L to below 2mmol/L reduced vascular disease risk by about one 
quarter, which is similar to the proportional reduction in risk produced by a 1mmol/L 
reduction at higher LDL-C concentrations. Several other intensive lipid lowering trials 
(TNT [LaRosa et al., 2005]; ALLIANCE [Koren et al., 2004]; A to Z [de Lemos et al., 
2004]) have demonstrated the ability to improve morbidity, but not mortality. The 
concern underpinning the intensive lipid lowering argument was that the more 
conservative guidelines may inadvertently lead to substantial under-treatment of high-
risk patients who present with LDL-C concentrations below, or close to, particular 
targets (Heart Protection Study Collaborative Group, 2002).  
 
Table A16.3 summarises the extent of the research activity in statins compared to the 
other case studies from launch up until 2007 and for the initial periods pre- and post-
launch. In a crowded market, evidence generation appears to be particularly important 
in substantiating claims of differentiation, as demonstrated by similar numbers of 
studies generated by all three drugs, despite entering the market at different positions. 
Table A16.3: Statins: volume of evidence: MEDLINE and EmBASE searches  
Statins No. of studies included on MEDLINE/EmBASE Databases 
(restricted to clinically sound studies) 
From launch to terminal curve 
date (year ending 2007) 
3 years before 
launch 
3 years post-launch 
Simvastatin 197 2 19 
Atorvastatin 165 3 21 





Cholesterol targets: 5 and 3mmol/L  
Guidelines, by setting and changing the cholesterol targets, are influential in 
determining the eligible patient population for statins. In the early 1990s, optimal 
cholesterol goals in Europe and the USA were set at either 5mmol/L for TC and 
3mmol/L for LDL-C, or a 25% reduction in TC and a 30% reduction in LDL-C, 
whichever achieved the lowest absolute value: Joint British Societies guidelines JBS1 
(Wood et al., 1998a); Joint European Societies guidelines JES 1 (Pyorala et al., 1994) 




Programme – Adult Treatment Panel guidelines NCEP-ATP I (National Cholesterol 
Education Programme, 1988). Moderate statin therapy (40mg simvastatin) achieved 
these targets, but at a significant cost to the NHS (£1 billion) (Wierzbicki, 2007). 
Following the genericisation of simvastatin, there were significant efforts to promote 
the use of generic statins as their cost differential allowed 5-6 patients to be treated for 
each one on a patented brand. 
 
Cholesterol targets: 4 and 2  
In light of the evidence from trials investigating the impact of intensive lipid lowering, a 
lack of consensus developed between guideline recommendations and policy. The 
updated UK JBS2 guidelines (British Cardiac Society et al., 2005), European JES 3 
guidelines (de Backer et al., 2003) and the American NCEP-ATP III guidelines 
(National Cholesterol Education Programme 2001) supported lowering targets to 4 and 
2mmol/L, with a minimum standard of 5 and 3mmol/L.  
 
The effect of driving down the medical consensus on the targets for cholesterol 
lowering was two-fold; it increased the number of patients eligible for statin therapy, 
and required more potent statins to achieve the lower targets. While simvastatin was 
available in 80mg doses, atorvastatin and rosuvastatin could achieve the same effect at 
much lower doses and therefore at reduced toxicity. The Department of Health 
however, kept targets at 5 and 3mmol/L in relation to the QOF indicators until NICE 
guidelines produced in May 2008 (just outside the time frame of the timeline) updated 




Primary prevention risk estimates 
In primary prevention, the JBS1 guidelines (Wood et al., 1998a) had recommended that 
individuals whose total CHD risk was ≥15% over 10 years were eligible for therapeutic 
intervention. While the NSF adopted a stance consistent with the JBS1 guidelines on 
cholesterol targets, for pragmatic reasons it set the risk level at ≥30%. However, in 
recognition of the gathering evidence base for lipid lowering, in the NICE statin 
technology appraisal in 2006, the risk level reduced to ≥20% (NICE, 2006).  
 
 
NICE Appraisal: Statins 
The NICE technology appraisal on statins (2006), produced at a relatively late stage in 
the diffusion of statins, recommended the use of statins in the secondary prevention of 
CVD and as part of the management strategy for primary prevention, advocating use of 
the statin with the lowest acquisition cost taking into account required daily dose and 
product price per dose. While this guidance favoured generic simvastatin or pravastatin 
at moderate doses, at higher doses, uncertainty related to the safety of 80mg simvastatin 
enabled the more potent statins atorvastatin and rosuvastatin to remain competitive in 
niche patient groups. Rosuvastatin was potentially disadvantaged as it could only make 
extrapolations of lipid profile data and not clinical endpoints as they were unavailable.  
 
 




A series of related NICE guidelines and appraisals were produced on diabetes, 
hypertension and myocardial infarction that discussed the context in which statins were 
recommended or appropriate lipid targets in these specific patient groups (see statin 
timeline commentary for details).  
 
10. Policy  
 
In the UK, the cholesterol targets of 5mmol/L and 3mmol/L were incorporated into 
policy, both in the National Service Framework for Coronary Heart Disease (NSF-
CHD) (Department of Health, 2000) and in the Quality and Outcomes Framework 
(QOF) of the General Medical Services contract in 2004, which led to more than two 
thirds of patients with atherosclerosis requiring statin therapy (Wierzbicki, 2007). The 
standards set out in the NSF-CHD were intended to help achieve the ultimate target as 
set out in the Government white paper ‘Saving Lives; Our Healthier Nation’ 
(Department of Health, 1999a) of reducing the death rate from CHD, stroke and related 
diseases amongst people under 75 years by at least two-fifths by 2010 to save a total of 
200,000 lives.  
 
 
11. Cost  
 
Instead of setting a premium for improved LDL-C lowering efficacy, the strategy of 
Warner-Lambert and Pfizer was to price atorvastatin lower than simvastatin. At an 
equivalent dose, a 28 day supply of atorvastatin cost £30.60 (20mg) versus £47.04 for 
simvastatin (40mg) (Joint Formulary Committee, 1997), enabling it to challenge 
simvastatin’s dominance of market share. When rosuvastatin was launched, its 
increased potency meant that it was less expensive than its competitors at equivalent 
efficacy doses.  
 
Category M – generic prescribing 
Despite generic simvastatin entering the market in May 2003, it was not until April 
2005 that the price of simvastatin fell dramatically following the introduction of 
Category M into the Drug Tariff when the new community pharmacy contract was 
launched.  This category, intended for generic medicines, enabled the Government to set 
a single tariff price to reflect the average manufacturers’ market price after discount, 
rather than the system that had existed before based on prices before discount, which 
had in the two years previously maintained a high cost for generic simvastatin.  Table 
A16.4 shows the mean TC and LDL-C lowering efficacy of the available doses of 













Table A16.4: Total cholesterol and LDL-cholesterol lowering efficacy of statins 
and 28 day pre- and post-generic costs (adapted from NHS Prescribing and 
Dispensing News, 2002). 
 
Statins  Mean TC 
reduction  
Mean LDL-
C reduction  
28 day cost (£) 
2003 (post-generic)59 2005 (post-schedule 
M)60 



























































































































From a primary prevention perspective, statin use was initially controversial despite 
only requiring low doses due to cost effectiveness issues when scaled up on a 
population level. However, generic availability has enabled this to become a viable 




                                                 
59Joint Formulary Committee, British National Formulary (No 46) September 2003 




Appendix 17: Participant company profiles  
Note: Figures quoted reflect the time period during which the interviews took place. 
 
1. AstraZeneca 
AstraZeneca formed in April 1999 through the merger of Astra AB of Sweden and 
Zeneca Group plc, UK. The company is engaged in research, development, 
manufacturing and marketing of prescription pharmaceuticals, with a main research 
focus in the following five therapeutic areas: cancer, cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, 
infection, neuroscience, respiratory and inflammation. In 2007, AstraZeneca was fourth 
in the list of the top 10 leading pharmaceutical corporations in the UK, with UK total 
market sales of £668 million.  
Quetiapine 
Quetiapine (Seroquel) accounted for sales of £92 million, which positioned it as 
AstraZeneca’s second best selling product in the UK, as well as in its worldwide 
portfolio, and 12th in the list of the top selling pharmaceutical products in the UK 
(ABPI, 2010). Quetiapine’s patent expired in 2012. 
 
Rosuvastatin 
Rosuvastatin (Crestor) was originally developed by Shinogi who granted AstraZeneca 
an exclusive worldwide licence in April 1998.  In 2007, rosuvastatin sales accounted for 
£61 million, positioning it as AstraZeneca’s fourth best selling product in the UK, and 
30th in the list of the top selling pharmaceutical products in the UK (ABPI, 2010). 
Rosuvastatin’s patent is due to expire in 2017. 
 
2. Bayer Schering 
Bayer AG is an international research based company founded in 1863 with 
headquarters based in Leverkusen, Germany. Its three business units include 
Healthcare; CropScience and MaterialScience, with Healthcare accounting for the 
largest proportion of sales (53%). Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals is one of four 
divisions of Bayer Healthcare, comprising General Medicine; Haemology and 
Neurology; Diagnostics and Imaging; Oncology and Women’s Healthcare. In 2006, 
Bayer acquired Schering Healthcare AG to become one of the world’s leading 
pharmaceutical specialists.  
In 2007, Bayer Schering was 14th in the list of the top leading pharmaceutical 
corporations in the UK, with total UK sales of £195 million (ABPI, 2010).  In the year 
ending 2007, vardenafil was Bayer’s eighth best selling product, accounting for 
worldwide sales of €332 million61. In the absence of direct UK sales figures for 
vardenafil, proportional sales in the UK based on worldwide sales, would have been in 
the region of £6.3 million for the same year. Vardenafil’s patent is due to expire in 
2018. 
                                                 






Janssen-Cilag (previously referred to as Janssen L.P.) is a division of Ortho-McNeil-
Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson). Janssen-Cilag 
focuses exclusively on mental health and markets prescription medications for the 
treatment of schizophrenia, bipolar mania, and irritability associated with autism. 
Janssen L.P. was founded in 1953 and is headquartered in Titusville, USA. In 2007, 
Janssen-Cilag, as a franchise of Johnson and Johnson, was 11th in the list of leading 
pharmaceutical corporations in the UK, with UK total market sales of £256 million.  
In 2007, sales of risperidone (Risperdal) accounted for £56 million, positioning it as 
Janssen-Cilag’s best selling product in the UK, and 38th in the list of top selling 
pharmaceutical products in the UK (ABPI, 2010). Risperidone’s patent expired in 2008. 
 
4. GSK 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) is the second largest company in terms of sales in the UK after 
Pfizer. It is a UK headquartered company that was formed in 2000 through the merger 
of Glaxo Wellcome plc and SmithKline Beecham plc. Each of these companies had a 
long heritage in pharmaceutical research and development and were themselves formed 
through a series of mergers and acquisitions. GSK has a varied portfolio of products for 
major disease areas including asthma, mental health, diabetes, cardiovascular disease, 
digestive conditions, virus control, infections and cancer. In 2007, GSK was second in 
the list of the top 10 leading pharmaceutical corporations in the UK, with UK total 
market sales of £1.06 billion. 
 
5. Lilly 
Eli Lilly and Company was founded in May 1876. Now known as Lilly, their global 
headquarters are located in Indianapolis, USA. They are a research based company with 
a focus on five medical specialty areas: cardiovascular, endocrinology, neurology, 
oncology and rheumatology. Lilly have had significant experience of the mental health 
market with their selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor fluoxetine (Prozac), which like 
olanzapine was not a first in class drug but achieved blockbuster status within a short 
period post-launch. In 2007, Lilly was ninth in the list of the top 10 leading 
pharmaceutical corporations in the UK, with UK total market sales of £345 million. 
Olanzapine 
Olanzapine (Zyprexa) accounted for £162 million, which positioned it as Lilly’s best 
selling product in the UK, and fourth in the list of the top selling pharmaceutical 










In the year ending 2007, tadalafil was Lilly’s fifth best selling product, accounting for 
worldwide sales of $1.2 billion62. In the absence of direct UK sales figures for tadalafil, 
proportional sales in the UK based on worldwide sales, would have been in the region 
of £22.5 million for the same year. Tadalafil’s patent is due to expire in 2016. 
 
6. Merck Sharp & Dohme (MSD) 
Merck Sharp & Dohme Limited (MSD) is the UK subsidiary of Merck & Co in the 
USA. Sharp & Dohme established their partnership in the UK in 1906, and merged with 
Merck & Co Inc. in 1953 to create MSD. MSD are a research-based company and focus 
on treatments for atherosclerosis and cardiovascular disease, diabetes, infectious 
diseases, neuroscience and ophthalmology, respiratory, bone, arthritic conditions, and 
vaccines. In 2007, Merck & Co was eighth in the list of the top 10 leading 
pharmaceutical corporations in the UK, with total UK sales of £353 million (ABPI, 
2010). 
Alendronate 
Alendronate (Fosamax) lost it patent in February 2008, but in the year ending 2007, it 
was Merck & Co’s third best selling product, accounting for global sales of $3 billion63. 
In the absence of direct UK sales figures for alendronate, proportional sales in the UK 
based on those in the USA, would have been in the region of £44 million for the same 
year. Alendronate’s patent expired in 2006. 
 
Simvastatin  
In 2007, simvastatin accounted for sales of £102 million, which positioned it as 10th in 
the list of top selling pharmaceutical products in the UK.  In sales terms, this position 
reflects the impact of genericisation following the loss of MDS’s patent in May 2003, 
putting simvastatin behind branded atorvastatin. However, the diffusion curve hierarchy 
reflects drug usage and therefore simvastatin maintained first position. 
 
7. Procter & Gamble (P&G) 
P&G are the world’s largest fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) company. They 
market more than 300 consumer brands in 160 countries. The company operates 
through three global business units: Beauty and Grooming, Health and Well-Being, and 
Household Care. Before P&G sold its pharmaceutical division to Warner Chilcott in 
October 2009, the Health Care division that developed pharmaceuticals, oral and 
personal health care products, contributed 17.5% of total sales in 2008 (of which 
pharmaceuticals formed a significant proportion).  
In 2007, P&G was 24th in the list of the top 10 leading pharmaceutical corporations in 
the UK, with total sales of £92 million.  
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Risedronate (Actonel) accounted for £48 million, which positioned it as P&G’s best 
selling product in the UK in 2007, and 43rd in the list of top selling pharmaceutical 
products in the UK (ABPI, 2010). Risedronate’s patent expired in 2010. 
 
Etidronate 
Etidronate’s patent expired in March 1998 and so it has been available generically for 
many years, hence the requirement to plot diffusion curves on the basis of usage, as 
opposed to sales.  It was not possible to identify sales figures, but it did not feature 
within the top 50 pharmaceutical products in the UK in 2007. 
 
8. Pfizer 
Pfizer Inc. was founded in New York in 1849 and is the world’s largest research-based 
pharmaceutical company, with a focus on 11 therapeutic areas including oncology, 
cardiovascular, pain, neuroscience and infectious diseases.  Pfizer Limited is the 
principal UK subsidiary of Pfizer Inc., comprising 4 divisions; Pharmaceutical Business 
(Established Products, Oncology, Primary Care and Specialty Care); Diversified 
Business (Nutrition, Consumer Healthcare and Animal Health); Research and 
Development; and Manufacturing and Distribution. Pfizer Inc. acquired Warner-
Lambert in 2000 and in doing so, gained Parke-Davis branded pharmaceuticals 
including atorvastatin (Lipitor). In 2003, Pfizer acquired Pharmacia, making it the 
largest pharmaceutical corporation in the UK, with total UK sales of £1.1 billion in 
2007. The company later merged with Wyeth in 2009.  
Sildenafil  
In 2007, sildenafil (Viagra) accounted for £62 million, which positioned it as Pfizer’s 
third best selling product in the UK after atorvastatin (Lipitor) and pregabalin (Lyrica), 
and 26th in the list of top selling pharmaceutical products in the UK (ABPI, 2010). 
Sildenafil’s patent expired in 2012. 
Atorvastatin 
In 2007, atorvastatin accounted for total UK sales of £456 million, positioning it as the 
top selling pharmaceutical product in the UK (ABPI, 2010). Once the price of generic 
simvastatin dropped significantly in 2005, atorvastatin’s use declined, but in sales terms 
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